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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Investigating the non-ideal behavior of the Amptek A111 charge sensitive preamplifier & discriminator board— 3 He proportional counter combination used in common safeguards neutron coincidence counters

Neutron coincidence counting is a well-established technique used for the nondestructive quantification of specialnuclear material during international safeguards inspections. The neutron counters are commonly designedwith an annular body, centered about an inner well or cavity into which a measurement item is placed,and the moderating annulus is populated with 3 He tubes connected to a varying number of preamplifiers.The Canberra Industries JAB-01 preamplifier/amplifier/discriminator board is employed within the company’sneutron coincidence counters, built for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-ideal behavior ofthese boards was identified during a detector characterization, using list mode data acquisition, of a CanberraIndustries JCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar implementing four JAB-01 boards. List mode data acquisition andanalysis reveals features that have commonly been overlooked by historic timing gate selection while using shiftregister data acquisition methods, which are routinely adopted in international safeguards. It has been shownthat double pulsing effects are not fully captured within the predelay setting; therefore, they may influencethe response of the system within the standard operating regime. We set out to identify and correct for doublepulsing in our post analysis of neutron pulse trains, while isolating this behavior to the relevant system. Tounderstand and potentially address these concerns, the responses of two different JAB-01 board systems – theJCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar and a modified JCC-51 Active Well Neutron Coincidence Counter – arecompared with the responses of an AnTech Inc. N2071 Neutron Coincidence Collar that also uses an amplifierbuilt on the Amptek A111 Charge Sensitive Preamplifier & Discriminator chip, and a JCC-71 that employs custompreamplifiers designed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2016

Safeguards Technology Factsheet 3 He-free Neutron Coincidence Counter

A full scale thermal neutron coincidence counter (High Level Neutron Counter – Boron: HLNB) based on 3 He alternative detection technology was designed and built at LANL and field tested at Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) during FY15. HLNB is based on boron-lined proportional plates that replace the traditional 3 He proportional tubes and was designed as a direct alternative to 3 He-based High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNC-II). During the JAEA field trial the HLNB demonstrated comparable performance to HLNC-II, which represents a key development in the area of 3 He alternative technologies and provides a complete demonstration of the technology for nuclear safeguards applications including high mass MOX samples.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2015

Design and performance of A 3 He-free coincidence counter based on parallel plate boron-lined proportional technology

Thermal neutron counters utilized and developed for deployment as non-destructive assay (NDA) instruments in the field of nuclear safeguards traditionally rely on 3He-based proportional counting systems. 3 He-based proportional counters have provided core NDA detection capabilities for several decades and have proven to be extremely reliable with range of features highly desirable for nuclear facility deployment. Facing the current depletion of 3He gas supply and the continuing uncertainty of options for future resupply, a search for detection technologies that could provide feasible short-term alternative to 3 He gas was initiated worldwide. As part of this effort, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) designed and built a 3 He-free full scale thermal neutron coincidence counter based on boron-lined proportional technology. The boronlined technology was selected in a comprehensive inter-comparison exercise based on its favorable performance against safeguards specific parameters. This paper provides an overview of the design and initial performance evaluation of the prototype High Level Neutron counter – Boron (HLNB). The initial results suggest that current HLNB design is capable to provide ~80% performance of a selected reference 3 He-based coincidence counter (High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter, HLNCC). Similar samples are expected to be measurable in both systems, however, slightly longer measurement times may be anticipated for large samples in HLNB. The initial evaluation helped to identify potential for further performance improvements via additional tailoring of boron-layer thickness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Simulations of Lithium-Based Neutron Coincidence Counter for Gd-Loaded Fuel

The Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security (NA-241) is supporting the project Lithium-Based Alternative Neutron Detection Technology Coincidence Counting for Gd-loaded Fuels at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the development of a lithium-based neutron coincidence counter for nondestructively assaying Gd loaded nuclear fuel. This report provides results from MCNP simulations of a lithium-based coincidence counter for the possible measurement of Gd-loaded nuclear fuel. A comparison of lithium-based simulations and UNCL-II simulations with and without Gd loaded fuel is provided. A lithium-based model, referred to as PLNS3A-R1, showed strong promise for assaying Gd loaded fuel.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

The D-D Neutron Generator as an Alternative to Am(Li) Isotopic Neutron Source in the Active Well Coincidence Counter

The 235 U mass assay of bulk uranium items, such as oxide canisters, fuel pellets, and fuel assemblies, is not achievable by traditional gamma-ray assay techniques due to the limited penetration of the item by the characteristic 235 U gamma rays. Instead, fast neutron interrogation methods such as active neutron coincidence counting must be used. For international safeguards applications, the most commonly used active neutron systems, the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC), Uranium Neutron Collar (UNCL) and 252 Cf Shuffler, rely on fast neutron interrogation using an isotopic neutron source [i.e., 252 Cf or Am(Li)] to achieve better measurement accuracies than are possible using gamma-ray techniques for high-mass, high-density items. However, the Am(Li) sources required for the AWCC and UNCL systems are no longer manufactured, and newly produced systems rely on limited supplies of sources salvaged from disused instruments. The 252 Cf shuffler systems rely on the use of high-output 252 Cf sources, which while still available have become extremely costly for use in routine operations and require replacement every five to seven years. Lack of a suitable alternative neutron interrogation source would leave a potentially significant gap in the safeguarding of uranium processing facilities. In this work, we made use of Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Large Volume Active Well Coincidence Counter (LV-AWCC) and a commercially available deuterium-deuterium (D-D) neutron generator to examine the potential of the D-D neutron generator as an alternative to the isotopic sources. We present the performance of the LV-AWCC with D-D generator for the assay of 235 U based on the results of Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations and measurements of depleted uranium (DU), low enriched uranium (LEU), and highly enriched uranium (HEU) items.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Distinguishing fissile uranium isotopes using an active well neutron coincidence counter

Proposed thorium-based nuclear fuel cycles are likely to require quantification and verification of 233 U within nuclear material. Because of their similar fission cross sections, active neutron nondestructive assay (NDA) systems may respond similarly to 233 U and 235 U. Traditional safeguards equipment has been optimized for 235 U and 238 U quantification associated with conventional uranium/plutonium fuel cycles and may not be directly applicable to 233 U quantification when mixed with other actinides. This work used models of the large volume active well coincidence counter (LV-AWCC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to evaluate the performance of this neutron NDA system to differentiate fissile uranium isotopes. The models were developed to simulate NDA system performance in response to a number of triangular radiation signature training device sources within the central cavity or well. This work predicted that the LV-AWCC can effectively differentiate 233 U from 235 U in certain modes of operation. In active mode, the LV-AWCC with the cadmium liner results in different doubles count rates between the fissile isotopes for a given fissile uranium mass. Without the cadmium liner, the uranium isotopes provide a statistically indistinguishable doubles count rate response for the fissile masses considered in this work (up to approximately 150 g). The cadmium liner serves to harden the neutron interrogation spectrum, which better exploits the notable difference in the 233 U and 235 U fission cross sections at approximately 1 eV. In passive mode, the two fissile isotopes exhibit different doubles and singles count rates regardless of liner presence because the passive source strength of 233 U is approximately 2 orders of magnitude stronger than that of 235 U due to the shorter half-life and correspondingly higher (α, n) yield. We conclude that using neutron interrogation in the LV-AWCC, two measurements are needed to quantify 233 U content in mixed uranium items. The first measurement is used to determine the total fissile uranium mass using a mode that cannot distinguish fissile isotopes (i.e., where a similar response is observed for both fissile uranium isotopes such as active doubles without cadmium or using a thermal neutron interrogation source). In conclusion, the second measurement is used to determine the 233 U content by using a differentiating technique (e.g., passive doubles, passive doubles to singles ratio, active doubles with cadmium).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Measurement of AmLi Sources for Active Well Coincidence Counter

To support the use of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) large-volume active well coincidence counter (LV-AWCC) in material control and accountancy (MC&A) measurements, a set of AmLi neutron sources was acquired from Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). These sources were measured to verify their suitability for use in the ORNL LV-AWCC. The sources produce neutrons at a rate that is within 4% of the rate for one set of AmLi sources already in use and 40% higher than the rate for the other set. These measurements indicate that the SRNL sources are suitable for use in the LV-AWCC because their sensitivity and measurement precision will be similar to those of the sets already in use. However, the SRNL sources still need to be evaluated for MC&A use.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2014

Boron-10 Based Neutron Coincidence Counter for Safeguards

The shortage of 3He has triggered the search for effective alternative neutron detection technologies for national security applications, including international nuclear safeguards. Any alternative neutron detection technology must satisfy two basic criteria: it must meet a neutron detection efficiency requirement, and it must be insensitive to gamma-ray interference at a prescribed level while still meeting the neutron detection requirement. For nuclear safeguards, a system must perform measurements in the field with a prescribed precision in a specified time. This paper describes an effort to design, model and test an alternatives-based neutron coincidence counter for nuclear safeguards applications. The technology chosen for use in an alternatives-based uranium neutron coincidence collar was boron-lined proportional counters. Extensive modeling was performed of various system configurations and comparisons were made to measurements on a commercial prototype boron-10 based uranium neutron coincidence collar.

alternative neutron detectors↗
DOE OSTI2013

Estimation of Performance of an Active Well Coincidence Counter Equipped with Boron-Coated Straw Neutron Detectors - 13401

He-3, a very rare isotope of natural helium gas, has ideal properties for the detection of thermal neutrons. As such it has become the standard material for neutron detectors and sees ubiquitous use within many radiometric applications that require neutron sensitivity. Until recently, there has been a fairly abundant supply of He-3. However, with the reduction in nuclear weapons, production of tritium ceased decades ago and the stockpile has largely decayed away, reducing the available He-3 supply to a small fraction of that needed for neutron detection. A suitable and rapidly-deployable replacement technology for neutron detectors must be found. Many potential replacement technologies are under active investigation and development. One broad class of technologies utilizes B-10 as a neutron capture medium in coatings on the internal surfaces of proportional detectors. A particular implementation of this sort of technology is the boron-coated 'straw' (BCS) detectors under development by Proportional Technologies, Inc. (PTi). This technology employs a coating of B-10 enriched boron carbide (B{sub 4}C) on the inside of narrow tubes, roughly 4 mm in diameter. A neutron counter (e.g. a slab, a well counter, or a large assay counter designed to accommodate 200 liter drums) could be constructed by distributing these narrow tubes throughout the polyethylene body of the counter. One type of neutron counter that is of particular importance to safeguards applications is the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC), which is a Los Alamos design that traditionally employs 42 He-3 detectors. This is a very flexible design which can accurately assay small samples of uranium- and plutonium-bearing materials. Utilizing the MCNPX code and benchmarking against measurements where possible, the standard AWCC has been redesigned to utilize the BCS technology. Particular aspects of the counter performance include the single-neutron ('singles') detection efficiency and the time constant for the decrease in neutron population in the counter following a fission event (a.k.a. the die-away time). Results of the modeling and optimization are presented. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

A comparison of Monte Carlo fission models for safeguards neutron coincidence counters

Monte Carlo simulation is a powerful tool used to model neutron coincidence detectors for international safeguards. The simulation has typically sampled properties such as the fission neutron multiplicity, energy, and direction, from independent probability density functions. However, multiplicity counters detect event-based neutron correlations and thus more accurate fission event modeling is needed. To respond to this need, the Fission Reaction Event Yield Algorithm (FREYA) and the Cascading Gamma-ray Multiplicity with Fission (CGMF) models were added in the newest version of MCNP, MCNP6.2. The models simulate individual fission events conserving momentum, energy, and angular momentum such that correlated particles are emitted. The effects of the new models on simulations of safeguards neutron coincidence counters were studied and compared to standard MCNP simulations. The MCNPX-PoliMi model was also included in the comparison. The properties of fission neutrons from safeguards relevant isotopes were compared to literature references. Then a hypothetical simplified detector was modeled to isolate the effects of specific differences between models. Experimental measurements from previous work were modeled and agreements were compared. Lastly, the probabilities of correlated events occurring in the experimental measurements were calculated with the different models. For example, the probability was calculated of detecting neutrons from both induced fission in uranium and spontaneous fission of Cf-252 in the same fission chain.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) using Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Detector

SNM verification can be accomplished via two methods i.e. destructive analysis (DA) or nondestructive analysis (NDA). The DA modes are much more accurate compared to NDA modes; nevertheless, the sample's physical integrity is destroyed in the process. Techniques such as ICP-MS, ID-ICP-MS, TI-MS are few examples of DA, where a bulk material is ground and mixed with a solution (some form of acid) to acquire a homogenous sample. In contrast, NDA modes utilize signals emitted by the sample such as gamma, neutrons, light, or heat to analyze samples under investigation. HPGe detectors are some of the most frequently used gamma detectors to assay SNM. However, in a high activity scenario it provides a large uncertainty and sometimes becomes unfeasible to measure low energy gamma rays. Meanwhile, neutron detectors are not affected by the gamma background, therefore they can be used in addition to the gamma detectors to verify total fissile mass ({sup 235}U + {sup 239}Pu) of SNM. The AWCC is one of the thermal neutron NDA systems developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It consists of 42 {sup 3}He detectors to measure gross neutrons (singles), coincidence neutrons (doubles), higher order multiplicity counting (triples, quadruples, etc.). It can effectively operate in both active and passive neutron interrogation modes. It can utilize AmLi, AmBe, or {sup 252}Cf active interrogation neutron sources. It is used to verify declared fissile mass ({sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu) present in SNM. Objectives: Calibrate HPGe and AWCC for lightly irradiated (with enough {sup 137}Cs gamma background) ∼93% enriched HEU fuels; Verify fissile mass ({sup 235}U +{sup 239}Pu) content using AWCC and HPGe; Model and benchmark AWCC in MCNP6. Neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting: Two or more neutrons are coincident if they are detected by the system within the specified gate window; In AWCC: Gate window is 128 μsec; Induced fission in fissile material such as {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu - emission of time correlated neutrons - Singles, Doubles, Triples, or Quadruples; No induced fission in non-fissile materials- no correlated neutrons - only singles. SNM can be verified with high accuracy and precision using gamma and neutron NDA instruments such as HPGe and AWCC. Interaction with thermal neutrons. Non-fissile atoms - do not emit correlated neutrons. Fissile atoms - emit correlated neutrons during induced fission events. The time correlated neutrons can be detected by using coincidence or multiplicity counters such as AWCC. Likewise, {sup 235}U produces 186 keV gamma peak that can be measured by a HPGe gamma detector. Counts under 186 keV gamma peak provide information about {sup 235}U content. Combining AWCC and HPGe results can provide better understanding of special nuclear material under investigation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

The DD Neutron Generator as an Alternative to Am(Li) Isotopic Neutron Source in the Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar

The 235 U mass assay of bulk uranium items, such as oxide canisters, fuel pellets, and fuel assemblies, is not achievable by traditional gamma-ray assay techniques because of the limited penetration of the item by the characteristic 235 U gamma rays. Instead, fast neutron interrogation methods such as active neutron coincidence counting must be used. For international safeguards applications, the most commonly used active neutron systems, the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC), Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL), and 252 Cf Shuffler, rely on fast neutron interrogation using an isotopic neutron source [i.e., 252 Cf or Am(Li)] to achieve better measurement accuracies than are possible using gamma-ray techniques for high-mass, high-density items. However, the Am(Li) sources required for the AWCC and UNCL systems are no longer manufactured, and newly produced systems rely on limited supplies of sources salvaged from disused instruments. The 252 Cf shuffler systems rely on the use of high-output 252 Cf sources, which while still available have become extremely costly for use in routine operations and require replacement every 5–7 years. Lack of a suitable alternative neutron interrogation source would leave a potentially significant gap in the safeguarding of uranium processing facilities. Previously we examined the performance of Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Large Volume Active Well Coincidence Counter modified to accept a commercially available deuterium-deuterium (DD) neutron generator to examine the potential of the DD neutron generator as an alternative to the isotopic sources [1]. That work indicated that the DD generator was a viable replacement for the AWCC applications, but because of the large dimensions of that generator, the DD/AWCC would have to be run as a delayed neutron counting system to provide equivalent measurement precision. In this work we examine the performance of a standard UNCL modified to accept the DD neutron generator for the assay of 235 U based on the results of Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations and measurements of depleted uranium and highly enriched uranium items. The projected performance of the modified UNCL for fresh pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies operated in both traditional coincidence counting and delayed neutron counting modes is presented.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Methods for diagnosing and quantifying double pulsing in a Uranium Neutron Collar system using shift register logic

Double pulsing in neutron coincidence counters is the result of a pulse processing chain-3He proportional counter timing incompatibility known to nondestructive assay system designers. It is not currently widely acknowledged, or accounted for, in the user community. However, it is gaining attention as list mode data acquisition and analysis becomes more commonly used for system diagnostics, revealing features that have been overlooked by historic timing gate selection using traditional shift register data acquisition methods. Double pulsing increases the apparent number of measured neutron events from a source. Therefore, it may contribute to a falsely increased count rate if present at the operational high voltage used when assaying samples, even with set predelays. The authors have previously studied the effects of double pulsing, using list mode data acquisition and analysis on neutron pulse trains in three common neutron coincidence counting systems used in routine measurements for international safeguards: a Canberra Industries JCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar, a variant on the Canberra Industries JCC-51 Active Well Neutron Coincidence Counter (the Large Volume Active Well Neutron Coincidence Counter), and an AnTech Inc. N2071 Neutron Coincidence Collar. We find that this non-ideal behavior was isolated to the Amptek A111 Charge Sensitive Preamplifier & Discriminator chip used in both the Canberra Industries and Antech systems. The double pulsing fraction was calculated in post-analysis for various high voltage settings in these A111-based systems, assuming no predelay settings. In this work, the authors expand upon this identification and analysis to make it more translatable between list mode data acquisition and analysis and shift register-based analysis. By investigating the double pulsing fractions in a JCC-71 Uranium Neutron Collar as a function of predelay settings, as well as describing and performing alternative tests and analyses to diagnose and quantify the double pulsing using shift register logic, this work hopes to complete the picture of double pulsing identification and analysis.

Safeguards↗