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2022 Annual Emissions Report and Annual Certification of Compliance Required by the Synthetic Minor Operating Permit, Permit Condition Number 19876, Plant 255, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

In accordance with the conditions of the Synthetic Minor Operating Permit (SMOP) issued to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) on August 29, 2002, and revised on February 4, 2009 and February 17, 2015, please find enclosed the 2022 Annual Emissions Report and the Annual Certification of Compliance for LLNL for the period of July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022. The 2022 Annual Emissions Report identifies the consecutive 12-month rolling totals by month for individual Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs), combined HAPs, combined Precursor Organic Compounds (POCs), and Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) emitted from the LLNL site during the months of July 2021 through June 2022.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Establishment of uncertainty ranges and probability distributions of actinide solubilities for performance assessment in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

The Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT) code developed at Sandia National Laboratories solves chemical equilibrium problems using the Pitzer activity coefficient model with a database containing actinide species. The code is capable of predicting actinide solubilities at 25 C in various ionic-strength solutions from dilute groundwaters to high-ionic-strength brines. The code uses oxidation state analogies, i.e., Am(III) is used to predict solubilities of actinides in the +III oxidation state; Th(IV) is used to predict solubilities of actinides in the +IV state; Np(V) is utilized to predict solubilities of actinides in the +V state. This code has been qualified for predicting actinide solubilities for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Compliance Certification Application in 1996, and Compliance Re-Certification Applications in 2004 and 2009. We have established revised actinide-solubility uncertainty ranges and probability distributions for Performance Assessment (PA) by comparing actinide solubilities predicted by the FMT code with solubility data in various solutions from the open literature. The literature data used in this study include solubilities in simple solutions (NaCl, NaHCO{sub 3}, Na{sub 2}CO{sub 3}, NaClO{sub 4}, KCl, K{sub 2}CO{sub 3}, etc.), binary mixing solutions (NaCl+NaHCO{sub 3}, NaCl+Na{sub 2}CO{sub 3}, KCl+K{sub 2}CO{sub 3}, etc.), ternary mixing solutions (NaCl+Na{sub 2}CO{sub 3}+KCl, NaHCO{sub 3}+Na{sub 2}CO{sub 3}+NaClO{sub 4}, etc.), and multi-component synthetic brines relevant to the WIPP.

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Building a Credible and Updated WIPP Performance Assessment - New Knowledge Versus Conservative Assumptions and FEP Analysis, A Balancing Act - 16299

Conservative assumptions are important components in conceptual model development where limited data is available. And, as appropriate, during the early 1990's Department of Energy (DOE) adopted many conservative assumptions in the development of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's (WIPP's) 24 Conceptual Models incorporated in DOE's 1996 Compliance Certification Application (CCA) performance assessment (PA). Many of these assumptions were formulated and documented in the WIPP relevant features, events and processes (FEPs) analyses; others were adopted when developing input parameter values and their distributions that were used as inputs to computer models. The Agency accepted these conservative assumptions during their 1996 CCA assessment for several reasons; 1) at the time there was a scarcity of data related to long-term behavior of many parameters needed to be incorporated in the PA, 2) sensitivity studies performed during this time period determined that the affected 'conservative' assumptions adopted for some parameters had minimal to no impact on repository performance; and, 3) DOE could demonstrate compliance with EPA's radioactive waste disposal regulations while adopting conservative assumptions and data. Since the initial 1996 CCA DOE has modified the repository panel closure design, and the repository footprint in the experimental areas has expanded. These modifications were incorporated into DOE's 2014 Compliance Re-certification Application for WIPP. Additionally, there have been numerous investigations related to both the short- and long-term behavior of salt in a repository setting. As a result, the Agency is reassessing the use of these conservative assumptions and the continued applicability of the original FEP analyses, primarily developed during DOE's 1996 PA and carried forward to the current re-certification. This paper examines some of these analyses. (authors)

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Distributed Wind Certification Best Practices Guideline: January 16, 2023 - January 15, 2026

This Distributed Wind (DW) Certification Best Practices Guideline describes the typical approach for certification of distributed wind turbines above and below 150 kilowatts (kW) in size based on the conformity assessment requirements in the United States. The purpose of the guideline is to clarify and consistently describe the path to certification for various systems and components by helping the user navigate the complex path to certification compliance. This is done via clarification of both the required turbine type certification elements, as well as third-party electrical safety listing of turbine system components and subassemblies. In the United States specifically, there is no wind turbine certification scheme that governs or maintains a consistent set of conformity assessment requirements, and this can lead to wide ranging interpretations of the standards and required elements for certifications. This guideline attempts to simplify the path by organizing the information and guiding the user to the applicable set of requirements. Any wind turbine manufacturer or designer of wind turbines used in distributed generation applications in the United States would find value in the conformity assessment guidance in this guideline. Users are expected to be involved in the technical development of the product and supporting documentation, as the details provided are geared towards electrical and mechanical engineering of the system and components.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

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The role of science supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

The presentation briefly addresses three topics. First, science has played an important role throughout the history of the WIPP project, beginning with site selection in the middle 1970s. Science was a key part of site characterization in the 1980s, providing basic information on geology, hydrology, geochemisty, and the mechanical behavior of the salt, among other topics. Science programs also made significant contributions to facility design, specifically in the area of shaft seal design and testing. By the middle 1990s, emphasis shifted from site characterization to regulatory evaluations, and the science program provided one of the essential bases for certification by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1998. Current science activities support ongoing disposal operations and regulatory recertification evaluations mandated by the EPA. Second, the EPA regulatory standards for long-term performance frame the scientific evaluations that provide the basis for certification. Unlike long-term dose standards applied to Yucca Mountain and proposed repositories in other nations, the WIPP regulations focused on cumulative releases during a fixed time interval of 10,000 years, and placed a high emphasis on the consequences of future inadvertent drilling intrusions into the repository. Close attention to the details of the regulatory requirements facilitated EPA's review of the DOE's 1996 Compliance Certification Application. Third, the scientific understanding developed for WIPP provided the basis for modeling studies that evaluated the long-term performance of the repository in the context of regulatory requirements. These performance assessment analyses formed a critical part of the demonstration that the site met the specific regulatory requirements as well as providing insight into the overall understanding of the long-term performance of the system. The presentation concludes with observations on the role of science in the process of developing a disposal system, including the importance of establishing the regulatory framework, building confidence in the long-term safety of the system, and the critical role of the regulator in decision making.

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In-Situ Testing and Performance Assessment of a Redesigned WIPP Panel Closure - 13192

There are two primary regulatory requirements for Panel Closures at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the nation's only deep geologic repository for defense related Transuranic (TRU) and Mixed TRU waste. The Federal requirement is through 40 CFR 191 and 194, promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The state requirement is regulated through the authority of the Secretary of the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) under the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA), New Mexico Statutes Annotated (NMSA) 1978, chap. 74-4-1 through 74-4-14, in accordance with the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (HWMR), 20.4.1 New Mexico Annotated Code (NMAC). The state regulations are implemented for the operational period of waste emplacement plus 30 years whereas the federal requirements are implemented from the operational period through 10,000 years. The 10,000 year federal requirement is related to the adequate representation of the panel closures in determining long-term performance of the repository. In Condition 1 of the Final Certification Rulemaking for 40 CFR Part 194, the EPA required a specific design for the panel closure system. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has requested, through the Planned Change Request (PCR) process, that the EPA modify Condition 1 via its rulemaking process. The DOE has also requested, through the Permit Modification Request (PMR) process, that the NMED modify the approved panel closure system specified in Permit Attachment G1. The WIPP facility is carved out of a bedded salt formation 655 meters below the surface of southeast New Mexico. Condition 1 of the Final Certification Rulemaking specifies that the waste panels be closed using Option D which is a combination of a Salado mass concrete (SMC) monolith and an isolation/explosion block wall. The Option D design was also accepted as the panel closure of choice by the NMED. After twelve years of waste handling operations and a greater understanding of the waste and the behavior of the underground salt formation, the DOE has established a revised panel closure design. This revised design meets both the short-term NMED Permit requirements for the operational period, and also the Federal requirements for long-term repository performance. This new design is simpler, easier to construct and has less of an adverse impact on waste disposal operations than the originally approved Option D design. The Panel Closure Redesign is based on: (1) the results of in-situ constructability testing performed to determine run-of-mine salt reconsolidation parameters and how the characteristics of the bedded salt formation affect these parameters and, (2) the results of air flow analysis of the new design to determine that the limit for the migration of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) will be met at the compliance point. Waste panel closures comprise a repository feature that has been represented in WIPP performance assessment (PA) since the original Compliance Certification Application of 1996. Panel closures are included in WIPP PA models principally because they are a part of the disposal system, not because they play a substantive role in inhibiting the release of radionuclides to the outside environment. The 1998 rulemaking that certified WIPP to receive transuranic waste placed conditions on the panel closure design to be implemented in the repository. The revised panel closure design, termed the Run-of-Mine (ROM) Panel Closure System (ROMPCS), is comprised of 30.48 meters of ROM salt with barriers at each end. The ROM salt is generated from ongoing mining operations at the WIPP and may be compacted and/or moistened as it is emplaced in a panel entry. The barriers consist of bulkheads, similar to those currently used in the panels as room closures. A WIPP performance assessment has been completed that incorporates the ROMPCS design into the representation of the repository, and compares repository performance to that achieved with the approved Option D design. Several key physical processes and rock mechanics principles are incorporated into the performance assessment. First, creep closure of the salt rock surrounding a panel entry results in consolidation of the ROM salt emplaced in the entry. Eventually, the ROM salt comprising the ROMPCS will approach a condition similar to intact salt. As the ROM salt reaches higher fractional densities during consolidation, back stress will be imposed on the surrounding rock mass leading to eventual healing of the disturbed rock zone above and below the panel closure. Healing of the disturbed rock zone above and below the ROMPCS reduces the porosity and permeability in those areas. Analysis of the new design demonstrates that: (1) the WIPP continues to meet regulatory compliance requirements when the ROMPCS design is implemented instead of Option D, and (2) there is no impact on the short-term effectiveness of the panel closure to limit the concentration of VOCs at the WIPP site boundary to a fraction of the health-based exposure limits (HBLs) during the operational period. (authors)

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Repository performance confirmation.

Repository performance confirmation links the technical bases of repository science and societal acceptance. This paper explores the myriad aspects of what has been labeled performance confirmation in U.S. programs, which involves monitoring as a collection of distinct activities combining technical and social significance in radioactive waste management. This paper is divided into four parts: (1) A distinction is drawn between performance confirmation monitoring and other testing and monitoring objectives; (2) A case study illustrates confirmation activities integrated within a long-term testing and monitoring strategy for Yucca Mountain; (3) A case study reviews compliance monitoring developed and implemented for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant; and (4) An approach for developing, evaluating and implementing the next generation of performance confirmation monitoring is presented. International interest in repository monitoring is exhibited by the European Commission Seventh Framework Programme 'Monitoring Developments for Safe Repository Operation and Staged Closure' (MoDeRn) Project. The MoDeRn partners are considering the role of monitoring in a phased approach to the geological disposal of radioactive waste. As repository plans advance in different countries, the need to consider monitoring strategies within a controlled framework has become more apparent. The MoDeRn project pulls together technical and societal experts to assimilate a common understanding of a process that could be followed to develop a monitoring program. A fundamental consideration is the differentiation of confirmation monitoring from the many other testing and monitoring activities. Recently, the license application for Yucca Mountain provided a case study including a technical process for meeting regulatory requirements to confirm repository performance as well as considerations related to the preservation of retrievability. The performance confirmation plan developed as part of the Yucca Mountain license application identified a broad suite of monitoring activities. A revision of the plan was expected to winnow the number of activities down to a manageable size. As a result, an objective process for the next stage of performance confirmation planning was developed as an integral part of an overarching long-term testing and monitoring strategy. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant compliance monitoring program at once reflects its importance to stakeholders while demonstrating adequate understanding of relevant monitoring parameters. The compliance criteria were stated by regulation and are currently monitored as part of the regulatory rule for disposal. At the outset, the screening practice and parameter selection were not predicated on a direct or indirect correlation to system performance metrics, as was the case for Yucca Mountain. Later on, correlation to performance was established, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant continues to monitor ten parameters originally identified in the compliance certification documentation. The monitoring program has proven to be effective for the technical intentions and societal or public assurance. The experience with performance confirmation in the license application process for Yucca Mountain helped identify an objective, quantitative methodology for this purpose. Revision of the existing plan would be based on findings of the total system performance assessment. Identification and prioritization of confirmation activities would then derive from performance metrics associated with performance assessment. Given the understanding of repository performance confirmation, as reviewed in this paper, it is evident that the performance confirmation program for the Yucca Mountain project could be readily re-engaged if licensing activities resumed.

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Re-evaluation of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Passive Institutional Controls Program - Status - 17116

The United States government set forth in 40CFR194.43 requirements for 'Passive Institutional Controls' for nuclear waste repositories. This regulation stated compliance applications for a repository 'shall include detailed descriptions of the measures that will be employed to preserve knowledge about the location, design and contents of the disposal system.' In the early 1990's the U.S. Department of Energy developed and proposed in the Compliance Certification Application of 1996 a robust and complex technical and engineering Passive Institutional Controls Program including such things as records management, large surface markers, salt berms, buried and above-ground information rooms and small subsurface markers/plaques. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Passive Institutional Control program meets the regulatory requirements and is certified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Presently this program is being re-evaluated in light of the Nuclear Energy Agency's, Records Knowledge and Memory initiative, shrinking government budgets, and the ethical/moral considerations of risks versus expenditures. This paper will discuss progress made to date in re-evaluating the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Passive Institutional Controls program and expected plans for the future. (authors)

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Plutonium Oxidation State Distribution in the Presence of WIPP-Relevant Organics and Iron Corrosion Products

The oxidation state and solubility of plutonium (Pu) in high ionic strength synthetic WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) brines as a function of pC H+ in the presence and absence of WIPP-relevant organic ligands (EDTA [Ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid], oxalate, citrate, acetate) and iron corrosion products (magnetite and metallic iron) at 𝑇 = 23 ± 2 ∘C was thoroughly studied by long-term batch solubility experiments (between approximately 800-1,100 days) from an undersaturation approach. The oxidation state of Pu in the WIPP environment has been a topic of interest since the initial Compliance Certification Application (CCA). This study aims to investigate the solubility of Pu under the expected WIPP conditions and to determine the oxidation state of the solid phase that will control the solubility. One of the most important results of this study is that the Pu oxidation state was analyzed both from the surface area of the corrosion products and in the precipitated solid. The analysis of the Pu oxidation state on the surface of the iron mineral from the ongoing undersaturated experiments is more relevant to the performance assessment of nuclear waste disposal than short term batch (plutonium-iron phase) experiments. The X-ray Absorption Near-Edge Spectroscopy (XANES) analysis showed that Pu oxidation state is different on the metal surface and in the precipitated solid. Pu(III) is the dominant oxidation state in the metallic iron (Fe 0 ) system in the presence and absence of organics. Pu(IV) is the dominant oxidation state in the magnetite system in the presence and absence of organics. Also, organics stabilize Pu(IV) in the magnetite system. Analysis of Pu in the precipitated solid by Extended X-ray Absorption Fine Structure (EXAFS) analysis showed that Pu formed an inner-sphere complex with iron with minor amounts of PuO 2 present. X-ray diffraction (XRD) results indicate that metallic iron and magnetite did not oxidize in three years in the alkaline and high ionic strength system. Under these conditions (8 < pC H+ < 10 at T = (22 ± 2) °C under nitrogen atmosphere, the solubility of Pu changes by up to three orders of magnitude (10 -5 and 10 -8 M). The spread in solubility is highest at pC H+ = 9. Pu(III) and Pu(IV) showed different solubility behavior in the synthetic WIPP brine. A summary of the data collected in this report will be submitted to Sandia National Laboratories as part of a parameter update report which will outline the changes to the OXSTAT parameter for the 2026 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2026). The experiments performed were done according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) approved Test Plan entitled “Effects of Radiolysis, Organic Complexation, and Redox Conditions on the Speciation and Oxidation State Distribution of Pu(III/IV)” (LCO-ACP-25). All data reported were obtained under the Los Alamos National Laboratory-Carlsbad Office (LANL-CO) Quality Assurance Program, which is compliant with the DOE Carlsbad Field Office, Quality Assurance Program Document (CBFO/QAPD).

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LLNL Semiannual Wastewater Point Source Monitoring Report (July 2020)

In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Part 403.12(e), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) submits a semiannual monitoring report regarding federally regulated wastewater generating processes (categorical processes) that discharge wastewater to the sanitary sewer system. Attachments A-2 and A-3 of the 2019-2020 Wastewater Discharge Permit #1250 granted to LLNL by the City of Livermore Water Resources Division (WRD) also mandate submission of this report. The LLNL Livermore Site is required to monitor identified electrical and electronic components processes (40 CFR Part 469) and metal finishing processes (40 CFR Part 433) semiannually and to submit monitoring reports in January and July of each year. Under authority delegated to enforce compliance with these regulations, the WRD reviews this report. This report provides information on the significant metal-finishing operations and electrical and electronic component operations located at the Livermore Site during the period from December 1, 2019 through May 31, 2020 and includes descriptions of the LLNL regulated (categorical) processes that discharge to the sanitary sewer. Attachments A-2 and A-3 of the 2019-2020 Wastewater Discharge Permit #1250 provide the list of categorical processes and the required self-monitoring program for point-source discharges at LLNL. The monitoring data collected for this report documents compliance with all federal and local pretreatment limits. Compliance certification accompanies this report, as required by federal regulations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Plutonium Oxidation State Distribution under WIPP Relevant Conditions (Rev. 2)

The oxidation state of plutonium in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) environment has been a topic of interest since the initial compliance certification application. Plutonium (Pu) was initially expected to be present primarily as Pu(IV), but since the presence of Pu(III) could not be ruled out, it was also included in performance assessment (PA) calculations. The redox of the other variant actinides, uranium (U) and neptunium (Np), are also coupled to the plutonium redox. This led to a position in performance assessment calculations that is commonly referred to as “50/50”. In which half of the PA realizations assume solubility is dominated by the low oxidation state [U(IV), Np(IV), Pu(III)] and the other half assume solubility is dominated by the higher oxidation state [U(VI), Np(V), Pu(IV)]. Recently, a joint group of WIPP project participants from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Department of Energy’s Carlsbad Field Office (DOE-CBFO) agreed on a new path forward for the oxidation state model in PA which will decouple the redox active actinides and will instead consider their redox as a function of E h . This will take the current binary approach and turn it into a system with four possible redox states.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

CYVET: A Cyber-Physical Assurance Framework Based on a Semi-Supervised Vetting Approach

The project is designed to directly address the needs described in the Topic Area 4 (“Cybersecurity Verification and Validation”) of the CEDS’19 Research Call. The proposed CYVET system directly addresses the need to elevate the current industry capabilities to verify and validate OT cybersecurity and associated control system infrastructure. Currently, there is a significant gap in the energy sector’s capability in that regard during infrastructure improvement, equipment procurement, and compliance certification. CYVET provides that needed capability. CYVET is device and architecture agnostic and thus broadly applicable across the energy sector. The goal of this project is to develop and deliver a cybersecurity verification and validation framework testing capability to verify and validate OT equipment, software, and the underlying control system architecture. The primary project objectives are (i) Verification: the synthesis and reconciliation of standards and vendor supplied features, (ii) Validation: the generation, execution, and presentation of testing scripts of verified security features, and (3) Demonstration: apply the developed technology capabilities for verification and validation at a relevant end-user facility in the energy sector.

Lopez Jr, Juan↗

Testing the James Webb Space Telescope Primary Mirror

JWST in-process optical testing and cryogenic requirement compliance certification, verification andvalidation was probably the most difficult metrology job of our generation in astronomical optics. But, the challenge was met: by hard work of dozens of optical metrologists; development and qualification of multiple custom test setups; and several new inventions, including 4D PhaseCam and Leica Absolute Distance Meter. This paper summarizes the metrology tools, test setups and processes used to characterize the JWST primary mirror.

Stahl, H. Philip↗

Influencing future exploratory drilling rates-a potential approach for the waste isolation pilot plant - 15307

The Department of Energy/Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO) is responsible for managing activities related to the disposal of TRU and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The WIPP Compliance Certification Application had a reference concerning natural resources at the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. This reference suggested that resources could be withdrawn from under the repository area from a distance and not affect the integrity of the repository. This would not eliminate, but would certainly diminish, the rate of exploratory drilling in the distant future. Currently the only scenarios that result in releases from the repository are human intrusion scenarios, without human intrusion radioactive releases to the accessible environment are essentially zero for the very long term future. (authors)

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Continuous Improvement and the Safety Case for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Geologic Repository - 13467

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geologic repository 2150 feet (650 m) below the surface of the Chihuahuan desert near Carlsbad, New Mexico. WIPP permanently disposes of transuranic waste from national defense programs. Every five years, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) submits an application to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to request regulatory-compliance re-certification of the facility for another five years. Every ten years, DOE submits an application to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) for the renewal of its hazardous waste disposal permit. The content of the applications made by DOE to the EPA for re-certification, and to the NMED for permit-renewal, reflect any optimization changes made to the facility, with regulatory concurrence if warranted by the nature of the change. DOE points to such changes as evidence for its having taken seriously its 'continuous improvement' operations and management philosophy. Another opportunity for continuous improvement is to look at any delta that may exist between the re-certification and re-permitting cases for system safety and the consensus advice on the nature and content of a safety case as being developed and published by the Nuclear Energy Agency's Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) expert group. DOE at WIPP, with the aid of its Science Advisor and teammate, Sandia National Laboratories, is in the process of discerning what can be done, in a reasonably paced and cost-conscious manner, to continually improve the case for repository safety that is being made to the two primary regulators on a recurring basis. This paper will discuss some aspects of that delta and potential paths forward to addressing them. (authors)

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WIPP - February 2014 operational events and the compliance re-certification application (CRA) 2014 - 15293

On Wednesday, February 5, 2014, an underground mine fire involving a salt haul truck occurred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). There were 86 workers in the mine when the fire occurred. All workers were evacuated. Nine days later, on Friday, February 14, 2014, there was an incident in the underground repository at WIPP which resulted in the release of americium and plutonium from one or more transuranic (TRU) waste containers into the environment. The release was detected by an underground continuous air monitor and then directed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter banks located in the surface exhaust building. However, a measurable portion bypassed the HEPA filters via leakage through two ventilation system dampers and was discharged directly to the environment from an exhaust duct. No personnel were determined to have received external contamination; however, some individuals that were on site were identified through bioassay to have initially tested positive for low level amounts of internal contamination. Trace amounts of americium and plutonium were detected off-site.While significant to day-to-day operations, these events have no impact to the long-term performance of the repository. Because WIPP's re-certification is based solely on the post-closure performance of the repository (40 CFR 191, Subparts B and C), these recent events do not affect the long-term performance predictions or its technical and scientific basis. In this paper we will further explore the requirements for WIPP's re-certification, and the basis for our contention that the recent WIPP operational events do not impact long-term repository performance or have any implications on salt as a geologic disposal media, and that re-certification efforts should continue uninterrupted. (authors)

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Progressing quality control in environmental impact assessment beyond legislative compliance: An evaluation of the IEMA EIA Quality Mark certification scheme

The effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) systems is contingent on a number of control mechanisms: procedural; judicial; evaluative; public and government agency; professional; and development aid agency. If we assume that procedural and judicial controls are guaranteed in developed EIA systems, then progressing effectiveness towards an acceptable level depends on improving the performance of other control mechanisms over time. These other control mechanisms are either absent, or are typically centrally controlled, requiring public finances; this we argue is an unpopular model in times of greater Government austerity. Here we evaluate a market-based mechanism for improving the performance of evaluative and professional control mechanisms, the UK Institute of Environmental Management and Assessments' EIA Quality Mark. We do this by defining dimensions of effectiveness for the purposes of our evaluation, and by identifying international examples of the approaches taken to delivering the other control measures to validate the approach taken in the EIA Quality Mark. We then evaluate the EIA Quality Mark, when used in combination with legal procedures and an active judiciary, against the effectiveness dimensions and use time-series analysis of registrant data to examine its ability to progress practice. We conclude that the EIA Quality Mark has merit as a model for a market-based mechanism, and may prove a more financially palatable approach for delivering effective EIA in mature systems in countries that lack centralised agency oversight. It may, therefore, be of particular interest to some Member States of the European Union for ensuring forthcoming certification requirements stemming from recent amendments to the EIA Directive. - Highlights: • Quality control mechanisms in EIA are identified. • Effectiveness of EIA is conceptualised for evaluation purposes. • The UK IEMA EIA Quality Mark is introduced as a market-based mechanism. • The EIA Quality Mark is found to progress quality in many, but not all, areas.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗