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At least 19 records

Basics of Biosafety

This slide presentation reviews the basics of biosafety and the importance of assuring proper biosafety practices. The objectives of the presentation are to review regulations about biosafety, and the different biosafety levels; the biosafety facilities at Johnson Space Center; the usage and maintenance of the biosafety cabinet, the proper methods to handle biologically hazardous materials upon exposure, and the methods of cleanup in the event of a spill, and the training requirements that are mandated for personnel handling biologically hazardous materials.

Wong, Willy↗

Principles of Biosafety

Biological safety, or biosafety, means containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release. This report is a training course for Biosafety with these features and objectives: Topics associated with biological safety, including basic terms, definitions, and approaches to biological safety; regulations, consensus guidance and standards for biological safety; safety requirements for working with biological materials at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); containment requirements for biological materials at LANL; and, emergency response requirements for biological materials at LANL.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Principles of Biosafety (Course # 31701) [Slides]

Biological safety, or biosafety, means containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release. Containment principles, facility design, and practices & procedures that prevent occupational infections in biological research, as well as the release of the organisms to the environment, must be implemented to protect researchers, laboratory support personnel, and the environment.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Draft Genome Sequences of Biosafety Level 2 Opportunistic Pathogens Isolated From the Environmental Surfaces of the International Space Station

The draft genome sequences of 20 biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) opportunistic pathogens isolated from the environmental surfaces of the International Space Station (ISS) were presented. These genomic sequences will help in understanding the influence of microgravity on the pathogenicity and virulence of these strains when compared with Earth strains.

Aleksandra Checinska Sielaff↗

Updated Medical Waste Management Plans and Emergency Action Plans for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Main Site

Attached are the updated Medical Waste Management Plans and Emergency Action Plans for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL) Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) facilities and Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) facility. A redline version of each document has also been provided. Minor changes such as facility personnel, contact information, and titles for those that support onsite Biosafety Labs at LLNL have been made to the document. It should be noted that the most recent versions of the Medical Waste Large Quantity Generator Registration Application Form and Medical Waste Management Plan were incorporated and sourced from the Alameda County Department of Environmental Health website.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Containment Facilities Integrated into a Curation Receiving Laboratory for Restricted Earth Return Missions

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection (PP) Office require sample containment and biohazard testing upon return to Earth. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, this is Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment. In the U.S., the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories publication authored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health houses the primary recommendations, standards, and design requirements for all BSL labs. Past mission concept studies for constructing a NASA Curation Receiving Laboratory with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (USD). As an alternative option, we have conducted a trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a fraction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in ~ 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional BSL-4 construction methods without compromising the preservation of the samples or Earth. For the design/construction requirements of a mobile/modular BSL-4 containment, we used the established HHS document standards and protocols for manipulation of agents in Class III Biosafety Cabinets (BSC; i.e., negative pressure gloveboxes) that are currently followed in operational BSL-4 facilities in the U.S.

Calaway, Michael J.↗

Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulations to Assess Spatial Variability and Optimal Ventilation Scenarios for Biological Laboratory Exposures

A significant amount of uncertainty exists regarding potential human exposure to laboratory biomaterials and organisms in Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) research laboratories. Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling is proposed as a way to better understand potential impacts of different combinations of biomaterials, laboratory manipulations, and exposure routes on risks to laboratory workers. Here, in this study, we use CFD models to simulate airborne concentrations of contaminants in an actual BSL-2 laboratory under different configurations. Results show that ventilation configuration, sampling location, and contaminant source location can significantly impact airborne concentrations and exposures. Depending on the source location and airflow patterns, the transient and time-integrated concentrations varied by several orders of magnitude. Contaminant plumes from sources located near a return vent (or exhaust like a fume hood or ventilated biosafety cabinet) are likely to be more contained than sources that are further from the exhaust. Having a direct flow between the source and the exhaust (through-flow condition) may reduce potential exposures to individuals outside the air flow path. Designing a BSL-2 room with ventilation and airflow patterns that maximize through-flow conditions to the return/exhaust vents and minimize dispersion and mixing throughout the room is, therefore, recommended. CFD simulations can also be used to assist in characterizing the impacts of supply and return vent locations, room layout, and source locations on spatial and temporal contaminant concentrations. In addition, proper placement of particle sensors can also be informed by CFD simulations to provide additional characterization and monitoring of potential exposures in BSL-2 facilities.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

A Novel and Secure Pseudovirus Reporter System Based Assay for Neutralizing and Enhancing Antibody Assay Against Marburg Virus

Marburg virus (MARV) is one of the principal members of the filovirus family, which can cause fatal hemorrhagic fever in humans. There are currently no prophylactic and therapeutic drugs on the market, and the high pathogenicity and infectivity of MARV make its research highly dependent on biosafety level 4 conditions, severely hindering the development of vaccines and therapies. Therefore, the development of medicines, such as MARV serological diagnosis, vaccines, and therapeutic antibody drugs, urgently needs a safe, convenient, and biosafety level 2 detection method to measure the neutralizing activity of MARV antibodies. To this end, we report a neutralization assay relying on a Rabies virus (RABV) reverse genetic operating system. We constructed infectious clones carrying the eGFP reporter gene and the full length of the original unmodified MARV GP gene. Based on the critical parameters of phylogenetic analysis, recombinant viruses targeting representative strains in the two major MARV lineages were successfully rescued. These pseudoviruses are safe in mice, and their inability to infect cells after being neutralized by antibodies can be visualized under a fluorescence microscope. We tested the system using the neutralizing antibody MR191. MR191 can significantly block the infection of BSR cells with pseudovirus. We compared it with the traditional lentivirus-type pseudovirus system to verify the system’s credibility and obtained the same results as reported in the literature. In general, we have established a safe and visualized method for evaluating the neutralizing activity of MARV antibodies. Compared with traditional methods, it has the advantages of convenient operation, short cycle, and low cost. It is a candidate method that can replace actual viruses for a neutralization assay.

Bi, Jinhao↗

Transboundary determinants of avian zoonotic infectious diseases: challenges for strengthening research capacity and connecting surveillance networks

As the climate changes, global systems have become increasingly unstable and unpredictable. This is particularly true for many disease systems, including subtypes of highly pathogenic avian influenzas (HPAIs) that are circulating the world. Ecological patterns once thought stable are changing, bringing new populations and organisms into contact with one another. Wild birds continue to be hosts and reservoirs for numerous zoonotic pathogens, and strains of HPAI and other pathogens have been introduced into new regions via migrating birds and transboundary trade of wild birds. With these expanding environmental changes, it is even more crucial that regions or counties that previously did not have surveillance programs develop the appropriate skills to sample wild birds and add to the understanding of pathogens in migratory and breeding birds through research. For example, little is known about wild bird infectious diseases and migration along the Mediterranean and Black Sea Flyway (MBSF), which connects Europe, Asia, and Africa. Focusing on avian influenza and the microbiome in migratory wild birds along the MBSF, this project seeks to understand the determinants of transboundary disease propagation and coinfection in regions that are connected by this flyway. Through the creation of a threat reduction network for avian diseases (Avian Zoonotic Disease Network, AZDN) in three countries along the MBSF (Georgia, Ukraine, and Jordan), this project is strengthening capacities for disease diagnostics; microbiomes; ecoimmunology; field biosafety; proper wildlife capture and handling; experimental design; statistical analysis; and vector sampling and biology. Here, we cover what is required to build a wild bird infectious disease research and surveillance program, which includes learning skills in proper bird capture and handling; biosafety and biosecurity; permits; next generation sequencing; leading-edge bioinformatics and statistical analyses; and vector and environmental sampling. Creating connected networks for avian influenzas and other pathogen surveillance will increase coordination and strengthen biosurveillance globally in wild birds.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Assessing the Biohazard Potential of Putative Martian Organisms for Exploration Class Human Space Missions

Exploration Class missions to Mars will require precautions against potential contamination by any native microorganisms that may be incidentally pathogenic to humans. While the results of NASA's Viking biology experiments of 1976 have been generally interpreted as inconclusive for surface organisms, the possibility of native surface life has never been ruled out and more recent studies suggest that the case for biological interpretation of the Viking Labeled Release data may now be stronger than it was when the experiments were originally conducted. It is possible that, prior to the first human landing on Mars, robotic craft and sample return missions will provide enough data to know with certainty whether or not future human landing sites harbor extant life forms. However, if native life is confirmed, it will be problematic to determine whether any of its species may present a medical risk to astronauts. Therefore, it will become necessary to assess empirically the risk that the planet contains pathogens based on terrestrial examples of pathogenicity and to take a reasonably cautious approach to bio-hazard protection. A survey of terrestrial pathogens was conducted with special emphasis on those pathogens whose evolution has not depended on the presence of animal hosts. The history of the development and implementation of Apollo anticontamination protocol and recent recommendations of the NRC Space Studies Board regarding Mars were reviewed. Organisms can emerge in nature in the absence of indigenous animal hosts and both infectious and non-infectious human pathogens are theoretically possible on Mars. The prospect of Martian surface life, together with the existence of a diversity of routes by which pathogenicity has emerged on Earth, suggests that the possibility of human pathogens on Mars, while low, is not zero. Since the discovery and study of Martian life can have long-term benefits for humanity, the risk that Martian life might include pathogens should not be an obstacle to human exploration. As a precaution, however, it is recommended that EVA suits be decontaminated when astronauts enter surface habitats when returning from field activity and that biosafety protocol approximating laboratory BSL 2 be developed for astronauts working in laboratories on the Martian surface. Quarantine of astronauts and Martian materials arriving on Earth should also be part of a human Mars mission and this and the surface biosafety program should be integral to human expeditions from the earliest stages of the mission planning.

Warmflash, David↗

Evolution of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory to the Astromaterial Sample Curation Facility: Technical Tensions Between Containment and Cleanliness, Between Particulate and Organic Cleanliness

The Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL) was planned and constructed in the 1960s to support the Apollo program in the context of landing on the Moon and safely returning humans. The enduring science return from that effort is a result of careful curation of planetary materials. Technical decisions for the first facility included sample handling environment (vacuum vs inert gas), and instruments for making basic sample assessment, but the most difficult decision, and most visible, was stringent biosafety vs ultra-clean sample handling. Biosafety required handling of samples in negative pressure gloveboxes and rooms for containment and use of sterilizing protocols and animal/plant models for hazard assessment. Ultra-clean sample handling worked best in positive pressure nitrogen environment gloveboxes in positive pressure rooms, using cleanable tools of tightly controlled composition. The requirements for these two objectives were so different, that the solution was to design and build a new facility for specific purpose of preserving the scientific integrity of the samples. The resulting Lunar Curatorial Facility was designed and constructed, from 1972-1979, with advice and oversight by a very active committee comprised of lunar sample scientists. The high precision analyses required for planetary science are enabled by stringent contamination control of trace elements in the materials and protocols of construction (e.g., trace element screening for paint and flooring materials) and the equipment used in sample handling and storage. As other astromaterials, especially small particles and atoms, were added to the collections curated, the technical tension between particulate cleanliness and organic cleanliness was addressed in more detail. Techniques for minimizing particulate contamination in sample handling environments use high efficiency air filtering techniques typically requiring organic sealants which offgas. Protocols for reducing adventitious carbon on sample handling surfaces often generate particles. Further work is needed to achieve both minimal particulate and adventitious carbon contamination. This paper will discuss these facility topics and others in the historical context of nearly 50 years' curation experience for lunar rocks and regolith, meteorites, cosmic dust, comet particles, solar wind atoms, and asteroid particles at Johnson Space Center.

Allton, J. H.↗

Tours of High-containment and Pristine Facilities in Support of Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Definition Studies

During 2019 and 2020, the NASA Tiger Team RAMA (acronym of the authors) toured several high-containment biosafety laboratories and pristine space-mission facilities worldwide to better understand their practices, capabilities, and lessons-learned to aid in planning a Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in support of Mars Sample Return (MSR). The team also included tours of a manufacturer of mobile and modular high-containment facilities as well as manufacturers of isolators and gloveboxes. In addition, the team visited the European Space Agency (ESA)ultraclean and sterile ISO 3 / airborne molecular contamination -9 (AMC-9) isolator line to clean and assemble the most critical hardware for ESA’s ExoMars Mars Lander System, and researchers developing a novel double-walled isolator (DWI) and robotic handling techniques in support of an MSR SRF. The RAMA team visits covered several construction modalities for an MSR SRF: (1) a new traditional fixed facility; (2) use of an existing fixed Biosafety Level 4(BSL-4) facility; (3) a novel modular BSL-4 approach; and (4) a hybrid combination of fixed, modular, and existing facilities. A new fixed facility approach can be tailored to MSR’s needs and is the approach used by all U.S. BSL-4 laboratories constructed to date. However, this approach could be the most expensive modality, take the longest to implement (8-12 years), and have significant programmatic risk of delay. The utilization of an existing BSL-4 facility may be possible depending on the final contamination control and science requirements for the MSR SRF. Due to the internal dimensions of the labs visited and facility structural requirements, it is unlikely that any modification can be made to the facility to meet cleanliness requirements. Furthermore, due to possible construction delays, possible capacity issues, and potential cross contamination vectors from in-house select agents, there may also be significant programmatic risks for sharing an existing facility. Another approach is building a contemporary modular facility. This is a novel approach that has recently been used for a BSL-3/3Ag facilities. The modular elements would be installed in a traditional building or shell structure. A modular facility has many advantages over a traditional fixed facility with lower costs, shorter design/construction/ commissioning schedule, and flexibility for easier retrofits and future expansion. Lastly, a hybrid approach of combining the use of either: (1) a modular facility inside a new fixed facility or (2) a modular and/or fixed BSL-4 annex in conjunction with an existing BSL-4 space should be considered. The advantage of a hybrid approach is that the facility could leverage the strengths of other approaches. Beyond facility construction approaches, the RAMA team investigated technologies and techniques for isolating and handling Martian samples in pristine environments. For example, ESA has been studying and developing a DWI breadboard along with other sample-handling technologies. The research and development investment for clean, remote manipulation and robotics at the start of the facility design phase would be beneficial to the SRF. Additionally, under-standing the lessons learned from Thales Alenia Space during the construction and operation of the most advanced state-of-the-art precision cleaning, sterilization, and assembly glovebox isolators ever developed for spacecraft hardware are also critical for the SRF. The RAMA team lays out a summary of the 18 facilities toured, and includes 43 observations,18 findings, and 22 areas of possible follow-up that the RAMA team and others could pursue to enable further findings. The observations and findings illustrate that constructing an MSR SRF would combine the complexity of both high-containment and pristine facilities, and merging these technologies would be challenging, but achievable.

Mars Sample Return↗

Metabolite, Protein, and Lipid Extraction (MPLEx): a method that simultaneously inactivates Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus and allows analysis of multiple host cell components following infection

Mass spectrometry (MS)-based, integrated proteomics, metabolomics, and lipidomics (collectively, multi-omics) studies provide a very detailed snap shot of virus-induced changes to the host following infection and can lead to the identification of novel prophylactic and therapeutic targets for preventing or lessening disease severity. Multi-omics studies with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) are challenging as the requirements of Biosafety Level 3 containment limit the numbers of samples that can be safely managed. To address these issues, the multi-omics sample preparation technique MPLEx (metabolite, protein, and lipid extraction) was developed to partition a single sample into three distinct parts (metabolites, proteins and lipids) for multi-omics analysis, while simultaneously inactivating MERS-CoV by solubilizing and disrupting the viral envelope and denaturing viral proteins. Here we describe the MPLEx protocol, highlight the step of inactivation, and describe the details of downstream processing, instrumental analysis of studies with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) are challenging as the requirements of Biosafety Level 3 containment limit the numbers of samples that can be safely managed. To address these issues, the multi-omics sample preparation technique MPLEx (metabolite, protein, and lipid extraction) was developed to partition a single sample into three distinct parts (metabolites, proteins and lipids) for multi-omics analysis, while simultaneously inactivating MERS-CoV by solubilizing and disrupting the viral envelope and denaturing viral proteins. Here we describe the MPLEx protocol, highlight the step of inactivation, and describe the details of downstream processing, instrumental analysis of the three separate analytes and their subsequent informatics pipelines.

Nicora, Carrie D.↗

Ongoing Cooperative Engagement Facilitates Agile Pandemic and Outbreak Response: Lessons Learned Through Cooperative Engagement Between Uganda and the United States

Pathogens threaten human lives and disrupt economies around the world. This has been clearly illustrated by the current COVID-19 pandemic and outbreaks in livestock and food crops. Here, to manage pathogen emergence and spread, cooperative engagement programs develop and strengthen biosafety, biosecurity, and biosurveillance capabilities among local researchers to detect pathogens. In this case study, we describe the efforts of a collaboration between the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Uganda Virus Research Institute, the primary viral diagnostic laboratory in Uganda, to implement and ensure the sustainability of sequencing for biosurveillance. We describe the process of establishing this capability along with the lessons learned from both sides of the partnership to inform future cooperative engagement efforts in low- and middle-income countries. We found that by strengthening sequencing capabilities at the Uganda Virus Research Institute before the COVID-19 pandemic, the institute was able to successfully sequence SARS-CoV-2 samples and provide data to the scientific community. We highlight the need to strengthen and sustain capabilities through in-country training, collaborative research projects, and trust.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

A review of experimental methods to determine bioaerosol transfer in energy recovery ventilators

Increasing ventilation is an effective method to reduce indoor airborne disease transmission. An Energy recovery ventilator (ERV) is a passive energy recovery device used to reduce the energy consumption of heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems for conditioning the ventilation air. It preconditions the ventilation air by transferring energy from building exhaust air. Therefore, the ventilation and exhaust air streams interact directly/indirectly in the ERV for energy transfer. It is surmised that the ERV may transfer bioaerosols (with pathogens) from the exhaust air to ventilation air, resulting in the spread of infectious diseases. Consequently, many pandemic HVAC guidelines recommend that the use of ERVs be limited. This is a highly unsustainable direction given the increased energy requirements associated with the high ventilation provision advocated for pandemic operation. It must be noted that no validated experimental evidence exists in literature for bioaerosol transfer in ERVs. Hence, it is necessary to conduct extensive bioaerosol transfer research before adopting the unsustainable practice of limiting the utilization of ERVs. The main objective of this review study is to summarize the experimental methods and instrumentation for bioaerosol transfer research in ERVs. This comprehensive article provides a detailed overview of the generation, sampling, and analysis of bioaerosols for conducting the experiments. Further, it explains the possible mechanisms for bioaerosol transfer in various types of ERVs based on which the ERVs that need immediate attention are identified. The main contribution of this research paper is that it provides a novel experimental method which encompasses the biosafety aspects, instrumentation, performance parameters and uncertainties in conducting virus contained bioaerosol transfer study in ERVs. The findings from this review will be helpful in designing bioaerosol transfer experiments and developing future ERV test standards for such experiments.

42 ENGINEERING↗