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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2025

Machine Learning for Anomaly Detection in Neural Network Security and SRF Cavities

This dissertation explores the development and deployment of machine learning approaches to address critical challenges in anomaly detection across two distinct domains: neural network security in federated learning settings and cavity behavior analysis in particle accelerator operations at Jefferson Lab in Newport News, Virginia. Anomaly detection identifies deviations from expected patterns, safeguarding systems in cybersecurity, industry, and research against malicious activities and failures. This dissertation demonstrates how our machine learning approaches enhance detection accuracy and efficiency in both neural network security and industrial applications. First, we investigate vulnerabilities in deep neural networks deployed in federated learning. Although federated learning preserves user privacy by training models locally, it remains vulnerable to backdoor attacks, in which malicious participants embed hidden triggers that induce targeted misbehavior. We propose a self-supervised contrastive learning framework to detect and mitigate such backdoor attacks. In our experiments, this method achieves higher detection accuracy and lower false positive rates than existing defenses, while operating without access to local model updates or original training data and thus preserving the privacy guarantees of the federated setting. Second, we address the operational reliability of superconducting radio-frequency (SRF) cavities at the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility (CEBAF). Our research leverages an unsupervised learning approach, combined with Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and k-means clustering, to identify anomalous behaviors in SRF cavities. Our method detects subtle anomalous behavior by analyzing SRF signal data. This knowledge allows for the early detection and resolution of potential faults, significantly improving the efficiency and reliability of operations. Third, we extend these insights to time-series anomaly detection more broadly. We design a contrastive-learning based model tailored to increasingly dynamic environments and academic research. This model improves detection accuracy in settings that require real-time monitoring and predictive maintenance. Our research underscores the broader applicability and impact of advanced machine learning techniques in anomaly detection. By extracting meaningful patterns from complex data, machine learning can significantly enhance security in distributed neural networks and improve the efficiency of particle accelerator operations. This dissertation serves as a stepping stone for future investigations into the vast possibilities of anomaly detection, inspiring further exploration and development of machine learning techniques in this field.

Ferguson, Hal [Old Dominion University]↗

DOE OSTI2025

XSub: Explanation-Driven Adversarial Attack against Blackbox Classifiers via Feature Substitution

Despite its significant benefits in enhancing the transparency and trustworthiness of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, explainable AI (XAI) can unintentionally provide adversaries with insights into blackbox models, increasing their vulnerability to various attacks. In this paper, we develop a novel explanation-driven adversarial attack against blackbox classifiers based on feature substitution, called XSub. The key idea of XSub is to strategically replace important features (identified via XAI) in the original sample with corresponding important features of a different label, thereby increasing the likelihood of the model misclassifying the perturbed sample. XSub only requires a minimal number of queries and can be easily extended to launch backdoor attacks in case the attacker has access to the model's training data. Our evaluation shows that XSub is not only effective and stealthy but also low-cost, showcasing its feasibility across a wide range of AI applications.

adversarial attack↗

DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2015

Cyber Security: Big Data Think II Working Group Meeting

This presentation focuses on approaches that could be used by a data computation center to identify attacks and ensure malicious code and backdoors are identified if planted in system. The goal is to identify actionable security information from the mountain of data that flows into and out of an organization. The approaches are applicable to big data computational center and some must also use big data techniques to extract the actionable security information from the mountain of data that flows into and out of a data computational center. The briefing covers the detection of malicious delivery sites and techniques for reducing the mountain of data so that intrusion detection information can be useful, and not hidden in a plethora of false alerts. It also looks at the identification of possible unauthorized data exfiltration.

computer security↗

DOE OSTI2026

The Double-edged Sword of Data-driven Super-Resolution: Adversarial Super-resolution Models

Data-driven super-resolution (SR) methods are often integrated into imaging pipelines as preprocessing steps to improve downstream tasks such as classification and detection. However, these SR models introduce a previously unexplored attack surface into imaging pipelines. In this paper, we present AdvSR, a framework demonstrating that adversarial behavior can be embedded directly into SR model weights during training, requiring no access to inputs at inference time. Unlike prior attacks that perturb inputs or rely on backdoor triggers, AdvSR operates entirely at the model level. By jointly optimizing for reconstruction quality and targeted adversarial outcomes, AdvSR produces models that appear benign under standard image quality metrics while inducing downstream misclassification. We evaluate AdvSR on three SR architectures (SRCNN, EDSR, SwinIR) paired with a YOLOv11 classifier and demonstrate that AdvSR models can achieve high attack success rates with minimal quality degradation. These findings highlight a new model-level threat for imaging pipelines, with implications for how practitioners source and validate models in safety-critical applications.

Sullivan, Haley [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000274069217)↗