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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Deconstructing the Nuclear Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface

The nuclear supply chain cyber-attack surface is a large, complex network of interconnected stakeholders and activities. The global economy has widened and deepened the supply chain resulting in larger numbers of geographically dispersed locations and increased difficulty ensuring the authenticity and security of digital assets. Although the nuclear industry has made significant strides in securing facilities from cyber-attacks, the supply chain remains vulnerable. This paper provides further details on each of the elements in the Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface, including supply chain lifecycle activities, key stakeholders, touchpoints, and attack types. Deconstructing this attack surface provides insights into supply chain threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. These insights will lead to improvements in cybersecurity supply chain risk analysis, development of new cybersecurity supply chain processes and tools, and enhancement of overall supply chain resilience.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Aggregate attack surface management for network discovery of operational technology

Interconnectivity has become a substratum of technology as the benefits of data-driven functionality are being realized in nearly all industries. Increased connectivity of Operational Technology (OT) exacerbates cyber risks because Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are becoming exposed to the Internet. These exposures are often done inadvertently through misconfigurations as additional network devices come online. Attack surface management (ASM) platforms can be used to identify vulnerabilities by performing external network discovery over the Internet using web spiders. These web spiders enable big data analytics of Internet of Things (IoT) devices as identifiable information of Internet-exposed equipment are archived in searchable databases that are made publicly available. There are a multitude of ASM service providers on the market. Here, this study was conducted to evaluate several commonly known tools to determine the aggregate attack surface of control systems. Queries were crafted by targeting commonly known manufacturers and communication protocols found in OT networks. Identified devices were that categorized based on technology types. Each query was replicated between several tools to target identical ICS equipment. Findings in this paper suggested a significant variance in the exposures discovered by each tool, but unique contributions were identified for each tool when a merged attack surface was derived. Therefore, all tools should be used in aggregate.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Attack Surface of Wind Energy Technologies in the United States

Low cost, reliable electrical energy production from wind relies upon automation and control systems, arguably more so than traditional thermal generation. These same systems, however, can serve as the target of adversaries’ cyber-attacks. Idaho National Laboratory (INL), at the request of the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) and Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s (EERE’s) Wind Energy Technologies Office (WETO), evaluated a generalized wind plant architecture to understand the classes of potential threat actors and the vectors that could enable a cyber-attack. This evaluation explores the attack surface of a representative wind plant, identifying potential methods and vectors that an adversary could leverage to conduct a cyber-attack. Included in this assessment are some recommended mitigations and approaches. Each recommendation requires a full security evaluation, cost/benefit analysis, and risk analysis by each owner and operator.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Attack Surface Analysis of the Digital Twins interface with Advanced Sensor and Instrumentation Interfaces: Cyber Threat Assessment and Attack Demonstration for Digital Twins in Advanced Reactor Architectures

A digital twin is a virtual representation of a physical system or object using real-time data that can predict and analyze how the system or object performs. This relatively new technology can be applied to the field of nuclear power generation, to aid in the design and development of new nuclear power plants and reduce operation costs using predictive maintenance and other data analytical methods. While there are already companies utilizing simulation software to train operators and technicians in the nuclear industry, some are now transitioning to utilizing their existing technology, software, and methods to develop digital twin solutions for the next generation of nuclear power plants, offering their services to utilities and government organizations around the world.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Attack Surface of Renewable Energy Technologies

This slide deck presents an overview of the threat landscape for renewable energy technologies. It highlights he growing penetration of renewable resources and potential impact of an attack. Standard architectures are shared to highlight where vulnerabilities may exist and attack paths to reach critical infrastructure. We discuss threat actors and attack paths. Several recent events impacting renewable energy assets or companies are explained.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Attack Surface of Wind Energy Technologies in the United States [Slides]

This slide deck presents an overview of the threat landscape for wind energy technologies. It highlights unique cybersecurity considerations for wind, the growing penetration and potential impact of an attack. Standard architectures are shared to highlight where vulnerabilities may exist and attack paths to reach critical infrastructure. We discuss threat actors and attack paths. Several recent events impacting wind assets or wind companies are explained.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Attack Sequences Generation for Electric Power Grid

Security assessment of cyber-physical energy systems (CPESs) such as the electric power grid is a critical operation to maintain availability, reliability, and quality of service in the presence of persistent threats from malicious cyber actors. Existing security assessment approaches such as penetration testing and red teaming rely on subject matter expert experience and forensic cyber analysis of historical events to perform realistic, threat-informed assessments of CPES defense. CPESs have a large attack surface because of the heterogeneity and complexity of underlying topology, devices, measurements, and vulnerabilities. The aforementioned approaches lead to partial coverage of the attack surface with a large set of unknown but possible exploits. There is a need to automate the CPES attack surface discovery and contextualize it for relevant, highly probable, real-world attack scenarios. We propose a methodology and framework to facilitate the discovery of the CPES attack surface. We present a multilayer attack graph with ranked attack sequences to describe CPES failure scenarios. We present a work-in-progress framework that lists key components to automate the attack modeling and sequence generation. We demonstrate the published National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource CPES failure scenario to highlight the trustworthiness of generated attack sequences.

Dutta, Ashutosh↗
DOE OSTI2025

Braxton Marlatt Intern Poster

The Internet of Things (IoT) encompasses a vast network of interconnected devices embedded with software, sensors, and network connectivity, enabling data collection and exchange. While IoT technology revolutionizes various industries, it also introduces significant security challenges. This research focuses on enhancing IoT security through the implementation of Zero Trust Architecture concepts, specifically targeting the Network and Device pillars of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Zero Trust Maturity Model. By generating Codified Attack Surfaces (CAS) using custom Structured Threat Information eXpression bundles, this project aims to provide enhanced visibility into network communications, detect vulnerabilities in device firmware, and improve the overall security posture for IoT devices and networks. The methodology involves defining custom STIX schema and objects, collecting data from intra-IoT traffic, external network traffic, and firmware analysis, and automating the conversion and correlation of this data into STIX bundles. The automated generation of attack surfaces offers comprehensive insights into activity, vulnerabilities, and anomalies within an IoT environment, enabling proactive threat identification and mitigation.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction, A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Deciphering Discrepancies: A Comparative Analysis of Docker Image Security

As the use of microservices continues to grow and become a foundational approach to architecting software solutions, ensuring the security of microservices is paramount. Docker images have emerged as the predominant solution to containerize microservices–and thus, Docker images are becoming a large attack surface. Thus, reducing vulnerabilities in Docker images will reduce microservice cyberattacks. A common way to find vulnerabilities in Docker images employs static analysis tools like Trivy and Grype. However, these tools frequently generate disparate vulnerability reports when analyzing the same Docker image, thus causing uncertainty in tool selection. We collected 927 Docker images, analyzed them with Trivy and Grype, and compared the vulnerabilities reported in each image. Among the 865 images found to have vulnerabilities, Trivy and Grype disagreed on both the number of vulnerabilities and the vulnerability IDs found therein. Since both tools interface with external vulnerability databases, some discrepancies can be attributed to how the tools interface with these external resources. The external vulnerability databases partially overlap and frequently contradict one another, thereby creating challenges for static analysis tool developers and end users alike. This New Ideas and Emerging Results (NIER) study contains new and critical information that practitioners need for selecting and using static analysis tools–given that increases in the use of Docker technologies means increases in the size of the attack surfaces.

Boles, Brittany [Montana State University]↗
DOE OSTI2025

Enhancing Automotive Intrusion Detection Through Multi-Modal Fusion: A CAN FD-LiDAR Approach

As vehicles become smarter and more autonomous, they increasingly depend on advanced sensors and communication technologies to operate securely. However, such growing dependence on technology—whether it’s CAN (Controller Area Network) for internal communication or LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) for sensing the world around them—also expands the attack surface for the types of cyber attacks. Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS) typically monitor these systems in isolation, limiting their ability to detect sophisticated, crosssystem attacks. To address this, we propose a multi-modal fusion approach that combines real-world CAN FD signals (from the HCRL dataset) with LiDAR features (from the nuScenes dataset) to enhance attack detection. Our method employs a twostage ensemble approach. Calibrated XGBoost and LightGBM models initially process CAN FD (Fuzzing Data) and LiDAR data independently, detecting timing anomalies and space abnormalities. They are subsequently logarithmically combined with a logistic regression meta-model along with 17 engineered features capturing cross-modal behavior, prediction conflicts, and nonlinear interactions. This approach achieves an AUC of 0.87 and an F1-score of 0.82, surpassing single-modality baselines and early fusion methods, at merely 2 ms inference latency. Compared with deep learning competitors, it is 3 times more efficient, providing a lightweight, interpretable, and real time solution to automotive cybersecurity.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Time-Based CAN IDS Paper Results Code

Modern vehicles are complex cyber-physical systems made of hundreds of electronic control units (ECUs) that communicate over controller area networks (CANs). This inherited complexity has expanded the CAN attack surface which is vulnerable to message injection attacks. These injections change the overall timing characteristics of messages on the bus, and thus, to detect these malicious messages, time-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed. However, time-based IDSs are usually trained and tested on low-fidelity datasets with unrealistic, labeled attacks. This makes difficult the task of evaluating, comparing, and validating IDSs. Here we detail and benchmark four time-based IDSs against the newly published ROAD dataset, the first open CAN IDS dataset with real (non-simulated) stealthy attacks with physically verified effects. We found that methods that perform hypothesis testing by explicitly estimating message timing distributions have lower performance than methods that seek anomalies in a distribution related statistic. In particular, these “distribution-agnostic” based methods outperform “distribution-based” methods by at least 55% in area under the precision-recall curve (AUC-PR). Our results expand the body of knowledge of CAN time-based IDSs by providing details of these methods and reporting their results when tested on datasets with real advanced attacks. Finally, we develop an after-market plug-in detector using lightweight hardware, which can be used to deploy the best performing IDS method on nearly any vehicle.

Moriano, Pablo [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oa↗
DOE OSTI2022

Reinforcement Learning for feedback-enabled cyber resilience

The rapid growth in the number of devices and their connectivity has enlarged the attack surface and made cyber systems more vulnerable. As attackers become increasingly sophisticated and resourceful, mere reliance on traditional cyber protection, such as intrusion detection, firewalls, and encryption, is insufficient to secure the cyber systems. Cyber resilience provides a new security paradigm that complements inadequate protection with resilience mechanisms. A Cyber-Resilient Mechanism (CRM) adapts to the known or zero-day threats and uncertainties in real-time and strategically responds to them to maintain the critical functions of the cyber systems in the event of successful attacks. Feedback architectures play a pivotal role in enabling the online sensing, reasoning, and actuation process of the CRM. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an important gathering of algorithms that epitomize the feedback architectures for cyber resilience. It allows the CRM to provide dynamic and sequential responses to attacks with limited or without prior knowledge of the environment and the attacker. In this work, we review the literature on RL for cyber resilience and discuss the cyber-resilient defenses against three major types of vulnerabilities, i.e., posture-related, information-related, and human-related vulnerabilities. Here we introduce moving target defense, defensive cyber deception, and assistive human security technologies as three application domains of CRMs to elaborate on their designs. The RL algorithms also have vulnerabilities themselves. We explain the major vulnerabilities of RL and present develop several attack models where the attacker target the information exchanged between the environment and the agent: the rewards, the state observations, and the action commands. We show that the attacker can trick the RL agent into learning a nefarious policy with minimum attacking effort. The paper introduces several defense methods to secure the RL-enabled systems from these attacks. However, there is still a lack of works that focuses on the defensive mechanisms for RL-enabled systems. Last but not least, we discuss the future challenges of RL for cyber security and resilience and emerging applications of RL-based CRMs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Towards Automatic Mapping of Vulnerabilities to Attack Patterns using Large Language Models

With the advent of new devices and applications, cyber attack surface is continuously evolving due to the emergence of new attack techniques and vulnerabilities. Hence, security management tool must assess the cyber risk of an enterprise at regular interval basis through comprehensively identifying associations among attack techniques, weakness, and vulnerabilities. However, existing repositories providing such associations are incomplete (i.e., missing associations), inducing the likelihood of undermining the risk of particular set of attack techniques. Moreover, such associations still rely on manual interpretation, which is slow compared to attack speed and ineffective for the increasing list of vulnerabilities and attack actions. Therefore, there is an urge to develop methodologies for automatically associating vulnerabilities to all relevant attack techniques. In this paper, we present a framework, named VWC-MAP, that can automatically identify all relevant attack techniques of a vulnerability via weakness based on their text descriptions, applying natural language process (NLP) techniques. To achieve that, we present a novel two-tiered classification approach, where the first tier classifies vulnerabilities to weakness, and the second tier classifies weakness to attack techniques. This research has improved the scalability of the current state-of-the-art tool to make vulnerability to weakness mapping significantly faster. Moreover, this paper presents two novel approaches for weakness to attack technique mapping applying Text-to-Text and link prediction techniques. Our experiment results cross-validated through cyber-security experts show that VWC-MAP can associate vulnerabilities to weakness types with 87% accuracy and to new attack patterns with 80% accuracy.

Das, Siddhartha Shankar↗