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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2014

Hardness assurance for proton direct ionization-induced SEEs using a high-energy proton beam

The low-energy proton energy spectra of all shielded space environments have the same shape. This shape is easily reproduced in the laboratory by degrading a high-energy proton beam, producing a high-fidelity test environment. We use this test environment to dramatically simplify rate prediction for proton direct ionization effects, allowing the work to be done at high-energy proton facilities, on encapsulated parts, without knowledge of the IC design, and with little or no computer simulations required. Proton direct ionization (PDI) is predicted to significantly contribute to the total error rate under the conditions investigated. Scaling effects are discussed using data from 65-nm, 45-nm, and 32-nm SOI SRAMs. These data also show that grazing-angle protons will dominate the PDI-induced error rate due to their higher effective LET, so PDI hardness assurance methods must account for angular effects to be conservative. As a result, we show that this angular dependence can be exploited to quickly assess whether an IC is susceptible to PDI.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 2 – Prioritizing Digital Assurance Challenges, Session 2

The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2014

On the determination of reference levels for quality assurance of flattening filter free photon beams in radiation therapy

Purpose: New definitions for some dosimetric parameters for use in quality assurance of flattening filter free (FFF) beams generated by medical linear accelerators have been suggested. The present study aims to validate these suggestions and to propose possible reference levels. Methods: The main characteristics of FFF photon beams were described in terms of: field size, penumbra, unflatness, slope, and peak-position parameters. Data were collected for 6 and 10 MV-FFF beams from three different Varian TrueBeam Linacs. Measurements were performed with a 2D-array (Starcheck system from PTW-Freiburg) and with the portal dosimetry method GLAaS utilizing the build-in portal imager of TrueBeam. Data were also compared to ion chamber measurements. A cross check validation has been performed on a FFF beam of 6 MV generated by a Varian Clinac-iX upgraded to FFF capability. Results : All the parameters suggested to characterize the FFF beams resulted easily measurable and little variation was observed among different Linacs. Referring to two reference field sizes of 10 × 10 and 20 × 20 cm{sup 2}, at SDD = 100 cm and d = dmax, from the portal dosimetry data, the following results (averaging X and Y profiles) were obtained. Field size: 9.95 ± 0.02 and 19.98 ± 0.03 cm for 6 MV-FFF (9.94 ± 0.02 and 19.98 ± 0.03 cm for 10 MV-FFF). Penumbra: 2.7 ± 0.3 and 2.9 ± 0.3 mm for 6 MV-FFF (3.1 ± 0.2 and 3.3 ± 0.3 for 10 MV-FFF). Unflatness: 1.11 ± 0.01 and 1.25 ± 0.01 for 6 MV-FFF (1.21 ± 0.01 and 1.50 ± 0.01 for 10 MV-FFF). Slope: 0.320 ± 0.020%/mm and 0.43 ± 0.015%/mm for 6 MV-FFF (0.657 ± 0.023%/mm and 0.795 ± 0.017%/mm for 10 MV-FFF). Peak Position −0.2 ± 0.2 and −0.4 ± 0.2 mm for 6 MV-FFF (−0.3 ± 0.2 and 0.7 ± 0.3 mm for 10 MV-FFF). Results would depend upon measurement depth. With thresholds set to at least 95% confidence level from the measured data and to account for possible variations between detectors and methods and experimental settings, a tolerance set of: 1 mm for field size and penumbra, 0.04 for unflatness, 0.1%/mm for slope, and 1 mm for peak position could be proposed from our data. Conclusions : The parameters proposed for the characterization and routine control of stability of profiles of FFF beams appear to be a viable solution with a strong similarity to the conventional parameters used for flattened beams. The results from three different TrueBeams and the cross-validation against a Clinac-iX suggested the possible generalization of the methods and the possibility to use common tolerances for the parameters. The data showed also the reproducibility of beam characteristics among different systems (of the same vendor) and the resulting parameter values could therefore be possibly generalized.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2015

Quality assurance of temporal variability of natural decay chain and neutron induced background for low-level NORM analysis

In this study, twenty-one high purity germanium (HPGe) background spectra were collected over 2 years at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A quality assurance methodology was developed to monitor spectral background levels from thermal and fast neutron flux levels and naturally occurring radioactive material decay series radionuclides. 238 U decay products above 222 Rn demonstrated minimal temporal variability beyond that expected from counting statistics. 238 U and 232 Th progeny below Rn gas displayed at most twice the expected variability. Further, an analysis of the 139 keV 74 Ge(n, γ) and 691 keV 72 Ge(n, n') spectral features demonstrated temporal stability for both thermal and fast neutron fluxes.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2026

Moving from Information Assurance to Functional Assurance with Engineered Controls

Cyber threats to operational technology demand more than traditional IT defenses—they require full-spectrum mission assurance. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that embeds engineered controls into system design to ensure critical functions remain safe and reliable, even under attack. Unlike conventional cybersecurity tools, engineered controls act directly on physical processes to prevent unacceptable outcomes such as equipment damage or mission failure. This session will outline the CIE framework and share examples of consequence-based design that deliver true resilience, not just fail-safe behaviors. Attendees will learn how to integrate these principles into the engineering lifecycle to support resilient-by-design architectures and inform emerging standards. This talk sets the stage for the panel discussion on advancing CIE across sectors as digital and physical systems converge.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Data quality assurance for the Majorana Demonstrator

The Majorana Demonstrator is an experiment constructed to search for neutrinoless double-beta decays in germanium-76 and to demonstrate the feasibility to deploy a large-scale experiment in a phased and modular fashion. It consists of two modular arrays of natural and 7648 Ge-enriched germanium detectors totalling 44.1 kg, located at the 4850' level of the Sanford Underground Research Facility in Lead, South Dakota, USA. Any Neutrinoless double-beta decay search requires a thorough understanding of the background and the signal energy spectra. This talk will discuss the various techniques employed to ensure the integrity of the measured spectra. Data collection is monitored with a thorough set of checks, and subsequent careful analysis is performed to qualify the data for higher level physics analysis. Instrumental background events are tagged for removal, and problematic channels are removed from consideration as necessary.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Privacy-Assured Aggregation Protocol for Smart Metering: A Proactive Fault-Tolerant Approach [Proactive Fault-Tolerant Aggregation Protocol for Privacy-Assured Smart Metering]

Smart meters are integral to demand response in emerging smart grids, by reporting the electricity consumption of users to serve application needs. But reporting real-time usage information for individual households raises privacy concerns. Existing techniques to guarantee differential privacy (DP) of smart meter users either are not fault tolerant or achieve (possibly partial) fault tolerance at high communication overheads. In this paper, we propose a fault-tolerant protocol for smart metering that can handle general communication failures while ensuring DP with significantly improved efficiency and lower errors compared with the state of the art. Our protocol handles fail-stop faults proactively by using a novel design of future ciphertexts, and distributes trust among the smart meters by sharing secret keys among them. We prove the DP properties of our protocol and analyze its advantages in fault tolerance, accuracy, and communication efficiency relative to competing techniques. We illustrate our analysis by simulations driven by real-world traces of electricity consumption.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Waste Management Project Success - Regulatory Assurance Systems - 20118

Waste management (WM) and remediation projects are essential within a restorative environmental culture. Despite years of experience, challenges and obstacles associated with efficient and effective WM project execution remain. Although some obstacles are project specific, a common challenge is navigating the regulatory landscape from planning through execution, particularly with first of a kind (FOAK) and first in a while (FIAW) projects. The absence of a comprehensive regulatory assurance strategy places significant hurdles in the path of project success. To clear a path for the successful execution of increasingly complex WM projects, this paper focuses on development of a comprehensive regulatory assurance strategy and implementation plan that effectively engages stakeholders, agencies, and performers to produce project plans that fully and cost effectively integrate applicable regulatory requirements. The most reliable way to align regulatory processes and decisions needed for mission success is through a regulatory assurance system. This system establishes a healthy interface with regulatory decision makers, to work in a collaborative manner, to create a common vision for regulatory decisions on an agreed upon schedule. A regulatory assurance system consists of several elements. Although the mission may vary from cleanup to site closure to nuclear component production, the elements of a regulatory assurance system remain essentially constant and must include: 1) identifying a common vision or end state, 2) developing a long-term, integrated strategy and schedule, 3) establishing a regulatory partnering team consisting of key decision-makers, 4) regular and frequent communication with decision-makers, 5) ensuring consistent surveillance for early identification of issues and changes that may impact the project, 6) quick resolution of emerging issues to prevent schedule impact, 7) identifying core compliance functions, 8) periodically assessing progress of the project as it relates to regulatory assurance and, 9) providing constructive feedback to improve the process. A regulatory assurance system provides a living, multi-faceted approach to planning, visioning, communicating and tracking to avoid surprises and ensure smooth and timely progress to the project. The overall success measures will be whether the system produces common sense regulatory decisions supporting the vision on time without appeal. Effective regulatory frameworks rarely happen on their own. Balanced, common-sense regulatory decisions stem from teams that are trained to work together to achieve shared goals. In this paper, particular attention is placed on the importance of starting with a shared vision for a regulatory assurance and execution strategy that leverages experience to establish optimal approaches. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Safeguards Information Assurance by Design

The assurance of Safeguards Information is crucial to meet IAEA obligations. Information can be potentially at risk for alteration when it is generated, stored, transmitted, or manipulated (such as in a calculation). Where, when, and how information is assured can vary depending on where in the information lifecycle it exists. Often, information protection measures are not considered until after a system is architected and built or are only applied to a portion of the information system. This typically limits the effectiveness of information assurance, can increase the cost of assuring the information, and can reduce the trust in the information received. Designing information assurance into the architecture of a system can significantly reduce information vulnerability at an affordable cost while improving the trust of the information. This paper discusses safeguards information assurance by design and architectural approaches from a lifecycle perspective including potential tools that can be utilized to help define information assurance requirements and help validate the effectiveness of these requirements as the system transitions through the lifecycle. The tools discussed include risk management tools, architectural approaches, modeling approaches, and red teaming benefits.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Assurance Theory: A Strategic Imperative

A commonly stated goal of many US Military activities, especially in the strategic realm of nuclear weapons, is to “deter potential adversaries and assure allies.” However, sometimes the phrase “assure allies” seems to be an appendage to a larger deterrence objective. Yet, assurance is fundamentally different than deterrence, even extended deterrence, which aims to shape the decisions of potential adversaries. Assurance, on the other hand, seeks to influence the decisions of allies. As such, assurance must not be treated as an appendage to deterrence, but rather as the strategic imperative that it is. A proper understanding of assurance is critical in an age of renewed great power competition where alliances provide an asymmetric strategic advantage over potential adversaries. This paper provides a primer on assurance theory, to include its definition, variables, challenges, and measures of success.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

APPLICATION OF OBJECTIVES-DRIVEN ASSURANCE CASES TO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN AN EVOLVING ACQUISITION MODEL

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

TH-A-BRC-02: AAPM TG-178 Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery Dosimetry and Quality Assurance

AAPM TG-135U1 QA for Robotic Radiosurgery - Sonja Dieterich Since the publication of AAPM TG-135 in 2011, the technology of robotic radiosurgery has rapidly developed. AAPM TG-135U1 will provide recommendations on the clinical practice for using the IRIS collimator, fiducial-less real-time motion tracking, and Monte Carlo based treatment planning. In addition, it will summarize currently available literature about uncertainties. Learning Objectives: Understand the progression of technology since the first TG publication Learn which new QA procedures should be implemented for new technologies Be familiar with updates to clinical practice guidelines AAPM TG-178 Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery Dosimetry and Quality Assurance - Steven Goetsch Purpose: AAPM Task Group 178 Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery Dosimetry and Quality Assurance was formed in August, 2008. The Task Group has 12 medical physicists, two physicians and two consultants. Methods: A round robin dosimetry intercomparison of proposed ionization chambers, electrometer and dosimetry phantoms was conducted over a 15 month period in 2011 and 2012 (Med Phys 42, 11, Nov, 2015). The data obtained at 9 institutions (with ten different Elekta Gamma Knife units) was analyzed by the lead author using several protocols. Results: The most consistent results were obtained using the Elekta ABS 16cm diameter phantom, with the TG-51 protocol modified as recommended by Alfonso et al (Med Phys 35, 11, Nov 2008). A key white paper (Med Phys, in press) sponsored by Elekta Corporation, was used to obtain correction factors for the ionization chambers and phantoms used in this intercomparison. Consistent results were obtained for both Elekta Gamma Knife Model 4C and Gamma Knife Perfexion units as measured with each of two miniature ionization chambers. Conclusion: The full report gives clinical history and background of gamma stereotactic radiosurgery, clinical examples and history, quality assurance recommendations and outline of possible dosimetry protocols. The report will be reviewed by the AAPM Working Group on Recommendations for Radiotherapy External Beam Quality Assurance and then by the AAPM Science Council before publication in Medical Physics Survey of possible calibration protocols for calibration of Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery (GSR) devices Overview of modern Quality Assurance techniques for GSR AAPM TG-218 Tolerance Levels and Methodologies for IMRT Verification QA - Moyed Miften Patient-specific IMRT QA measurement is a process designed to identify discrepancies between calculated and delivered doses. Error tolerance limits are not well-defined or consistently applied across centers. The AAPM TG-218 report has been prepared to improve the understanding and consistency of this process by providing recommendations for methodologies and tolerance limits in patient-specific IMRT QA. Learning Objectives: Review measurement methods and methodologies for absolute dose verification Provide recommendations on delivery methods, data interpretation, the use of analysis routines and choice of tolerance limits for IMRT QA Sonja Dieterich has a research agreement with Sun Nuclear Inc. Steven Goetsch is a part-time consultant for Elekta.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Safety Assurance Framework for Nuclear Digital Instrumentation and Control Software

Software in digital instrumentation and control (D&C) systems poses unique challenges for the safety assurance of nuclear power plants. Through a literature survey of 21 sources, we analyzed various claims, arguments, and evidence used in safety assurance cases across industries. These were organized into a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) safety assurance case framework to organize and visualize the various arguments for DI&C safety. We developed a classification for the levels of the framework, which can be used in other safety assurance cases to improve clarity.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Watching the Watchers with Verified Formal-Assurance Tools (Abbreviated Final Report)

The “Watching the Watchers” project studied the problem of establishing assurance cases for tools that are used to assure other things. Specifically, we were interested in understanding the tools and techniques one could apply to software to build an assurance case to evaluate their applicability, difficulty, level of assurance provided, and scalability. To do so we chose a set of use cases of relevance to LLNL and our various DOE and non-DOE partners and developed demonstrators to perform this evaluation. Our key focal point was around additive manufacturing problems and assurance gaps that we identified in the additive manufacturing workflow from start to completion. We also explored other areas related to AI, data analysis, and concurrent programming. Follow-on research is planned to take our prototypes from this project and adapt and mature them to fit LLNL mission applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗