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Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

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Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 2 – Prioritizing Digital Assurance Challenges, Session 2

The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.

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Moving from Information Assurance to Functional Assurance with Engineered Controls

Cyber threats to operational technology demand more than traditional IT defenses—they require full-spectrum mission assurance. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that embeds engineered controls into system design to ensure critical functions remain safe and reliable, even under attack. Unlike conventional cybersecurity tools, engineered controls act directly on physical processes to prevent unacceptable outcomes such as equipment damage or mission failure. This session will outline the CIE framework and share examples of consequence-based design that deliver true resilience, not just fail-safe behaviors. Attendees will learn how to integrate these principles into the engineering lifecycle to support resilient-by-design architectures and inform emerging standards. This talk sets the stage for the panel discussion on advancing CIE across sectors as digital and physical systems converge.

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Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING

Safety Assurance Framework for Nuclear Digital Instrumentation and Control Software

Software in digital instrumentation and control (D&C) systems poses unique challenges for the safety assurance of nuclear power plants. Through a literature survey of 21 sources, we analyzed various claims, arguments, and evidence used in safety assurance cases across industries. These were organized into a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) safety assurance case framework to organize and visualize the various arguments for DI&C safety. We developed a classification for the levels of the framework, which can be used in other safety assurance cases to improve clarity.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN

Watching the Watchers with Verified Formal-Assurance Tools (Abbreviated Final Report)

The “Watching the Watchers” project studied the problem of establishing assurance cases for tools that are used to assure other things. Specifically, we were interested in understanding the tools and techniques one could apply to software to build an assurance case to evaluate their applicability, difficulty, level of assurance provided, and scalability. To do so we chose a set of use cases of relevance to LLNL and our various DOE and non-DOE partners and developed demonstrators to perform this evaluation. Our key focal point was around additive manufacturing problems and assurance gaps that we identified in the additive manufacturing workflow from start to completion. We also explored other areas related to AI, data analysis, and concurrent programming. Follow-on research is planned to take our prototypes from this project and adapt and mature them to fit LLNL mission applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

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Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

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Safety Assurance of Software and Machine Learning Development for Nuclear Instrumentation and Controls

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems monitor and control parameters in nuclear power plants. Ensuring their safety is a critical part of ensuring overall plant safety. Nuclear power plant licensing generates thousands of safety documents that could be organized more effectively using a safety assurance case (SAC). We conducted a literature survey of SACs and created a SAC framework for DI&C software using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). This framework focuses on four software development processes: management & assurance, pre-developed software (PDS) qualification, the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), and the Machine Learning Development Life Cycle (MLDLC). We organized our framework using a novel level structure that can be applied to other SACs to improve their clarity. Finally, we demonstrate how our framework can be incorporated as part of a SAC for a larger reactor system.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN

The Digital Assurance for High Consequence Systems (DAHCS) Mission Campaign Whitepaper

The DAHCS (pronounced “Dax”) MC is a 7-year, $\$$45 million research portfolio within Sandia’s Laboratory Directed Research and Development program. The DAHCS MC arose in response to a great need: to ensure that the use of digital technologies does not weaken our nation’s high consequence systems. Digital technologies offer many benefits in speed, cost, and flexibility, and we seek to reap those benefits without introducing new system failures. However, digital technologies cannot be evaluated the same way as analog technologies. Initiatives across the nation highlight the capability gap that prevents efficient, effective digital assurance. The Challenge Today’s digital assurance tools, techniques, and methods are inadequate to confidently characterize, assess, and manage digital risk; they are ad hoc, slow, costly, and rarely scalable to increasingly complex digital technologies. The rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape exacerbates this problem because digital assurance now must secure against digital risks now and in the future, including those introduced by rapidly evolving technologies, adversaries, and systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

ORNL Package Testing Program Software Quality Assurance Plan

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Package Testing Program (PTP) uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software in performing data collection of thermal test results for package designs that contain radioactive materials. Specifically, this software is used to collect temperature data from the furnace, packages, and ambient air to prepare and execute the thermal test specified in 10 CFR 71.73, “Thermal Test.” This software quality assurance (SQA) plan sets forth the guidelines, standards, and procedures that shall be used to provide SQA for PTP software applications. This is a living document that will be maintained for the lifecycle of the PTP program. The SQA plan follows the requirements set forth in ORNL Standards Based Management System (SBMS): Information Technology; Subject Area: Software Quality Assurance. When applicable to the requirements as described in ORNL SBMS, Software Quality Assurance, the software shall be listed in the ORNL Software Registration System (SRS). Exemptions to this SBMS are COTS and firmware that are not modified; spreadsheet applications and personal productivity tools that do not have a utility or safety application, research applications, legacy software, system software, vendor-supplied software used to interface with the vendor’s services, software used within the organization to facilitate processing or management of information, and software developed for applications not specific to the US Department of Energy (DOE).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

NeuroSymbolic Approaches as a Vector for Assured Artificial Intelligence

The deployment of artificial intelligence systems in critical applications requires higher levels of assurance for safety, security, and interpretability. While neurosymbolic (NESY) approaches combining neural networks with symbolic reasoning offer potential advantages for assured AI, existing differentiable neurosymbolic frameworks face significant limitations including computational overhead and performance constraints. This report investigates the ISED (InferSampleEstimateDescend) framework as an alternative approach that enables neurosymbolic learning without requiring endtoend differentiability. We evaluate ISED’s utility for geointelligence applications by comparing neurosymbolic models against standard neural networks on aircraft classification tasks using the RarePlanes and MTARSI imagery datasets. Our results demonstrate that while ISEDbased models achieve slightly lower accuracy (89.7% vs 92.1% on RarePlanes; 91.1% vs 92.5% on MTARSI), they provide critical explainability capabilities that enable tracing incorrect predictions back to specific attribute misclassifications. We also present an automated pipeline that generates both attributeclass mappings and neurosymbolic model architectures from natural language descriptions, significantly reducing the manual effort required for NESY model deployment. These findings suggest that ISED offers a promising direction for developing assured AI systems where interpretability and reasoning transparency are prioritized alongside performance.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

Digital Assurance for High Consequence Systems: 2024 Mission Campaign White Paper

This Sandia National Laboratories Mission Campaign (MC) seeks to create the technical basis that allows national leaders to efficiently assess and manage the digital assurance of high consequence systems. We will call for transformative research that enables efficient (1) development of provably secure systems and secure integration of untrusted products, (2) intelligent threat mitigation, and (3) digital risk-informed engineering trade-offs. Ultimately, this MC will impact multiple national security missions; it will develop an informed Digital Assurance for High Consequence Systems (DAHCS) community and expand Sandia partnerships to build this national capability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

Software Quality Assurance Plan: Cardinal

The Cardinal Software Quality Assurance (SQA) Program aims to provide the controls and processes necessary to enable continuous, high-quality software development while meeting user and program sponsor requirements. This SQA Plan (SQAP) delineates the SQA Program framework for Cardinal by describing the Program activities, organization, and documentation, and by clearly defining the interconnection of all Program items. It should be noted that this SQAP is aligned with the current version of the Argonne Quality Assurance Program Plan, which was designed to align with DOE O 414.1D. This SQAP is also aligned with the revision 10 of the SQAP for MOOSE and MOOSE-based applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

Quality Assurance Program Plan for SFR Metallic Fuel Data Qualification

This document contains an evaluation of the applicability of the current Quality Assurance Standards from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Standard NQA-1 (NQA-1) criteria and identifies and describes the quality assurance process(es) by which attributes of historical, analytical, and other data associated with sodium-cooled fast reactor [SFR] metallic fuel will be evaluated. This process is being instituted to facilitate validation of data to the extent that such data may be used to support future licensing efforts associated with advanced reactor designs. The initial data to be evaluated under this program were generated during the US Integral Fast Reactor program between 1984-1994, where the data include, but are not limited to, research and development data and associated documents, test plans and associated protocols, operations and test data, technical reports, and information associated with past United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviews of SFR designs. It is recognized that managing the data generated by large research and development projects presents a significant challenge for retaining data integrity and availability. American Society of Mechanical Engineers Standard NQA-1 (NQA-1) 2008/2009a provides appropriate requirements for this plan.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS

Performance Assurance Planning Guide for Utility Energy Service Contracts: 2025 Edition

Administered by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP), the Utility Program has fostered collaboration among federal agencies and their serving utilities for more than 25 years. The Utility Program supports agencies using Utility Energy Service Contracts (UESCs), a well-developed, effective contracting vehicle that enable the latest approaches to cost-effective energy management at federal sites. Federal agencies have successfully used UESCs to award over 2,000 energy and water efficiency and renewable energy projects, investing approximately $\$$2.8 billion in furthering the Federal Government's efforts to reduce energy intensity. Authorized by 42 U.S. Code section 8256 (10 U.S. Code section 2913 for the Department of Defense), a UESC is a limited-source acquisition between a federal agency and an eligible serving utility for energy management services that generate savings from the implementation of energy- and water -conservation measures (collectively referred to as ECMs), with 42 U.S. Code section 8287 (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Part 241), providing the term of a UESC, which may extend up to 25 years. Through a UESC, the utility partner assesses designs, and implements the desired ECMs - which can range from lighting retrofits and renewable energy systems, to combined heat and power plants or other technologies and strategies, and may provide financing for the project. The agency may use any combination of appropriations and third-party financing to pay for the project, providing useful flexibility. There is no limit to the project size, big or small, that can be implemented using a UESC. To assist agencies implementing a UESC, FEMP has developed a Utility Energy Service Contract Guide and this companion guidance document to help agencies and their utility partners better understand the best practices for to ensure UESCs continue to perform and generate savings throughout their performance period. These best practices utilize a combination of effective project management, communication, documentation, and a detailed Performance Assurance Plan. This plan is a project specific set of actionable protocols that define important tasks and responsibilities throughout the contract term and reflects the site conditions, complexities, agency capabilities, and operating and maintaining planned ECMs.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY

Field Insights: Strengthening Digital Assurance Through On-Site Network Monitoring

The accelerating deployment of digital energy infrastructure, ranging from inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), to advanced grid control platforms, has brought unprecedented visibility, flexibility, and efficiency to the electric grid. However, this digital transformation also introduces new cybersecurity challenges, particularly in the form of supply chain risks and operational blind spots at the grid edge. Over the past year, the Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through its Rapid Risk Assessment initiative, along with the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), through its Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, have supported a series of on-site network engagements led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These engagements, conducted in partnership with asset owners across the country, have focused on identifying real-world vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in operational environments, many of which are not detectable through remote assessments or traditional compliance audits. The goal of this report is to distill key findings and lessons learned during network hunt engagements from INL’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 - 2025. It is intended to help asset owners—regardless of their participation in the program—better understand the evolving threat landscape and adopt practical measures to secure their digital energy infrastructure.

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