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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Use of Heated Helium to Simulate Surface Pressure Fluctuations on the Launch Abort Vehicle During Abort Motor Firing

The solid-rocket plumes from the Abort motor of the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV, also know as Orion) were simulated using hot, high pressure, Helium gas to determine the surface pressure fluctuations on the vehicle in the event of an abort. About 80 different abort situations over a wide Mach number range, (0.3< or =M< or =1.2) and vehicle attitudes (+/-15deg) were simulated inside the NASA Ames Unitary Plan, 11-Foot Transonic Wind Tunnel. For each abort case, typically two different Helium plume and wind tunnel conditions were used to bracket different flow matching critera. This unique, yet cost-effective test used a custom-built hot Helium delivery system, and a 6% scale model of a part of the MPCV, known as the Launch Abort Vehicle. The test confirmed the very high level of pressure fluctuations on the surface of the vehicle expected during an abort. In general, the fluctuations were found to be dominated by the very near-field hydrodynamic fluctuations present in the plume shear-layer. The plumes were found to grow in size for aborts occurring at higher flight Mach number and altitude conditions. This led to an increase in the extent of impingement on the vehicle surfaces; however, unlike some initial expectations, the general trend was a decrease in the level of pressure fluctuations with increasing impingement. In general, the highest levels of fluctuations were found when the outer edges of the plume shear layers grazed the vehicle surface. At non-zero vehicle attitudes the surface pressure distributions were found to become very asymmetric. The data from these wind-tunnel simulations were compared against data collected from the recent Pad Abort 1 flight test. In spite of various differences between the transient flight situation and the steady-state wind tunnel simulations, the hot-Helium data were found to replicate the PA1 data fairly reasonably. The data gathered from this one-of-a-kind wind-tunnel test fills a gap in the manned-space programs, and will be used to establish the acoustic environment for vibro-acoustic qualification testing of the MPCV.

Panda, Jayanta↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Design Considerations of an Ascent Abort Monitor Algorithm for Use During Service Module Aborts

In support of human rating the Artemis missions, NASA's Orion program requires continuous abort coverage from liftoff through mission destination. During a portion of the ascent trajectory, the currently achievable abort mode is determined by an Orion algorithm using the onboard navigated vehicle state. This ascent abort monitor determines achievability for Orion's Mode 2 abort, Untargeted Abort Splashdown (UAS), by propagating the current vehicle state through ascent abort events to determine sufficient timing to perform the abort and to a ballistic touchdown point to approximate landing location relative to prescribed keep out boundaries. The algorithm was updated for Artemis 2 to allow the capability to limit loads for the majority of ascent. Performance of the algorithm has been demonstrated and verified through dispersed trajectory analysis with emulated flight software, unit testing, and hardware in the loop testing.

Esteban Guzman↗
NASA NTRS2011

Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Pad Abort Test Vehicle (PATV) II Attitude Control System (ACS) Integration and Pressurization Subsystem Dynamic Random Vibration Analysis

In order to mitigate catastrophic failures on future generation space vehicles, engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have begun to integrate a novel crew abort systems that could pull a crew module away in case of an emergency at the launch pad or during ascent. The Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) is a recent test vehicle that was designed as an alternative to the baseline Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) to demonstrate the performance of a "tower-less" LAS configuration under abort conditions. The MLAS II test vehicle will execute a propulsive coast stabilization maneuver during abort to control the vehicles trajectory and thrust. To accomplish this, the spacecraft will integrate an Attitude Control System (ACS) with eight hypergolic monomethyl hydrazine liquid propulsion engines that are capable of operating in a quick pulsing mode. Two main elements of the ACS include a propellant distribution subsystem and a pressurization subsystem to regulate the flow of pressurized gas to the propellant tanks and the engines. The CAD assembly of the Attitude Control System (ACS) was configured and integrated into the Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV) design. A dynamic random vibration analysis was conducted on the Main Propulsion System (MPS) helium pressurization panels to assess the response of the panel and its components under increased gravitational acceleration loads during flight. The results indicated that the panels fundamental and natural frequencies were farther from the maximum Acceleration Spectral Density (ASD) vibrations which were in the range of 150-300 Hz. These values will direct how the components will be packaged in the vehicle to reduce the effects high gravitational loads.

Ekrami, Yasamin↗
NASA NTRS2015

Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) Propulsion on Pad Abort 1 (PA-1)

This presentation provides a concise overview of the highly successful Orion Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) flight test, and the three rocket motors that contributed to this success. The primary purpose of the Orion PA-1 flight was to help certify the Orion Launch Abort System (LAS), which can be utilized in the unlikely event of an emergency on the launchpad or during mission vehicle ascent. The PA-1 test was the first fully integrated flight test of the Orion LAS, one of the primary systems within the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). The Orion MPCV is part of the architecture within the Space Launch System (SLS), which is being designed to transport astronauts beyond low-Earth orbit for future exploration missions. Had the Orion PA-1 flight abort occurred during launch preparations for a real human spaceflight mission, the PA-1 LAS would have saved the lives of the crew. The PA-1 flight test was largely successful due to the three solid rocket motors of the LAS: the Attitude Control Motor (ACM); the Jettison Motor (JM); and the Abort Motor (AM). All three rocket motors successfully performed their required functions during the Orion PA-1 flight test, flown on May 6, 2010 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, culminating in a successful demonstration of an abort capability from the launchpad.

SLS↗
NASA NTRS2015

Abort Trigger False Positive and False Negative Analysis Methodology for Threshold-Based Abort Detection

This paper describes a quantitative methodology for bounding the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) probabilities associated with a human-rated launch vehicle abort trigger (AT) that includes sensor data qualification (SDQ). In this context, an AT is a hardware and software mechanism designed to detect the existence of a specific abort condition. Also, SDQ is an algorithmic approach used to identify sensor data suspected of being corrupt so that suspect data does not adversely affect an AT's detection capability. The FP and FN methodologies presented here were developed to support estimation of the probabilities of loss of crew and loss of mission for the Space Launch System (SLS) which is being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The paper provides a brief overview of system health management as being an extension of control theory; and describes how ATs and the calculation of FP and FN probabilities relate to this theory. The discussion leads to a detailed presentation of the FP and FN methodology and an example showing how the FP and FN calculations are performed. This detailed presentation includes a methodology for calculating the change in FP and FN probabilities that result from including SDQ in the AT architecture. To avoid proprietary and sensitive data issues, the example incorporates a mixture of open literature and fictitious reliability data. Results presented in the paper demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach in providing quantitative estimates that bound the probability of a FP or FN abort determination.

risk assessment↗
NASA NTRS2016

A Proposed Ascent Abort Flight Test for the Max Launch Abort System

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center initiated the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Project to investigate alternate crew escape system concepts that eliminate the conventional launch escape tower by integrating the escape system into an aerodynamic fairing that fully encapsulates the crew capsule and smoothly integrates with the launch vehicle. This paper proposes an ascent abort flight test for an all-propulsive towerless escape system concept that is actively controlled and sized to accommodate the Orion Crew Module. The goal of the flight test is to demonstrate a high dynamic pressure escape and to characterize jet interaction effects during operation of the attitude control thrusters at transonic and supersonic conditions. The flight-test vehicle is delivered to the required test conditions by a booster configuration selected to meet cost, manufacturability, and operability objectives. Data return is augmented through judicious design of the boost trajectory, which is optimized to obtain data at a range of relevant points, rather than just a single flight condition. Secondary flight objectives are included after the escape to obtain aerodynamic damping data for the crew module and to perform a high-altitude contingency deployment of the drogue parachutes. Both 3- and 6-degree-of-freedom trajectory simulation results are presented that establish concept feasibility, and a Monte Carlo uncertainty assessment is performed to provide confidence that test objectives can be met.

Tartabini, Paul V.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Continuous Improvements to East Coast Abort Landings for Space Shuttle Aborts

Improvement initiatives in the areas of guidance, flight control, and mission operations provide increased capability for successful East Coast Abort Landings (ECAL). Automating manual crew procedures in the Space Shuttle's onboard guidance allows faster and more precise commanding of flight control parameters needed for successful ECALs. Automation also provides additional capability in areas not possible with manual control. Operational changes in the mission concept allow for the addition of new landing sites and different ascent trajectories that increase the regions of a successful landing. The larger regions of ECAL capability increase the safety of the crew and Orbiter.

Butler, Kevin D.↗
NASA NTRS2020

An Ejectable Data Recorder Subsystem for the Ascent Abort-2 Test Flight of the Orion Launch Abort System

The Ejectable Data Record (EDR) subsystem was a unique development opportunity at NASA with challenges that necessitated innovation. EDR employed a “skunkworks” development approach in which we designed, built, and delivered 47 end items, not including ground support equipment. We used as many COTS components as possible, we looked for process efficiencies to meet our tight deadlines, and the EDR team was involved in the flight operations of the AA-2 test flight and responsible for the recovery operations of the ejected payloads. This paper will discuss the design and development of the EDR subsystem, as well as the results of the system performance during the AA-2 test flight.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
DOE OSTI2023

Medication abortion via digital health in the United States: a systematic scoping review

Digital health, including telemedicine, has increased access to abortion care. The convenience, flexibility of appointment times, and ensured privacy to abortion users may make abortion services via telemedicine preferable. This scoping review systematically mapped studies conducted on abortion services via telemedicine, including their effectiveness and acceptability for abortion users and providers. All published papers included abortion services via telemedicine in the United States were considered. Articles were searched in PubMed, CINAHL, and Google Scholar databases in September 2022. The findings were synthesized narratively, and the PRISMA-ScR guidelines were used to report this study. Out of 757 retrieved articles, 33 articles were selected based on the inclusion criteria. These studies were published between 2011 and 2022, with 24 published in the last 3 years. The study found that telemedicine increased access to abortion care in the United States, especially for people in remote areas or those worried about stigma from in-person visits. The effectiveness of abortion services via telemedicine was comparable to in-clinic visits, with 6% or fewer abortions requiring surgical intervention. Both care providers and abortion seekers expressed positive perceptions of telemedicine-based abortion services. However, abortion users reported mixed emotions, with some preferring in-person visits. The most common reasons for choosing telemedicine included the distance to the abortion clinic, convenience, privacy, cost, flexibility of appointment times, and state laws imposing waiting periods or restrictive policies. Telemedicine offered a preferable option for abortion seekers and providers. The feasibility of accessing abortion services via telemedicine in low-resource settings needs further investigation.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2002

Shuttle Abort Flight Management (SAFM) - Application Overview

One of the most demanding tasks that must be performed by the Space Shuttle flight crew is the process of determining whether, when and where to abort the vehicle should engine or system failures occur during ascent or entry. Current Shuttle abort procedures involve paging through complicated paper checklists to decide on the type of abort and where to abort. Additional checklists then lead the crew through a series of actions to execute the desired abort. This process is even more difficult and time consuming in the absence of ground communications since the ground flight controllers have the analysis tools and information that is currently not available in the Shuttle cockpit. Crew workload specifically abort procedures will be greatly simplified with the implementation of the Space Shuttle Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) project. The intent of CAU is to maximize crew situational awareness and reduce flight workload thru enhanced controls and displays, and onboard abort assessment and determination capability. SAFM was developed to help satisfy the CAU objectives by providing the crew with dynamic information about the capability of the vehicle to perform a variety of abort options during ascent and entry. This paper- presents an overview of the SAFM application. As shown in Figure 1, SAFM processes the vehicle navigation state and other guidance information to provide the CAU displays with evaluations of abort options, as well as landing site recommendations. This is accomplished by three main SAFM components: the Sequencer Executive, the Powered Flight Function, and the Glided Flight Function, The Sequencer Executive dispatches the Powered and Glided Flight Functions to evaluate the vehicle's capability to execute the current mission (or current abort), as well as more than IS hypothetical abort options or scenarios. Scenarios are sequenced and evaluated throughout powered and glided flight. Abort scenarios evaluated include Abort to Orbit (ATO), Transatlantic Abort Landing (TAL), East Coast Abort Landing (ECAL) and Return to Launch Site (RTLS). Sequential and simultaneous engine failures are assessed and landing footprint information is provided during actual entry scenarios as well as hypothetical "loss of thrust now" scenarios during ascent.

Hu, Howard↗
NASA NTRS2011

Algorithm for Determination of Orion Ascent Abort Mode Achievability

For human spaceflight missions, a launch vehicle failure poses the challenge of returning the crew safely to earth through environments that are often much more stressful than the nominal mission. Manned spaceflight vehicles require continuous abort capability throughout the ascent trajectory to protect the crew in the event of a failure of the launch vehicle. To provide continuous abort coverage during the ascent trajectory, different types of Orion abort modes have been developed. If a launch vehicle failure occurs, the crew must be able to quickly and accurately determine the appropriate abort mode to execute. Early in the ascent, while the Launch Abort System (LAS) is attached, abort mode selection is trivial, and any failures will result in a LAS abort. For failures after LAS jettison, the Service Module (SM) effectors are employed to perform abort maneuvers. Several different SM abort mode options are available depending on the current vehicle location and energy state. During this region of flight the selection of the abort mode that maximizes the survivability of the crew becomes non-trivial. To provide the most accurate and timely information to the crew and the onboard abort decision logic, on-board algorithms have been developed to propagate the abort trajectories based on the current launch vehicle performance and to predict the current abort capability of the Orion vehicle. This paper will provide an overview of the algorithm architecture for determining abort achievability as well as the scalar integration scheme that makes the onboard computation possible. Extension of the algorithm to assessing abort coverage impacts from Orion design modifications and launch vehicle trajectory modifications is also presented.

Tedesco, Mark B.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRS2015

Orion Launch Abort System Performance on Exploration Flight Test 1

This paper will present an overview of the flight test objectives and performance of the Orion Launch Abort System during Exploration Flight Test-1. Exploration Flight Test-1, the first flight test of the Orion spacecraft, was managed and led by the Orion prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and launched atop a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket. This flight test was a two-orbit, high-apogee, high-energy entry, low-inclination test mission used to validate and test systems critical to crew safety. This test included the first flight test of the Launch Abort System preforming Orion nominal flight mission critical objectives. NASA is currently designing and testing the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). Orion will serve as NASA's new exploration vehicle to carry astronauts to deep space destinations and safely return them to earth. The Orion spacecraft is composed of four main elements: the Launch Abort System, the Crew Module, the Service Module, and the Spacecraft Adapter (Fig. 1). The Launch Abort System (LAS) provides two functions; during nominal launches, the LAS provides protection for the Crew Module from atmospheric loads and heating during first stage flight and during emergencies provides a reliable abort capability for aborts that occur within the atmosphere. The Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) consists of an Abort Motor to provide the abort separation from the Launch Vehicle, an Attitude Control Motor to provide attitude and rate control, and a Jettison Motor for crew module to LAS separation (Fig. 2). The jettison motor is used during a nominal launch to separate the LAS from the Launch Vehicle (LV) early in the flight of the second stage when it is no longer needed for aborts and at the end of an LAS abort sequence to enable deployment of the crew module's Landing Recovery System. The LAS also provides a Boost Protective Cover fairing that shields the crew module from debris and the aero-thermal environment during ascent. Although the Orion Program has tested a number of the critical systems of the Orion spacecraft on the ground, the launch environment cannot be replicated completely on Earth. A number of flight tests have been conducted and are planned to demonstrate the performance and enable certification of the Orion Spacecraft. Exploration Flight Test 1, the first flight test of the Orion spacecraft, was successfully flown on December 5, 2014 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 37. Orion's first flight was a two-orbit, high-apogee, high-energy entry, low-inclination test mission used to validate and test systems critical to crew safety, such as heat shield performance, separation events, avionics and software performance, attitude control and guidance, parachute deployment and recovery operations. One of the key separation events tested during this flight was the nominal jettison of the LAS. Data from this flight will be used to verify the function of the jettison motor to separate the Launch Abort System from the crew module so it can continue on with the mission. The LAS nominal jettison event on Exploration Flight Test 1 occurred at six minutes and twenty seconds after liftoff (See Fig. 3). The abort motor and attitude control motors were inert for Exploration Flight Test 1, since the mission did not require abort capabilities. A suite of developmental flight instrumentation was included on the flight test to provide data on spacecraft subsystems and separation events. This paper will focus on the flight test objectives and performance of the LAS during ascent and nominal jettison. Selected LAS subsystem flight test data will be presented and discussed in the paper. Exploration Flight Test -1 will provide critical data that will enable engineering to improve Orion's design and reduce risk for the astronauts it will protect as NASA continues to move forward on its human journey to Mars. The lessons learned from Exploration Flight Test 1 and the other Flight Test Vehicles will certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of a human-rated space launch vehicle.

McCauley, R.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Orion Launch Abort System Performance During Exploration Flight Test 1

The Orion Launch Abort System Office is taking part in flight testing to enable certification that the system is capable of delivering the astronauts aboard the Orion Crew Module to a safe environment during both nominal and abort conditions. Orion is a NASA program, Exploration Flight Test 1 is managed and led by the Orion prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and launched on a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket. Although the Launch Abort System Office has tested the critical systems to the Launch Abort System jettison event on the ground, the launch environment cannot be replicated completely on Earth. During Exploration Flight Test 1, the Launch Abort System was to verify the function of the jettison motor to separate the Launch Abort System from the crew module so it can continue on with the mission. Exploration Flight Test 1 was successfully flown on December 5, 2014 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 37. This was the first flight test of the Launch Abort System preforming Orion nominal flight mission critical objectives. The abort motor and attitude control motors were inert for Exploration Flight Test 1, since the mission did not require abort capabilities. Exploration Flight Test 1 provides critical data that enable engineering to improve Orion's design and reduce risk for the astronauts it will protect as NASA continues to move forward on its human journey to Mars. The Exploration Flight Test 1 separation event occurred at six minutes and twenty seconds after liftoff. The separation of the Launch Abort System jettison occurs once Orion is safely through the most dynamic portion of the launch. This paper will present a brief overview of the objectives of the Launch Abort System during a nominal Orion flight. Secondly, the paper will present the performance of the Launch Abort System at it fulfilled those objectives. The lessons learned from Exploration Flight Test 1 and the other Flight Test Vehicles will certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of a human-rated space launch vehicle.

McCauley, Rachel↗
NASA NTRS2008

J-2X Abort System Development

The J-2X is an expendable liquid hydrogen (LH2)/liquid oxygen (LOX) gas generator cycle rocket engine that is currently being designed as the primary upper stage propulsion element for the new NASA Ares vehicle family. The J-2X engine will contain abort logic that functions as an integral component of the Ares vehicle abort system. This system is responsible for detecting and responding to conditions indicative of impending Loss of Mission (LOM), Loss of Vehicle (LOV), and/or catastrophic Loss of Crew (LOC) failure events. As an earth orbit ascent phase engine, the J-2X is a high power density propulsion element with non-negligible risk of fast propagation rate failures that can quickly lead to LOM, LOV, and/or LOC events. Aggressive reliability requirements for manned Ares missions and the risk of fast propagating J-2X failures dictate the need for on-engine abort condition monitoring and autonomous response capability as well as traditional abort agents such as the vehicle computer, flight crew, and ground control not located on the engine. This paper describes the baseline J-2X abort subsystem concept of operations, as well as the development process for this subsystem. A strategy that leverages heritage system experience and responds to an evolving engine design as well as J-2X specific test data to support abort system development is described. The utilization of performance and failure simulation models to support abort system sensor selection, failure detectability and discrimination studies, decision threshold definition, and abort system performance verification and validation is outlined. The basis for abort false positive and false negative performance constraints is described. Development challenges associated with information shortfalls in the design cycle, abort condition coverage and response assessment, engine-vehicle interface definition, and abort system performance verification and validation are also discussed.

Santi, Louis M.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Design of Launch Abort System Thrust Profile and Concept of Operations

This paper describes how the Abort Motor thrust profile has been tailored and how optimizing the Concept of Operations on the Launch Abort System (LAS) of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) aides in getting the crew safely away from a failed Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). Unlike the passive nature of the Apollo system, the Orion Launch Abort Vehicle will be actively controlled, giving the program a more robust abort system with a higher probability of crew survival for an abort at all points throughout the CLV trajectory. By optimizing the concept of operations and thrust profile the Orion program will be able to take full advantage of the active Orion LAS. Discussion will involve an overview of the development of the abort motor thrust profile and the current abort concept of operations as well as their effects on the performance of LAS aborts. Pad Abort (for performance) and Maximum Drag (for separation from the Launch Vehicle) are the two points that dictate the required thrust and shape of the thrust profile. The results in this paper show that 95% success of all performance requirements is not currently met for Pad Abort. Future improvements to the current parachute sequence and other potential changes will mitigate the current problems, and meet abort performance requirements.

Litton, Daniel↗