Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Weapons industry.”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Post-Calibration Uncertainty Analysis for Travel Times at a Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant

The Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant (NWIRP) in McGregor, Texas began manufacturing explosives in 1980 and several hazardous chemicals were discovered in lakes and streams surrounding the site in 1998. Contaminants traveled to local lakes and streams much faster than initially predicted. This research estimated contaminant travel times and identified locations where monitoring wells should be installed to yield the greatest reductions in uncertainties in travel-time predictions. To this end, groundwater and particle-tracking models for NWIRP site were built to predict hydraulic heads and contaminant travel times. Next, parameter (hydraulic conductivities) uncertainties, parameter identifiabilities, observation (hydraulic heads) worth, and predictive (contaminant travel times) uncertainties were quantified. Parameter uncertainties were reduced by up to 92%; a total of 19 of 158 parameters were at least moderately identifiable; travel-time uncertainties were reduced up to 92%. Additionally, travel-time predictions and post-calibration parameter distributions were generated using the null-space Monte Carlo (NSMC) technique. NSMC predicted that conservative tracers exited the flow system within a year, which matches with field data. Finally, an observations-worth analysis found that additional 11 more measurements would reduce travel-time uncertainties by factors from 1.04 to 4.3 over existing data if monitoring wells were installed at the suggested locations.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Exposure and genetics increase risk of beryllium sensitisation and chronic beryllium disease in the nuclear weapons industry

Beryllium sensitisation (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) are caused by exposure to beryllium with susceptibility affected by at least one well-studied genetic host factor, a glutamic acid residue at position 69 (E69) of the HLA-DPb chain (DPbE69). However, the nature of the relationship between exposure and carriage of the DPbE69 genotype has not been well studied. The goal of this study was to determine the relationship between DP{beta}E69 and exposure in BeS and CBD. Current and former workers (n=181) from a US nuclear weapons production facility, the Y-12 National Security Complex (Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA), were enrolled in a case-control study including 35 individuals with BeS and 19 with CBD. HLA-DPB1 genotypes were determined by PCR-SSP. Beryllium exposures were assessed through worker interviews and industrial hygiene assessment of work tasks. After removing the confounding effect of potential beryllium exposure at another facility, multivariate models showed a sixfold (OR 6.06, 95% CI 1.96 to 18.7) increased odds for BeS and CBD combined among DP{beta}E69 carriers and a fourfold (OR 3.98, 95% CI 1.43 to 11.0) increased odds for those exposed over an assigned lifetime-weighted average exposure of 0.1 {micro}g/m{sup 3}. Those with both risk factors had higher increased odds (OR 24.1, 95% CI 4.77 to 122). DP{beta}E69 carriage and high exposure to beryllium appear to contribute individually to the development of BeS and CBD. Among workers at a beryllium-using facility, the magnitude of risk associated with either elevated beryllium exposure or carriage of DP{beta}E69 alone appears to be similar.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

HOW MIGHT INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE NONPROLIFERATION

Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include 1) the nuclear industry, 2) dual-use industries, and 3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that, ultimately, broad engagement of global industry leaders in self regulation is needed to result in the greatest nonproliferation benefit.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Microbial Community Dynamics of Lactate Enriched Hanford Groundwaters

The Department of Energy site at Hanford, WA, has been historically impacted by U and Cr from the nuclear weapons industry. In an attempt to stimulate microbial remediation of these metals, in-situ lactate enrichment experiments are ongoing. In order to bridge the gap from the laboratory to the field, we inoculated triplicate anaerobic, continuous-flow glass reactors with groundwater collected from well Hanford 100-H in order to obtain a stable, enriched community while selecting for metal-reducing bacteria. Each reactor was fed from a single carboy containing defined media with 30 mM lactate at a rate of 0.223 ml/min under continuous nitrogen flow at 9 ml/min. Cell counts, organic acids, gDNA (for qPCR and pyrosequencing) and gases were sampled during the experiment. Cell counts remained low (less than 1x107 cells/ml) during the first two weeks of the experiment, but by day 20, had reached a density greater than 1x108 cells/ml. Metabolite analysis showed a decrease in the lactate concentrations over time. Pyruvate concentrations ranged from 20-40 uM the first week of the experiment then was undetectable after day 10. Likewise, formate appeared in the reactors during the first week with concentrations of 1.48-1.65 mM at day 7 then the concentrations decreased to 0.69-0.95 on day 10 and were undetectable on day 15. Acetate was present in low amounts on day 3 (0.15-0.33 mM) and steadily increased to 3.35-5.22 mM over time. Similarly, carbon dioxide was present in low concentrations early on and increased to 0.28-0.35 mM as the experiment progressed. We also were able to detect low amounts of methane (10-20 uM) during the first week of the experiment, but by day 10 the methane was undetectable. From these results and pyrosequencing analysis, we conclude that a shift in the microbial community dynamics occurred over time to eventually form a stable and enriched microbial community. Comprehensive investigations such as these allow for the examination of not only which nutrient source will accelerate site remediation, but also provide insight to evaluate remediation strategies through which enriched community members are important for bioremediation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Common tester platform concept.

This report summarizes the results of a case study on the doctrine of a common tester platform, a concept of a standardized platform that can be applicable across the broad spectrum of testing requirements throughout the various stages of a weapons program, as well as across the various weapons programs. The common tester concept strives to define an affordable, next-generation design that will meet testing requirements with the flexibility to grow and expand; supporting the initial development stages of a weapons program through to the final production and surveillance stages. This report discusses a concept investing key leveraging technologies and operational concepts combined with prototype tester-development experiences and practical lessons learned gleaned from past weapons programs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Advanced engineering environment collaboration project.

The Advanced Engineering Environment (AEE) is a model for an engineering design and communications system that will enhance project collaboration throughout the nuclear weapons complex (NWC). Sandia National Laboratories and Parametric Technology Corporation (PTC) worked together on a prototype project to evaluate the suitability of a portion of PTC's Windchill 9.0 suite of data management, design and collaboration tools as the basis for an AEE. The AEE project team implemented Windchill 9.0 development servers in both classified and unclassified domains and used them to test and evaluate the Windchill tool suite relative to the needs of the NWC using weapons project use cases. A primary deliverable was the development of a new real time collaborative desktop design and engineering process using PDMLink (data management tool), Pro/Engineer (mechanical computer aided design tool) and ProductView Lite (visualization tool). Additional project activities included evaluations of PTC's electrical computer aided design, visualization, and engineering calculations applications. This report documents the AEE project work to share information and lessons learned with other NWC sites. It also provides PTC with recommendations for improving their products for NWC applications.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Summary of FY13 Industry Interviews

The spread of weapons of mass destruction relies on the illicit procurement of dual-use items, and industry plays a critical role in preventing these transfers. Export control systems regulate industry’s sales, but there are additional steps that industry and government can take to stop proliferators. Collectively, these additional steps are known as industry self-regulation. The industry self-regulation project at PNNL has identified several approaches to going “beyond compliance” in recent years, including corporate sustainability, competitive advantages for nonproliferation, and a third party. In FY12 the project team moved from a research phase to an implementation phase, and prepared to seek feedback from industry on these topics. This effort included research to identify American manufacturers of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part 2 Annex commodities. To gain initial responses from industry about whether these ideas could be reasonably implemented, in FY13 the project team conducted a series of outreach interviews. Outreach was initially focused on firms in the carbon fiber, filament winding, and maraging steel sectors. The project team chose these sectors based on the number of firms that produce these items and their proliferation relevance. As the year progressed, the team widened its outreach to manufacturers of a variety of NSG-controlled commodities. In total, the project team contacted 57 firms and conducted 13 interviews. The interviewed firms manufactured or distributed at least 11 controlled commodities. All interviews were conducted on a not for-public-attribution basis, and all information in this summary, unless otherwise cited, can be assumed to be derived from the interviews.

Nonproliferation↗

Plutonium isotope ratio variations in North America

Historically, approximately 12,000 TBq of plutonium was distributed throughout the global biosphere by thermo nuclear weapons testing. The resultant global plutonium fallout is a complex mixture whose {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio is a function of the design and yield of the devices tested. The average {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio in global fallout is 0.176 + 014. However, the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio at any location may differ significantly from 0.176. Plutonium has also been released by discharges and accidents associated with the commercial and weapons related nuclear industries. At many locations contributions from this plutonium significantly alters the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios from those observed in global fallout. We have measured the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios in environmental samples collected from many locations in North America. This presentation will summarize the analytical results from these measurements. Special emphasis will be placed on interpretation of the significance of the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios measured in environmental samples collected in the Arctic and in the western portions of the United States.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Coordinate Measuring Machine Pit Artifact Inspection Procedure

The goal of this document is to outline a procedure for dimensional measurement of Los Alamos National Laboratory's CMM Pit Artifact. This procedure will be used by the Manufacturing Practice's Inspection Technology Subgroup of the Interagency Manufacturing Operations Group and Joint Operations Weapon Operations Group (IMOG/JOWOG 39) round robin participants. The intent is to assess the state of industry within the Nuclear Weapons Complex for measurements made on this type of part and find which current measurement strategies and techniques produce the best results.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Nuclear System-of-Systems Capabilities Analytic Process

This dissertation discusses the impetus for, development of, and initial demonstration of NuSCAPTM: the Nuclear System-of-Systems Capabilities Analytic Process TM . NuSCAP is an approach executed via a Python® application that enables capabilities-based vulnerability analyses of military systems of systems (SOS) exposed to prompt nuclear weapon effects. The NuSCAP application calls on industry-standard, fast-running nuclear weapon effects tools and the Monte Carlo N-Particle®1 (MCNP®) code to evaluate the impact of nuclear weapon environments on the military capabilities of a complex and networked SOS.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Advanced Tele-operation and Shared Autonomy for Nuclearized Robotic Systems - 17333

Remotely-initiated operations have existed for more than 50 years in the nuclear weapons complex, as the environments are far too extreme for humans. We introduce the scope of the nuclear waste cleanup effort and describe some existing applications of robotics technology at specific sites. We offer summaries of both the technology that is currently used, as well as a discussion of the types of problems that the technology is applied to. We contrast this with the current state of practice in other areas where robots are deployed in the real world, such as with military infantry units. We then go on to summarize and discuss the current state of the art in advanced tele-operation research and in shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed-loop automation to complete tasks. Our discussion focuses on areas with particular relevance to nuclear waste management, such as remote inspection and manipulation. Armed with this background, we then identify specific technology gaps that must be closed in order to successfully bring advanced tele-operation and shared autonomy technologies to bear on problems in nuclear waste management, such as (1) environmental remediation; (2) sampling, characterization, and disposition of tanks with hazardous and highly radioactive waste and (3) decontamination and decommissioning of facilities with gloveboxes and hot cells. We propose a roadmap for how to transition the current state of the art approaches in advanced robotics and shared autonomy to practice in the nuclear industry and how to close the technology gaps previously identified. This roadmap covers not only the technical advances that need to be made, but also considers the social and societal aspects. Drawing parallels with the adoption of similar technologies in the military and other areas, we offer concrete suggestions for how to deploy these new technologies effectively into the nuclear industry from a human-centered perspective. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis Code for High Gradient Dielectric Insulator Surface Breakdown

High voltage (HV) insulators are critical components in high-energy, accelerator and pulsed power systems that drive diverse applications in the national security, nuclear weapons science, defense and industrial arenas. In these systems, the insulator may separate vacuum/non-vacuum regions or conductors with high electrical field gradients. These insulators will often fail at electric fields over an order of magnitude lower than their intrinsic dielectric strength due to flashover at the dielectric interface. Decades of studies have produced a wealth of information on fundamental processes and mechanisms important for flashover initiation, but only for relatively simple insulator configurations in controlled environments. Accelerator and pulsed power system designers are faced with applying the fundamental knowledge to complex, operational devices with escalating HV requirements. Designers are forced to rely on “best practices” and expensive prototype testing, providing boundaries for successful operation. However, the safety margin is difficult to estimate, and system design must be very conservative for situations where testing is not practicable, or replacement of failed parts is disruptive or expensive. The Phase I program demonstrated the feasibility of developing an advanced code for modeling insulator breakdown. Such a code would be of great interest for a number of applications, including high energy physics, microwave source development, fusion sciences, and other research and industrial applications using high voltage devices.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

CMM Interim Check Design of Experiments (U)

Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMM) are widely used in industry, throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to verify part conformance to design definition. Calibration cycles for CMMs at LANL are predominantly one year in length and include a weekly interim check to reduce risk. The CMM interim check makes use of Renishaw’s Machine Checking Gauge which is an off-the-shelf product simulates a large sphere within a CMM’s measurement volume and allows for error estimation. As verification on the interim check process a design of experiments investigation was proposed to test a couple of key factors (location and inspector). The results from the two-factor factorial experiment proved that location influenced results more than the inspector or interaction.

42 ENGINEERING↗

CMM Interim Check (U)

Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMM) are widely used in industry, throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to verify part conformance to design definition. Calibration cycles for CMMs at LANL are predominantly one year in length. Unfortunately, several nonconformance reports have been generated to document the discovery of a certified machine found out of tolerance during a calibration closeout. In an effort to reduce risk to product quality two solutions were proposed – shorten the calibration cycle which could be costly, or perform an interim check to monitor the machine’s performance between cycles. The CMM interim check discussed makes use of Renishaw’s Machine Checking Gauge. This off-the-shelf product simulates a large sphere within a CMM’s measurement volume and allows for error estimation. Data was gathered, analyzed, and simulated from seven machines in seventeen different configurations to create statistical process control run charts for on-the-floor monitoring.

42 ENGINEERING↗

RePED 250: Manufacturing and Market Analysis of High-Temperature Alternators

The novel repetitive pulsed electric drill 250 (RePED 250) has the potential to greatly lower the costs and drilling times of geothermal projects. This tool discharges electric pulses through hard rock formations, shattering the rock in tension and allowing it to be quickly removed. One hurdle in bringing this technology to market is the RePED 250 downhole alternator. This component is essential for supplying power to the electronic drilling tool. There are currently no downhole tools on the market that meet the RePED 250 alternator's high temperature and power requirements. This report focuses on the path to commercialization for this novel alternator technology being developed as part of the RePED 250 project. One aim of this work is to identify the geothermal market size for the RePED 250 alternator, as well as other potential markets for this technology outside of geothermal. The geothermal market is very small, with only approximately 13 wells drilled in the United States each year. The worldwide market is several times this size and growing each year. The ability of the RePED 250 technology to drastically reduce the cost of geothermal projects may also lead to an increase in this market size. Technology developed for the high-temperature, high-power RePED 250 alternator can also be used to create high-temperature and high-power motors. These motors and alternators will have potential applications in oil and gas drilling, a $300 billion dollar industry in the United States alone, as well as in more distant industries such as aircraft, weapon systems, space exploration, and electric vehicles. Other aspects of the RePED 250 alternator's path to commercialization are also analyzed, including the supply chain for production materials and potential manufacturing methods. The supply chain and manufacturing practices for low-temperature motors and alternators are well established and require relatively minor changes for the high-temperature and high-power RePED 250 alternator. Sourcing for high-temperature materials has been identified, as well as potential supply chain risks. These most notably include electrical steel and high-temperature samarium cobalt (SmCo) magnets. Overall, these risks are not expected to be significant at the likely manufacturing scale required for the RePED 250.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Walk the Talk: How PNNL is developing a Supply Chain Security Culture

For the past decade, a team at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has engaged industry to “go beyond compliance” in controlling and securing their supply chains to ensure their goods are not diverted to nuclear weapons programs. This work has focused on dual-use industries that manufacture products that can be used in both commercial applications and in the development of a nuclear weapon. The team encourages industry to self-regulate to reduce proliferation risks. As part of that work, PNNL interviewed numerous companies about their compliance practices in order to understand their business and to build awareness around best practices to ensure security of goods and information along their supply chains. As a result, PNNL has identified seven indicators that a company can adopt as part of their commitment to nonproliferation ideals.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Walk the Talk: Progress in Building a Supply Chain Security Culture

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has engaged industry to “go beyond compliance” for over a decade in controlling and securing their supply chains to ensure their goods are not diverted to nuclear weapons programs. This work has focused on dual-use industries that manufacture products that can be used in both commercial applications and in the development of a nuclear weapon. The team encourages industry to self-regulate to reduce proliferation risks. As part of that work, PNNL interviewed numerous companies about their compliance practices to understand their business and to build awareness around best practices to ensure security of goods, technology, and information along their supply chains. From conducting this work, PNNL identified indicators that a company can adopt as part of its commitment to nonproliferation ideals with a focus on supply chain security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗