Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Waste Isolation Pilot Plant”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Initial Simulations of Empty Room Collapse and Reconsolidation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geologic repository for defense-related nuclear waste. If left undisturbed, the virtually impermeable rock salt surrounding the repository will isolate the nuclear waste from the biosphere. If humans accidentally intrude into the repository in the future, then the likelihood of a radionuclide release to the biosphere will depend significantly on the porosity and permeability of the repository itself. Room ceilings and walls at the WIPP tend to collapse over time, causing rubble piles to form on floors of empty rooms. The surrounding rock formation will gradually compact these rubble piles until they eventually become solid salt, but the length of time for a rubble pile to reach a certain porosity and permeability is unknown. This report details the first efforts to build models to predict the porosity and permeability evolution of an empty room as it closes. Conventional geomechanical numerical methods would struggle to model empty room collapse and rubble pile consolidation, so three different meshless methods, the Immersed Isogeometric Analysis Meshfree, Reproducing Kernel Particle Method (RKPM), and the Conformal Reproducing Kernel method, were assessed. First, the meshless methods and the finite element method each simulated gradual room closure, without ceiling or wall collapse. All three methods produced equivalent room closure predictions with comparable computational speed. Second, the Immersed Isogeometric Analysis Meshfree method and RKPM simulated two-dimensional empty room collapse and rubble pile consolidation. Both methods successfully simulated large viscoplastic deformations, fracture, and rubble pile rearrangement to produce qualitatively realistic results. In addition to geomechanical simulations, the flow channels in damaged salt and crushed salt were measured using micro-computed tomography, and input into a computational fluid dynamics simulation to predict the salt's permeability. Although room for improvement exists, the current simulation approaches appear promising.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

White Paper on Lithium-Ion Battery Safety for use in Safety Planning at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is an underground facility designed to safely dispose of radioactive waste. The WIPP uses many heavy vehicles to transport materials and equipment underground. Most of these vehicles are powered by traditional internal combustion engines (ICE) with diesel fuel. Recently, electric vehicles (EVs) powered with batteries have been used at the WIPP. EVs have very low operational and maintenance costs, not considering battery replacements, and they have zero emissions during operation. This absence of emissions makes them ideal for underground facilities with limited ventilation. Even if a facility has robust ventilation normally, ventilation systems can break down leading to restrictions in ICE powered operations. Figure 1 shows a rendering of the WIPP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Simulations of Pipe Overpack Container Compaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is an operating geologic repository in southeastern New Mexico for transuranic (TRU) waste from nuclear defense activities. Past nuclear criticality concerns have generally been low at the WIPP due to the low initial concentration of fissile material and the natural tendency of fissile solute to disperse during fluid transport in porous media (Rechard et al. 2000). On the other hand, the list of acceptable WIPP waste types has expanded over the years to include Criticality Control Overpack (CCO) containers and Pipe Overpack (POP) containers. Containers bound for WIPP are bundled together in hexagon shaped 7-packs (six containers surround one container in the center). Two 7-packs are often combined into a TRUPACT-II package for a total of 14 containers. Most TRUPACT-II packages are restricted to a maximum fissile mass equivalent to plutonium (FMEP) between 0.1 and 0.38 kg, but a CCO TRUPACT-II package and a POP TRUPACT-II package are respectively permitted to have 5.32 kg and 2.80 kg FMEP (see Section 3 of US DOE (2013)). Consequently, CCO container criticality after emplacement at the WIPP was evaluated in Saylor and Scaglione (2018), and Oak Ridge National Laboratories is currently at work on POP container criticality analyses.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advantages of the shielded containers at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) disposal operations currently employ two different disposal methods: one for Contact Handled (CH) waste and another for Remote Handled (RH) waste. CH waste is emplaced in a variety of payload container configurations on the floor of each disposal room. In contrast, RH waste is packaged into a single type of canister and emplaced in pre-drilled holes in the walls of disposal rooms. Emplacement of the RH waste in the walls must proceed in advance of CH waste emplacement and therefore poses logistical constraints, in addition to the loss of valuable disposal capacity. To improve operational efficiency and disposal capacity, the Department of Energy (DOE) has proposed a shielded container for certain RH waste streams. RH waste with relatively low gammaemitting activity would be packaged in lead-lined containers, shipped to WIPP in existing certified transportation packages for CH waste and emplaced in WIPP among the stacks of CH waste containers on the floor of a disposal room. RH waste with high gamma-emitting activity would continue to be emplaced in the boreholes along the walls. The new RH container is similar to the nominal 208-liter (55-gallon) drum, however it includes about 2.5 cm (1 in) of lead, sandwiched between thick steel sheets. Furthermore, the top and bottom are made of thick plate steel to strengthening the package to meet transportation requirements. This robust configuration provides an overpack for materials that otherwise would be RH waste. This paper describes the container and the regulatory approach used to meet the requirements imposed by regulations that apply to WIPP. This includes a Performance Assessment used to evaluate WIPP's long-term performance and the DOE's approach to gain approval for the transportation of shielded containers. This paper also describes estimates of the DOE's RH transuranic waste inventory that may be packaged and emplaced in shielded containers. Finally, the paper includes a discussion of how the DOE proposes to track the waste packaged into shielded containers against the RH waste inventory and how this will comply with the regulated volume.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PFLOTRAN Integrated Performance Assessment at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the deep geologic disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste in southeast New Mexico. The purpose of performance assessment (PA) is to estimate probability of potential radionuclide releases from the repository to the environment for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after its closure. The use of PFLOTRAN has been proposed to enhance PA with more physically realistic flow and transport models in 3D. PFLOTRAN is a state-of-art massively parallel subsurface flow and reactive transport code. This paper introduces the progress of implementation of PFLOTRAN in the PA and the preliminary results for undisturbed repository conditions. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Environmental Assessment for the Above Ground Storage Capability at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Draft

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the nation’s only approved repository for the disposal of defense related/defense generated transuranic (TRU) and mixed hazardous TRU waste (henceforth called TRU waste). The mission of the WIPP Project is to realize the safe disposal of TRU waste from TRU waste generator sites in the Department of Energy waste complex. The WIPP Project was authorized by Title II, Section 213(a) of Public Law 96-164 (U. S. Congress 1979). Congress designated the WIPP facility “for the express purpose of providing a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the defense activities and programs of the United States exempted from regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).” The WIPP facility is operated by the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE). Transuranic waste that is disposed in the WIPP facility is defined by Section 2(18) the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act of 1992 (LWA) (U. S. Congress, 1992) as: “waste containing more than 100 nanocuries of alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes per gram of waste, with half-lives greater than 20 years, except for: (A) high-level radioactive waste; (B) waste that the Secretary has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator, does not need the degree of isolation required by the disposal regulations; or (C) waste that the NRC has approved for disposal on a case-by-case basis in accordance with part 61 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Ground Control Annual Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (Rev. 7)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is designed to permanently dispose of transuranic radioactive waste left from the research and production of nuclear weapons. Transuranic waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, and other such items contaminated with trace amounts of radioactive elements, mostly plutonium. Located in southeastern New Mexico, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, project facilities include disposal rooms excavated in an ancient, stable salt formation 2,150 feet (655 meters) underground. This deep geologic setting requires that a comprehensive ground control program be in place to monitor and assure the stability of the underground openings and address issues of concern. The primary objective of the WIPP ground control program is to provide a safe environment for personnel and equipment in a manner that is consistent with the primary facility operational objective of waste disposal. In meeting this primary objective, the regulatory requirements specific to ground control are also satisfied. The ground control program is a concerted and centralized activity responsible for providing a continuing assessment of the capabilities of the underground openings to achieve that objective. The fundamentals on which the ground control program at WIPP is based are as follows: (1) safe access is maintained as long as access is required; (2) regular ground-control maintenance is required to maintain safe access; (3) ground control maintenance efforts increase with the age of the openings; (4) ground control plans are specific but flexible; and (5) regulatory requirements are met. The extensive geotechnical monitoring program provides a high degree of confidence in the ability to predict and mitigate ground control issues before they become safety problems. The evaluation of ground conditions is a continuous process. The Westinghouse TRU Solutions (WTS) Geotechnical Engineering Section gathers and evaluates data from various sources on a periodic basis. This information is formally presented in a variety of ways, primarily bimonthly and annual reports.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Ground Control Annual Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (Rev. 8)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is designed to permanently dispose of transuranic radioactive waste left from the research and production of nuclear weapons. Transuranic waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, and other such items contaminated with trace amounts of radioactive elements, mostly plutonium. Located in southeastern New Mexico, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, project facilities include disposal rooms excavated in an ancient, stable salt formation 2,150 feet (655 meters) underground. This deep geologic setting requires that a comprehensive ground control program be in place to monitor and assure the stability of the underground openings and address issues of concern. The primary objective of the WIPP ground control program is to provide a safe environment for personnel and equipment in a manner that is consistent with the primary facility operational objective of waste disposal. In meeting this primary objective, the regulatory requirements specific to ground control are also satisfied. The ground control program is a concerted and centralized activity responsible for providing a continuing assessment of the capabilities of the underground openings to achieve that objective. The fundamentals on which the ground control program at WIPP is based are as follows: (1) safe access is maintained as long as access is required; (2) regular ground-control maintenance is required to maintain safe access; (3) ground control maintenance efforts increase with the age of the openings; (4) ground control plans are specific but flexible; and (5) regulatory requirements are met. The extensive geotechnical monitoring program provides a high degree of confidence in the ability to predict and mitigate ground control issues before they become safety problems. The evaluation of ground conditions is a continuous process. The Westinghouse TRU Solutions (WTS) Geotechnical Engineering Section gathers and evaluates data from various sources on a periodic basis. This information is formally presented in a variety of ways, primarily bimonthly and annual reports.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of PFLOTRAN Transport Capability for Use in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Performance Assessment - 20545

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) performance assessment (PA) calculations estimate the probability of radionuclide release from the repository to the land surface and across the land withdrawal boundary for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after facility closure. Simulations of flow and transport in the repository and the surrounding Salado Formation are foundational to the PA. Because proposed additional waste emplacement panels would result in an asymmetric repository layout, the US Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing to transition to use of a three-dimensional (3-D) model domain for simulation of flow and transport instead of the two-dimensional (2-D) flared grid domain currently used. DOE has charged Sandia National Laboratories with developing the capability necessary to simulate processes affecting flow and transport in the WIPP in PFLOTRAN, an open-source massively parallel multi-phase flow and reactive transport code. The new flow and transport capabilities developed in PFLOTRAN incorporate WIPP-specific process models and will replace the 2-D simulators (BRAGFLO and NUTS) that are currently utilized for Salado flow and transport calculations in WIPP PA. The focus of this paper is on the development of a new Nuclear Waste Transport (NWT) mode in PFLOTRAN that has all of the capabilities necessary for Salado transport simulations, including the ability to handle complete dry-out (100% gas saturation) of arbitrary cells in the model domain, radionuclide mass conservation at step changes in porosity associated with borehole intrusion, and the ability to calculate fluxes on a flared grid. The new PFLOTRAN transport capability and a suite of verification tests were designed around a list of functional requirements for WIPP PA calculations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Overview

The mission of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is to demonstrate the safe, environmentally sound, cost effective, permanent disposal of Transuranic (TRU) waste left from production of nuclear weapons.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗