FACILITY OPERATING PLAN FOR AREA 5 ASBESTOS SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL SITE CLASS III SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL SITE PERMIT NO. SW 532
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DESIGN REPORT FOR AREA 5 ASBESTOS SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL SITE CLASS III SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL SITE PERMIT NO. SW 532
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Food waste disposal and utilization in the United States: A spatial cost benefit analysis
Not Available
Badgett, Alex (ORCID:0000000291697098)↗
Safety aspects of nuclear waste disposal in space
Safety issues involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes in space as a complement to mined geologic repositories are examined as part of an assessment of the feasibility of nuclear waste disposal in space. General safety guidelines for space disposal developed in the areas of radiation exposure and shielding, containment, accident environments, criticality, post-accident recovery, monitoring systems and isolation are presented for a nuclear waste disposal in space mission employing conventional space technology such as the Space Shuttle. The current reference concept under consideration by NASA and DOE is then examined in detail, with attention given to the waste source and mix, the waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, launch site operations and facilities, Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, orbit transfer vehicle, orbital operations and space destination, and the system safety aspects of the concept are discussed for each component. It is pointed out that future work remains in the development of an improved basis for the safety guidelines and the determination of the possible benefits and costs of the space disposal option for nuclear wastes.
Rice, E. E.↗
Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada
Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.
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Preliminary risk benefit assessment for nuclear waste disposal in space
This paper describes the recent work of the authors on the evaluation of health risk benefits of space disposal of nuclear waste. The paper describes a risk model approach that has been developed to estimate the non-recoverable, cumulative, expected radionuclide release to the earth's biosphere for different options of nuclear waste disposal in space. Risk estimates for the disposal of nuclear waste in a mined geologic repository and the short- and long-term risk estimates for space disposal were developed. The results showed that the preliminary estimates of space disposal risks are low, even with the estimated uncertainty bounds. If calculated release risks for mined geologic repositories remain as low as given by the U.S. DOE, and U.S. EPA requirements continue to be met, then no additional space disposal study effort in the U.S. is warranted at this time. If risks perceived by the public are significant in the acceptance of mined geologic repositories, then consideration of space disposal as a complement to the mined geologic repository is warranted.
Rice, E. E.↗
U.S. program assessing nuclear waste disposal in space - A status report
Various concepts for the space disposal of nuclear waste are discussed, with attention given to the destinations now being considered (high earth orbit, lunar orbit, lunar surface, solar orbit, solar system escape, sun). Waste mixes are considered in the context of the 'Purex' (Plutonium and Uranium extraction) process and the potential forms for nuclear waste disposal (ORNL cermet, Boro-silicate glass, Metal matrix, Hot-pressed supercalcine) are described. Preliminary estimates of the energy required and the cost surcharge needed to support the space disposal of nuclear waste are presented (8 metric tons/year, requiring three Shuttle launches). When Purex is employed, the generated electrical energy needed to support the Shuttle launches is shown to be less than 1%, and the projected surcharge to electrical users is shown to be slightly more than two mills/kW-hour.
Rice, E. E.↗
Nuclear waste disposal in space
Work on nuclear waste disposal in space conducted by the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and contractors are reported. From the aggregate studies, it is concluded that space disposal of nuclear waste is technically feasible.
Burns, R. E.↗
Tank waste disposal
Chapter for Hanford book focusing on waste disposal at Hanford
IDF, waste disposal, Nuclear Waste↗
Radionuclide Transport Simulations Supporting Proposed Borehole Waste Disposal in Israel
A scientific collaboration between the U.S. and Israel is underway to assess the suitability of a potential site for subsurface radioactive waste disposal in the Negev Desert, Israel. The Negev Desert has several favorable attributes for geologic disposal, including an arid climate, a deep vadose zone, interlayered low-permeability lithologies, and carbonate rocks with high uranium-sorption potential. These features may provide a robust natural barrier to radionuclide migration. Geologic and laboratory characterization data from the Negev Desert are incorporated into multiphase flow and transport models, solved using PFLOTRAN, to aid in site characterization and risk analysis that will support decision-making for waste disposal in an intermediate-depth borehole design. The lithology with the greatest uranium sorption potential at the site is phosphorite. We use modeling to evaluate the ability of this layer to impact uranium transport around a proposed disposal borehole. The current objective of the simulations is focused on characterizing hypothetical leakage from waste canisters and subsequent uranium migration under three infiltration scenarios. Here, we describe a hydrogeologic model based on data from a local exploratory borehole and present results for uranium flow and transport simulations under varying infiltration scenarios. We find that under the current climate conditions, it is likely that uranium will remain in the near-field of the borehole for thousands of years. However, under a hypothesized extreme climate scenario representing an increase in infiltration by a factor of 300x above present-day values, uranium may break through the phosphorite layer and exit the base of the model domain (~200 m above the water table) within 1000 years. Simulation results have direct implications for the planning of nuclear waste disposal in the Negev Desert, and specifically in intermediate-depth boreholes.
58 GEOSCIENCES↗
Monitoring Plan for the Idaho National Laboratory Remote Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility
This monitoring plan for Idaho National Laboratory’s Remote-Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility was developed to meet the requirements for monitoring low-level waste disposal facilities according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” and the guidance provided in the associated technical standard “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation” (DOE-STD-5002-2017). The purpose of this monitoring plan is to document a monitoring strategy that includes (1) compliance monitoring activities to demonstrate compliance with regulatory standards/limits and (2) performance monitoring to build confidence the facility is performing as demonstrated in the facility performance assessment (PA) (DOE-ID 2018a), composite analysis (CA) (DOE ID 2012), and CA addendum (DOE-ID 2018b). The de minimus impact to the aquifer predicted by the PA suggests that aquifer compliance monitoring should be augmented with performance monitoring of the drainage course materials and sedimentary interbeds in the vadose zone beneath the facility to provide a more effective means of identifying performance deviations. The monitoring approach delineated in this document was informed by the systems evaluation of natural and engineered facility features presented in the PA, an assessment of aquifer baseline conditions (INL 2017d), the dose analysis conducted in support of the PA and CA, and monitoring data collected during the first four years of facility operations (baseline monitoring phase) (INL 2023b). This plan provides monitoring locations, sampling frequencies, and sampling methods; recommendations for data evaluation; and a description of the monitoring plan implementation. Collected data will be used to demonstrate facility compliance and to identify conditions that are not consistent with the key assumptions made by the PA and CA.
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Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Appendix F
As a supplement to Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.3, Table F-1 through Table F-24 provide tabular results of the sensitivity analysis calculations for waste disposal timing (Sensitivity Case S6) in NR07E (Cases 3 and 4) and NR26E (Cases 1 through 4). The title of each table identifies the DU, sensitivity case, and performance measure. Section F.1.1 (Table F-1 through Table F-8) presents results for NR07E and Section F.1.2 (Table F-9 through Table F-24) presents results for NR26E. In each table, radionuclides are sorted from highest to lowest nominal concentration or dose factor. Nominal values are when waste disposal occurs at the start of operations; timeline values are when waste disposal occurs at the end of operations. The differences (Δ values) in the last column of each table equal the timeline concentration or dose factor minus the nominal concentration or dose factor, where DF and CF are shorthand designations for dose factor and concentration factor, respectively.
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Past Approaches for Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Waste Disposal in the United States—Part 1: Safety Criteria and Treatment of Uncertainty
The United States (US), with its 50-year experience in developing deep geologic disposal for transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), has much to share with other countries. Yet, other countries are better able to translate the US experience and corresponding policy decisions into solutions sensible for their country when they understand the compliance requirements in US laws and regulations. This paper presents past approaches in the generic and site-specific standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and implementing regulations of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using the framework provided by (1) key questions of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, and (2) international consensus standards. Both the 1985 EPA generic standards, as updated in 1993 and applied at the operating Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southern New Mexico for transuranic waste from atomic energy defense activities, and the EPA 2008 site-specific standards and implementing regulations, as applied at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in southern Nevada for SNF and HLW, adopt the strategy of using quantitative, probabilistic analysis to assess performance and compliance.
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Monitoring the dispersion of ocean waste disposal plumes from ERTS-1 and Skylab
The author has identified the following significant results. About forty miles off the Delaware coast is located the disposal site for waste discharged from a plant processing titanium dioxide. The discharge is a greenish-brown; 15-20% acid liquid which consists primarily of iron chlorides and sulfates. The barge which transports this waste has a 1,000,000 gallon capacity and makes approximately three trips to the disposal site per week. ERTS-1 MSS digital tapes are being used to study the dispersion patterns and drift velocities of the iron-acid plume. Careful examination of ERTS-1 imagery disclosed a fishhook-shaped plume about 40 miles east of Cape Henlopen caused by a barge disposing acid wastes. The plume shows up more strongly in the green band than in the red band. Since some acids have a strong green component during dumping and turn slowly more brownish-reddish with age, the ratio of radiance signatures between the green and red bands may give an indication of how long before the satellite overpass the acid was dumped. Enlarged enhancements of the acid waste plumes, prepared from the ERTS-1 MSS digital tapes aided considerably in studies of the dispersion of the waste plume. Currently acid dumps are being coordinated with ERTS-1 overpasses.
Klemas, V.↗
An evaluation of some special techniques for nuclear waste disposal in space
A preliminary examination is reported of several special ways for space disposal of nuclear waste material which utilize the radioactive heat in the waste to assist in the propulsion for deep space trajectories. These include use of the wastes in a thermoelectric generator (RTG) which operates an electric propulsion device and a radioisotope - thermal thruster which uses hydrogen or ammonia as the propellant. These propulsive devices are compared to the space tug and the space tug/solar electric propulsion combination for disposal of waste on a solar system escape trajectory. Such comparisons indicate that the waste-RTG approach has considerable potential provided the combined specific mass of the waste container - RTG system does not exceed approximately 150 kg/kw sub e. Several exploratory numerical calculations have been made for high earth orbit and Earth escape destinations.
Mackay, J. S.↗
Thermal loading effects on chalk hydromechanical behavior for nuclear waste disposal
Safe disposal of heat-generating nuclear waste depends on host rock stability under thermal, hydrological, and mechanical stresses. This study investigates the effect of thermal loading on mechanical behavior of the shallowly buried Ghareb formation chalk through triaxial and hydrostatic constant strain rate and creep tests at temperatures up to 100 ˚C and effective pressures up to 20.7 MPa. Experimental results show that thermal loading reduces the elastic moduli of chalk by 50–75%, and a transition occurs above 60 ˚C where creep rates increase rapidly. Water saturation nearly doubles the thermally induced strain compared to dry conditions and strongly decreases material rigidity. Thermal loading also leads to significant pore pressure increases under undrained conditions and leads to reductions in the apparent permeability during drained conditions. Laboratory experimental data were used to parameterize and develop a preliminary constitutive model for predicting future deformation during repository operations in the Ghareb. The strongly coupled effects – mechanical weakening, fluid pressure fluctuations, and permeability modification – demonstrate that elevated repository temperatures will have a pronounced effect on the near field Ghareb behavior during waste disposal operations. The findings indicate that the coupled interactions must be considered in predictive models and repository design to ensure long-term nuclear waste isolation and safety.
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PARTITIONING AND TRANSMUTATION OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL IN SUPPORT OF GEOLOGICAL WASTE DISPOSAL
Nuclear energy is a low-carbon technology that generates bulk baseload electricity and supports long-lasting eco-friendly sustainability goals. However, it still faces challenges, such as the securing and managing of long-lived nuclear actinides and fission products—most notably the used fuel, which is considered high-level waste (HLW). Direct geological waste disposal would be the most economical option for HLW but requires highly qualified sites whose geophysical behavior will remain stable for 10,000 years. Partitioning and transmutation (P&T) of used fuel reduces radioactivity and decay heat generation, enabling efficient geological waste disposal. P&T research and development, along with the prospects of P&T techniques such as wet/dry separation and accelerator-driven systems, were reviewed to identify critical needs that must be met to foster their successful implementation.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
U.S. program assessing nuclear waste disposal in space - A 1981 status report
Concepts, current studies, and technology and equipment requirements for using the STS for space disposal of selected nuclear wastes as a complement to geological storage are reviewed. An orbital transfer vehicle carried by the Shuttle would kick the waste cannister into a 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit. One flight per week is regarded as sufficient to dispose of all high level wastes chemically separated from reactor fuel rods from 200 GWe nuclear power capacity. Studies are proceeding for candidate wastes, the STS system suited to each waste, and the risk/benefits of a space disposal system. Risk assessments are being extended to total waste disposal risks for various disposal programs with and without a space segment, and including side waste streams produced as a result of separating substances for launch.
Rice, E. E.↗