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At least 19 records

(Oxy)hydroxides Formed on Aluminum Fuel Materials After Irradiation and Long-Term Wet Storage - 20354

The aluminum cladding of research-reactor fuel experiences general corrosion when in contact with water during in-reactor service and post-discharge wet storage, resulting in the formation of adherent aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films. These (oxy)hydroxides contain chemically-bound water that poses challenges for extended dry storage due to the risk of thermal or radiolytic decomposition releasing free water and/or hydrogen and oxygen gases. This study describes characterization of the (oxy)hydroxides present on several aluminum materials used in reactor operation and subsequently stored wet in the L-Basin storage facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) for an extended period. Characterization data providing insight into the loading, composition, and morphology of (oxy)hydroxides to be expected on service-exposed aluminum cladding provides valuable benchmarks for designing adequate drying and dry-storage approaches. This work is part of a broader investigation to address knowledge gaps and technical data needs for dry storage of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), which included in-lab growth of (oxy)hydroxide films on aluminum alloy substrates to investigate formation behavior, investigation of drying methods to remove existing (oxy)hydroxides from ASNF cladding, and measurement of radiolytic yield of hydrogen from (oxy)hydroxide powders and films. In this study, (oxy)hydroxide films were characterized for three aluminum-alloy materials used in reactors and subsequently stored wet for up to approximately 40 years in L-Basin at SRS: one cropping from a Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) fuel element (Al-6061 alloy), one cropping from a Universal Sleeve Housing (USH) (Al-6063 alloy), and one Mark-16B fuel assembly (either Al-6061 or Al- 6063). The USH and Mark-16B were used in SRS production reactors. Characterization of the as-received (oxy)hydroxides included scanning electron microscopy (SEM) in both plan-view and cross-section to characterize the (oxy)hydroxide layer's morphology, thickness, and structure. X-ray diffraction (XRD) was used to identify the chemical composition and distinguish between the various aluminum (oxy)hydroxides known to form under reactor and storage conditions. XRD analysis revealed both bayerite (Al(OH)3) and boehmite (AlOOH) on the surface of the MURR and USH samples, as well as bayerite, boehmite, and gibbsite (another Al(OH)3 polymorph) on the surface of the Mark-16B sample. The aluminum trihydroxides, bayerite and gibbsite, are typically associated with corrosion in low-temperature (<80 deg. C) water, while boehmite is expected to form at higher water temperature (>80 deg. C). The presence of bayerite on the USH, which is believed to have operated close to 90 deg. C, suggests that boehmite formed during in-reactor exposure was not protective against further hydroxide growth in low-temperature wet storage. Cross-section scanning electron microscopy (SEM) showed total (oxy)hydroxide layer thicknesses of ∼5- 10 μm for the MURR and ∼5-15 μm for the Mark-16B. The thickness of the USH's (oxy)hydroxide layer was indiscernible by the current mounting and imaging method, despite plan-view SEM and XRD confirming the presence of an (oxy)hydroxide layer. (authors)

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Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program for SNF Wet Storage Life Extension - 20489

Approximately 27 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management is stored in the L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This 'DOE SNF' is comprised of approximately 12,000 aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel assemblies (∼7 MTHM), and approximately 2000 non-aluminum fuel assemblies (∼20 MTHM). A program is in progress to perform Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) of the fuel and their storage containers to characterize the materials' condition, and to evaluate the effects of service to enable continued safe wet storage of the SNF. The Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP), a two-part program to develop and implement remote underwater Non-Destructive Examination of the aluminum SNF, and of the containers of the non-aluminum SNF, respectively, is aimed at the characterization and evaluation of corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel and container materials. The predominant design of the aluminum SNF (ASNF) stored in L Basin is the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) equivalent design, a plate fuel design. These SNF are stored in 5'' diameter tubes or 5'' x 5'' squares (called bundles) that are nominally 12' or up to 14' long. The SNF is de-bundled and inspected using a custom-designed MTR Fuel Inspection Table. The inspection table provides for indexed fuel positioning for a video camera examination with controlled lighting. A total of 10 of the SNF originating from foreign research and test reactors were selected for examination based on burnup, enrichment, and prior damage caused by service/storage history. A special inspection campaign of these 10 assemblies is in progress. The observed corrosion damage included minor to moderate attack from general corrosion, pitting, crevice, end grain and galvanic corrosion. Example results from the completed inspections are shown and discussed. The focus is a comparison of the as-received condition versus the as-found current storage condition that will serve to validate Water Chemistry and Corrosion Monitoring Programs. The non-aluminum SNF (NASNF) stored in L Basin are of diverse design that includes various geometries with claddings of stainless steel, Zircaloy, and Hastelloy. The fuel core materials include uranium alloys, oxides/mixed oxides, and carbides. These SNF materials, originating from early experimental and test reactors, are in various physical forms including single fuel elements and cut pieces. The fuel is stored in L Basin in various configurations including in direct bundled storage in aluminum tubes and in isolation cans that are in the bundles or in a larger over-size storage container (OSC). Concern with inside-out corrosion and the potential loss of configuration control and ability to handle the storage containers prompted the development of remote NDE methods that include visual and UT technologies to assess the condition of the containers. Candidate stored materials were selected for a special inspection campaign; the development of the NDE methods for the inspection for galvanic, crevice and sediment-induced corrosion (inside-out) are discussed. A summary of the SNF storage in L Basin at the SRS, and an overview of the AMCAP to enable continued safe storage of DOE SNF are described. (authors)

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Characterization of oxide films on aluminum materials following reactor exposure and wet storage in the SRS L-Basin

This report describes the characterization of oxide films on one cropped piece of 6061, one 6063, and one cropped piece that could have been either 6061 or 6063 aluminum-based alloy, stored wet for up to approximately 40 years in L-Basin on the Savannah River Site (SRS). One 6061 cropping was from a Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) fuel element. The 6063 piece was from a cropping from a Universal Sleeve Housing (USH). The Mark-16B fuel assembly could have been either 6061 or 6063 based on design drawings. Both the Mark-16B and USH were used in SRS Production Reactors. Characterization of the as-received oxides includes the oxide morphology, thickness, structure, and chemical composition. The aim is to characterize the oxide layer on aluminum cladding and fuel components that have reactor service and long-term basin storage service.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Visual Examination of Aluminum Containers for Extended Wet Storage of Non-Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel (FY 2021)

The goal of the Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) program is to provide a condition assessment of the storage containers for non-aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in L Basin and demonstrate continued safe storage of all NASNF pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The storage configuration of NASNF is vulnerable to inside-out corrosion attack. The approach being used in AMCAP is to develop and deploy examination methods for remote, in-situ inspection of the bundle storage in VTS and for OSC storage in the OSC racks. A method for Visual Examination (VE) using video-recording cameras was readied as part of the full-scale mockup development, and was deployed in L Basin for the initial condition assessment work. This report describes the development and the deployment of the VE for inspection of selected bundles in L Basin. The first deployment of the VE system was for visually examining five spent fuel bundles. Bundles were chosen based on their vulnerability in terms of inner fuel contents, history, storage duration, storage configuration, and possibility of inside out corrosion due to galvanic coupling of fuel cladding with the aluminum bundle wall.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ATR Spent Fuel Options Study

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a materials and fuels test nuclear reactor that performs irradiation services for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Naval Reactors, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and other research programs. ATR achieved initial criticality in 1967 and is expected to operate in support of needed missions until the year 2050 or beyond. It is anticipated that ATR will generate approximately 105 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) elements per year through the year 2050. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) currently stores 2,008 ATR SNF elements in dry storage, 976 in wet storage, and expects to have 1,000 elements in wet storage before January 2017. A capability gap exists at INL for long-term (greater than the year 2050) management, in compliance with the Idaho Settlement Agreement (ISA), of ATR SNF until a monitored retrievable geological repository is open. INL has significant wet and dry storage capabilities that are owned by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) and operated and managed by Fluor Idaho, which include the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center’s (INTEC’s) CPP-666, CPP-749, and CPP-603. In addition, INL has other capabilities owned by DOE-NE and operated and managed by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA), which are located at the Materials and Fuel Complex (MFC). Additional storage capabilities are located on the INL Site at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF). Current INL SNF management planning, as defined in the Fluor Idaho contract, shows INTEC dry fuel storage, which is currently used for ATR SNF, will be nearly full after transfer of an additional 1,000 ATR SNF from wet storage. DOE-NE tasked BEA with identifying and analyzing options that have the potential to fulfill this capability gap. BEA assembled a team comprised of SNF management experts from Fluor Idaho, Savannah River Site (SRS), INL/BEA, and the MITRE Corp with an objective of developing and analyzing options for fulfilling the capability gap. This management options analysis is not an alternatives analysis as defined by DOE Order 413.3B; rather, it is an evaluation of near-term, mid term and long-term actions needed to fulfill the capability gap. The actions are described in sufficient detail to inform stakeholders and DOE decision makers regarding a potential path forward. The recommended path forward will inform Fiscal Year 2019 budget formulation, support potential National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses, and may or may not include capital asset projects.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Effects of Inoculation with Lactic Acid Bacteria on the Preservation of Nannochloropsis gaditana Biomass in Wet Anaerobic Storage and Its Impact on Biomass Quality

Wet anaerobic storage of algal biomass is a promising preservation approach that can ensure a continuous supply of these feedstocks to biorefineries year-round. An effective solution to preservation must ensure minimal dry matter loss and a change in biochemical composition during storage. Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate the preservation of Nannochloropsis gaditana biomass through wet anaerobic storage and its impact on biomass quality. Prior to storage, the algae sample is inoculated with two different strains of lactic acid bacteria and thereafter stored for 30 and 180 days. Each inoculant limited the dry matter loss to <10% (dry basis) after the storage duration. Final pH values (4.3–4.8) indicate that the biomass samples are properly ensiled, achieving the acidic conditions necessary for preservation. Compositional analysis of the biomass after storage shows a reduction in carbohydrate content, a relative increase in lipid content, and no significant change in the protein fraction. Glucose and galactose were the most prevalent sugar monomers. The low dry matter loss and minimal compositional change indicate that wet anaerobic storage is an effective means of preserving algal biomass and ensuring a constant supply of algal biomass feedstock to a biorefinery.

Oginni, Oluwatosin↗

Compact System for Operating and Decommissioned Reactor Used Fuel Management - 17243

Most nuclear power plants in operation today were designed with limited wet storage for their discharged used nuclear fuel (UNF), predicated on the assumption that either recycling or geologic storage would be available within the reactor's lifetime. While that has proven to be the case in some countries such as France with its recycling, it has not for most. In the USA, dry storage of UNF at the plant site at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) has since the mid-1980s been the primary mode of interim storage so that the plant can off-load its UNF from the pools at the power plants. Initially the space reserved for the ISFSI at a reactor site was based on the assumption that the Department of Energy (DOE) would be transporting that UNF to a geological repository site, such as Yucca Mountain, by 1998. However, due to the delay in the opening of any geological repository the utilities are running out of space on their existing ISFSIs for additional UNF dry storage systems. Since plants prefer to keep their ISFSIs inside the protected area of the plant, options for expanding the ISFSI are becoming limited. At the same time, increasing the capacity of the dry storage systems is also not an option in most cases as the dry storage systems have almost reached their capacity limits with the 37 PWR or 89 BWR fuel assembly canister designs. For plants that have announced plans to shut down, their main priority is to off-load the UNF from the pool to dry storage at an ISFSI so that they can proceed to 'Safe store' or other storage options, and start their decommissioning process as soon as possible. Thus, keeping the size of the ISFSI compact is very important for safety, security and economics. This paper will describe the details of a reduced footprint version of AREVA TN's NUHOMS{sup R} System that addresses the need for maximizing ISFSI capacity. This system not only offers a compact design that stores nearly double the number of UNF assemblies in the same space, it also offers superior radiation protection to the workers and public. In addition, it offers unmatched protection against beyond design basis (BDB) events like the tsunami at Fukushima in Japan, the earthquake at North Anna site, tornadoes and manmade attacks such as the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. It also includes significant enhancement for a robust Canister Evolved Safety Program for Aging Management. The utilities in the USA are currently using dry storage systems with canisters of different diameter, different length, and different weights. The fuel assemblies that are stored in these canisters are also different in their fuel types (PWR or BWR),different fuel parameters like burnups, enrichments, and cooling times and different storage orientations in the storage overpacks like horizontal or vertical. The compact version of AREVA TN's NUHOMS{sup R} System offers a 'Universal' Storage Overpack which is designed to accept all these different design dry storage canister available in the industry. As UNF storage continues to drives the industry towards innovations that address the need for consolidated storage, compact ISFSIs and aging management, this new evolution of the AREVA TN NUHOMS{sup R} system offers a significant leap forward in addressing all of these challenges. (authors)

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Innovative Implementation of Consolidated Dry Fuel Storage at the INL - 19655

An innovative nuclear-fuel storage bucket design provides increased fuel storage capacity at the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site. The IFSF is a dry storage facility that is at approximately 93% of its fuel storage capacity. This innovative fuel storage bucket provides for higher density packaging, thereby allowing for the receipt of more fuel at the IFSF and subsequent completion of the wet-to-dry fuel transfer scope at the INL's Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). The subject fuel originates from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the INL Site. All spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at INTEC is required by the Idaho Settlement Agreement (ISA) to be out of wet storage by December 31, 2023. The ISA is a tri-party agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Navy, and the State of Idaho. Currently, the INTEC CPP-666 pools contain all of the INL's SNF remaining in wet storage, and INTEC's Spent Fuel Project is on schedule to meet the ISA deadline. Interestingly, the INL Site's environmental cleanup contract awarded to Fluor Idaho in 2016 also initially required the Spent Fuel Project to continue SNF receipts from the ATR into wet storage at the CPP-666 pools. The continued receipts of ATR SNF into the CPP-666 basin were able to be redirected to the IFSF because of the new storage package design, enabling the Spent Fuel Project to meet the ISA requirement to have all SNF out of wet storage by 2023. Complicating the need to redirect ATR receipts from wet storage is the lack of interim storage capacity at the ATR site. This lack of ATR storage capacity threatened to terminate reactor operations if the SNF could not be received at INTEC. The contractual requirement for continued ATR SNF receipts to prevent termination of reactor operations is resolved by the implementation of the innovative consolidated dry storage configuration in the IFSF. Consolidated fuel storage at the IFSF provides increased fuel storage capacity to facilitate meeting the ISA and the Fluor Idaho contract requirements. It provides for the completion of the ATR wet-to-dry fuel transfer scope and supports continued operation of the ATR by allowing the receipt of additional ATR SNF directly into IFSF dry storage. (authors)

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Regulatory Basis for Dry Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Canister Inspections

Nuclear power plants in the United States began moving Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) from wet storage to dry storage in Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) in 1986 at Surry station in Virginia. Dry storage represented an innovative solution to the problem created by the U.S. government's failure to fulfill its obligation to begin removing SNF from power plant sites. Today, about 70 ISFSIs have been placed into operation on the sites of current, or former nuclear power plants. There are currently over 2,200 SNF dry storage systems (DSSs) in service at these locations. Thirteen of these ISFSIs are located at sites with no operating reactor, and this number is due to increase in the coming years. Operating nuclear power stations use ISFSI storage to maintain wet storage capacity for recently discharged SNF. Permanently shutdown nuclear power plants use ISFSI storage to allow decommissioning and dismantlement of the power plant structures, systems, and components. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates the licensing, construction, and operation of ISFSIs under Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Energy, Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater than Class-C Waste (10 CFR 72). When the regulations in 10 CFR 72 were created around 1980, 20 years was chosen by the NRC as the license term for a specific ISFSI license and later, for a DSS Certificate of Compliance (CoC). Twenty years was, at the time, believed to be a sufficient time period for on-site interim dry storage of spent nuclear fuel before the U.S. government began moving the spent fuel away from the plant site for final disposal. Little, if any consideration was given to providing a regulatory framework for extending ISFSI licenses and DSS CoCs beyond 20 years at that time. However, shortly after the turn of the century, with still no federal program for removing SNF from reactor sites on the near-term horizon it became apparent that most DSSs would be required to remain in service at the ISFSIs beyond the initial 20-year license term. Operation beyond the original license term requires the specific license or the DSS CoC (used at a general license ISFSI) to be renewed. The requirements for renewal of a specific ISFSI license or a DSS CoC include addressing age-related degradation of structures, systems, and components that perform or support safety functions. (authors)

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Market-Based and System-Wide Fuel Cycle Optimization

The Dynamic Resource Exchange (DRE) gives agency to consumer facilities to determine the preference of any particular trade that is offered by suppliers to satisfy its requests. This provides a natural balance of power in the relationship between consumers and suppliers. However, in situations in which suppliers have flexibility surrounding the way that they respond to individual requests, they have no mechanism to assess how different bids will be received by the consumer. Theoretically, a supplier can offer multiple bids to respond to a given request in an attempt to “cover their bases”, but this introduces more arcs into the underlying network flow problem, increasing the cost to solve the problem. In the extreme, when a supplier can continuously vary the characteristics of the bid, this can represent a large number of additional arcs and have real performance consequences. To remedy this inefficiency in the implementation of the market-level optimization, the definition of a request has been extended to include a function that can be used by the supplier to query the preference that would be assigned by a consumer for a potential bid. The supplier is then free to implement arbitrarily complex algorithms to revise/optimize its bid based on responses to this function. A supplier can chose to not invoke the function at all, mimicking the original DRE behavior, can use it to select among a small set of discrete choices, or can implement an internal algorithm to seek an optimum bid on a continuous parameter space. This capability was demonstrated with a storage facility that preferred material with a specific decay heat that was as close as possible to the maximum allowable decay heat, while requiring the specific decay heat to fall between a minimum and maximum level. This archetype was used to fill multiple storage roles in a simulation that also included a standard recipe reactor: wet storage with no maximum allowable specific decay heat, dry storage with a modest maximum allowable specific decay heat, and a geologic repository with a low maximum allowable specific decay heat. In such a simulation, the reactor, wet storage and dry storage always offer their material to be taken by one of the other storage facilities. The preference function of the consumer would always ensure that material only flowed when the decay heat was sufficiently low, but in the absence of objective function callbacks, would allow for many superfluous offers that exceeded those limits. If this archetype also uses a callback function to probe the preference of the receiving facility for each possible offer, it can avoid making offers that are not going to be accepted by the receiving facility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technology Development for Dry Storage of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20490

A candidate disposition pathway for the > 13 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, is the drying and placement of the SNF into sealed-canister dry storage, with the ASNF-in- canisters 'road-ready' for transportation to and final direct disposal in a repository waste package. Technical information gaps in fuel drying, and fuel dry storage behavior, have previously challenged the declaration of technology readiness for drying and placement of this fuel into the DOE Standard Canister design for > 50 years of safe dry storage. The principal technical information gaps included: i) characterization and thermal dehydration behavior of aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films attendant on the cladding due to film formation during reactor operation and during post-discharge up to long-term wet storage histories; and ii) G-value data to enable estimation of the radiolytic gas generation from the cladding with its (oxy)hydroxide films. Thus, the oxide films on the ASNF challenged the safety of a sealed storage canister with thermal and radiolytic decomposition of the waters on the films that can lead to corrosion, pressurization, and flammability issues. These gaps in the technical information base have largely been closed. This paper discusses the investigations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Savannah River National laboratory (SRNL), and outlines the pending technology development work for input to an engineering design to enable a road-ready dry storage system for ASNF. The ASNF inventory considered for road-ready dry storage is stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) at the INL. The ASNF inventory in the SRS L Basin is from foreign and domestic research reactors (FRR and DRR), and is diverse in terms of design, irradiation, and post-reactor-discharge storage conditions; these factors yield a range of characteristics of cladding oxide films on ASNF. Mixed aluminum (oxy)hydroxide (boehmite and bayerite/gibbsite) films, non-uniform in thicknesses up to a maximum local thickness bounded by 25 μm, were observed on ASNF materials removed from wet storage in the L Basin and in non-sealed dry storage at the SRS following reactor service and a long-term (up to 40+ years) interim storage history. The ASNF inventory at INTEC, in both wet and vented dry storage, is predominantly from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), but it also includes DRR and FRR fuel. To address a profound behavior of these films, radiolysis testing of aluminum specimens with mixed type boehmite/bayerite oxide films was performed to develop basic data on G-values for production of radiolytic hydrogen under dry storage conditions with nominal relative humidity, temperature, and cover gas. Modeling and simulation of canister internal environments with postulated inventories of oxide films provides estimation of the evolution of the conditions of the canister loaded with ASNF. Simultaneous Thermal Analysis (TGA/DSC) of hydrated oxide powders, and laboratory-scale aluminum specimens with a bayerite film (∼10 μm) using TGA methods, inform drying time/temperature conditions to be used for the ASNF. A demonstration project is recommended for Verification and Validation of the drying and storage of the ASNF. Remaining major tasks leading up to the hot demonstration include scale-up radiolysis testing and scale-up drying testing. Engineering design with the information from the technology program will establish the safety basis and enable long-term (> 50 years) dry storage compatibility with ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister pending its transportation to and disposal in a repository. This full capability would show the ASNF-in-canister storage system to be road-ready. (authors)

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Amplicon Sequencing Reveals Microbiological Signatures in Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Basins

Water quality is an important determinant for the structural integrity of alloy cladded fuels and assemblies during long-term wet storage. Detailed characterization of a water filled storage basin for spent nuclear reactor fuel was performed following the formation and proliferation of an amorphous white flocculent. White precipitant was sampled throughout the storage basin for chemical and spectroscopic characterization, and eDNA was extracted for pyrosequencing of bacterial rRNA gene diversity. Accordingly, spectroscopic analyses indicated the precipitant to be primarily amorphous to crystalline aluminum (oxy) hydroxides with minor associated elemental components including Fe, Si, Ti, and U. High levels of dissolved carbon were co-localized with the precipitant relative to bulk water. Bacterial densities were highly variable between sampling locations and with depth; cell numbers (log scale) ranged from 5.6 to 4.89 cells / mL. Bacterial diversity that was physically associated with the aluminum (oxy) hydroxide complexes exceeded an estimated 4,000 OTUs / amplicon library (3% cutoff) and the greatest percent majority of sequences were aligned to the families Burkholderiales (23%), Nitrospiraceae (23%), Hyphomicrobiaceae (17%), and Comamonadaceae (6%). We surmise that episodic changes in the physical and chemical properties of the basin contribute to the polymerization of aluminum (oxy) hydroxides, which in turn can chemisorb nutrients, carbon ligands and bacterial cells from the surrounding bulk aqueous phase. As such, these precipitants should establish favorable microhabitats for bacterial colonization and growth. Comparative analyses of 16S rRNA gene amplicon libraries across diverse environmental landscapes were performed and microbiological signatures unique to the spent nuclear fuel storage basin environment were revealed. These insights could spur the development of tractable bioindicators that are specific of and diagnostic for water quality at discrete locations and finer scales of resolution, marking an important contribution for improved water quality and management of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities.

aluminum↗

Evaluation of Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel during Drying and Dry Storage

The DOE SNF Working Group ASNF Subgroup and the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board have identified knowledge gaps regarding the management of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF).[1, 2] The objectives of this research are to observe, sample and analyze the nature of aluminum surface corrosion and corrosion layer chemistry relevant to the ASNF performance over the duration of the dry storage segment of the fuel life cycle. The primary goal is to build an understanding of ASNF behavior, from reactor service and wet storage through drying and dry storage, with parallel testing of surrogate materials. The premise is that residual water affiliated with the aluminum oxide from corrosion during reactor service and wet storage, continues to influence ASNF performance during dry storage, and that even after successful drying the surface conditions of ASNF have yet to be satisfactorily characterized. The initial scope collected and analyzed specimens from irradiated non-fuel components of aluminum-clad Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) fuel elements that are routinely removed at the end of reactor service life. Techniques have been developed for remote material sampling from ATR elements from vented dry storage at the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF). These techniques involve 1) nipping off a small corner of the aluminum near where the end box had been removed and 2) scraping the exterior (non-fueled) plate surface to collect an oxide sample. This second effort targets ATR elements expected to have seen the longest residence in storage, both in the CPP-603 pool (with poor water quality) and in dry storage at IFSF, within the fuel handling scheduled to consolidate ATR at IFSF and receive the remaining inventory at CPP-666. Follow on work has been proposed to nip corners and collect scrapings immediately following ATR fuel drying, before placement in dry storage. Sample analysis will use multiple techniques to understand the chemical composition and morphology of the surface oxides. A simultaneous effort is progressing to develop surrogate materials to enable rigorous controlled experiments. Consistently produced, these surrogate materials can then be used to demonstrate limitations inherent to remote sampling and to validate performance models under relevant constraints. The combined efforts will substantiate ASNF performance and fuel management decisions regarding drying and packaging over a more complete range of life cycle conditions. [1] DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Working Group, Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel: Technical Considerations and Challenges for Extended (>50 Years) Dry Storage, DOE/ID RPT#: 1575, prepared by Aluminum-Clad SNF Sub Working Group, June 2017. [2] U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Management and Disposal of U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel, A Report to the United States Congress and the Secretary of Energy, December 2017, p. 143.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Modeling the Drying of a Mock Used Fuel Assembly with COBRA-SFS Cycle-4 - 18597

The processing and storage of nuclear fuel is an ever increasingly pressing issue. Around 70,000 tons of used fuel are currently in either dry or wet storage on site at nuclear power plants or at specified spent fuel storage facilities. Additionally, about 2,000 tons are added to that sum each year. To promote retrievability, limit degradation in the canister, and reduce potential for hydrogen generation, spent fuel that is initially in wet storage must be dried before moving to dry cask storage. Therefore, this research seeks to use a mock used fuel storage cask to replicate the conditions in the industry during the drying process of fuel being moved from storage pools. To simulate this, a mock storage cask has been constructed to closely resemble those used in industry such that any areas that tend to retain water are replicated effectively. It is able to hold one mock used fuel assembly. The assembly used is an AREVA 10A 10 x 10 assembly with 78 rods filled with depleted uranium, 12 heater rods to simulate decay heat, a 3 x 3 BWR water channel, and one interchangeable rod position for tests such as a simulated failed fuel rod, BWR water rod, and PWR guide tube tests. The industry standard procedure is used in drying the assembly which involves stepping the system pressure down and holding for certain periods until reaching 3 torr and holding for 30 minutes. This is believed to sufficiently dry the assembly. The goal is to record data throughout these tests that can provide the industry with a greater understanding of how well the process works. This data will also be used to develop and validate a computer model of the drying process. Mechanistic models are currently under development. Reduced order models are being investigated for incorporation into current related engineering codes such as COBRA-SFS. COBRA-SFS is a member of the COBRA family of codes which is mainly used in the evaluation of thermal hydraulic systems containing spent nuclear fuel. However, it does not currently have the capability to account for processes such as evaporation encountered during drying operations. Therefore, those physical models are to be added to the source code. At present a model of the experiment has been created using the COBRA-SFS Cycle-4 code. A number of steady state models along with transient models have been developed and presented. Each of these yield valuable results for comparison with the experiments conducted. In addition to comparison with experimental results, the data collected from COBRA-SFS is compared with that which has been generated from other computer models which utilize computational fluid dynamics. (authors)

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Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) Material Test Reactor (MTR) (Fuel Inspection Program Report)

The AMCAP MTR Fuel Inspection Program, a special inspection program comprised of four inspection campaigns, examined a total of ten (10) pre-selected aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel core spent nuclear fuel assemblies (ASNF) stored in the L Area Disassembly Basin (L Basin) at the Savannah River Site. A full description of the inspections and the results are reported. The fuel had been stored in bundled-tube storage (Vertical Tube Storage) for periods of 18 to 21 years. The prior service experience of the individual 10 assemblies varies, but all included irradiation followed by wet storage at international research reactor sites prior to shipment to the US and storage in L Basin. The 10 assemblies were expected to be among the “worst"’ in terms of prior corrosion damage of the entire inventory of the direct-bundle-stored ASNF in L Basin. The inventory of MTR ASNF in L Basin will continue to be stored in the bundled-tube configuration or in slug-storage buckets with inserts pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The MTR fuel inspections focused on collecting information for characterization of the material condition of the ASNF considering various types of aluminum fuel corrosion degradation of its assembled materials in water storage. A custom-designed Fuel Inspection Table was used to stage the fuel for remote, enhanced visual examination (close-up video imaging & recording) with controlled lighting and positioning that enables reproducibility of imaging conditions. The inspections were conducted by fuel subject matter expert staff from Spent Fuel Project Engineering (SFPE) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Stills captured from the video records were used to compare the corrosion evolution from previous records, as available. This evaluation of the inspection results including the comparison to the previous inspection results demonstrate that the water quality and the storage configuration of ASNF in L Basin do not cause aggressive corrosion degradation of the fuel; mitigation of the prior corrosion degradation of the fuel also appears to have been achieved with the good water quality conditions of L Basin. Recommendations are made for future inspection of the fuel to trend corrosion degradation and demonstrate continued safe wet storage of the ASNF in L Basin. The next fuel examination is recommended to be performed in 5 years.

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