Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “WEAPONS INDUSTRY”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Post-Calibration Uncertainty Analysis for Travel Times at a Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant

The Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant (NWIRP) in McGregor, Texas began manufacturing explosives in 1980 and several hazardous chemicals were discovered in lakes and streams surrounding the site in 1998. Contaminants traveled to local lakes and streams much faster than initially predicted. This research estimated contaminant travel times and identified locations where monitoring wells should be installed to yield the greatest reductions in uncertainties in travel-time predictions. To this end, groundwater and particle-tracking models for NWIRP site were built to predict hydraulic heads and contaminant travel times. Next, parameter (hydraulic conductivities) uncertainties, parameter identifiabilities, observation (hydraulic heads) worth, and predictive (contaminant travel times) uncertainties were quantified. Parameter uncertainties were reduced by up to 92%; a total of 19 of 158 parameters were at least moderately identifiable; travel-time uncertainties were reduced up to 92%. Additionally, travel-time predictions and post-calibration parameter distributions were generated using the null-space Monte Carlo (NSMC) technique. NSMC predicted that conservative tracers exited the flow system within a year, which matches with field data. Finally, an observations-worth analysis found that additional 11 more measurements would reduce travel-time uncertainties by factors from 1.04 to 4.3 over existing data if monitoring wells were installed at the suggested locations.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Nuclear System-of-Systems Capabilities Analytic Process

This dissertation discusses the impetus for, development of, and initial demonstration of NuSCAPTM: the Nuclear System-of-Systems Capabilities Analytic Process TM . NuSCAP is an approach executed via a Python® application that enables capabilities-based vulnerability analyses of military systems of systems (SOS) exposed to prompt nuclear weapon effects. The NuSCAP application calls on industry-standard, fast-running nuclear weapon effects tools and the Monte Carlo N-Particle®1 (MCNP®) code to evaluate the impact of nuclear weapon environments on the military capabilities of a complex and networked SOS.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

RePED 250: Manufacturing and Market Analysis of High-Temperature Alternators

The novel repetitive pulsed electric drill 250 (RePED 250) has the potential to greatly lower the costs and drilling times of geothermal projects. This tool discharges electric pulses through hard rock formations, shattering the rock in tension and allowing it to be quickly removed. One hurdle in bringing this technology to market is the RePED 250 downhole alternator. This component is essential for supplying power to the electronic drilling tool. There are currently no downhole tools on the market that meet the RePED 250 alternator's high temperature and power requirements. This report focuses on the path to commercialization for this novel alternator technology being developed as part of the RePED 250 project. One aim of this work is to identify the geothermal market size for the RePED 250 alternator, as well as other potential markets for this technology outside of geothermal. The geothermal market is very small, with only approximately 13 wells drilled in the United States each year. The worldwide market is several times this size and growing each year. The ability of the RePED 250 technology to drastically reduce the cost of geothermal projects may also lead to an increase in this market size. Technology developed for the high-temperature, high-power RePED 250 alternator can also be used to create high-temperature and high-power motors. These motors and alternators will have potential applications in oil and gas drilling, a $300 billion dollar industry in the United States alone, as well as in more distant industries such as aircraft, weapon systems, space exploration, and electric vehicles. Other aspects of the RePED 250 alternator's path to commercialization are also analyzed, including the supply chain for production materials and potential manufacturing methods. The supply chain and manufacturing practices for low-temperature motors and alternators are well established and require relatively minor changes for the high-temperature and high-power RePED 250 alternator. Sourcing for high-temperature materials has been identified, as well as potential supply chain risks. These most notably include electrical steel and high-temperature samarium cobalt (SmCo) magnets. Overall, these risks are not expected to be significant at the likely manufacturing scale required for the RePED 250.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Neutron spectroscopy of plutonium using a handheld detection system

The ability to distinguish multiple forms of plutonium from one another, such as oxide and metal, is paramount in areas of nuclear nonproliferation and international safeguards. In its metal form, plutonium can be readily used in a nuclear weapon, while oxide forms are associated with nuclear reactor fuel. Oxide-based plutonium forms emit neutrons with an energy spectrum that is significantly different from the fission neutrons that are emitted from plutonium metal. Organic scintillation detectors output pulses that are proportional to the neutron energy deposited, and therefore present a means of distinguishing these plutonium forms based on their energy spectra. In this work, metal and oxide forms of plutonium were measured using a handheld detection system based on an organic glass scintillator. Monte Carlo modeling of these experiments was performed to provide insight into the origin of the features in the observed light output spectra. Through analysis of multiple regions of these spectra, in a matter of minutes we were able to unambiguously discriminate oxide and metal plutonium forms from one another and from a plutonium-beryllium neutron source, which was considered for comparison because these sources are commonly used in industrial applications. The ability to discriminate weapons-usable material from nuclear reactor fuel has applications in nuclear treaty verification and safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards Considerations for Salt Fuel Fabrication

Molten salt reactors (MSR) with liquid fuel present a unique safeguards challenge whereby the current verification techniques have not been evaluated for effectiveness and applicability. While MSR operations have been the subject of prior studies, the front-end liquid fuel preparation activities have not been extensively evaluated. Reviewing the existing resources on fuel fabrication and evaluating the range of fuel fabrication process options available will allow safeguards analysts to identify the applicability of existing safeguards practices, identify gaps in capability, and identify opportunities where safeguards may be applied. There is no existing supplier of fuel salt for MSRs. In an extensive review of MSR technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA's) Nuclear Power Technology Development Section acknowledges the gap in existing capabilities for fuel salt fabrication, noting, simply, “if demand exists, supply will appear.” Salt reactor fuel has not been previously produced on an industrial scale in a non-nuclear weapon state. These characteristics of MSR fuel fabrication present high levels of uncertainty, but they also represent an opportunity to mature safeguards techniques alongside liquid fuel preparation technologies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radiation Hardening – Test Capabilities (LANSCE) [Slides]

The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) has exceptional facilities for research and testing of radiation effects in electronics. We have the best terrestrial neutron source for sea-level and airplane-altitude environments. We have a thermal neutron test capability at the Lujan Center and a proton beam test capability at the “Blue Room”. LANL has the programmatic mission to develop this radiation-effects program, namely space and satellite environments, high-performance computing (silent data corruption), and weapons delivery systems. We have a strong connection to industry which continues to grow.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Additive manufacturing: a challenge to nuclear nonproliferation

Additive manufacturing (AM) is a rapidly developing technology that allows industries to automate and simplify the production of highly complicated items. Recently, there are concerns that AM techniques have the potential to be utilized in the fields of nuclear weapons and nuclear enrichment technology. Presently, there are very few international or domestic export controls that apply to AM's role in the nuclear industry, constituting an unmanaged proliferation pathway. Pre-existing export controls focus on general concepts and processes and do not consider specific nuances of various techniques that are categorized as additive manufacturing. To introduce legislation and controls that will be effective in monitoring proliferation pathways, one must investigate and characterize AM techniques and their nuclear applications. This paper categorizes and ranks 33 AM techniques based on their potential impact on the nuclear fuel cycle and the development of nuclear weapons. Through this method of characterization and categorization, export controls would address specific AM nuclear proliferation risks without disrupting the entire industry and fuel cycle. Additionally, legislation employing this method would identify loopholes in export controls using a holistic approach to managing and monitoring proliferation pathways.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Countering the future chemical weapons threat

After decades of difficult negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted in 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997, banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons (CW). As the CWC celebrates the 25th anniversary of its entry into force, it can document considerable success, much of it attributed to the CWC implementing body—the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, facing a volatile international security environment and an everchanging chemical industry, the OPCW must transform to meet its mission and remain an exemplar for multilateralism. As the next CWC review conference approaches in 2023, a next-generation OPCW 2.0 can be effective and credible only if it reinforces international norms against CW, anticipates future challenges posed by advancements in science and technology (S&T), incorporates more qualitative elements into the verification and compliance system, and keeps pace with technological change.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Exceedance Response Action (ERA) Level 2 (Technical Report)

The Sandia National Laboratories, California (SNL/CA) site comprises approximately 410 acres and is located in the eastern portion of Livermore, Alameda County, California. The property is owned by the United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and is being managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS). Operations at the SNL/CA facility consist of DOE statutory responsibilities for nuclear weapon research and design, development of energy technologies, and basic scientific research. Specific industrial activities occur in discrete buildings and include electroplating or anodizing, machine shop, permitted hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facility (TSDF), and a scrap yard.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Exceedance Response Action (ERA) Level 2 Technical Report Update

The Sandia National Laboratories, California (SNL/CA) site comprises approximately 410 acres and is located in the eastern portion of Livermore, Alameda County, California. The property is owned by the United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and is being managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS). Operations at the SNL/CA facility consist of DOE statutory responsibilities for nuclear weapon research and design, development of energy technologies, and basic scientific research. Specific industrial activities occur in discrete buildings and include electroplating or anodizing, machine shop, permitted hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facility (TSDF), and a scrap yard. This report provides an update to the ERA Level 2 Technical Report Update previously submitted in June 2022 (2022 ERA L2 Technical Report Update) for iron, aluminum, and pH. In accordance with the California’s General Permit for Discharges of Storm Water Associated with Industrial Activities (IGP) Section XII.D.3.c, an ERA Level 2 Technical Report update is to be submitted with the annual report when a facility utilizing an Industrial Activity Best Management Practice (BMP) Demonstration (IABMPD) experiences additional exceedances of the numeric action levels.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

ILLICIT TRANSIT INTERDICTION GLOBAL ANALYSIS

This study aims to enhance the security of radioactive materials during transport by analyzing commonalities in cargo thefts conducted by non-state groups such as thieves and terrorists. This research focuses on identifying patterns and trends in the methods used to steal high-value cargo, with the goal of applying these insights to improve transport security of radioactive materials. Key questions addressed include the frequency of specific tools, techniques, and insider involvement in thefts, as well as the use of weapons, electronic jamming equipment, and specialized tools. Findings will inform security design improvements and industry practices to mitigate vulnerabilities. The study involves a comprehensive review of literature and case studies, utilizing data sources from 2018 to 2023. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to thefts of valuable cargo in transit, with a focus on incidents involving non-state actors. The methodology will include statistical and inferential analysis to identify trends, with results visualized through pie charts, frequency analyses, and terrain maps. The discussion will highlight the implications of findings and provide actionable recommendations for strengthening security measures. Limitations such as data availability and reporting inconsistencies will be acknowledged. Suggestions for future improvements will be constructed using existing case studies and expert feedback. The study’s outcomes aim to raise awareness within the industry, inform policy decisions, and enhance security protocols for radioactive material transport. Metrics for impact include the potential publication of findings, presentations at conferences to raise awareness, and the subsequent actions taken by stakeholders based on the research. By identifying trends and vulnerabilities and suggesting improvements, this research contributes to preventing the illicit use of nuclear and radiological materials.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Tools and Incentives for Implementing Codes of Ethics to Help Prevent the Reemergence of Chemical Weapons

Since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the establishment of the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 1997, 96% of the world’s declared stockpile, comprising 72,305 metric tons of chemical warfare agents have been destroyed. Despite this notable progress, the convergence of chemistry and biology brings new challenges to preventing chemical weapons production, as the technical capability to manipulate the chemistry of microorganisms has diffused beyond the chemical industry and academic research communities. The development and voluntary adoption by chemical practitioners around the world of ethical codes or guidelines, such as The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) , are important steps in strengthening international nonproliferation efforts through their potential to impact the intent of the individual by normalizing ethical behavior. However, the simple act of adopting a code does not guarantee ethical behavior. Care must be taken to ensure those adopting the code understand specifically the behavior being asked of them, and they must be given ample opportunities to practice exercising those behaviors in low-risk situations and encouragement to keep trying when they fail. Furthermore, in small-to-medium chemical companies, concerns that adopting such measures could negatively impact profit margins may dissuade some business owners from voluntarily adopting ethical codes, while a country’s decision makers may not prioritize establishment of new regulatory mechanisms that could address some of these concerns. In this paper, factors that may positively influence a chemical company’s decision to adopt ethical guidelines, such as integration of social sustainability elements into frameworks and approaches to maintain social legitimacy in the eyes of the broader community, are explored. Voluntary adoption of ethical codes gives teeth to arms control regimes. By encouraging chemical companies to become engaged in the community around them and providing easy-to-use tools like scenario-based E-learning to enable remote engagement and facilitate understanding of the principles undergirding the GCCE, they actively participate in making the world a better place and minimizing the potential for reemergence of chemical weapons.

Small Chemical Companies, Codes of Ethics, E-learn↗

Facility Safety Plan – Building 225

B225 is operated by the Weapons and Complex Integration (WCI) Directorate and is classified as a Low Hazard facility for radiological hazards and Light Science Industry (LSI) for chemical, radiation generating devices (RGDs) and industrial hazards. Explosives and biological hazards are not authorized for B225. B225 is located in the southwest quadrant of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) less than 600 meters from the nearest site boundary. B225 is a single-story concrete tilt-up building with a steel deck roof. The primary mission of this facility is to apply nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods to materials, components, and assemblies. B225 also contains the polymer additive manufacturing laboratories. The floor plans for B225 are provided in Appendix A.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Stabilization of Preternatural Barium Oxidation States as an Unexpected Byproduct of β-Decay: Discovery of a New Halide Semiconductor Alloy

137 Cs has a wide range of roles in the nuclear industry. The solid material, safely encapsulated in CsCl as 137 CsCl, is stored as fission product waste from nuclear power production and legacy waste from nuclear weapons production; it has also served as a radiation source in food and sewage irradiators as well as medical devices. However, because of the solubility of the chloride salt and the relatively high specific activity of 137 Cs, damaged or broken capsules can lead to severe radiological accidents. Safe capsule design and material recycling are complicated by the unclear structural evolution during β-decay, which remains ambiguous due to the differing oxidation states of Cs (1+) and Ba (2+). Here, in this study, we use first-principles calculations to investigate the evolving structure–property relationships of Cs 1–x Ba x Cl during β-decay. Despite the well-established 2+ formal oxidation state of alkali-earth metals, we find that Ba 1+ can be stabilized in the form of a mixed-valence alloy at low concentrations. Specifically, we identify three regimes for the β-decay of 137 Cs into CsCl: Ba-doped CsCl (Ba ≤ 14%), wherein Ba has the expected 2+ oxidation state; Cs–Ba–Cl alloys, where Ba has a mix of the usual Ba 2+ and highly unusual Ba 1+ oxidation state in the form of a quasi-disordered mixed-valence alloy (Ba = 25%); and phase separation into a CsCl + BaCl 2 + Ba (m) mechanical mixture, where Ba reverts to its expected 2+ oxidation state (Ba > 25%). Surprisingly, the Cs 0.75 Ba 0.25 Cl mixed-valence alloy is a narrow indirect band gap semiconductor (1.05 eV) despite the insulating nature of both CsCl and BaCl 2 . It also exhibits strongly excitonic polarized optical properties, has glass-like ultralow thermal conductivity (directional average of 0.21 W/mK at 300 K), and shows greater resistance to deformation under both tensile and volumetric strengths compared with the original CsCl structure (e.g., shear and Young’s modulus of 9.04 and 31.62 GPa, respectively). These findings imply that transmutation of 137 Cs leads to highly unusual chemical bonding that stabilizes Ba 1+ in local regions of the quasi-disordered Cs 0.25 Ba 0.75 Cl, resulting in anomalous physical properties. Moreover, this discovery provides valuable insight for safe nuclear waste capsule design, which can aid in preventing environmental or human exposure to radioactive materials.

Fuhr, Addis S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORN↗

Building 100 Groundwater Bioremediation at the Former DOE Pinellas Plant, Florida: Review of Progress and Opportunities

Weapons research, development, and production operations at the former Pinellas Plant, which includes the Building 100 area, released chlorinated organic solvents into the subsurface, contaminating the underlying soil and groundwater. The site was sold to Pinellas County and is now home to a thriving industrial park known as the Young - Rainey Science, Technology, and Research (STAR) Center. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has applied bioremediation at the Building 100 Area as a key technology to clean up the chlorinated volatile organic compound (cVOC) contamination in soil and groundwater. The monitoring data indicate significant progress toward remedial objectives over the past two decades. Starting conditions in the 1980s-1990s included areas containing residual undissolved dense nonaqueous phase liquids (DNAPLs) and the associated presence of an extensive high concentration plume in the groundwater. The original parent cVOCs were primarily tetrachloroethene (PCE) and trichloroethene (TCE). After several informative pilot studies, bioremediation was implemented at the Building 100 Area of the site and relies on reductive biological pathways and the sequential removal of chlorine from the parent cVOCs forming dichloroethane (DCE) and chloroethene (vinyl chloride, VC). As bioremediation sites evolve toward cleanup, the trends in VC concentrations often serve as a critical indicator for progress and remediation timeframe because VC typically has a lower concentration target remedial objective (nominally 1 to 2 μg/L) compared to PCE and TCE (nominally 3 to 5 μg/L).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Determining Cs-137 Background body burdens for Wild Pigs At Savannah River Site

Savannah River Site (SRS) is a unique U.S. Department of Energy facility in that most of the 310-square miles of land has not be industrialized since operations began in 1953. This has allowed abundant, undisturbed vegetation structure to exists as well as an increase in herd sizes among wildlife populations onsite. Cs-137 is widespread across SRS due to the production of nuclear materials, but is mostly from global atmospheric fallout from nuclear weapons testing. Due to most of SRS being undisturbed land, the concentrations of Cs-137 are higher on site than off site. The SRS began conducting annual deer harvests that were open to the public beginning in 1965. All animals harvested during these hunts are monitored for Cs-137, which is measured using a Sodium Iodide detector. There has been an effective method for calculating the background Cs-137 body burden for the deer population at the SRS, developed by Gaines and Novak using data collected during hunts and gamma overflight data to determine the areas contaminated by site activities. For animals that have a Cs-137 concentration above the established background level, a dose is assigned to the hunter. By applying the same method for wild pigs using data collected from hunts, gamma overflight, and developing a site-specific home range of wild pigs, we were able to calculate the Cs-137 background body burden concentrations of wild pigs on site. Objectives: Develop site-specific home range for wild pigs at SRS; Determine the average concentrations of Cs-137 in wild pigs from background; Use Gaines and Novak method for determining background Cs-137 body burdens wild pigs on SRS. Methods and Materials: Development of site-specific home range of wild pigs was determined to be 2.5 miles using: Four studies conducted between 1969 and 1992 for the SRS wild pig population. (Mayer and Brisbin) The background compartments were determined using: Gamma overflight data showing contaminated areas; Site-specific home range of the wild pigs. Results and Conclusion: All data were generated through the JMP software to provide a histogram and summary statistics. The estimate of an upper tolerance limit for the background contamination with 95% confidence is 1.965 pCi/g for the wild pigs. This means that for wild pigs on SRS from the background compartments are expected to have Cs-137 concentrations of less than 1.965 pCi/g. The current background for the deer is 2.59 pCi/g. For the background compartments Cs-137 concentrations from 2012-2018: Mean: 0.815 pCi/g, Maximum: 2.341 pCi/g, Minimum: -0.704 pCi/g.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (2022 Annual Site Environment Report (ASER))

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is a premier research laboratory that is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). As a national security laboratory, LLNL is responsible for ensuring that the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. The Laboratory also meets other pressing national security needs including countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening homeland security, and conducting major research in atmospheric, earth, and energy sciences, bioscience and biotechnology, and engineering, basic science, and advanced technology. The Laboratory is managed and operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) and serves as a scientific resource to the U.S. government and a partner to industry and academia.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site Annual Environmental Report 2020

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is a premier research laboratory that is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). As a national security laboratory, LLNL is responsible for ensuring that the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. The Laboratory also meets other pressing national security needs, including countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strengthening homeland security, and conducting major research in atmospheric, earth, and energy sciences, bioscience and biotechnology, and engineering, basic science, and advanced technology. The Laboratory is managed and operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS), and serves as a scientific resource to the U.S. government and a partner to industry and academia.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗