Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “US NRC”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Panel Session 75: US NRC - Current and Emerging US NRC Regulatory Topics

The panel addressed several current and emerging NRC regulatory issues impacting the radioactive waste arena. The panelists provided different perspectives on several key issues such as the revision of 10 CFR Part 61, scoping study on very low-level waste and consolidated interim storage of spent nuclear fuel among other timely regulatory topics. Co-Chairs, John Tappert and Larry Camper, introduced the session panel members and provided a summary of the purpose of the session. The panel focused on several current and emerging US NRC regulatory issues impacting the radioactive waste arena and stakeholders. The panelists provided different perspectives on several key regulatory issues such as: the revision of 10CFR Part 61, the Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) and Transuranic (TRU) waste disposal, coping with studies on very low-level waste and waste classification system, as well as other timely regulatory topics. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Overview of NRC Low-Level Radioactive Waste Activities and Initiatives (Christepher McKenney, US NRC (USA)); 2 - Is the Grass Really Greener? Canadian Regulatory Perspective (Karine Glenn, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Canada)); 3 - EPRI Perspectives on 10CFR61 Revision (Lisa Edwards, EPRI (USA)); 4 - State of Nuclear Industry and Radwaste Management (Janet Schlueter, Nuclear Energy Institute (USA)); 5 - Concrete Steps the U.S. NRC Can Take to Improve LLW Disposal (Tom Magette, Talisman International (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 14: US NRC - Current and Emerging US NRC Regulatory Topics

This panel focused on several current and emerging US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulatory issues impacting the commercial radioactive waste arena in the US. The panelists provided different perspectives on key issues such as the revision of 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 61 'Licensing Requirements For Land Disposal Of Radioactive Waste', the scoping study on very low-level waste, the consolidated interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other timely regulatory topics. Panelists with presentations: Overview of NRC Low-Level Radioactive Waste Activities and Initiatives (Patricia Holahan); US Nuclear Power Plant Waste Management - US LLW Disposal Issues (Joe Weismann); Decommissioning Rule (Vern C. Rogers); What is TRU? Definition, Legislation, and Rulemaking (David Carlson); LLRW Regulatory Topics of Interest in Texas (Bobby Janecka); International Low Level Waste Management Practices (Richard McGrath)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Comparative Analysis Between US NRC Requirements and US DOE Orders - 13402

Small modular reactor (SMR) is a nuclear reactor design approach that is expected to herald in a new era of clean energy in the U.S. These reactors are less than one-third the size of conventional large nuclear power reactors, and have factory-fabricated components that may be transported by rail or truck to a site selected to house a small nuclear reactor. To facilitate the licensing of these smaller nuclear reactor designs, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is in the process of developing a regulatory infrastructure to support licensing review of these unique reactor designs. As part of these activities, the NRC has been meeting with the Department of Energy (DOE) and with individual SMR designers to discuss potential policy, licensing, and key technical differences in SMR designs. It is anticipated by the NRC that such licensing interaction and guidance early in the design process will contribute towards minimizing complexity while adding stability and predictability in the licensing and subsequent regulation of new reactor designs such as SMRs. In conjunction with the current NRC initiative of developing the SMR licensing process, early communication and collaboration in the identification and resolution of any potential technical and licensing differences between NRC requirements and similar requirements applicable at DOE sites would help to expedite demonstration and implementation of SMR technology in the US. In order to foster such early communication, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) has begun taking the first steps in identifying and evaluating potential licensing gaps that may exist between NRC and DOE requirements in siting SMRs at DOE sites. A comparison between the existing NRC regulations for Early Site Permits and the DOE Orders was undertaken to establish the degree of correlation between NRC requirements and compliance methods in place at DOE sites. The ability to use existing data and information to expedite the development of the Environmental Report is being evaluated at the Savannah River Site as a case study for application across the DOE Complex. This paper will present areas of direct correlation as well as those where the need for site specific data for either DOE operations or NRC compliance warrant additional interaction between the agencies. Areas where further refinement of the SMR technologies may drive collaborative development of revised regulations through such means as industry consensus standards will also be highlighted. Both NRC and DOE have requirements that mandate public involvement in their processes. The importance and value of early engagement with the public as well as collaborating regulatory agencies is of critical importance when deploying new technologies. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

TableCalculator: a Transparent Public Tool to Replicate US NRC LLW Classification Table Calculations - 19395

Classification of Low-Level Waste (LLW) as Class A, B, C, or Greater than Class C (GTCC) is based on tables provided in Section 61.55 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Those tables were developed from model projections of dose to an inadvertent intruder in agricultural and construction scenarios at different times after closure of a LLW land disposal site. The calculations were performed with two FORTRAN codes, which are documented in US NRC guidance documents published in the early 1980's. Although the equations and parameter values used in the codes are publicly available, no modern, user-friendly implementation of the codes is known to US NRC staff. Because Very Low-Level Waste (VLLW) and GTCC waste disposal are related to the low end and high end of the existing LLW waste classifications, respectively, recent interest in options for disposal of VLLW and GTCC waste have generated public interest in the original assumptions made during the development of the LLW classification tables. Certain stakeholder analyses have recommended alternatives to the existing LLW concentration limits by calculating a projected intruder dose under different conditions than were evaluated in the original development of 10 CFR Part 61 (e.g., using more modern dosimetry or assuming deeper disposal) and comparing the radionuclide concentrations that result in a projected annual dose of 5 milliSieverts (mSv) (500 millirem (mrem)) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to the concentrations in the waste classification tables. However, beginning with the 10 CFR Part 61 LLW classification limits and modifying only one or two assumptions to generate a proposed concentration limit could lead to misleading results without a thorough analysis of whether other assumptions made in the original development of the waste classification tables remain valid. In particular, the US NRC made adjustments to the 10 CFR 61.55 table values during the rulemaking process based on qualitative considerations. Those adjustments mean that many of the values in the final tables cannot simply be assumed to quantitatively represent a 5 mSv (500 mrem) projected inadvertent intruder dose without an assessment of whether the technical bases used to develop the adjustments are applicable to the new analysis. Furthermore, the waste classification limits were based on the limiting critical organ dose rather than a TEDE. Therefore, any calculation based on the assumption that the waste classification limits correspond to 5 mSv (500 mrem) TEDE could benefit from consideration of how differences in exposure pathways could affect the limiting critical organ dose differently from the TEDE. To facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the calculations used to develop the waste classification tables, the US NRC staff has developed a user-friendly tool to replicate the original calculations. Results were verified against output from the FORTRAN codes and the classification table values. The tool, TableCalculator, is expected to be made publicly available and will allow the user to trace the original calculations and to observe the effects of changes in disposal assumptions and other parameter values. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A RE-LOOK AT THE US NRC SAFETY GOALS

Since they were adopted in 1986, the US NRC’s Safety Goals have played a valuable role as a de facto risk acceptance criterion against which the predicted performance of a commercial nuclear power reactor can be evaluated and assessed. The current safety goals are cast in terms of risk metrics called quantitative health objectives (QHOs), limiting numerical values of the risks of the early and latent health effects of accidental releases of radioactivity to the offsite population. However, while demonstrating compliance with current safety goals has been an important step in assessing the acceptance of the risk posed by LWRs, new or somewhat different goals may be needed that go beyond the current early fatality and latent cancer fatality QHOs in assessing reactor risk. Natural phenomena such as hurricanes seem to be suitable candidates for establishing a background rate to derive a risk goal as their order of magnitude cost of damages is similar to those estimated in severe accident Level 3 PRAs done for nuclear power plants. This paper obtains a risk goal that could have a wider applicability, compared to the current QHOs, as a technology-neutral goal applicable to future reactors and multi-unit sites.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Certification of RadICS FPGA-based platform under US NRC requirements - 386

The paper discusses approach, applicable to certify digital instrumentation and control (I and C) platform under US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. Currently, Radics LLC is certifying its Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)-based RadICS Platform using Platform-based test specimen. The Platform has been recently certified under IEC 61508 to meet Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 3 requirements. Up to now Radics LLC has developed a number of FPGA-based I and C applications based on RadICS Platform. Those applications include applications based on customer's specification and reverse engineering applications (Fit, Form and Function reproduction of existing equipment). The life cycles of applications include independent verification and validation of FPGA-based I and C systems/components, Commercial Grade Dedication of components for FPGA-based I and C systems, turnkey implementation of I and C project, supply of hardware, engineering tools and application design process. The paper also describes in details certification approach, which is based on Digital I and C-ISG- 06 and includes the following stages: general agreement with the US NRC, Topical Report submittal, timely responses and successful audits, and timely issuance of approved Topical Report. Such approach is supported by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Quality Management System, which is also discussed in the paper. In addition, an overview of RadICS Platform Topical Report is presented, including its overview and structure, certification scope and obligatory appendixes. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

AREVA NP MR Cladding benefits for proposed US NRC RIA and LOCA requirements

M5 is the reference alloy of AREVA NP for PWR cladding applications. It is a zirconium-based alloy containing 1% niobium, no tin, and well-controlled oxygen, iron, and sulfur contents. It has a fully recrystallized microstructure. The absence of tin in M5 results in a very low corrosion rate and hydrogen pick-up during normal operation, even at high burn-up and in high duty irradiation conditions. Due to this low hydrogen pick-up under irradiation (typically less than 100 ppm, End of Life), M5 retains a very good strength and an exceptional residual ductility during and after the accident. This allows utilities implementing M5 to simplify the safety analysis and to demonstrate significant margins regarding fuel related criteria. Simplified methods are easier for plants to implement and maintain for future plant operations and core design management. This paper specifically presents 3 examples on the safety improvement brought by M5 cladding. First, during a reactivity-induced accident (RIA), the properties of M5 are such that bounding analyses for future cycles are significantly simplified, in particular by demonstrating that fuel dispersal will not occur. The major aspects of the AREVA NP RIA methodology are presented. A second focus is made on the low hydrogen embrittlement of M5 and on its high ductility after quenching during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). In a third part, the breakaway oxidation testing program currently under development in Paimboeuf (France) is described, including details about the testing devices and qualification. The tests have demonstrated that M5 cladding does not have breakaway at least up to 5000 s oxidation duration at 1000 C. degrees, which is much higher than the LOCA duration.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Implementation of a Risk-Informed Monitoring Program for the Saltstone Disposal Facility - 19374

Section 3116(b) of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) requires the US NRC, in coordination with the appropriate State agency, to monitor certain disposal actions of the US DOE to assess compliance with the performance objectives in Subpart C of Part 61 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Under Section 3116(b), the US NRC monitors the US DOE disposal of salt waste at the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. Since the first US NRC monitoring plan for the SDF was issued in 2007, the US NRC staff has made the risk-significant areas of interest more specific. Following the US DOE issuance of the 2009 performance assessment for the SDF and the US NRC review of that document, the US NRC issued its second monitoring plan for the SDF in 2013. The 2013 US NRC monitoring plan included 11 monitoring areas, which were broken down into 40 specific monitoring factors. The US NRC prioritized those monitoring factors (i.e., low, medium, high) based on the sensitivity of model results to the assumptions or processes covered by the monitoring factor and the uncertainty in those assumptions or processes. Those monitoring factors can be opened, closed, revised, and re-prioritized based on new information or changes in the US DOE activities and plans. For example, the list of US NRC high-priority monitoring factors has changed in response to changing information. The flexibility of this approach allows the US NRC to remain focused on risk-significant areas of interest. The US NRC staff has made changes to the NDAA monitoring program at the SDF since the issuance of the 2007 monitoring plan. First, the development of more specific monitoring factors and the prioritization of those monitoring factors has been successful in focusing the US NRC and the US DOE resources on risk-significant issues and providing transparency to stakeholders. Second, the US NRC reviews have become more focused on addressing specific monitoring factors, which has made the process for updating the monitoring plan more transparent. Finally, periodic management meetings and monthly telephone calls maintain open communications between the US NRC, US DOE, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), and US EPA. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Addressing embedded digital devices in safety-related systems of nuclear power plants - 307

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the development of the approach to addressing embedded digital devices (EDD) in safety-related systems of nuclear power plants in the U.S. and around the world. In April, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) issued RIS 2016-05 to heighten awareness that EDDs might exist in procured equipment used in safety-related systems without the devices having been explicitly identified in procurement documentation. Inadequate consideration of these devices in digital technology system upgrades, component replacements, and new equipment applications could lead to an adverse safety consequence. The US NRC request was for addressees to implement early efforts to identify these devices. An area where this is being addressed is in regard to the performance of Diversity and Defense-In-Depth (D3) analyses, as addressed in US NRC Branch Technical Position 7-19. Nuclear facilities have increased their use and reliance on digital technology in systems and equipment (e.g., I and C, electrical systems, and fluid systems). In addition to digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems, examples of safety-related equipment that may use digital technology include emergency diesel generators, pumps, valve actuators, motor control centers, breakers, priority logic modules, time-delay relays, and uninterruptible power sources. In the U.S. and around the world, engineering and licensing activities in standards and guidance have been, and are being developed to address this important consideration in protecting safety-related systems. This paper addresses development of an extended approach to evaluating common-cause failure vulnerability and mitigation in regard to equipment with an EDD. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

US NRC-Sponsored Research on Stress Corrosion Cracking Susceptibility of Dry Storage Canister Materials in Marine Environments - 13344

At a number of locations in the U.S., spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is maintained at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). These ISFSIs, which include operating and decommissioned reactor sites, Department of Energy facilities in Idaho, and others, are licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72. The SNF is stored in dry cask storage systems, which most commonly consist of a welded austenitic stainless steel canister within a larger concrete vault or overpack vented to the external atmosphere to allow airflow for cooling. Some ISFSIs are located in marine environments where there may be high concentrations of airborne chloride salts. If salts were to deposit on the canisters via the external vents, a chloride-rich brine could form by deliquescence. Austenitic stainless steels are susceptible to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC), particularly in the presence of residual tensile stresses from welding or other fabrication processes. SCC could allow helium to leak out of a canister if the wall is breached or otherwise compromise its structural integrity. There is currently limited understanding of the conditions that will affect the SCC susceptibility of austenitic stainless steel exposed to marine salts. NRC previously conducted a scoping study of this phenomenon, reported in NUREG/CR-7030 in 2010. Given apparent conservatisms and limitations in this study, NRC has sponsored a follow-on research program to more systematically investigate various factors that may affect SCC including temperature, humidity, salt concentration, and stress level. The activities within this research program include: (1) measurement of relative humidity (RH) for deliquescence of sea salt, (2) SCC testing within the range of natural absolute humidity, (3) SCC testing at elevated temperatures, (4) SCC testing at high humidity conditions, and (5) SCC testing with various applied stresses. Results to date indicate that the deliquescence RH for sea salt is close to that of MgCl{sub 2} pure salt. SCC is observed between 35 and 80 deg. C when the ambient (RH) is close to or higher than this level, even for a low surface salt concentration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NUHOMS{sup R} EOS (Extended Optimized Storage): Robust, Advanced, and Dual Purpose Dry Storage System - 16472

AREVA TN has completed the design, analysis, and US NRC license submittal for the NUHOMS{sup R} Extended Optimized Storage (EOS) system. NUHOMS{sup R} EOS offers a large capacity and high heat load dry storage and transportation solution for UNF. EOS is not a new system, but an evolution of the already-proven safe and low-risk horizontal NUHOMS{sup R} storage system, which is one of the most widely used UNF dry storage systems in the United States. The EOS system features a 37PTH dry shielded canister (DSC) for 37 PWR UNF assemblies and an 89BTH DSC for the 89 BWR UNF assemblies. The EOS DSCs will be stored inside a horizontal storage module (HSM) that is a robust, fortress-like concrete storage overpack. Designed with the lessons learned from the Fukushima event in Japan in mind, EOS has robust margins for beyond design basis (BDB) events and offers the lowest risk and highest safety margin of any dry storage system design for recovery from BDB events. EOS also offers innovative aging management features with an aging management program (AMP) to assure safe and low dose long-term storage at the utility sites. EOS incorporates ports for AMP inspections and offers the option of using duplex stainless steel (DSS) for the DSC shell in order to negate corrosion issues. EOS is stored horizontally and above ground, making it easy and quick to access for visual inspection, monitoring, and mitigating actions during AMP. NUHOMS{sup R} EOS is optimized for high capacity, high burnup, high enrichments, and very low cooling times for UNF assemblies. It enables the highest heat load per canister (50 kW) and low dose rates. Even with high heat loads, EOS has significant margins to design basis limits. As the future of used fuel disposition will require the need to move fuel off-site to interim or consolidated storage, EOS is the ideal solution as it enables on-site loading and unloading operations that mitigate risk when transferring fuel on-site or transporting fuel off-site. The EOS design can be safely located in a traditional outdoor setting with fortress-like concrete reinforced modules that offer superior resistance to attack or can be safely operated inside of a building enclosure for those utilities desiring a more discreet siting for its used fuel storage systems. EOS has an innovative basket design that is made of high strength low alloy (HSLA) material and is easy to fabricate due to its non-welded design. Its innovative inlet and outlet air vent design, which incorporates dose reduction hardware, allows for optimal ambient airflow for highly efficient heat transfer with minimal radiation dose. The NUHOMS{sup R} EOS storage modules are interlocked in a side-by-side configuration offering superior and robust seismic performance. The license application for NUHOMS{sup R} EOS is currently under US NRC review and this system will be available for deployment in 2017. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 57: US Nuclear Power Plant Waste Management - US LLW Disposal Issues

This panel focused on senior utility managers discussing specific disposal site issues with the disposal site operators. Representatives from each of the operating commercial disposal sites began by presenting an update of their facility, license, and waste acceptance criteria (WAC) followed by a panel discussion in response to audience questions. Panelists with presentations: Current and Emerging US NRC Regulatory Topics (Joe Weismann); WCS Update (Dan Burns); EnergySolutions Clive Facility Support for US LLW Disposal Issues (Vern C. Rogers)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

limiting rods selection in large break LOCA analysis with the RELAP5-3D code

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing a new rulemaking on emergency core system/loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) performance analysis. In the proposed rulemaking, designated as 10 CFR 50.46(c), the US NRC put forward an equivalent cladding oxidation criterion as a function of cladding pre-transient hydrogen content. The proposed rulemaking imposes more restrictive and burnup-dependent cladding embrittlement criteria; consequently more fuel rods need to be analyzed under LOCA conditions to maintain the safety margin, compared to the current practice in which only one hot rod needs to be analyzed. New analysis methods are required to provide a thorough characterization of the reactor core in order to identify the locations of the limiting rods under LOCA conditions. In this work, the best-estimate plus uncertainty analysis capability for large break LOCA with the new cladding embrittlement criteria using the RELAP5-3D code is established and demonstrated with a reduced set of uncertainty parameters. With the new analysis method, the limiting transient case and the limiting rods can be easily identified in response to the proposed new rulemaking. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Comparison of German and American fabrication standards for transportation and storage containments of high level radioactive material type B packages - 15055

As the competent authority for the evaluation of German radioactive material (RAM) transport and storage packages, BAM (the German Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing) has evaluated various international cask manufacturers regarding compliance with the German Type B(U) licensing requirements. The US NRC has recommended paragraphs in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B and PV) Code, Section III, Division 3, as the measure to quantify the safety requirements of the US regulations regarding fabrication of RAM transportation and storage containments. The objective of this study is to compare the fabrication criteria of the German Dangerous Goods Procedural Rules (BAM-GGR) and the German Institute for Standardization (DIN) with the US quantitative measures for fabrication of RAM package containment vessels. This comparison will cover major similarities and differences between the requirements of the German standards and the ASME Code requirements for Type B package containment fabrication QC (quality control). While the material most often used for German RAM containment applications is ductile cast iron (DCI), in the US forged austenitic stainless steel is typically used. This study focuses on fabrication QC measures required to ensure reproducible and acceptable properties for DCI containments. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗