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Sustainability of the U.S. Manufacturing Sector: Use of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals

The United Nations' 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to improve health and education, reduce inequality, and encourage economic growth, while also preserving or improving the conditions of our oceans and forests. Pursuing these SDGs would mean $12 trillion in economic opportunities for companies, while also improving the lives of all people and bettering the planet. Some manufacturing companies are already focusing on sustainability, but not all. In 2019, almost 30% of National Association of Manufacturers members did not have a sustainable policy, goals, or program in place. Business drivers for sustainability and the SDGs are similar, with focuses on economic growth and consumer demands. Despite the shortcomings of the SDGs, they represent an opportunity for manufacturing companies to further improve energy, material efficiency, and productivity. This report evaluates the SDGs and the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector was analyzed using the technology assessments (TAs) introduced in the 2015 Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) review, which focused on concepts, challenges, and solutions to meet the United States' energy needs. Annual or sustainability reporting of companies performing work in one of those TAs were analyzed for mentions of the SDGs. The call-out boxes throughout this report provide examples of companies making progress toward the SDGs. The possible overlap between the SDGs and the Advanced Manufacturing Office (AMO) was also evaluated. The TAs in the 2015 QTR Review were furthered with detailed targets in the draft Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) for Fiscal Years 2017-2021. Direct and likely relationships between the SDGs and the TAs were established. Positives, challenges, SDG-related literature, and future steps are also discussed in this report.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Can exascale computing and explainable artificial intelligence applied to plant biology deliver on the United Nations sustainable development goals?

Human population growth and accelerated climate change necessitate agricultural improvements using designer crop ideotypes (idealized plants that can grow in niche environments). Diverse and highly skilled research groups must integrate efforts to bridge the gaps needed to achieve international goals toward sustainable agriculture. Given the scale of global agricultural needs and the breadth of multiple types of omics data needed to optimize these efforts, explainable artificial intelligence (AI with a decipherable decision making process that provides a meaningful explanation to humans) and exascale computing (computers that can perform 1018 floating-point operations per second, or exaflops) are crucial. Accurate phenotyping and daily-resolution climatype associations are equally important for refining ideotype production to specific environments at various levels of granularity. In this article, we review advances toward tackling technological hurdles to solve multiple United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and discuss a vision to overcome gaps between research and policy.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Global Energy Policy to Achieve the United States’ Nationally Determined Contributions: Potential Pathway

In 2021, the United States declared its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in preparation for the COP26 climate summit, setting goals to achieve zero emission electricity by 2035, and reducing net emissions by 50–52% compared to 2005 levels. The current U.S. energy policies were found to not be adequate to meet these goals, thus it is necessary to draft a pathway to achieving these goals through policy changes. This study focused on foreign energy policies to analyze the most effective policies in a host of sectors. By identifying the most ambitious and effective policies from around the world in each sector, this study was able to suggest a policy pathway that can potentially achieve both of goals set in the NDC. In guiding the development of the proposed policy pathway, this study analyzed policies from Australia, Canada, California, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This study found that the most drastic CO2 reductions came from low-carbon electricity policy, but contributions were also made from carbon capture, reforestation, hydrogen, energy efficiency, and climate smart agriculture.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Unprecedented climate events: Historical changes, aspirational targets, and national commitments

The United Nations Paris Agreement creates a specific need to compare consequences of cumulative emissions for pledged national commitments and aspirational targets of 1.5° to 2°C global warming. We find that humans have already increased the probability of historically unprecedented hot, warm, wet, and dry extremes, including over 50 to 90% of North America, Europe, and East Asia. Emissions consistent with national commitments are likely to cause substantial and widespread additional increases, including more than fivefold for warmest night over ~50% of Europe and >25% of East Asia and more than threefold for wettest days over >35% of North America, Europe, and East Asia. In contrast, meeting aspirational targets to keep global warming below 2°C reduces the area experiencing more than threefold increases to <10% of most regions studied. However, large areas—including >90% of North America, Europe, East Asia, and much of the tropics—still exhibit sizable increases in the probability of record-setting hot, wet, and/or dry events.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Synthesis of national reports for Rio+20

In the lead up to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), which took place in Brazil in June 2012, there were numerous efforts in countries around the world to help governments, civil society organizations and individuals prepare for the event. One of the more significant efforts led by UNDP in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) was a support programme to 72 countries across all regions to build a consensus on national views around the themes and objectives of the Rio+20 Conference. This report highlights significant advances in sustainable development from almost 60 country reports and underscores the challenges and bottlenecks to moving beyond the economic-led growth strategies of the past 20 years.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

What Crime? Legal Jurisdiction over Civilians in the Pacific Proving Ground

In late 1948 the Atomic Energy Commission “designated Enewetak Atoll as a permanent proving ground.” Subsequently renamed, the Pacific Proving Ground (PPG), six nuclear tests, including Mike, were conducted on the atoll. When Mike vaporized an entire island, it became clear that Enewetak’s small islands were insufficient and Bikini Atoll, abandoned after Operation Crossroads, was made part of the PPG. Authority to create the PPG resided in a “Trusteeship” agreement between the United States and the United Nations. Following the first World War, the Marshall Islands became a “Mandate” of the League of Nations. After World War II, the League’s successor, the United Nations, converted the Marshall Islands to a “Strategic Trusteeship” with the United States as its administrator. The Strategic Trust designation gave the U.S. nearly unfettered control over the islands, including the right to establish the PPG.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2019, Revision 0

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): • CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment • CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well • CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility • CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater • CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits • CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This report covers fiscal year 2012 (October 2011–September 2012). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material - in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium - for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international - most likely International Atomic Energy Agency - monitoring. Many non-weapon states argue that the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. This paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, for Fiscal Year 2014

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for several Corrective Action Units (CAUs). The locations of the sites are shown in Figure 1. This report covers fiscal year 2014 (October 2013–September 2014). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, 111, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches (in.) in a 24-hour period and at CAU 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 in. in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. In addition to visual inspections, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. At CAU 111, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, subsidence surveys, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are conducted. The results of the vegetation surveys and an analysis of the soil moisture monitoring data at CAU 110 are presented in this report. Results of additional monitoring at CAU 111 are documented annually in the Nevada National Security Site Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites and in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, which will be prepared in approximately June 2015. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. It is recommended to continue inspections and monitoring as scheduled.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, For Fiscal Year 2010

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs): (1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; (2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; (3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; (4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; and (5) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure 1. This report covers fiscal year 2010 (October 2009-September 2010). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0021 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units and identification of any deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the units. The condition of covers, fencing, signs, gates, and locks is documented. In addition, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. The results of the inspections, summary of maintenance activities, results of vegetations surveys, and analysis of monitoring data are presented in this report. Copies of the inspection checklists are included as Appendix A. Field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix B. Photographs taken during the site inspections are included in Appendix C.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2017, Revision 0

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and, CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inches in a 24-hour period and at CAU 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAU 110, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 111, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, subsidence surveys, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are conducted. This report will address all monitoring items notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 4 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2018 (Revision 0)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calender year 2018. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110 the site fence, gate, lock and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Fiscal Year 2011 (October 2010-September 2011)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs): • CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; • CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; • CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; • CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; and • CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report covers fiscal year 2011 (October 2010-September 2011). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units and identification of any deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the units. The condition of covers, fencing, signs, gates, and locks is documented. In addition, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. The results of the inspections, summary of maintenance activities, results of vegetations surveys, and analysis of monitoring data are presented in this report. Copies of the inspection checklists are included as Appendix A. Field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix B. Photographs taken during the inspections are included in Appendix C. It is recommended to continue semiannual inspections at CAUs 90 and 91; quarterly inspections at CAUs 92, 110, and 112; and additional inspections at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. At CAU 92, it is recommended to remove the wave barriers, as they have not proven to be necessary to protect the cover. At CAU 110, it is recommended to continue annual vegetation monitoring and soil moisture monitoring, and to reduce the frequency of subsidence surveys from twice per year to once every other year (biennially).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for fiscal year 2013 (October 2012 - September 2013)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and, CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Fiscal Year 2015 (October 2014–September 2015), Revision 0

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs); CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report covers fiscal year 2015 (October 2014 through September 2015). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

August 5, 1963-President Kennedy's Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow, Russia

On August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs marked the end of World War II and the beginning of the nuclear age. As tensions between East and West settled into a Cold War, scientists in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union conducted tests and developed more powerful nuclear weapons. In 1959, radioactive deposits were found in wheat and milk in the northern United States. As scientists and the public gradually became aware of the dangers of radioactive fallout, they began to raise their voices against nuclear testing. Leaders and diplomats of several countries sought to address the issue. In May 1955, the United Nations Disarmament Commission brought together the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on ending nuclear weapons testing. Conflict soon arose over inspections to verify underground testing. The Soviet Union feared that on-site inspections could lead to spying that might expose the Soviets' vastly exaggerated claims of the number of deliverable nuclear weapons. As negotiators struggled over differences, the Soviet Union and the United States suspended nuclear tests—a moratorium that lasted from November 1958 to September 1961. John F. Kennedy had supported ban on nuclear weapons testing since 1956. He believed a ban would prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, and took a strong stand on the issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. Once elected, President Kennedy pledged not to resume testing in the air and promised to pursue all diplomatic efforts for a test ban treaty before resuming underground testing. He envisioned the test ban as a first step to nuclear disarmament. President Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, just five weeks after the humiliating defeat of the US-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev took a hard line at the summit. He announced his intention to cut off Western access to Berlin and threatened war if the United States or its allies tried to stop him. Many US diplomats felt that Kennedy had not stood up to the Soviet premier at the summit and left Khrushchev with the impression that he was a weak leader. President Kennedy's political and military advisers feared that the Soviet Union had continued secret underground testing and made gains in nuclear technology. They pressured Kennedy to resume testing. And, according to a Gallup poll in July 1961, the public approved of testing by a margin of two-to-one. In August 1961, the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume atmospheric testing, and over the next three months it conducted 31 nuclear tests. It exploded the largest nuclear bomb in history—58 megatons—4,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In his commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963, Kennedy announced a new round of high-level arms negotiations with the Russians. He boldly called for an end to the Cold War. "If we cannot end our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity." The Soviet government broadcast a translation of the entire speech, and allowed it to be reprinted in the controlled Soviet press. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by US Secretary Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home—one day short of the 18th anniversary of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Over the next two months, President Kennedy convinced a fearful public and a divided Senate to support the treaty. The Senate approved the treaty on September 23, 1963, by an 80-19 margin. Kennedy signed the ratified treaty on October 7, 1963. The treaty: prohibited nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space allowed underground nuclear tests as long as no radioactive debris falls outside the boundaries of the nation conducting the test pledged signatories to work towards complete disarmament, an end to the armaments race, and an end to the contamination of the environment by radioactive substances. Thirty-three years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Signed by 71 nations, including those possessing nuclear weapons, the treaty prohibited all nuclear test explosions including those conducted underground. Though it was signed by President Bill Clinton, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗