Crossing sequences and off-line Turing machine computations.
One-tape off-line Turing machines covering crossing sequences, recognition problems and computation times
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One-tape off-line Turing machines covering crossing sequences, recognition problems and computation times
One-tape off-line Turing machine, analyzing characteristics and computation time minimization
Lower bounds on computation times of certain input-output transformations and tradeoff relation between computation time and dimensionality of Turing machine tapes
In the first of this pair of papers, it was proven that there cannot be a physical computer to which one can properly pose any and all computational tasks concerning the physical universe. It was then further proven that no physical computer C can correctly carry out all computational tasks that can be posed to C. As a particular example, this result means that no physical computer that can, for any physical system external to that computer, take the specification of that external system's state as input and then correctly predict its future state before that future state actually occurs; one cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of correctly "processing information faster than the universe does". These results do not rely on systems that are infinite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an infinitely fast, infinitely dense computer, with computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine. This generality is a direct consequence of the fact that a novel definition of computation - "physical computation" - is needed to address the issues considered in these papers, which concern real physical computers. While this novel definition does not fit into the traditional Chomsky hierarchy, the mathematical structure and impossibility results associated with it have parallels in the mathematics of the Chomsky hierarchy. This second paper of the pair presents a preliminary exploration of some of this mathematical structure. Analogues of Chomskian results concerning universal Turing Machines and the Halting theorem are derived, as are results concerning the (im)possibility of certain kinds of error-correcting codes. In addition, an analogue of algorithmic information complexity, "prediction complexity", is elaborated. A task-independent bound is derived on how much the prediction complexity of a computational task can differ for two different reference universal physical computers used to solve that task, a bound similar to the "encoding" bound governing how much the algorithm information complexity of a Turing machine calculation can differ for two reference universal Turing machines. Finally, it is proven that either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic information complexity), in that there is one and only version of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.
Continuous dynamical systems intuitively seem capable of more complex behavior than discrete systems. If analyzed in the framework of the traditional theory of computation, a continuous dynamical system with countably many quasistable states has at least the computational power of a universal Turing machine. Such an analysis assumes, however, the classical notion of measurement. If measurement is viewed nonclassically, a continuous dynamical system cannot, even in principle, exhibit behavior that cannot be simulated by a universal Turing machine.
Continuous dynamical systems intuitively seem capable of more complex behavior than discrete systems. If analyzed in the framework of the traditional theory of computation, a continuous dynamical system with countablely many quasistable states has at least the computational power of a universal Turing machine. Such an analyses assumes, however, the classical notion of measurement. If measurement is viewed nonclassically, a continuous dynamical system cannot, even in principle, exhibit behavior that cannot be simulated by a universal Turing machine.
Topological classification of the 4-manifolds bridges computation theory and physics. A proof of the undecidability of the homeomorphy problem for 4-manifolds is outlined here in a clarifying way. It is shown that an arbitrary Turing machine with an arbitrary input can be encoded into the topology of a 4-manifold, such that the 4-manifold is homeomorphic to a certain other 4-manifold if and only if the corresponding Turing machine halts on the associated input. Physical implications are briefly discussed.
In this paper we study the difficulty of solving problems in economics. For this purpose, we adopt the notion of undecidability from recursion theory. We show that certain problems in economics are undecidable, i.e., cannot be solved by a Turing Machine, a device that is at least as powerful as any computational device that can be constructed. In particular, we prove that even in finite closed economies subject to a variable initial condition, in which a social planner knows the behavior of every agent in the economy, certain important social planning problems are undecidable. Thus, it may be impossible to make effective policy decisions. Philosophically, this result formally brings into question the Rational Expectations Hypothesis which assumes that each agent is able to determine what it should do if it wishes to maximize its utility. We show that even when an optimal rational forecast exists for each agency (based on the information currently available to it), agents may lack the ability to make these forecasts. For example, Lucas describes economic models as 'mechanical, artificial world(s), populated by ... interacting robots'. Since any mechanical robot can be at most as computationally powerful as a Turing Machine, such economies are vulnerable to the phenomenon of undecidability.
Machine dependence of degree-of-difficulty relation for recursive functions, considering Turing machine as programmed computer
It has been demonstrated that classical probabilities, and in particular, probabilistic Turing machine, can be simulated by combining chaos and non-Lipschitz dynamics, without utilization of any man-made devices. Self-organizing properties of systems coupling simulated and calculated probabilities and their link to quantum computations are discussed.
It has been demonstrated that classical probabilities, and in particular, probabilistic Turing machine, can be simulated by combining chaos and non-LIpschitz dynamics, without utilization of any man-made devices (such as random number generators). Self-organizing properties of systems coupling simulated and calculated probabilities and their link to quantum computations are discussed.
It has been demonstrated that classical probabilities, and in particular, probabilistic Turing machine, can be simulated by combining chaos and non-Lipschitz dynamics, without utilization of any man-made devices(such as random number generators). Self-orgainizing properties of systems coupling simulated and calculated probabilities and their link to quantum computations are discussed. Special attention was focused upon coupled stochastic processes, defined in terms of conditional probabilities, for which joint probability does not exist. Simulations of quantum probabilities are also discussed.
A property of polynomial complete languages is extended in order to better compare various classes of formal languages defined by time- or tape-bounded turing machines.
In this first of two papers, strong limits on the accuracy of physical computation are established. First it is proven that there cannot be a physical computer C to which one can pose any and all computational tasks concerning the physical universe. Next it is proven that no physical computer C can correctly carry out any computational task in the subset of such tasks that can be posed to C. This result holds whether the computational tasks concern a system that is physically isolated from C, or instead concern a system that is coupled to C. As a particular example, this result means that there cannot be a physical computer that can, for any physical system external to that computer, take the specification of that external system's state as input and then correctly predict its future state before that future state actually occurs; one cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of correctly 'processing information faster than the universe does'. The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that are infinite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an infinitely fast, infinitely dense computer, with computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine. This generality is a direct consequence of the fact that a novel definition of computation - a definition of 'physical computation' - is needed to address the issues considered in these papers. While this definition does not fit into the traditional Chomsky hierarchy, the mathematical structure and impossibility results associated with it have parallels in the mathematics of the Chomsky hierarchy. The second in this pair of papers presents a preliminary exploration of some of this mathematical structure, including in particular that of prediction complexity, which is a 'physical computation analogue' of algorithmic information complexity. It is proven in that second paper that either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic information complexity), in that there is one and only version of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.
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An impact of ideas associated with the concept of a hypothetical quantum computer upon classical computing is analyzed. Two fundamental properties of quantum computing: direct simulations of probabilities, and influence between different branches of probabilistic scenarios, as well as their classical versions, are discussed.
Several representations of the recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets are presented. The first states that every r.e. set is the homomorphic image of the intersection of two linear context-free languages. The second states that every r.e. set is accepted by an on-line Turing acceptor with two pushdown stores such that in every computation, each pushdown store can make at most one reversal (that is, one change from 'pushing' to 'popping'). It is shown that this automata theoretic representation cannot be strengthened by restricting the acceptors to be deterministic multitape, nondeterministic one-tape, or nondeterministic multicounter acceptors. This provides evidence that reversal bounds are not a natural measure of computational complexity for multitape Turing acceptors.