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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

International challenge to predict the impact of radioxenon releases from medical isotope production on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty sampling station

Abstract The International Monitoring System (IMS) is part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). At entry-into-force, half of the 80 radionuclide stations will be able to measure concentrations of several radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear explosions, and then the full network may be populated with xenon monitoring afterward (Bowyer et al., 2013). Fission-based production of 99Mo for medical purposes also releases radioxenon isotopes to the atmosphere (Saey, 2009). One of the ways to mitigate the effect of emissions from medical isotope production is the use of stack monitoring data, if it were available, so that the effect of radioactive xenon emissions could be subtracted from the effect from a presumed nuclear explosion, when detected at an IMS station location. To date, no studies have addressed the impacts the time resolution or data accuracy of stack monitoring data have on predicted concentrations at an IMS station location. Recently, participants from seven nations used atmospheric transport modeling to predict the time-history of 133Xe concentration measurements at an IMS station in Germany using stack monitoring data from a medical isotope production facility in Belgium. Participants received only stack monitoring data and used the atmospheric transport model and meteorological data of their choice. Some of the models predicted the highest measured concentrations quite well (a high composite statistical model comparison rank or a small mean square error with the measured values). The results suggest release data on a 15 min time spacing is best. The model comparison rank and ensemble analysis suggests that combining multiple models may provide more accurate predicted concentrations than any single model. Further research is needed to identify optimal methods for selecting ensemble members and those methods may depend on the specific transport problem. None of the submissions based only on the stack monitoring data predicted the small measured concentrations very well. The one submission that best predicted small concentrations also included releases from nuclear power plants. Modeling of sources by other nuclear facilities with smaller releases than medical isotope production facilities may be important in discriminating those releases from releases from a nuclear explosion.

133Xe↗
DOE OSTI2014

Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material - in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium - for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international - most likely International Atomic Energy Agency - monitoring. Many non-weapon states argue that the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. This paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

An international monitoring system for verification to support both the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the nonproliferation treaty

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons calls for states to meet regularly to consider measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapon programs. Key to this effort is mapping a comprehensive set of nuclear weapon program indicators and further developing international capacity to monitor them. Distinct from the deadlocked Conference on Disarmament, this new forum will have an opportunity to examine and elaborate disarmament verification concepts. One relevant concept is a Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation International Monitoring System (NDN-IMS), elaborated from a proposal most recently noted by the United Nations Open-ended Working Group (A/71/371). As a flexible framework, an NDN-IMS, could help unite diverse technologies and mechanisms around the purpose of disarmament verification in ways that support the existing nonproliferation regime and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Elements could include satellite imagery from new constellations, wide area environmental sampling, and civil society reporting.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

August 5, 1963-President Kennedy's Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow, Russia

On August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs marked the end of World War II and the beginning of the nuclear age. As tensions between East and West settled into a Cold War, scientists in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union conducted tests and developed more powerful nuclear weapons. In 1959, radioactive deposits were found in wheat and milk in the northern United States. As scientists and the public gradually became aware of the dangers of radioactive fallout, they began to raise their voices against nuclear testing. Leaders and diplomats of several countries sought to address the issue. In May 1955, the United Nations Disarmament Commission brought together the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on ending nuclear weapons testing. Conflict soon arose over inspections to verify underground testing. The Soviet Union feared that on-site inspections could lead to spying that might expose the Soviets' vastly exaggerated claims of the number of deliverable nuclear weapons. As negotiators struggled over differences, the Soviet Union and the United States suspended nuclear tests—a moratorium that lasted from November 1958 to September 1961. John F. Kennedy had supported ban on nuclear weapons testing since 1956. He believed a ban would prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, and took a strong stand on the issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. Once elected, President Kennedy pledged not to resume testing in the air and promised to pursue all diplomatic efforts for a test ban treaty before resuming underground testing. He envisioned the test ban as a first step to nuclear disarmament. President Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, just five weeks after the humiliating defeat of the US-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev took a hard line at the summit. He announced his intention to cut off Western access to Berlin and threatened war if the United States or its allies tried to stop him. Many US diplomats felt that Kennedy had not stood up to the Soviet premier at the summit and left Khrushchev with the impression that he was a weak leader. President Kennedy's political and military advisers feared that the Soviet Union had continued secret underground testing and made gains in nuclear technology. They pressured Kennedy to resume testing. And, according to a Gallup poll in July 1961, the public approved of testing by a margin of two-to-one. In August 1961, the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume atmospheric testing, and over the next three months it conducted 31 nuclear tests. It exploded the largest nuclear bomb in history—58 megatons—4,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In his commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963, Kennedy announced a new round of high-level arms negotiations with the Russians. He boldly called for an end to the Cold War. "If we cannot end our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity." The Soviet government broadcast a translation of the entire speech, and allowed it to be reprinted in the controlled Soviet press. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by US Secretary Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home—one day short of the 18th anniversary of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Over the next two months, President Kennedy convinced a fearful public and a divided Senate to support the treaty. The Senate approved the treaty on September 23, 1963, by an 80-19 margin. Kennedy signed the ratified treaty on October 7, 1963. The treaty: prohibited nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space allowed underground nuclear tests as long as no radioactive debris falls outside the boundaries of the nation conducting the test pledged signatories to work towards complete disarmament, an end to the armaments race, and an end to the contamination of the environment by radioactive substances. Thirty-three years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Signed by 71 nations, including those possessing nuclear weapons, the treaty prohibited all nuclear test explosions including those conducted underground. Though it was signed by President Bill Clinton, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nomenclature, Chemical Abstracts Service Numbers, Isomer Enumeration, Ring Strain and Stereochemistry: What Does Any of This Have to do with an International Chemical Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaty?

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an international disarmament and non-proliferation treaty that mandates a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This treaty entered-into-force in 1997 and has a nearly universal membership of world states. The CWC provides definitions for what constitutes a chemical weapon and describes chemicals for which verification measures and regulatory oversight are required. These chemicals, which must be declared to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for verification purposes, appear in three Schedules within the CWC. The schedules list specific chemical substances and families of chemicals defined by molecular structure descriptions that allow a range of specified variable groups. The text of an international treaty provides a basis for laws and regulatory requirements at international and national levels that must be enacted to comply with treaty obligations. These laws and regulations must account for the “chemistry” that is described in the treaty text, which has been negotiated and agreed upon by world governments. In this paper, we look at some of the chemicals described within the CWC and discuss how atoms and molecules, nomenclature and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers, isomer enumeration, ring strain and stereochemistry influence the obligations of States to an international treaty. The material draws upon the authors’ experiences from an interactive “Science for Diplomats” initiative that has provided a forum for engaging with chemical disarmament decision makers to aid in their understanding of fundamental concepts in chemistry that have impact on treaty implementation. We hope this article will spark interest from chemistry students and educators in the provision of science advice for policymakers and provide policymakers with an appreciation of the complexity and importance of understanding the language of chemistry in support of a world free of chemical weapons.

Organic Chemistry, Alkanes/Cycloalkanes, Applicati↗
NASA NTRS2004

The Role of Satellite Earth Observation Data in Monitoring and Verifying International Environmental Treaties

The term verification implies compliance verification in the language of treaty negotiation and implementation, particularly in the fields of disarmament and arms control. The term monitoring on the other hand, in both environmental and arms control treaties, has a much broader interpretation which allows for use of supporting data sources that are not necessarily acceptable or adequate for direct verification. There are many ways that satellite Earth observation (EO) data can support international environmental agreements, from national forest inventories to use in geographic information system (GIs) tools. Though only a few references to satellite EO data and their use exist in the treaties themselves, an expanding list of applications can be considered in support of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). This paper explores the current uses of satellite Earth observation data which support monitoring activities of major environmental treaties and draws conclusions about future missions and their data use. The scope of the study includes all phases of environmental treaty fulfillment - development, monitoring, and enforcement - and includes a multinational perspective on the use of satellite Earth observation data for treaty support.

Johnston, Shaida↗
DOE OSTI2012

Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2012

High-Resolution Fast-Neutron Spectrometry for Arms Control and Treaty Verification

Many nondestructive nuclear analysis techniques have been developed to support the measurement needs of arms control and treaty verification, including gross photon and neutron counting, low- and high-resolution gamma spectrometry, time-correlated neutron measurements, and photon and neutron imaging. One notable measurement technique that has not been extensively studied to date for these applications is high-resolution fast-neutron spectrometry (HRFNS). Applied for arms control and treaty verification, HRFNS has the potential to serve as a complimentary measurement approach to these other techniques by providing a means to either qualitatively or quantitatively determine the composition and thickness of non-nuclear materials surrounding neutron-emitting materials. The technique uses the normally-occurring neutrons present in arms control and treaty verification objects of interest as an internal source of neutrons for performing active-interrogation transmission measurements. Most low-Z nuclei of interest for arms control and treaty verification, including 9Be, 12C, 14N, and 16O, possess fast-neutron resonance features in their absorption cross sections in the 0.5- to 5-MeV energy range. Measuring the selective removal of source neutrons over this energy range, assuming for example a fission-spectrum starting distribution, may be used to estimate the stoichiometric composition of intervening materials between the neutron source and detector. At a simpler level, determination of the emitted fast-neutron spectrum may be used for fingerprinting 'known' assemblies for later use in template-matching tests. As with photon spectrometry, automated analysis of fast-neutron spectra may be performed to support decision making and reporting systems protected behind information barriers. This paper will report recent work at Idaho National Laboratory to explore the feasibility of using HRFNS for arms control and treaty verification applications, including simulations and experiments, using fission-spectrum neutron sources to assess neutron transmission through composite low-Z attenuators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

History of and Aftermath from the Withdrawal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2019

Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires States Parties to designate a “competent international authority or authorities” for negotiating and verifying the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programs. Ensuring that such an authority or authorities is able to be fit for purpose when required to meet these tasks will be crucial for both the future implementation and legitimacy of the Treaty. To address this challenge, this article proposes the early creation of a two-part organizational structure, comprising an implementation support unit and a dedicated scientific and technical advisory body, to begin the process of institutionalizing the treaty, and build the technical basis for meeting its verification goals should a nuclear-weapon-possessing state decide to join. The article then discusses how such two-part structure could be scaled-up as a standing international organization tasked with the coordination of an ad hoc inspectorate, which would also cooperate and complement the work of existing nuclear verification organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. This evolutionary and adaptive strategy to institution building could empower the new Treaty by supporting the emergence of a new regime complex for nuclear disarmament, while taking into account the initially limited financial and technical resources of its member states.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

The Significance of Strategic Foresight in Verification Technologies: A Case Study of the INF Treaty

Verification technologies can serve as important tools of statecraft in arms control efforts beyond providing monitoring capabilities and deterring noncompliance. The INF Treaty provides an insightful case study of the strategic side of verification technologies, illuminating how these capabilities can be used to shape negotiation positions and treaty content, provide domestic and international assurance, and manage tensions in the treaty implementation process. Operationalizing verification technologies in this way expands the tools available at the diplomatic and policy levels, but it requires foresight and preparedness to identify and develop the relevant technical capabilities. The most important finding of this case study is that technical preparedness had an important impact, but only after a period of latency. The verification approaches used in the INF Treaty were developed before the topic was raised in the negotiations, and thus the capabilities were available when certain political shifts had occurred

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1991

Explaining patterns in the ratification of global environmental treaties

A study was made of the ratification behavior of 160 countries with respect to 38 global environmental treaties. The study identifies and explains patterns in the ratification of treaties, providing two means of assessing the likelihood that any given country will support global environmental treaties. National ratification totals reveal a pattern of high ratification by countries in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. A country's standing within the range of high to low ratification rates can be explained by the statistical model developed in the study. This research allows one to identify countries likely to support global environmental treaties.

Cook, David W.↗