Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “TRU WASTE”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Achievements and process improvements in processing transuranic waste at the TRU Waste Processing Center - 15488

Wastren Advantage, Inc., (WAI) is the DOE Prime contractor for the TRU Waste Processing Center (TWPC) located in Oak Ridge, TN. This paper highlights the TWPCs specific achievements and process improvements associated with both Contact (CH) and Remote Handled (RH), Transuranic (TRU) waste receipt processing and repackaging for disposal. The five key improvement areas and achievements include: - The TWPC installed, tested and operated successfully the Drum Venting System (DVS) to vent over-packed CH-TRU waste drums in several configurations including 55-gallon drums over-packed in 79 or 85-gallon drums. - A new Remote Drum Opener (RDO) system was designed, tested and placed in service to vent drums discovered in overpack boxes in the Box Breakdown Area and to vent overpack configurations that could not be handled in the standard DVS (e.g., 110 gallon overpacks and multiple drum configurations). - The Cask Processing Enclosure (CPE) approach to repackaging RH-TRU waste contained in concrete casks was developed and implemented - Hot Cell outage to incorporate planned equipment modifications and improvements to maintain processing rates. - To improve certification and segregation of CH-TRU from drums that meet Low Level Waste criteria for disposal at Nevada the TWPC added additional equipment/facilities for Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) and Real Time Radiography (RTR). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

WIPP Space Faces TRU Waste Disposal Limits; The Volume Reducing Solution - 18365

Transuranic (TRU) waste packaging for removal from a glovebox has for many years involved the use of bags as the primary containment. In many cases, many hydrogenous layers of bags, yards of tape, and multiple filters are added to the waste stream in order to get the TRU waste into the final 55 gallon drum package to be shipped and buried at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The WIPP is currently limited to a total finite disposed volume of Contact Handled (CH) and Remote Handled (RH) TRU waste. As of early 2014 over half of the allotted WIPP volume had been filled with mainly CH-TRU waste. Based on current bag operation packaging methods used, the Department of Energy's (DOE) remaining CH and RH waste will not fit in the remaining limited WIPP space. Bag operations, can be performed safely by good operators following tedious repetitive processes and many Administrative Safety Controls. Since the bag is the only confinement layer between the contamination and the operator, contamination incidents can occur. Bag-out operations require close proximity to the waste to perform the process. With some waste streams, this close to waste proximity increases operator radiation dose. Central Research Laboratories (CRL), based in Red Wing Minnesota, who for many decades has developed proven engineered material transfer solutions based around their Rapid Transfer Port (RTP) technology, has worked with DOE sites to develop a TRU Waste Management Solution. The solution is a single filtered large Polyethylene (PE) or Stainless Steel (SST) Rapid Transfer Port container in a standard Department of Transportation (DOT) 7A, Type A drum, which allows for loading of TRU waste directly from the operational glovebox without the use of bags, sleeves or tapes to provide leak tight containment. All operator interventions to connect and disconnect a drum to and from the glovebox are achieved in an upright ergonomic position by one (1) operator in less than three (3) minutes. Minimal As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) levels are achieved during connect and disconnect of the drum, due to the engineered safety controls of the RTP. The CRL RTP solution allows glovebox or re-packaged TRU waste to be safely transferred to the final 55 Gallon drum container without additional bags or tape. The high diffusion coefficient filter on the CRL RTP 55G container and elimination of added hydrogenous packaging, improves the Decay Heat Limit (DHL) per drum for most TRU waste types compared with bagged drums, and in most cases allows more TRU waste to be loaded per drum. Inorganic TRU waste materials can be packaged directly into the CRL RTP SST drum container to the maximum DHL and Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) allowable for a drum. This paper will show how highly efficient TRAMPAC approved TRU waste packaging of CH and RH TRU waste can be accomplished in a safer, cost effective manner without adding any additional packaging materials to the waste stream, thus increasing the chance of placing all DOE's legacy and to be generated TRU waste in the remaining WIPP space. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

National Plan for the Disposal of Existing and Future TRU Wastes - 18616

Now that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) has re-opened, after being down for three years due to an accident the DOE National TRU Program has re-developed a plan for the disposal of existing and future TRU wastes. The National TRU Waste Management Plan (NTWMP) is an integrated plan to address the needs of DOE sites across the DOE Weapons Complex that create and store TRU waste, and is centered on the capability of WIPP to receive and dispose of TRU waste. The WIPP capability is planned as a weekly shipping rate and is defined by emplacement and receipt rate capabilities since WIPP is not permitted for long-term storage. And, shipping rates may be constrained by new WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) and future plans for repository configurations and disposal package capabilities over the next 30 years. Since WIPP is the only disposal system available to the DOE for TRU waste disposal, DOE has a newly projected life-cycle need for WIPP to remain open and available up to 2050. It is projected that the need for WIPP will continue up to the year 2050 for the disposition of the remaining legacy TRU inventories and for the disposal of TRU waste continuing to be generated at DOE's National Laboratories. In addition, there are several other potential new waste streams in which WIPP is being considered an alternative solution for their disposition. The NTWMP has been updated to reflect the short-term and long-term plans for TRU waste disposal at WIPP. The short-term plan is used by DOE for budget projection and integration purposes to facilitate and inform budget planning, both in DOE's Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organizations. Most legacy TRU waste (generated in the past and stored at DOE sites today) is owned and managed by EM. And, EM submits integrated budget requests for DOE sites, including the integration of resources for TRU waste management. NNSA and DOE's Office of Science (OS) funds TRU waste management as part of their mission funding and NNSA should eventually be the primary user of the WIPP resources as EM's legacy TRU waste is cleaned-up. Prior to the unexpected shutdown of WIPP in 2014, there was a small back-log of waste certified for WIPP disposal and shipments of TRU waste to WIPP were 'just-in-time' as waste was certified. After three years of WIPP being down, DOE sites have built significant back-logs of TRU waste to be certified for WIPP. That back-log built up to over 25,000 containers of TRU waste during that three-year period (Table 1). The backlog included both Contact-Handled (CH) TRU waste and Remote-Handled (RH) TRU waste, and even though WIPP re-opened in April of 2017, it is only open for TRU waste containers that can be stacked on disposal room floors. Plans for changing RH waste disposal packages and methods are in-the-works, but are not yet mature enough for significant planning. In addition, the WIPP underground facilities are now partially contaminated with radioactive particulate, which significantly reduces the WIPP operational efficiencies as compared to 2014. With a large back-log of waste ready for WIPP disposal and limited throughput for WIPP disposal rates, the focus of the NTWMP is to prioritize the selection of TRU wastes from the various sites based on WIPP waste emplacement rates and shipping rates to WIPP. Some TRU waste sites have a significant need to be top priority for shipments to WIPP, and that must be balanced with the need for all TRU waste sites to have some shipments to deplete their back-log of TRU wastes. Storage and management of TRU waste is very costly for DOE and many of those resources could be used to optimize the overall disposition of TRU waste and save DOE significant funding. In addition, the plan will show the possible transition of TRU Waste Management from primarily being an EM function to being an NNSA function in the coming years. As legacy TRU waste inventories are removed, and as NNSA mission-related TRU waste inventories are produced, DOE will be faced with deciding where the primary responsibility for TRU waste management should reside. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Repackaging of High Fissile TRU Waste at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center - 13240

Twenty-six drums of high fissile transuranic (TRU) waste from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) operations were declared waste in the mid-1980's and placed in storage with the legacy TRU waste inventory for future treatment and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Repackaging and treatment of the waste at the TRU Waste Packaging Center (TWPC) will require the installation of additional equipment and capabilities to address the hazards for handling and repackaging the waste compared to typical Contact Handled (CH) TRU waste that is processed at the TWPC, including potential hydrogen accumulation in legacy 6M/2R packaging configurations, potential presence of reactive plutonium hydrides, and significant low energy gamma radiation dose rates. All of the waste is anticipated to be repackaged at the TWPC and certified for disposal at WIPP. The waste is currently packaged in multiple layers of containers which presents additional challenges for repackaging activities due to the potential for the accumulation of hydrogen gas in the container headspace in quantities than could exceed the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL). The outer container for each waste package is a stainless steel 0.21 m{sup 3} (55-gal) drum which contains either a 0.04 m{sup 3} or 0.06 m{sup 3} (10-gal or 15-gal) 6M drum. The inner 2R container in each 6M drum is ∼12 cm (5 in) outside diameter x 30-36 cm (12-14 in) long and is considered to be a > 4 liter sealed container relative to TRU waste packaging criteria. Inside the 2R containers are multiple configurations of food pack cans, pipe nipples, and welded capsules. The waste contains significant quantities of high burn-up plutonium oxides and metals with a heavy weight percentage of higher atomic mass isotopes and the subsequent in-growth of significant quantities of americium. Significant low energy gamma radiation is expected to be present due to the americium in-growth. Radiation dose rates on inner containers are estimated to be 1-3 mSv/hr (100-300 mrem/hr) with an unshielded dose rate on the waste itself of over 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr). Additional equipment to be installed at the TWPC will include a new perma-con enclosure and a shielded/inert glovebox in the process building to repackage and stabilize the waste. All of the waste will be repackaged into Standard Pipe Overpacks. Most of the waste (21 of the 26 drums) is expected to be repackaged at the food-pack can level (i.e. the food-pack cans will not be opened). Five of the incoming waste containers are expected to be repackaged at the primary waste level. Three of the containers exceed the 200 gram Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) limit for the Standard Pipe Overpack. These three containers will be repackaged down to the primary waste level and divided into eight Standard Pipe Overpacks for shipment to WIPP. Two containers must be stabilized to eliminate any reactive plutonium hydrides that may be present. These containers will be opened in the inert, shielded glovebox, and the remaining corroded plutonium metal converted to a stable oxide form by using a 600 deg. C tube furnace with controlled oxygen feed in a helium carrier gas. The stabilized waste will then be packaged into two Standard Pipe Overpacks. Design and build out activities for the additional repackaging capabilities at the TWPC are scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2013 with repackaging, stabilization, and certification activities scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2014. Following repackaging and stabilization activities, the Standard Pipe Overpacks will be certified for disposal at WIPP utilizing Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) to verify the absence of prohibited items and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) to verify the isotopic content under the TWPC WIPP certification program implemented by the Central Characterization Project (CCP). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Thermochemical Reactivity Hazards of TRU Waste Constituents - 16075

The thermochemical stability of transuranic (TRU) wastes can be problematic and can lead to uncontrolled chemical reactions that can pose a risk to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. In 2003, decontamination cloth waste laden with sodium or potassium nitrate and cerium nitrate caught fire in a glovebox at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) in Colorado. In 2005, as a result of the RFETS fire, management responsible for decommissioning Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) engaged Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to investigate the thermochemical stabilities of potential TRU wastes arising from decontamination of PFP plutonium gloveboxes. Based on PNNL's studies, PFP management used decontamination approaches that would produce TRU wastes that would be stable during PFP waste management operations, during transport, and eventually during disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. In 2014, TRU waste containing nitrate-laden organic kitty litter reacted uncontrollably, breached its TRU drum, released TRU, contaminated 21 individuals and the WIPP, and resulted in TRU release outside the facility. In support of the Technical Advisory Team assembled by DOE to investigate the causes of the WIPP event, PNNL investigated the thermochemical stabilities of characteristic wastes in the breached drum and identified a waste that could have caused the breach. This paper describes the RFETS fire, provides results from PNNL's screening studies of potential PFP decontamination wastes and, provides results from PNNL's probative studies investigating the thermochemical stabilities of representative waste constituents in the breached WIPP drum. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Multi-Year Work Plan to De-Inventory TRU Waste Stored at LANL - 12121

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) continues to accelerate disposition of transuranic (TRU) waste stored at its Technical Area 54 (TA-54) Area G waste management facility. The current focus is on complete removal of all non-cemented above-grade Legacy and newly-generated TRU waste that was in storage on October 1, 2011, by no later than June 30, 2014. This inventory of above-grade TRU is defined as 3,706 m{sup 3} of material. Legacy TRU waste containers were placed into storage up to 40 years ago, and most of the older containers must be remediated to address compliance issues before the waste can be characterized, certified as meeting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), and shipped for disposition. More than half of the remaining TRU waste volume stored above grade is contained within oversize boxes that contain waste items that must be repackaged or size reduced. Facilities and major types of equipment needed to remediate and characterize the TRU waste inventory are largely in place, but two additional oversize box processing lines are being implemented in 2012. Multiple work shifts are planned for most remediation lines in 2013. An integrated risk-based project management schedule for all disposition activities has been developed that is based on a 'Solution Package' approach. Inventories of containers that have issues in common were compiled into about 15 waste categories and about 70 'Solution Packages' that identify all of the activities needed to disposition the inventory of TRU waste in storage. Scheduled activities include all precursor activities to begin remediation, remediation processing, characterization and certification to the WIPP WAC, and shipping of containers to WIPP. Processing of the 3,706 m{sup 3} is projected to result in about 4,500 55-gallon (208 L) drums and 1,000 standard waste boxes that will be shipped to WIPP. About 385 shipments from LANL to WIPP are projected before June 30, 2014, to ship these containers, at a rate of 5 to 6 shipments a week. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Transporting Non-Compliant TRU Wastes in the OPTIMUS{sup TM} Packages - 20493

The OPTIMUS{sup TM} product line of packages was developed with the purpose of providing a versatile and modular packaging option for shipping problematic wastes and fissile material contents. The product line includes a high-activity design in the OPTIMUS-H and a low activity design in the OPTIMUS-L. The two variants utilize a singular containment vessel design, that is enclosed in different protective components that offer different levels of shielding along with thermal and impact protection. The thick shielding provided by the OPTIMUS-H packaging allows for higher activity contents than the OPTIMUS-L to be transported. But the lightweight design of the OPTIMUS-L packaging allows for more packages to be transported in a single shipment. The containment vessel design shared between the two packages provides leak-tight containment of all radioactive contents along with the capabilities to easily leak test and the option to inert and backfill the contents, as necessary, prior to each shipment of the package. Together the OPTIMUS package designs offer significant flexibility and are capable of handling a wide variety of waste materials and other radioactive contents. One of the primary contents covered in the initial design effort for these packages is TRU waste contents beyond the standard waste materials that are compliant with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria. More specifically, the initial content of interest is TRU Waste drums containing sealed containers with potentially flammable gases. While there are multiple other packaging options available for transporting standard WIPP compliant TRU wastes, the goal of the OPTIMUS packages is to offer a superior option for transporting both standard TRU wastes as well as the more problematic non-compliant wastes, among other contents. The non-compliant TRU waste contents explicitly included for the OPTIMUS packages are standard aerosol cans and DOT 3E lecture bottles. However, the methods applied for the package containment can be easily adjusted to cover other sealed container types with potentially flammable gases. The primary challenges with including these items are both the obvious issue of potential for flammable gases (e.g. aerosol propellants) in the package, but also the uncertainty in the exact state of the contents. Because these desired contents are waste materials, the characterization of the materials present in the waste may include some uncertainties. For example, though it may be known that there are one or more aerosol cans in a TRU waste drum, it may not be known if this can is full, spent, or anywhere in between. Also there may be equal uncertainty in the contents of the aerosol can, specifically in the potentially flammable propellant remaining in the can. To include these types of non-compliant items as acceptable contents for the package, the methods utilized in the safety analyses of the OPTIMUS packages must consider all of the uncertainties in the characterization of the waste. The methods utilized cover a range of concerns with transporting contents of this nature including pressure buildup, gas generation, and gaseous combustion for demonstrating the containment of the package. The ability to transport these problematic contents in the OPTIMUS packages gives TRU waste generating sites the option to relocate these drums to an offsite location where the non-compliant items can be properly managed through removal or destruction. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

What's in WIPP? Packaging TRU Waste to Enhance WIPP's Capacity - 16515

Beginning in 1999, and continuing for 15 years, the US DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository successfully disposed of defense Transuranic (TRU) waste. Six of the originally planned ten disposal panels were filled before two unrelated accidents temporarily halted disposal operations in February 2014. Based on counting the gross volume of all containers emplaced in WIPP to date, a little more than half of the legislated volume capacity has been subscribed (91,000 cubic meters). This paper describes the many different packaging configurations that have been used to ship TRU waste to WIPP, and makes observations that may enhance the repository capacity when shipments resume. The contents of shipments to WIPP are limited by many requirements of the repository waste acceptance criteria. These criteria derive from three primary sources; 1) the Certificate of Compliance (CoC), issued by the NRC for Type B shipping packaging used by WIPP; 2) The Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, issued by the New Mexico Environment Department; and 3) the WIPP facility's own Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), developed under DOE's regulation 10CFR830. To meet these criteria, various TRU waste forms have been packaged in different ways, with varying packaging efficiency. Of course, there is an overall upper limit on WIPP's volume capacity that was legislated as part of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The volume counted against this limit has been calculated by simply summing the volumes of individual payload containers shipped to and emplaced at WIPP. This method counts significant non-waste volumes inside the containers due to over-packing inner containers and partially filled containers. Without some change to how disposal volumes are calculated, or how waste is packaged, the amount of TRU waste yet to be shipped to WIPP could exceed the legislated capacity. Concepts to enhance the packaging efficiency of future waste shipments to WIPP are presented. Approximate estimates of the waste versus non-waste volumes that have been emplaced to date are discussed. This paper only considers contact handled TRU waste (i.e., contact dose rates < 2 mSv/hr). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Project Plan, Status, and Lessons Learned for the LANL 3,706 m{sup 3} TRU Waste Campaign - 13085

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is currently engaged in a campaign to disposition 3,706 m{sup 3} of transuranic (TRU) waste stored above grade at its Technical Area 54 (TA-54) Area G waste management facility before June 30, 2014. This campaign includes complete removal of all non-cemented above-grade TRU waste that was in storage on October 1, 2011, and is defined as 3,706 m{sup 3} of material. TRU waste containers were placed into storage up to 40 years ago, and most of the older containers must be remediated to address compliance issues before the waste can be characterized, certified as meeting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), and shipped for disposition. More than half of the remaining TRU waste volume stored above grade is contained within oversize boxes that contain waste items that must be repackaged or size reduced. Facilities and major types of equipment needed to remediate and characterize the TRU waste inventory include two additional oversize box processing lines that are being brought into service as Nuclear Hazard Category III facilities in fiscal year (FY) 2013. Multiple work shifts are scheduled for most remediation lines in FY 2013. An integrated risk-based project management schedule for all disposition activities has been developed that is based on a 'Solution Package' approach. Inventories of containers that have issues in common were compiled into about 15 waste categories and about 75 'Solution Packages' that identify all of the activities needed to disposition the inventory of TRU waste in storage. Scheduled activities include all precursor activities to begin remediation, remediation processing, characterization and certification to the WIPP WAC, and shipping of containers to WIPP. Other industrial processing practices that have been adopted to improve efficiency include staging of containers for remediation, characterization, and shipping; establishment of a transportation center; and load management practices for transportation payloads. Progress and accomplishments during FY 2012 are reviewed, and plans for FY 2013 are presented in some detail. Lessons learned on adoption of industrial processing practices are also discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over-pack container, similar to the pipe component, called the criticality control over-pack, which will significantly enhance the efficiency of disposal. Hundreds of shipments of transuranic SNM, suitably packaged to meet WIPP waste acceptance criteria and with safeguards terminated have been successfully emplaced at WIPP (primarily from the Rocky Flats site clean-up) since WIPP opened. DOE expects that thousands more may eventually result from SNM consolidation efforts throughout the weapons complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Basis of Knowledge for Oxidizing Chemicals in TRU Waste - 18654

A new Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) document for implementing new requirements in the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) titled Basis of Knowledge for Evaluating Oxidizing Chemicals in the TRU waste was issued in July, 2017 and has now been implemented on several waste streams. The February 14, 2014, airborne radiation release in Room 7 of the WIPP underground disposal unit 7 was caused by an exothermic chemical reaction of nitrate oxidizing chemicals and organic materials in a single 55-gallon container. That event exposed hazards not previously evaluated in the WIPP safety basis. A new WIPP Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), Revision 5b, was developed that addressed potential hazards related to the airborne radiation release and evaluated and addressed new fire hazard scenarios. The revised hazards analysis within the DSA specifically included potential chemical exothermic reactions in waste containers and propagating fires. Compliance with WAC was credited as initial conditions to the hazards analysis, and Chapter 18 was added making the WIPP WAC compliance program a safety management program within the DSA. The WIPP DSA, Revision 5b, Chapter 18, and the WIPP WAC require the use of this document when performing the enhanced acceptable knowledge (AK) process on transuranic (TRU) waste determined to contain oxidizing chemicals. The WIPP WAC was revised to address the conditions and requirements of DSA Revision 5b. The use of this Basis of Knowledge (BoK) by WIPP Certified Programs is specified in the WIPP WAC, Appendix H, Enhanced Acceptable Knowledge. This document establishes criteria that must be used by the WIPP Certified Programs to evaluate TRU waste containing one or more oxidizing chemicals to determine acceptability at the WIPP as-is and to identify when additional evaluation or treatment is required. This BoK also includes options and requirements to be used by TRU waste sites when further evaluation, testing, and/or treatment are required. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) will review requests, plans, and technical justifications and provide written decisions prior to implementation by the TRU waste sites. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Understanding Nitrate Chemistry - The Key to Safer and More Efficient TRU Waste Acceptance - 19618

Investigations into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) radiological release from a transuranic (TRU) waste drum concluded that the event was initiated by a thermal runaway, principally involving interactions between the polysaccharide-based kitty litter and nitric acid, which released radiological material along with hot gases and combustible materials from the drum. In this paper, the hazards of polysaccharides present as either starch based kitty litter or cellulose rags in a TRU waste drum exposed to nitric acid (and by extension metal nitrate salts) have been evaluated, based on considerations of how complex nitrogen redox cycles carry out the aqueous phase oxidation of alcohols and related organic functional groups. These exothermic reactions, coupled with a positive feedback loop inherent to nitrogen redox chemistry, can initiate an autocatalytic thermal runaway and explosive gas generation, which poses the most significant risk under ambient conditions where acidic solution may be present (in small quantities as free liquid or sorbed within a solid matrix). Nitric acid is an extremely potent oxidant but is itself remarkably inert, rarely interacting directly with oxidizable substrates and instead exerting its vast potential energy through lower oxidation state reactants such as nitrogen dioxide and nitrous acid that are generated from its slow self-decomposition. Nitrous acid is the reactant that carries out substrate oxidation, and systems that are not pre-loaded with nitrous acid will experience an induction period before significant reactivity commences. Under oxidizing fuel-lean conditions, nitrogen dioxide may induce autocatalytic nitrous acid formation, which may supplement additional side-reactions, potentially leading to thermal runaway. Therefore, the system is most vulnerable at the end of an induction period. Metal nitrate salts promote this ambient temperature solution chemistry (cf. traditional oxidizer properties of metal nitrate salts, which operate in the solid state at elevated temperatures) by releasing nitric acid into the system via hydrolysis. Unlike simple alcohols with a single hydroxyl functional group, the chemistry of polymeric carbohydrates (polysaccharides) such as starches and cellulose is more diverse. Therefore, the oxidation of the simple monomeric carbohydrate glucose is first examined to provide insight into the analogous reactivity with polysaccharides. Although less reactive than alcohols by virtue of extensive hydrogen bonding, carbohydrates are oxidized by nitric acid through the same fundamental mechanisms, complicated by a variety of competing side reactions including acid-catalyzed hydrolytic depolymerization to more reactive (ultimately monomeric) units, as well as other degradation reactions promoted by radical mechanisms. For this reason, polysaccharides such as starches that are more susceptible to hydrolysis are more reactive than cellulose, with the attendant microbial population in starch based kitty litter adding a special aspect of reactivity. From this safety evaluation, a bounding latency period has been developed beyond which a stored TRU waste drum that contains polysaccharides (starch based kitty litter excluded) commingled with nitric acid and/or metal nitrate salts may no longer present a hazard under ambient conditions, based on a compilation of induction periods and reaction times involving nitric acid with various oxidizable substrates under a variety of conditions from synthetic procedures, tests, and adverse incident scenarios. By obviating the need for costly treatment options or characterization, a better understanding of nitrate redox chemistry and the hazards it presents with polysaccharide oxidation thus provides a more efficient means to safely dispose of TRU waste generated within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Managing TRU waste processing and storage issues/challenges - 15487

Operational events at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility resulted in suspension of disposal operations and waste shipments to WIPP creating significant challenges for the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The Oak Ridge Transuranic (TRU) Waste Program which was poised to re-start shipping after a 2.5 year suspension of the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) certification activities which resulted in on-site accumulation of the highest activity contact handled (CH) TRU waste containers. As a result, Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) is nearing its physical storage capacity for CH waste and has already reached storage capacity limits for remote handled (RH) TRU waste. The TWPC storage capacity for RH-TRU waste is very limited and dependent on real time shipping support to continue RH waste processing activities in the facilities Hot Cell. Additionally, changes in dispersion modeling (i.e., dry deposition factor changes) used in the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) present Material at Risk (MAR) management challenges to effectively manage off-site dose consequences. These facts necessitated the identification of alternative waste storage options for both CH and RH waste to continue waste processing operations at TWPC. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Transuranic (TRU) Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW), FWORCHMLLW103, Revision 13 [TWPC 2021]), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) (Rev. 21)

This document, DOE/WIPP 90-045, RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON), is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents and a description of methods used to demonstrate compliance with the RH-TRU Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). All containers must have a content code approved by the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant RH-TRU Payload Engineer to be eligible for shipment. The content codes contained herein are developed under the requirements outlined in the RH-TRAMPAC.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Characterization techniques for TRU waste from the Analytical Laboratory Hot Cells at Idaho National Laboratory

Characterization techniques for TRU waste from the Analytical Laboratory Hot Cells at Idaho National Laboratory Since the first reactor went hot in 1942, there has been a never ending desire to improve the nuclear reactor and the fuel that it burns. The Idaho National Laboratory has been a key player in reactor and fuel development. As more research projects begin, the spectrum of waste parameters grows. Over the years, the Analytical Laboratory (AL) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has supported a large range of various research projects. Each project brings its own challenge and analytical technique that, in turn, yields its own unique waste parameters. The AL Hot Cells at INL consist of 6 small cells that can support around 12 different fuel research projects at a time along with infrastructure and environmental samples. Each different project yields different levels of transuranic (TRU) material, RCRA constituents, dose, and contamination levels. The waste parameters from each project dictate a path forward for the waste Low-Level Waste (LLW), Contact Handled TRU (CH-TRU), Mixed Contact Handled TRU (M-CH-TRU), Remote Handled TRU (RH-TRU), or Mixed Remote Handled TRU (M-RH-TRU). With visual examination techniques and process knowledge as an aid, there have been waste handling methods developed that allow debris and sample material to be segregated. Unique characterization mechanisms have been applied for each debris and sample material that are generally more accurate than smear and surface contamination data. For debris found in the Hot Cells, analytical data is gathered and conservatively summarized for each fuel type and research method. This consists of data from Quadrupole Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (Q-ICP-MS), Gamma Spectroscopy, and some data verification through Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) and Multi-Collector Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (MC-ICP-MS). This data gives a range of TRU isotope concentrations. Fuel age is taken into account to determine the dominant TRU activity isotopes. Cesium concentrations are also gathered. Each parameter/fuel type then ties a measured Cesium number to TRU content based on historical analytical data. Debris in the hot cells is segregated by project and packaged in individual 2 gallon metal paint cans. Each can is counted by gamma spectroscopy in a calculated and measured geometry. Using process knowledge to determine the fuel or project type, newly counted cesium numbers can be applied to the historic analytical data and TRU content can be estimated. The TRU content allows waste debris to be segregated between CH-TRU and RH-TRU. Packaging techniques can allow for the minimization if RH-TRU waste. Sample material received into the AL must be dissolved into a liquid matrix in order to be analyzed in most cases. When analysis is complete, these liquids go through a consolidation, complexation, neutralization, and solidification process where real time analytical data can be used to calculate TRU content and RCRA constitutes. These calculations allow for no further analytical data to be gathered. The waste matrix is considered stable and acceptable by all AK [define AK] documents. The unique techniques used in characterizing and handling the Analytical Laboratories Hot Cell waste can be applied to various situations and various laboratories. They allow for more accurate data for waste constituents and also for the minimization of RH-TRU waste.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2013

Expert System for Building TRU Waste Payloads - 13554

The process for grouping TRU waste drums into payloads for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal is a very complex process. Transportation and regulatory requirements must be met, along with striving for the goals of shipment efficiency: maximize the number of waste drums in a shipment and minimize the use of empty drums which take up precious underground storage space. The restrictions on payloads range from weight restrictions, to limitations on flammable gas in the headspace, to minimum TRU alpha activity concentration requirements. The Overpack and Payload Assistant Tool (OPAT) has been developed as a mixed-initiative intelligent system within the WIPP Waste Data System (WDS) to guide the construction of multiple acceptable payloads. OPAT saves the user time while at the same time maximizes the efficiency of shipments for the given drum population. The tool provides the user with the flexibility to tune critical factors that guide OPAT's operation based on real-time feedback concerning the results of the execution. This feedback complements the user's external knowledge of the drum population (such as location of drums, known challenges, internal shipment goals). This work demonstrates how software can be utilized to complement the unique domain knowledge of the users. The mixed-initiative approach combines the insight and intuition of the human expert with the proficiency of automated computational algorithms. The result is the ability to thoroughly and efficiently explore the search space of possible solutions and derive the best waste management decision. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗