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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records

Synthetic data generation for machine learning model training for energy theft scenarios using cosimulation

Abstract Technical and non‐technical losses in distribution circuits result in significant economic costs to power utilities. One type of non‐technical loss is energy theft by various means including illegal tapping of feeders, bypassing the meter, and billing fraud. These losses are usually hard to detect, and can remain undetected for long periods of time. Machine learning models have been proven effective in detecting these conditions, but rely on the availability of large, good‐quality training data sets. The problem is exacerbated by the imbalanced nature of data related to these conditions—energy theft, though costly, is very rare. The available data sets generally have very few samples of theft with most of the data pertaining to normal operation. Such data sets are generally not suitable to train machine learning models. In this paper, an overview of energy theft detection techniques, the challenges with their data needs, and the limitations of current techniques to bridge such data limitations is presented. A co‐simulation framework is proposed to generate reliable training data for machine learning algorithms for theft detection. An example scenario is presented and a machine learning model is built to detect certain kinds of energy theft.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Risk of theft and malicious use of radiation sources in transit

Remote radioactive source applications require frequent transportation of sources from storage locations to remote sites. This introduces risk of theft of a source during the transportation process, with the level of risk proportional to the radioactivity of the source. To that end, theft of smaller sources, such as microcurie-level moisture density gauges, are of minor concern, but larger sources, such as those used for radiography and well logging, present more risk. Radiography sources include 192 Ir, 75 Se, or 60 Co radionuclides with radioactivity amounts at or exceeding IAEA Category 2. Well-logging sources, primarily 241 Am/Be, are used for their neutron-emission properties. 137 Cs is also used in well-logging at lower activities than in radiography but at levels that still present some risk. The vulnerability for malicious use of such sources to cause contamination and associated economic effects is dependent on the elemental chemical and physical properties, especially melting point and bulk modulus. Theft of radiography sources is somewhat common, well-logging sources less so. Theft of sources commonly occurs in concert with theft of the vehicle, with the source subsequently abandoned. There have been some instances where a source appears to have been specifically targeted. There are a variety of security measures and protocols, available and under development, to mitigate the risk of theft and assist in source recovery.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Security: Protracted Theft Analysis

The objectives of this presentation are to recognize situations and opportunities for protracted theft strategies; review methodology for analysis of protracted theft; and apply methodology to URF.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIALS IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES FOR VARIOUS PROLIFERATION AND THEFT SCENARIOS

We must anticipate that the day is approaching when details of nuclear weapons design and fabrication will become common knowledge. On that day we must be particularly certain that all special nuclear materials (SNM) are adequately accounted for and protected and that we have a clear understanding of the utility of nuclear materials to potential adversaries. To this end, this paper examines the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing SNM and alternate nuclear materials associated with the plutonium-uranium reduction extraction (Purex), uranium extraction (UREX), coextraction (COEX), thorium extraction (THOREX), and PYROX (an electrochemical refining method) reprocessing schemes. This paper provides a set of figures of merit for evaluating material attractiveness that covers a broad range of proliferant state and subnational group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this paper is that all fissile material must be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and must be provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by subnational groups; no 'silver bullet' fuel cycle has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. The work reported herein has been performed at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for, the nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security is discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Evidence for methanobactin “Theft” and novel chalkophore production in methanotrophs: impact on methanotrophic-mediated methylmercury degradation

Abstract Aerobic methanotrophy is strongly controlled by copper, and methanotrophs are known to use different mechanisms for copper uptake. Some methanotrophs secrete a modified polypeptide—methanobactin—while others utilize a surface-bound protein (MopE) and a secreted form of it (MopE*) for copper collection. As different methanotrophs have different means of sequestering copper, competition for copper significantly impacts methanotrophic activity. Herein, we show that Methylomicrobium album BG8, Methylocystis sp. strain Rockwell, and Methylococcus capsulatus Bath, all lacking genes for methanobactin biosynthesis, are not limited for copper by multiple forms of methanobactin. Interestingly, Mm. album BG8 and Methylocystis sp. strain Rockwell were found to have genes similar to mbnT that encodes for a TonB-dependent transporter required for methanobactin uptake. Data indicate that these methanotrophs “steal” methanobactin and such “theft” enhances the ability of these strains to degrade methylmercury, a potent neurotoxin. Further, when mbnT was deleted in Mm. album BG8, methylmercury degradation in the presence of methanobactin was indistinguishable from when MB was not added. Mc. capsulatus Bath lacks anything similar to mbnT and was unable to degrade methylmercury either in the presence or absence of methanobactin. Rather, Mc. capsulatus Bath appears to rely on MopE/MopE* for copper collection. Finally, not only does Mm. album BG8 steal methanobactin, it synthesizes a novel chalkophore, suggesting that some methanotrophs utilize both competition and cheating strategies for copper collection. Through a better understanding of these strategies, methanotrophic communities may be more effectively manipulated to reduce methane emissions and also enhance mercury detoxification in situ.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Exercise: Abrupt Theft During Shipment

After the session the participants will be able to do the following: 1. Determine system improvements which will improve the overall system effectiveness for this scenario, and 2. Analyse the assigned insider scenario to determine the relative improvement.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Exercise: Abrupt Theft Using Shielding When Needed

After the session the participants will be able to do the following: 1. Determine system improvements which will improve the overall system effectiveness for this scenario, and 2. Analyse the assigned insider scenario to determine the relative improvement.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Exercise: Abrupt Theft During Emergency Evacuation

After the session the participants will be able to do the following: 1. Determine system improvements which will improve the overall system effectiveness for this scenario, and 2. Analyse the assigned insider scenario to determine the relative improvement.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗