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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Sphincter Seal Development & Testing

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project (SPD, Project Y744) requested the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to perform a series of leak and durability tests on sphincter seals that were designed to process blend cans and shield cans into an SPD glovebox. Each sphincter seal assembly consisted of a stainless-steel outer sleeve weldment that was bolted onto the test enclosure and an aluminum inner sleeve that housed seven to nine Neoprene seals. All tests were executed to determine long term effects from processing approximately a year’s worth of blend and shield cans through the sphincter seals.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Automated Inspection of Criticality Control Overpacks for Surplus Plutonium Disposition: Qualification Update – 25313

In an effort to reduce the amount of nuclear waste in South Carolina, the Department of Energy (DOE) tasked the Savannah River Site (SRS) with diluting and disposing of the amount of plutonium in the state. This process involves the movement and shipment of over 100,000 criticality control overpacks (CCOs) throughout the project lifespan, lending itself to the use of automation to reduce worker radiation exposure and more efficiently utilize human capital. Due to the large scope, this overarching process was broken down into several different “automation projects” to be developed. The first opportunity pursued was the receipt and inspection of empty CCO drums coming into SRS, identified as Automation Project 1 (AP1), and is the focus of this paper. AP1 was developed to unpack incoming CCOs and inspect them for unwanted foreign objects and any damage to the drum or its contents. This process is accomplished by the combination of an automated guided vehicle (AGV) that delivers CCOs to a robotic arm which uses a suite of custom tools to disassemble a CCO, inspect the inside and outside of the CCO and its inner criticality control container (CCC), reassemble the CCC and CCO, and apply a tamper indicating device (TID) to the inspected drum. In past years, the robotic work cell had been developed in a small-scale testing facility for proof-of-concept. This year, major improvements were made to the robotic work cell to perform the process, including integration into the final facility where CCOs will be inspected. Other technical improvements include the implementation of sensor feedback and safety relays into the control system to allow the state of the work cell to be better tracked, and additional development of the TID application process to complete the robotic inspection. Further enhancements were made to the robotic vision processes and robot pathing, as well as development on a computer vision inspection process to detect inspection criteria anomalies in CCOs. In addition to developmental improvements, the work cell underwent a six-month testing period to ensure the project requirements were met. Results of this testing period demonstrate the work cell’s capability to meet project throughput goals at an acceptable level, successfully document the status of each CCO inspected, and reduce the toll on technical operations’ human power by two thirds. At the time of this paper, the work cell is capable of autonomously handling up to eight CCOs with an AGV, delivering CCOs to and from the robot work cell, and having a robotic arm perform a full receipt and inspection procedure on each CCO. Moving forward, repeatability will be improved so that these CCOs can be run back-to-back seamlessly, as well as improving the system to handle more significant edge cases and failure modes.

Spivey, Nicholas↗
DOE OSTI2024

Development of Automation Technologies for Glovebox Processing, Part 2

Topics • Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Overview • Robotic Arm Development for Glovebox Operations • Automatic Sphincter Loading System (ASLS) Update Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Overview • Application Background • Development Scope • Improvement Goals • Limitations

Krementz, Daniel↗
DOE OSTI2025

Custom Equipment Development for Processing of Surplus Plutonium

The Strategic Laboratory Assessment (SLA), a collaborative team of SRNL and ORNL personnel, has been established to advance the objectives of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Project, by identifying and developing technologies to accelerate disposition, reduce life cycle costs, minimize worker radiation exposure, improve worker safety, and minimize Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program risks. [1] The SLA team has identified can cutting and plutonium (Pu) oxide size reduction as two glovebox processes where technology enhancements would be valuable. The DOESTD-3013 package currently in use for Pu downblending requires cutting two nested cans before the inner convenience can that holds the Pu oxide may be accessed for further processing. A rotary tubing-style cutter is used for opening the 3013 packages within the glovebox. Collet changeouts are required between cutting of the outer and inner cans. The SLA team is currently developing and testing an adjustable-clamp can cutter design that eliminates collet changeouts and allows cutting of the outer and inner can at the same time, resulting in significant reduction of radiological dose and process time, as well as improved ergonomics. To meet the Pu oxide particle size requirement, size reduction of Pu oxide agglomerations must be performed within the process gloveboxes. The SLA team has identified jaw crushing technology as an alternative to the currently employed rotary mill. Jaw crusher advantages include reduced dust within the glovebox, increased batch sizes, and easier integration with other glovebox processes due to the flow-through nature of jaw crushing. Commercially manufactured jaw crushers are either too large and/or too heavy for implementation in the SPD gloveboxes, so the SLA team is developing and testing a custom jaw crusher to meet the needs of the SPD Project.

Krementz, Daniel [Savannah River National Laborato↗
DOE OSTI2021

Pit Disassembly and Processing/Oxidation Capacity (PDP) for Disposition of Surplus Plutonium at Los Alamos (FY2021 Workshop 1) [Slides]

This workshop will establish NNSA/LANL consensus on the planning basis for: updating the 2017 Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) pre-conceptual estimate by identifying the specific scope elements that will be included; identifying the specific scope elements that will be included in the Line Item project; and identifying the preliminary agenda items for the next PDP workshop.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

3D Source Reconstruction Using Coded Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging

Recent measurements with coded-aperture imagers demonstrate material mass determination in a holdup setting to an accuracy within a few percent. This capability is of particular interest to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project, which aims to dilute and dispose of surplus plutonium oxide. Gamma-ray imagers can be used to determine holdup without interrupting normal operations. In this work, we examine techniques for 3D source localization and mass determination using gamma-ray imagers. Coded-aperture imagers provide excellent source localization within the 2D image plane; however, multiple imagers operating in tandem are necessary to identify source location in 3D space. A Maximum Likelihood Expectation-Maximization (MLEM) method for fitting detector mappings is a powerful tool for accomplishing this task. MLEM allows 3D source localization to be simultaneously constrained using multiple gamma-ray imagers by constructing the basis for the MLEM fit using detector mappings from different detector locations stitched together. Each of these basis points represents a singular response from a source in 3D space and is generated using Monte Carlo simulations of sources placed individually at different locations throughout the imager’s field of view. Additionally, implementing knowledge of the physical equipment in the simulations of the glovebox used for the SPD project incorporates attenuation effects that are needed to calculate material holdup.

Laminack, Alex↗
DOE OSTI2022

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Your Role as a Program Manager in Pit Production Mission Integration (PPMI-DO)

PPMI is responsible for integrating the planning, execution, and reporting for LANL’s Pit Manufacturing efforts, surplus plutonium disposition activities, the Material Recycle and Recovery (MR&R) program, and other programs of national significance. Our programmatic sponsors rely on PPMI to capitalize on the unique capabilities and expertise in PF-4 (the only Security Cat I/Haz Cat II Pu processing facility in the Nation) and other vital facilities across the laboratory to deliver on mission critical products in support of National Security.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Potential safety impacts associated with production of gaseous PuF 6 due to reactions between 3013-compliant PuO 2 with Novec TM 1230 at temperature

A part of the NNSA/SRNS Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is a planned expansion of an existing facility with capabilities to handle, process, package, and characterize large amounts of plutonium oxide materials for permanent disposition at WIPP. The facility design for this future processing capability will include glovebox operations, HEPA filters, and exhaust/ventilation systems. An NNSA review of the facility support systems included comments on the potential residual reactivity of previously-stabilized PuO 2 , and on the possibility of chemical interactions between stabilized PuO 2 and a new fire suppressant (Novec TM 1230), a replacement for chlorinated/brominated compounds such as HALON TM , to be employed in the event of a room/glovebox fire where PuO 2 will be processed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Development of Automated Material Handling System with Alternate Gripper Designs for the Purpose of Increased Performance & Worker Safety

Savannah River National Laboratory’s (SRNL) Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Program leads the development and transition of automated unit operations for the processing of Plutonium oxide. A mixing can is opened, filled with material, mixed, set inside of a die can, and finally punched into compressed material. Replication of the process is constructed in A-area, where the mixing can weighs 1.6 kg (3.5 lbs.) and the compressed material weighs 4 kg (8.8 lbs.). Due to the constant process of Plutonium disposition, the fatigue on workers and worker dose accumulates quickly over time. SPD aims to automate this process by using a robotic arm to replace the hands-on worker. Automation will: Reduce worker radiation dose; Increase process throughout; Reduce costs for the disposition of Plutonium oxide.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Overview of SRNS NNSA Projects in the Eyes of Criticality Safet

Overview of NNSA Projects (Criticality Safety) – Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility – Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project – Tritium Finishing Facility – Progress of Criticality Safety Analysis – Processes requiring CAAS

Stephens, Una D.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Adaptable Technology Integration for Enhanced Worker Safety and Efficiency within the SPD Gloveboxes [Slides]

Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Overview: (1) Application Background – Location: Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina – High backlog of plutonium material to process – Parallel lines of gloveboxes – Highly manual operations requiring full PPE and reader/worker steps; (2) Development Scope – Development of automated processes and opportunities to provide robust engineering design alternatives for baseline design that would meet process improvement goals.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Implementation of a System of Gamma Imagers for Measuring Plutonium Holdup

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is an effort to dilute and dispose of many tonsof weapons grade plutonium. This work will take place in a shielded glovebox to protect workers fromradiological dose. Accurate measurements of the holdup, or material left behind, in the gloveboxes is im-portant for Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, andprocess monitoring. Shielding around the gloveboxes presents an obstacle for the traditional GeneralizedGamma Holdup (GGH) method. The uncertainties associated with that method, at around 28%, arealso detrimental since the amount of holdup must be kept below an established limit with a high level ofconfidence.Passive gamma-ray imaging provides a more complete depiction of the distribution of radioactivematerials. Recent refinement of the method has demonstrated that quantitative information can beextracted from the images with a well-characterized system. A permanently installed system of gamma-ray imagers is currently being developed to measure plutonium holdup in the SPD gloveboxes. Thispaper will report on progress with the development of this system.This application requires that the features of current commercially available instruments from H3Dand PHDS, optimized for measurement performance in a mobile application, be translated into theconstraints of the operational environment with fixed installations. The interaction between facilityconstraints and measurement capabilities will be addressed.A series of measurements with plutonium sources in a mocked-up glovebox geometry with imagersmounted above the ceiling of the glovebox have been taken. Imager performance with respect to angularresolution, minimum measurement time for quantification, and signal-to-noise ratio with a multitudeof sources will be evaluated for those measurements. A series of prototypes of user interfaces will bepresented for display of the data to its various consumers for the purposes of Nuclear Material Controland Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, and process monitoring.

Schmitt, Kyle↗
DOE OSTI2024

Criticality Safety Calculations for Inadvertent PuF6 Formation

During a review of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) at Savannah River Site (SRS) project Safety Basis Strategy a comment was made about the risk of inadvertent formation of plutonium hexafluoride, PuF6, during a plutonium fire suppressed by the NovecTM 1230 fire suppressant. NovecTM 1230 is a fluorine rich non-hydrogenous extinguishing agent. Hydrogenous materials, like water, increase reactivity of fissile material by adding moderation to the system and thus are generally not used as firefighting agents in fissile material areas.

Wade, Brindley↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cold Testing for Characterization of Oxide Feed Impurities in Support of the ARIES Program

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program converts surplus plutonium metal components into an oxide powder form and packages the material for final disposition. In support of the ARIES program, over a metric ton (MT) of plutonium has been removed from surplus nuclear weapons since 1998 and packaged for long-term storage in 3013 cans. The oxide production rate is anticipated to increase substantially over the next decade in support of dilute and dispose goals. Analytical chemistry data from destructive analysis of the resulting 70+ blend lots to date has been reported for contaminants in the product oxide. Changes in the Pu product specification for Pu oxide product, induced by a different pit mix, the LANL swap program and processing Alternate (non-Pit Pu) Feed Stock (AFS) metals, will affect the level and the mix of these contaminants in the upcoming years. With these changes in feed material, it will be important to provide fast and efficient measurement of elemental impurities in the oxide to be certain that the process is under control and to monitor the anticipated changes from the historical blend lot data. Non-destructive methods need to be evaluated for the characterization of the plutonium oxide product and the quantification of the impurities at the current and anticipated levels. A feasibility study has begun to investigate the applicability of new spectroscopic methods for oxide impurity characterization. To this end, here we describe the preparation of surrogate materials to support these investigations, and the results of a feasibility study investigating the use of LIBS (Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy) to characterize the surrogate materials as calibration standards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Long-term Moisture Adsorption in Packaged Plutonium Oxide

In 2018, the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE-NNSA) began implementing dilute and dispose to remove 34 metric tons (MT) of surplus weapons grade plutonium from the US stockpile. Under this plan, surplus plutonium material is converted into plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) before being stored in metal containers and sent to the DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The dilute and dispose project was implemented as a more cost-effective method for abiding by the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) between the USA and Russia, as compared to producing mixed oxide fuel (MOX). The PMDA was originally signed in 2000 and amended in 2010.2 The disassembly of pits and conversion to PuO 2 as part of dilute and dispose is carried out through the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The dilute portion of dilute and dispose is carried out at Savannah River Site (SRS). With this program in place, it is necessary to ensure the safe, long-term storage of the PuO 2 generated during this process until final disposal at WIPP is accomplished.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Characterization Techniques Investigated for Characterization of Anomalous Materials in Plutonium Oxide – 25666

The DOE has adopted a Dilute and Dispose approach for processing surplus plutonium which consists of blending plutonium oxide with adulterants and packaging it in a form which is acceptable for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The feed material for the downblend process is intended to be pure plutonium oxide powder, however other objects are occasionally encountered within the oxide, particularly with legacy material. Potential technologies which could assist in the resolution of incidents where such anomalies are encountered have been investigated. Resolution of these incidents requires characterization of the anomalous object so that plutonium oxide processing can resume and so that a disposition pathway can be determined for the anomalous material. Technologies including gamma ray spectroscopy, alpha-gamma coincidence, LiDAR volumetric measurements, and surface conductivity measurements were investigated for this purpose, with a focus on systems which can be easily introduced into the processing environment when an anomaly is encountered, then removed from the environment after resolution to avoid impeding normal processing activities. This places an emphasis on small and portable measurement systems and systems that can operate in a high-background, oxide-processing environment. Gamma ray systems investigated include the GR1™a CZT detector and the MicroGe™a germanium detector, with a focus on detecting characteristic gamma rays from Pu-239 and other actinides. A gamma ray and alpha particle coincidence method was investigated with the goal of identifying actinides in the presence of a gamma ray background produced by adjacent plutonium oxide material. Leica™b BLK360 G1 and Keyence™c LJ-X8300 LiDAR systems were investigated for use in conjunction with mass measurements to gain accurate material density values, and a Foerster Sigmatest™d 2.070 was tested to determine surface conductivity. The combination of these properties would allow improved identification and characterization of a wide variety of potential anomalous material.

Munson, Justin M.↗