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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Collaborative Decision Approach for Electricity Pricing-demand Response Stackelberg Game

Demand response programs are considered as a valuable resource in smart grids that provide several advantages of load shifting, peak load reduction, mediating intermittency of renewable energy integration, etc. Flexible price-based incentives have been recognized as a critical strategy in motivating and compensating consumers' load adjustment actions for successful implementation of demand response. Game theoretical approaches, especially Stackelberg games are popularly adopted to model the relationship between electricity price and customers' demand response and solved by the classical centralized backward induction (BI) method. However, the BI method generally requires convexity of the follower's model for necessary optimality conditions, and the computational time of any centralized approach increases sharply with larger problem instances. In this paper, the Stackelberg game of electricity pricing-demand response between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) is decomposed based on a collaborative optimization (CO) framework, where each LA is treated as a discipline with its own domain constraints (e.g. building temperature control), while the DSO at the system level tries to reduce the solution discrepancy and guide the searching towards optimality. Several groups of comparison experiments have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed collaborative decision approach in solving the demand response game.

Chen, Yang↗
DOE OSTI2020

Genetic algorithm for demand response: a stackelberg game approach

Demand response (DR) has gained a significant recent interest due to its potential for mitigating many power system problems. Game theory is a very effective tool to be utilized in DR management. In this paper, the DR between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) is designed as a Stackelberg game, where the DSO acts as the leader and LAs are regarded as the followers. Due to the limitations of the centralized solution approaches, a genetic algorithm-based decentralized approach is proposed. To demonstrate the proposed approach, a case study concerning a day-ahead optimization for a real-time pricing market with a single DSO and three LAs is designed and optimized. The proposed approach is able to shift the demand peaks and prove that it has a great potential to be used for the Stackelberg game between a DSO and multiple LAs to fully exploit the potential of DR.

Amasyali, Kadir↗
DOE OSTI2020

Transactive Energy Systems: The Market-based Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources

This paper synthesizes a unifying framework that captures a large class of transactive energy systems studied in the literature. The framework consists of four key elements: agent preferences, control decisions, information structure, and solution concept. Among them, agent preference specifies the preferred outcome by each agent and models the conflict of interest in decision making. Control decision specifies the set of decisions for each agent to maximize its payoff. Information structure describes the information available to each agent before it makes a decision. Solution concept encodes the rationality assumptions of each agent in the system. These elements are important in identifying and distinguishing different transactive energy systems. In this paper, we use them to analyze a number of important ones, including the competitive equilibrium, Stackelberg game, reverse Stackelberg game, and mechanism design. Each class of these problems is formulated as a special case of the proposed transactive energy systems. Their connections and differences are discussed. Available tools and results for each category of problems are surveyed.

Li, Sen↗
DOE OSTI2020

Distributed Solution Approach for a Stackelberg Pricing Game of Aggregated Demand Response

Demand-side management is a fundamental up-to-date strategy that transforms the traditional power grid to a modern smart grid where the flexible pricing mechanisms play a critical role in its successful implementation. In this paper, the pricing-demand response between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the DSO is the price maker that adjusts its strategy based on observed responses from LAs. With the concerns of computational cost and privacy protection, two distributed solution approaches, particle swarm optimization and pattern search algorithm, are conducted and compared with the classical centralized backward induction approach. Numerical results on a small case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed distributed solution approaches in leveraging flexible demand response potential.

Chen, Yang↗
DOE OSTI2022

Hierarchical Model-Free Transactional Control of Building Loads to Support Grid Services

A transition from generation on demand to consumption on demand is one of the solutions to overcome the many limitations associated with the higher penetration of renewable energy sources. Such a transition, however, requires a considerable amount of load flexibility in the demand side. Demand response (DR) programs can reveal and utilize this demand flexibility by enabling the participation of a large number of grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEB). Existing approaches on DR require significant modelling or training efforts, are computationally expensive, and do not guarantee the satisfaction of end users. To address the aforementioned limitations, this software code considers a scalable hierarchical model-free transactional control approach that incorporates elements of virtual battery, game theory, and model-free control (MFC) mechanisms. The developed approach separates the control mechanism into upper and lower levels. The MFC modulates the flexible GEB in the lower level with guaranteed thermal comfort of end users in response to the optimal pricing and power signals determined in the upper layer using a Stackelberg game integrated with aggregate virtual battery constraints. Additionally, the usage of MFC necessitates less burdensome computational and communication requirements, thus, it is easily deployable even on small, embedded devices. This software code enables the use of residential and small-size commercial buildings to offer a potentially substantial source of ancillary grid services that are currently underutilized. A hierarchical, model-free transactive building control provides a smooth interface between the grid service requests of utilities and the reliable control required by participating buildings. Model-free control, which supports distributed control architecture, will be a more scalable solution that can be deployed in neighborhood-size systems as well as individual buildings. The proposed approach contributes to the body of knowledge on two main aspects. First, it couples the MFC with the game-theoretic control and proposes a scalable model-free transactive control approach. MFC does not require any modeling effort or model training for the various building loads. This is very beneficial since deriving an accurate model for every single unit participating in DR programs and obtaining all the parameters about the units (e.g., thermal coefficients, standby losses) are infeasible. Also, MFC is computationally efficient, easily deployable even on small, embedded devices, and can be implemented in real time. Second, it integrates the concept of virtual battery into DR via the Stackelberg game. The concept of virtual battery enables efficient coordination and aggregation of a large number of flexible GEB with guaranteed thermal comfort of end users.

Olama, Mohammed [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), O↗
DOE OSTI2025

Game theoretic modeling and optimization of competition and collaboration in dual channel electronic waste supply chains

The rapid growth of electronic waste (e-waste) presents critical challenges for sustainable resource recovery and environmental protection. This study develops a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model formulated as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, that integrates dynamic pricing and cost-sharing mechanisms to optimize both economic and environmental outcomes. The model explicitly captures strategic interactions between manufacturer-led and third-party recycling channels, accounting for consumer behavior, regulatory incentives, and market competition. Numerical simulations conducted (implemented over a four-iteration horizon using a commercial optimization solver) show that, relative to the baseline equilibrium, manufacturer profit increases from 11.6 thousand USD to 37.9 thousand USD (+226.8%), total recycled volume rises from 7,848 to 7,942 units (+1.2%), and collector profit nearly doubles under cost-sharing, enabling more equitable profit distribution. Furthermore, scenario-based simulations across Sub-Saharan Africa, high-income economies, and emerging Asian industrial countries reveal that infrastructure quality, policy intensity, and labor costs critically shape recycling efficiency and profit allocation. These findings demonstrate that subsidies alone are insufficient to ensure system efficiency. Instead, coordinated strategies that integrate internal incentive alignment with context-sensitive policy support are required. Overall, this study offers a robust framework for designing resilient, efficient, and regionally adaptable e-waste management systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Optimizing Transportation Networks for E-Waste Reverse Logistics: A Multi-Modal Cost Allocation and Pricing Strategy

The exponential growth of electronic waste (e-waste) poses critical challenges for sustainable reverse logistics and transportation network optimization. This study develops a dual-channel transportation framework for e-waste logistics that integrates dynamic freight pricing, cost allocation mechanisms, and game-theoretic coordination. The model captures interactions between centralized hubs and distributed processing networks, accounting for freight rate elasticity, volume allocation, and capacity constraints. Using Stackelberg game theory and cost-sharing strategies, the framework optimizes transportation efficiency and profit distribution across logistics channels. Numerical simulations show that the dual-channel structure increases centralized hub profit by 226.8% compared to baseline single-channel operations, while boosting total transported volume by 1.2% and nearly doubling freight collector profit under cost-sharing. Scenario analyses across regional infrastructures reveal that network density, policy incentives, and logistics costs shape routing efficiency and profit allocation. These findings suggest that coordinated strategies combining dynamic pricing, targeted infrastructure investment, and strategic cost allocation are needed to design efficient, resilient, and regionally adaptable e-waste transportation systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Solving the duck curve in a smart grid environment using a non-cooperative game theory and dynamic pricing profiles

With the intermittency that comes with electricity generation from renewables, utilizing dynamic pricing will encourage the demand-side to respond in a smart way that would minimize the electricity costs and flatten the net electricity demand curve. Determining the optimal dynamic pricing profile that would leverage distributed storage to flatten the curve is a novel idea that needs to be studied. Moreover, the economic feasibility of utilizing distributed electrical energy storage is still not given in the literature. Therefore, in this paper, a novel way of solving a citywide dynamic model using a bilevel programming algorithm is introduced. The problem is developed as a novel non-cooperative Stackelberg game that utilizes air-conditioning systems and electrical storage through the end-users to determine the optimal dynamic pricing profile. The results show that the combined effect of utilizing demand-side air-conditioning systems and distributed storage together can flatten the curve while employing the optimal dynamic pricing profile. An economic study is performed to determine the economic feasibility of 20 different cases with different battery designs and the level of solar penetration. Three metrics were used to evaluate the economic performance of each case: the levelized cost of storage, the levelized cost of energy, and the simple payback period. Most cases had levelized cost of storage values lower than 0.457 $/kWh, which is the lower bound available in the literature. Seven out of 16 cases have a simple payback period shorter than the lifetime of the system (25 years). The case with a 100 MW PV power plant and a battery storage of size 597 MWh, was found to be the most promising case with a simple payback period of 12.71 years for the photovoltaic plant and 19.86 years for the demand-side investments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Decentralized Market Mechanism for Energy Communities under Operating Envelopes

Here, we propose an operating envelopes (OEs) aware energy community market mechanism that dynamically charges/rewards its members based on two-part pricing. The OEs are imposed exogenously by a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) on the energy community's revenue meter and is subject to a generalized net energy metering (NEM) tariff design. By formulating the interaction of the community operator and its members as a Stackelberg game, we show that the proposed two-part pricing achieves a Nash equilibrium and maximizes the community's social welfare in a decentralized fashion while ensuring that the community's operation abides by the OEs. The market mechanism conforms with the cost-causation principle and guarantees community members a surplus level no less than their maximum surplus when they autonomously face the DSO. The dynamic and uniform community price is a monotonically decreasing function of the community's aggregate renewable generation. We also analyze the impact of exogenous parameters such as NEM rates and OEs on the value of joining the community. Lastly, through numerical studies, we showcase the community's welfare, and pricing, and compare its members' surplus to customers under the DSO's regime.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Stochastic Pricing Game for Aggregated Demand Response Considering Comfort Level

In recent years, demand response (DR) has been explored as a fundamental strategy for demand-side management due to its advantages in mediating intermittency of renewable energy generation, load shifting, etc. To engage customers in DR programs, several deterministic price-based DR strategies have been developed and implemented. However, the stochastic weather conditions and occupants' consumption behaviors often make the deterministic solution less robust to uncertainties. In this paper, with the consideration of the uncertainties, a stochastic Stackelberg game is proposed to model the price-demand negotiation between a distributed system operator and load aggregators, where the virtual battery constraints are extracted from the building thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs)‘ characteristics to guarantee comfortable TCLs' levels. Following the negotiation, a priority-based control method is used to allocate the optimal aggregated power DR profile at the building level and track the power signal. Several groups of experiments have demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the stochastic solutions.

Chen, Yang↗
DOE OSTI2020

Techno-economic analysis of the impact of dynamic electricity prices on solar penetration in a smart grid environment with distributed energy storage

This study investigates the technical and economic feasibility of using high levels of solar energy penetration up to 400 MW into a smart grid system of 60,000 smart houses. A novel non-cooperative Stackelberg game is introduced that incorporates the profitability of the supply-side and helps in solving problems related to overgeneration and photovoltaic curtailment. The non-cooperative game is intended to find the optimal dynamic prices that would leverage distributed storage through the demand-side to stabilize the power grid operation. Ten cases are studied with five photovoltaic plant sizes and two battery designs. Here, a novel quantitative analysis of high levels of solar penetration as a percentage of the total electricity demand is introduced to evaluate the technical feasibility of the studied cases. To evaluate the economic viability of the proposed smart grid system, four metrics were used: the levelized cost of energy, the levelized cost of storage, the payback period, and the net present value. Two out of ten studied cases were concluded to be the most promising cases, one with a solar photovoltaic plant size of 200 MW and the other with 300 MW. The case with 300 MW solar plant is preferred as it paves the way for more solar energy deployment with a solar penetration percentage up to 67.78%. This case had a payback period of 10.72 years and a net present value of $\$51.44$ M for the solar plant and a payback period of 12.06 years and a net present value of $\$40.75$ M for the demand-side.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Network-Aware and Welfare-Maximizing Dynamic Pricing for Energy Sharing

The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energysharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy-sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.

aggregates↗
DOE OSTI2020

BI-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION FOR ELECTRICITY TRANSACTION IN SMART COMMUNITY WITH MODULAR PUMP HYDRO STORAGE

Grid integration of the increasing distributed energy resources could be challenging in terms of new infrastructure investment, power grid stability, etc. To resolve more renewables locally and reduce the need for extensive electricity transmission, a community energy transaction market is assumed with market operator as the leader whose responsibility is to generate local energy prices and clear the energy transaction payment among the prosumers (followers). The leader and multi-followers have competitive objectives of revenue maximization and operational cost minimization. This non-cooperative leader-follower (Stackelberg) game is formulated using a bi-level optimization framework, where a novel modular pump hydro storage technology (GLIDES system) is set as an upper level market operator, and the lower level prosumers are nearby commercial buildings. The best responses of the lower level model could be derived by necessary optimality conditions, and thus the bi-level model could be transformed into single level optimization model via replacing the lower level model by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) necessary conditions. Several experiments have been designed to compare the local energy transaction behavior and profit distribution with the different demand response levels and different local price structures. The experimental results indicate that the lower level prosumers could benefit the most when local buying and selling prices are equal, while maximum revenue potential for the upper level agent could be reached with non-equal trading prices.

Chen, Yang↗
NASA NTRS2000

Adaptivity in Agent-Based Routing for Data Networks

Adaptivity, both of the individual agents and of the interaction structure among the agents, seems indispensable for scaling up multi-agent systems (MAS s) in noisy environments. One important consideration in designing adaptive agents is choosing their action spaces to be as amenable as possible to machine learning techniques, especially to reinforcement learning (RL) techniques. One important way to have the interaction structure connecting agents itself be adaptive is to have the intentions and/or actions of the agents be in the input spaces of the other agents, much as in Stackelberg games. We consider both kinds of adaptivity in the design of a MAS to control network packet routing. We demonstrate on the OPNET event-driven network simulator the perhaps surprising fact that simply changing the action space of the agents to be better suited to RL can result in very large improvements in their potential performance: at their best settings, our learning-amenable router agents achieve throughputs up to three and one half times better than that of the standard Bellman-Ford routing algorithm, even when the Bellman-Ford protocol traffic is maintained. We then demonstrate that much of that potential improvement can be realized by having the agents learn their settings when the agent interaction structure is itself adaptive.

Wolpert, David H.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Network-Aware and Welfare-Maximizing Dynamic Pricing for Energy Sharing: Preprint

The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energysharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.

energy communities↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Blockchain and PKI-Based Secure Vehicle-to-Vehicle Energy-Trading Protocol

With the increasing awareness for sustainable future and green energy, the demand for electric vehicles (EVs) is growing rapidly, thus placing immense pressure on the energy grid. To alleviate this, local trading between EVs should be encouraged. In this paper, we propose a blockchain and public key infrastructure (PKI)-based secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) energy-trading protocol. A permissioned blockchain utilizing the proof of authority (PoA) consensus and smart contracts is used to securely store data. Encrypted communication is ensured through transport layer security (TLS), with PKI managing the necessary digital certificates and keys. A multi-leader, multi-follower Stackelberg game-based trade algorithm is formulated to determine the optimal energy demands, supplies, and prices. Finally, we propose a detailed communication protocol that ties all the components together, enabling smooth interaction between them. Key findings, such as system behavior and performance, scalability of the trade algorithm and the blockchain, smart contract execution costs, etc., are presented through numerical results by implementing and simulating the protocol in various scenarios. This work not only enhances local energy trading among EVs, encouraging efficient energy usage and reducing burden on the power grid, but also paves a way for future research in sustainable energy management.

Stackelberg game↗