Study of Spacecraft Deployables Failures
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Spacecraft Deployables, Failures, Anomalies↗
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Study of Spacecraft Deployables Failures
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Spacecraft Deployables, Failures, Anomalies↗
Study of Spacecraft Deployables Failures
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Spacecraft Deployables↗
On-orbit deployment anamolies: What can be done?
Modern communications satellites rely heavily upon deployable appendage (i.e., solar arrays, communications antennas, etc.) to perform vital functions that enable the spacecraft to effectively conduct mission objectives. Communications and telemetry antennas provide the radio-frequency link between the spacecraft and the earth ground station, permitting data to be transmitted and received from the satellite. Solar arrays serve as the principle source of electrical energy to the satellite, and re-charge internal batteries during operation. However, since satellites cannot carry back-up systems, if a solar array fails to deploy, the mission is lost. The subject of on-orbit anomalies related to the deployment of spacecraft appendage, and possible causes of such failures are examined. Topics discussed include mechanical launch loading, on-orbit thermal and solar concerns, reliability of spacecraft pyrotechnics, and practical limitations of ground-based deployment testing. Of particular significance, the article features an in-depth look at the lessons learned from the successful recovery of the Telesat Canada Anik-E2 satellite in 1991.
Freeman, Michael↗
Bayesian Approach for Reliability Assessment of Sunshield Deployment on JWST
Deployable subsystems are essential to mission success of most spacecraft. These subsystems enable critical functions including power, communications and thermal control. The loss of any of these functions will generally result in loss of the mission. These subsystems and their components often consist of unique designs and applications, for which various standardized data sources are not applicable for estimating reliability and for assessing risks. In this study, a Bayesian approach for reliability estimation of spacecraft deployment was developed for this purpose. This approach was then applied to the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Sunshield subsystem, a unique design intended for thermal control of the observatory's telescope and science instruments. In order to collect the prior information on deployable systems, detailed studies of "heritage information", were conducted extending over 45 years of spacecraft launches. The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Spacecraft Operational Anomaly and Reporting System (SOARS) data were then used to estimate the parameters of the conjugative beta prior distribution for anomaly and failure occurrence, as the most consistent set of available data and that could be matched to launch histories. This allows for an emperical Bayesian prediction for the risk of an anomaly occurrence of the complex Sunshield deployment, with credibility limits, using prior deployment data and test information.
Kaminskiy, Mark P.↗
The Galileo high gain antenna deployment anomaly
On April 11, 1991, the Galileo spacecraft executed a sequence that would open the spacecraft's High Gain Antenna. The Antenna's launch restraint had been released just after deployment sequence, the antenna, which opens like an umbrella, never reached the fully deployed position. The analyses and tests that followed allowed a conclusive determination of the likely failure mechanisms and pointed to some strategies to use for recovery of the high gain antenna.
Johnson, Michael R.↗
On Possible Arc Inception on Low Voltage Solar Array
Recent analysis of spacecraft failures during the period of 1990-2013 demonstrated clearly that electrostatic discharges caused more than 8 of all registered failures and anomalies, and comprised the most costly losses (25) for operating companies and agencies. The electrostatic discharges on spacecraft surfaces are the results of differential charging above some critical (threshold) voltages. The mechanisms of differential charging are well known, and various methods have been developed to prevent a generation of significant electric fields in areas of triple junctions. For example, low bus voltages in Low Earth Orbit plasma environment and slightly conducting layer over coverglass (ITO) in Geosynchronous Orbit surroundings are believed to be quite reliable measures to prevent discharges on respective surfaces. In most cases, the vulnerable elements of spacecraft (solar arrays, diode boards, etc.) go through comprehensive ground tests in vacuum chambers. However, tests articles contain the miniscule fragments of spacecraft components such as 10-30 solar cells of many thousands deployed on spacecraft in orbit. This is one reason why manufacturing defects may not be revealed in ground tests but expose themselves in arcing on array surface in space. The other reason for ineffectiveness of discharge preventive measures is aging of all materials in harsh orbital environments. The expected life time of modern spacecraft varies within the range of five-fifteen years, and thermal cycling, radiation damages, and mechanical stresses can result in surface erosion on conductive layers and microscopic cracks in coverglass sheets and adhesive films. These possible damages may cause significant increases in local electric field strengths and subsequent discharges. The primary discharges may or may not be detrimental to spacecraft operation, but they can produce the necessary conditions for sustained arcs initiation. Multiple measures were developed to prevent sustained discharges between adjacent strings, and many ground tests were performed to determine threshold parameters (voltage and current) for sustained arcs. And again, manufacturing defects and aging in space environments may result in considerable decrease of critical threshold parameters. This paper is devoted to the analysis of possible reasons behind arcing on spacecraft with low bus voltages.
plasma interaction↗
On Possible Arc Inception on Low Voltage Solar Array
Recent analysis of spacecraft failures during the period of 1990-2013 demonstrated clearly that electrostatic discharges caused more than 8 percent of all registered failures and anomalies, and comprised the most costly losses (25 percent) for operating companies and agencies. The electrostatic discharges on spacecraft surfaces are the results of differential charging above some critical (threshold) voltages. The mechanisms of differential charging are well known, and various methods have been developed to prevent a generation of significant electric fields in areas of triple junctions. For example, low bus voltages in Low Earth Orbit plasma environment and slightly conducting layer over cover-glass (ITO) in Geosynchronous Orbit surroundings are believed to be quite reliable measures to prevent discharges on respective surfaces. In most cases, the vulnerable elements of spacecraft (solar arrays, diode boards, etc.) go through comprehensive ground tests in vacuum chambers. However, tests articles contain the miniscule fragments of spacecraft components such as 10-30 solar cells of many thousands deployed on spacecraft in orbit. This is one reason why manufacturing defects may not be revealed in ground tests but expose themselves in arcing on array surface in space. The other reason for ineffectiveness of discharge preventive measures is aging of all materials in harsh orbital environments. The expected life time of modern spacecraft varies within the range of five-fifteen years, and thermal cycling, radiation damages, and mechanical stresses can result in surface erosion on conductive layers and microscopic cracks in cover-glass sheets and adhesive films. These possible damages may cause significant increases in local electric field strengths and subsequent discharges. The primary discharges may or may not be detrimental to spacecraft operation, but they can produce the necessary conditions for sustained arcs initiation. Multiple measures were developed to prevent sustained discharges between adjacent strings, and many ground tests were performed to determine threshold parameters (voltage and current) for sustained arcs. And again, manufacturing defects and aging in space environments may result in considerable decrease of critical threshold parameters. This paper is devoted to the analysis of possible reasons behind arcing on spacecraft with low bus voltages.
low voltage solar array↗
2011 Mars Science Laboratory Launch Period Design
The Mars Science Laboratory mission, set to launch in the fall of 2011, has the primary objective of landing the most advanced rover to date to the surface of Mars to assess whether Mars ever was, or still is today, able to sustain carbon-based life. Arriving at Mars in August 2012, the Mars Science Laboratory will also demonstrate the ability to deliver large payloads to the surface of Mars, land more accurately (than previous missions) in a 20-km by 25-km ellipse, and traverse up to 20 km. Following guided entry and parachute deployment, the spacecraft will descend on a parachute and a Powered Descent Vehicle to safely land the rover on the surface of Mars. The launch/arrival strategy is driven by several key requirements, which include: launch vehicle capability, atmosphere-relative entry speed, communications coverage during Entry, Descent and Landing, latitude accessibility, and dust storm season avoidance. Notable among these requirements is maintaining a telecommunications link from atmospheric entry to landing plus one minute, via a Direct-To-Earth X-band link and via orbital assets using an UHF link, to ensure that any failure during Entry, Descent and Landing can be reconstructed in case of a mission anomaly. Due to concerns related to the lifetime of the relay orbiters, two additional launch/arrival strategies have been developed to improve Entry, Descent, and Landing communications. This paper discusses the final launch/arrival strategy selected prior to the launch period down-selection that is scheduled to occur in August 2011. It is also important to note that this paper is an update to Ref. 1 in that it includes two new Type 1 launch periods and drops the Type 2 launch period that is no longer considered.
mission design↗
Design Methods and Practices for Fault Prevention and Management in Spacecraft
Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) is intended to become a critical capability for all space, lunar and planetary exploration vehicles and systems at NASA. Monitoring and managing the health state of diverse components, subsystems, and systems is a difficult task that will become more challenging when implemented for long-term, evolving deployments. A key technical challenge will be to ensure that the ISHM technologies are reliable, effective, and low cost, resulting in turn in safe, reliable, and affordable missions. To ensure safety and reliability, ISHM functionality, decisions and knowledge have to be incorporated into the product lifecycle as early as possible, and ISHM must be considered as an essential element of models developed and used in various stages during system design. During early stage design, many decisions and tasks are still open, including sensor and measurement point selection, modeling and model-checking, diagnosis, signature and data fusion schemes, presenting the best opportunity to catch and prevent potential failures and anomalies in a cost-effective way. Using appropriate formal methods during early design, the design teams can systematically explore risks without committing to design decisions too early. However, the nature of ISHM knowledge and data is detailed, relying on high-fidelity, detailed models, whereas the earlier stages of the product lifecycle utilize low-fidelity, high-level models of systems and their functionality. We currently lack the tools and processes necessary for integrating ISHM into the vehicle system/subsystem design. As a result, most existing ISHM-like technologies are retrofits that were done after the system design was completed. It is very expensive, and sometimes futile, to retrofit a system health management capability into existing systems. Last-minute retrofits result in unreliable systems, ineffective solutions, and excessive costs (e.g., Space Shuttle TPS monitoring which was considered only after 110 flights and the Columbia disaster). High false alarm or false negative rates due to substandard implementations hurt the credibility of the ISHM discipline. This paper presents an overview of the current state of ISHM design,and a review of formal design methods to make recommendations about possible approaches to enable the ISHM capabilities to be designed-in at the system-level, from the very beginning of the vehicle design process.
Tumer, Irem Y.↗
Evaluation of Anomaly Detection Capability for Ground-Based Pre-Launch Shuttle Operations
This chapter will provide a thorough end-to-end description of the process for evaluation of three different data-driven algorithms for anomaly detection to select the best candidate for deployment as part of a suite of IVHM (Integrated Vehicle Health Management) technologies. These algorithms were deemed to be sufficiently mature enough to be considered viable candidates for deployment in support of the maiden launch of Ares I-X, the successor to the Space Shuttle for NASA's Constellation program. Data-driven algorithms are just one of three different types being deployed. The other two types of algorithms being deployed include a "nile-based" expert system, and a "model-based" system. Within these two categories, the deployable candidates have already been selected based upon qualitative factors such as flight heritage. For the rule-based system, SHINE (Spacecraft High-speed Inference Engine) has been selected for deployment, which is a component of BEAM (Beacon-based Exception Analysis for Multimissions), a patented technology developed at NASA's JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) and serves to aid in the management and identification of operational modes. For the "model-based" system, a commercially available package developed by QSI (Qualtech Systems, Inc.), TEAMS (Testability Engineering and Maintenance System) has been selected for deployment to aid in diagnosis. In the context of this particular deployment, distinctions among the use of the terms "data-driven," "rule-based," and "model-based," can be found in. Although there are three different categories of algorithms that have been selected for deployment, our main focus in this chapter will be on the evaluation of three candidates for data-driven anomaly detection. These algorithms will be evaluated upon their capability for robustly detecting incipient faults or failures in the ground-based phase of pre-launch space shuttle operations, rather than based oil heritage as performed in previous studies. Robust detection will allow for the achievement of pre-specified minimum false alarm and/or missed detection rates in the selection of alert thresholds. All algorithms will also be optimized with respect to an aggregation of these same criteria. Our study relies upon the use of Shuttle data to act as was a proxy for and in preparation for application to Ares I-X data, which uses a very similar hardware platform for the subsystems that are being targeted (TVC - Thrust Vector Control subsystem for the SRB (Solid Rocket Booster)).
Martin, Rodney Alexander↗
Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype
Automating prelaunch diagnostics for launch vehicles offers three potential benefits. First, it potentially improves safety by detecting faults that might otherwise have been missed so that they can be corrected before launch. Second, it potentially reduces launch delays by more quickly diagnosing the cause of anomalies that occur during prelaunch processing. Reducing launch delays will be critical to the success of NASA's planned future missions that require in-orbit rendezvous. Third, it potentially reduces costs by reducing both launch delays and the number of people needed to monitor the prelaunch process. NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle to bring the Orion capsule and its crew of four astronauts to low-earth orbit on their way to the moon. Ares I-X will be the first unmanned test flight of Ares I. It is scheduled to launch on October 27, 2009. The Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype is a prototype ground diagnostic system that will provide anomaly detection, fault detection, fault isolation, and diagnostics for the Ares I-X first-stage thrust vector control (TVC) and for the associated ground hydraulics while it is in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and on the launch pad. It will serve as a prototype for a future operational ground diagnostic system for Ares I. The prototype combines three existing diagnostic tools. The first tool, TEAMS (Testability Engineering and Maintenance System), is a model-based tool that is commercially produced by Qualtech Systems, Inc. It uses a qualitative model of failure propagation to perform fault isolation and diagnostics. We adapted an existing TEAMS model of the TVC to use for diagnostics and developed a TEAMS model of the ground hydraulics. The second tool, Spacecraft Health Inference Engine (SHINE), is a rule-based expert system developed at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. We developed SHINE rules for fault detection and mode identification. The prototype uses the outputs of SHINE as inputs to TEAMS. The third tool, the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS), is an anomaly detection tool developed at NASA Ames Research Center and is currently used to monitor the International Space Station Control Moment Gyroscopes. IMS automatically "learns" a model of historical nominal data in the form of a set of clusters and signals an alarm when new data fails to match this model. IMS offers the potential to detect faults that have not been modeled. The three tools have been integrated and deployed to Hangar AE at KSC where they interface with live data from the Ares I-X vehicle and from the ground hydraulics. The outputs of the tools are displayed on a console in Hangar AE, one of the locations from which the Ares I-X launch will be monitored. The full paper will describe how the prototype performed before the launch. It will include an analysis of the prototype's accuracy, including false-positive rates, false-negative rates, and receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves. It will also include a description of the prototype's computational requirements, including CPU usage, main memory usage, and disk usage. If the prototype detects any faults during the prelaunch period then the paper will include a description of those faults. Similarly, if the prototype has any false alarms then the paper will describe them and will attempt to explain their causes.
Schwabacher, Mark↗
Launching and Deploying the James Webb Space Telescope
On December 25, 2021, at 12:20 UTC, the James Webb Space Telescope lifted off and onward to its destination in orbit at the second Lagrange point. With more than two decades in development, and an international collaboration between NASA, CSA, and ESA, Webb is one of the most anticipated science missions ever launched. After a dramatic and flawless launch, Webb's toughest and riskiest days lie ahead. Unprecedented in its complexity and ambition, over the next two weeks Webb would undergo the most complex on-orbit deployment sequence ever attempted, with any single deployment anomaly carrying the risk of full mission failure. An exquisite design, years of ground testing, a exhaustively trained and rehearsed operations and engineering team, and an unprecedented level of contingency planning, all resulted in a fully and successfully deployed Webb observatory, on its way to L2, and nominally cooling to its cryogenic temperatures. Although Webb still had many more months of commissioning left, there was a collective sigh of relief heard round the world. This incredible achievement was not by chance but was years in the making. We go behind the scenes of Webb's first month on orbit, starting with the unique and challenging launch itself, the time criticality of its mid-course corrections, and a summary of nearly 14 days to undergo nearly 50 major deployments. We discuss what went better than planned and how years of robust and detailed contingency planning were prepared for unanticipated events and on-orbit spacecraft behavior. And finally, we provide a brief overview of the entire commissioning process which successfully completed on July 10th, 2022.
Keith A Parrish↗
Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era
The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.
Aaron L Morris↗
General Purpose Data-Driven Monitoring for Space Operations
As modern space propulsion and exploration systems improve in capability and efficiency, their designs are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex. Determining the health state of these systems, using traditional parameter limit checking, model-based, or rule-based methods, is becoming more difficult as the number of sensors and component interactions grow. Data-driven monitoring techniques have been developed to address these issues by analyzing system operations data to automatically characterize normal system behavior. System health can be monitored by comparing real-time operating data with these nominal characterizations, providing detection of anomalous data signatures indicative of system faults or failures. The Inductive Monitoring System (IMS) is a data-driven system health monitoring software tool that has been successfully applied to several aerospace applications. IMS uses a data mining technique called clustering to analyze archived system data and characterize normal interactions between parameters. The scope of IMS based data-driven monitoring applications continues to expand with current development activities. Successful IMS deployment in the International Space Station (ISS) flight control room to monitor ISS attitude control systems has led to applications in other ISS flight control disciplines, such as thermal control. It has also generated interest in data-driven monitoring capability for Constellation, NASA's program to replace the Space Shuttle with new launch vehicles and spacecraft capable of returning astronauts to the moon, and then on to Mars. Several projects are currently underway to evaluate and mature the IMS technology and complementary tools for use in the Constellation program. These include an experiment on board the Air Force TacSat-3 satellite, and ground systems monitoring for NASA's Ares I-X and Ares I launch vehicles. The TacSat-3 Vehicle System Management (TVSM) project is a software experiment to integrate fault and anomaly detection algorithms and diagnosis tools with executive and adaptive planning functions contained in the flight software on-board the Air Force Research Laboratory TacSat-3 satellite. The TVSM software package will be uploaded after launch to monitor spacecraft subsystems such as power and guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C). It will analyze data in real-time to demonstrate detection of faults and unusual conditions, diagnose problems, and react to threats to spacecraft health and mission goals. The experiment will demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of integrated system health management (ISHM) technologies with both ground and on-board experiments.
Iverson, David L.↗
NASA Space Mechanisms Handbook and Reference Guide Expanded Into CD-ROM Set
Several NASA missions suffered failures and anomalies due to problems in applying space mechanisms technology to specific projects. Research shows that engineers often lack either adequate knowledge of mechanism design or sufficient understanding of how mechanisms affect sensitive systems. The Space Mechanisms Project conducted a Lessons Learned study and published a Space Mechanisms Handbook to help space industry engineers avoid recurring design, qualification, and application problems. The Space Mechanisms Handbook written at the NASA Glenn Research Center details the state-of-the-art in space mechanisms design as of 1998. NASA's objective in developing this Space Mechanisms Handbook was to provide readily accessible information on such areas as space mechanisms design, mechanical component availability and use, testing and qualification of mechanical systems, and a listing of worldwide space mechanisms experts and testing facilities in the United States. This handbook has been expanded into a two-volume CD-ROM set in an Adobe Acrobat format. In addition to the handbook, the CD's include (1) the two volume Space Mechanisms Lessons Learned Study, (2) proceedings from all the NASA hosted Aerospace Mechanisms Symposia held through the year 2000, (3) the Space Materials Handbook, (4) the Lubrication Handbook for the Space Industry, (5) the Structural & Mechanical Systems Long-Life Assurance Design Guidelines, (6) the Space Environments and Effects Source-Book, (7) the Spacecraft Deployable Appendages manual, (8) the Fastener Design Manual, (9) A Manual for Pyrotechnic Design, Development and Qualification, (10) the Report on Alternative Devices to Pyrotechnics on Spacecraft, and (11) Gearing (a manual). In addition, numerous other papers on tribology and lubrication are included.This technical summary of the project provides information on how to obtain the handbook and related information.
Fusaro, Robert L.↗
Orion Entry Display Feeder and Interactions with the Entry Monitor System
The Orion spacecraft is designed to return astronauts to a landing within 10 km of the intended landing target from low Earth orbit, lunar direct-entry, and lunar skip-entry trajectories. Al pile the landing is nominally controlled autonomously, the crew can fly precision entries manually in the event of an anomaly. The onboard entry displays will be used by the crew to monitor and manually fly the entry, descent, and landing, while the Entry Monitor System (EMS) will be used to monitor the health and status of the onboard guidance and the trajectory. The entry displays are driven by the entry display feeder, part of the Entry Monitor System (EMS). The entry re-targeting module, also part of the EMS, provides all the data required to generate the capability footprint of the vehicle at any point in the trajectory, which is shown on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). It also provides caution and warning data and recommends the safest possible re-designated landing site when the nominal landing site is no longer within the capability of the vehicle. The PFD and the EMS allow the crew to manually fly an entry trajectory profile from entry interface until parachute deploy having the flexibility to manually steer the vehicle to a selected landing site that best satisfies the priorities of the crew. The entry display feeder provides data from the ENIS and other components of the GNC flight software to the displays at the proper rate and in the proper units. It also performs calculations that are specific to the entry displays and which are not made in any other component of the flight software. In some instances, it performs calculations identical to those performed by the onboard primary guidance algorithm to protect against a guidance system failure. These functions and the interactions between the entry display feeder and the other components of the EMS are described.
Baird, Darren↗
Work on Planetary Atmospheres and Planetary Atmosphere Probes
A summary final report of work accomplished is presented. Work was performed in the following areas: (1) Galileo Probe science analysis, (2) Galileo probe Atmosphere Structure Instrument, (3) Mars Pathfinder Atmosphere Structure/Meteorology instrument, (4) Mars Pathfinder data analysis, (5) Science Definition for future Mars missions, (6) Viking Lander data analysis, (7) winds in Mars atmosphere Venus atmospheric dynamics, (8) Pioneer Venus Probe data analysis, (9) Pioneer Venus anomaly analysis, (10) Discovery Venus Probe Titan probe instrument design, and (11) laboratory studies of Titan probe impact phenomena. The work has resulted in more than 10 articles published in archive journals, 2 encyclopedia articles, and many working papers. This final report is organized around the four planets on which there was activity, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Titan, with a closing section on Miscellaneous Activities. A major objective was to complete the fabrication, test, and evaluation of the atmosphere structure experiment on the Galileo probe, and to receive, analyze and interpret data received from the spacecraft. The instrument was launched on April 14, 1989. Calibration data were taken for all experiment sensors. The data were analyzed, fitted with algorithms, and summarized in a calibration report for use in analyzing and interpreting data returned from Jupiter's atmosphere. The sensors included were the primary science pressure, temperature and acceleration sensors, and the supporting engineering temperature sensors. Computer programs were written to decode the Experiment Data Record and convert the digital numbers to physical quantities, i.e., temperatures, pressures, and accelerations. The project office agreed to obtain telemetry of checkout data from the probe. Work to extend programs written for use on the Pioneer Venus project included: (1) massive heat shield ablation leading to important mass loss during entry; and (2) rapid planet rotation, which introduced terms of motion not needed on Venus. When the Galileo Probe encountered Jupiter, analysis and interpretation of data commenced. The early contributions of the experiment were to define (1) the basic structure of the deep atmosphere, (2) the stability of the atmosphere, (3) the upper atmospheric profiles of density, pressure, and temperature. The next major task in the Galileo Probe project was to refine, verify and extend the analysis of the data. It was the verified, and corrected data, which indicated a dry abiabatic atmosphere within measurement accuracy. Temperature in the thermosphere was measured at 900 K. Participation in the Mars atmospheric research included: (1) work as a team member of the Mars Atmosphere Working Group, (2) contribution to the Mars Exobiology Instrument workshop, (3) asssistance in planning the Mars global network and (4) assitance in planning the Soviet-French Mars mission in 1994. This included a return to the Viking Lander parachute data to refine and improve the definition of winds between 1.5 and 4 kilometer altitude at the two entry sites. The variability of the structure of Mars atmosphere was addressed, which is known to vary with season, latitude, hemisphere and dust loading of the atmosphere. This led to work on the Pathfinder project. The probe had a deployable meteorology mast that had three temperature sensors, and a wind sensor at the tip of the mast. Work on the Titan atmospheric probe was also accomplished. This included developing an experiment proposal to the European Space Agency (ESA), which was not selected. However, as an advisor in the design and preparation of the selected experiment the researcher interacted with scientist on the Huygens Probe Atmosphere Structure Experiment. The researcher also participated in the planning for the Venus Chemical Probe. The science objectives of the probe were to resolve unanswered questions concerning the minor species chemistry of Venus' atmosphere that control cloud formation, greenhouse effectiveness, and the thermal structure. The researcher also reviewed problems with the Pioneer Venus Probe, that caused anomalies which occurred on the Probes at and below 12.5 km level of the Venus' atmosphere. He convened and participated in a workshop that concluded the most likely hardware cause was insulation failure in the electrical harness outside the Probes' pressure vessels. It was discovered that the shrink tubing material failed at 600K. This failure could explain the anomalies experienced by the probes. The descent data of the Pioneer probes, and the Soviet Vega Lander was analyzed to evaluate the presence of small scale gravity waves in and below the Venus cloud layer.
Lester, Peter↗