Methods to Improve Safety Risk Management and Safety Assurance: In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
An onboard risk management automation design is presented based on run-time assurance principles, as well as the concept for In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) as described by the National Academies. The automation is designed to operate independently of the autopilot and perform real-time risk assessment spanning multiple classes of hazards, predict constraint violations, and track autopilot states. In the event of elevated risk conditions or predicted constraint violations, the automation will select from a set of available contingencies and trigger autopilot mode changes if necessary to mitigate risk exposure. The onboard automation also informs the remote operator/pilot of what the independent monitor is observing and any contingency decisions or actions that may arise during flight. Details of an implementation of this design and results of verification and validation activities, as required to meet stringent NASA software and system assurance standards, are also presented. This includes simulation and flight testing using small unmanned aircraft systems.
ePORT (electronic Project Online Risk Tool) provides a systematic approach to using an electronic database program to manage a program/project risk management processes. This presentation will briefly cover the standard risk management procedures, then thoroughly cover NASA's Risk Management tool called ePORT. This electronic Project Online Risk Tool (ePORT) is a web-based risk management program that provides a common framework to capture and manage risks, independent of a programs/projects size and budget. It is used to thoroughly cover the risk management paradigm providing standardized evaluation criterion for common management reporting, ePORT improves Product Line, Center and Corporate Management insight, simplifies program/project manager reporting, and maintains an archive of data for historical reference.
Durability, reliability and safety are closely related in battery operation, requiring proper design to assure performance. To attain these properties are challenging and their issues of concerns need to be addressed in a coherent, holistic approach. For cell manufacturers, battery safety is about proper cell design. To implement effective safety measures, key is to engage failure mode and effect analysis in a sufficiently quantitative manner to understand cause-and-consequence relationship through advanced diagnostic and prognostic analyses to derive adequate cell design metrics to facilitate safe cell design. A key aspect of safety, not often discussed in the literature, is how to address it in the full context of electrochemical, thermal and mechanical balance. It is also important to realize that only when we can characterize the degree of tolerance and resilience to abuse, we are mature to know how to design a safe battery for operation.
Durability, reliability and safety are closely related in battery operation, requiring proper design to assure performance. To attain these properties are challenging and their issues of concerns need to be addressed in a coherent, holistic approach. For cell manufacturers, battery safety is about proper cell design. To implement effective safety measures, key is to engage failure mode and effect analysis in a sufficiently quantitative manner to understand cause-and-consequence relationship through advanced diagnostic and prognostic analyses to derive adequate cell design metrics to facilitate safe cell design. A key aspect of safety, not often discussed in the literature, is how to address it in the full context of electrochemical, thermal and mechanical balance. It is also important to realize that only when we can characterize the degree of tolerance and resilience to abuse, we are mature to know how to design a safe battery for operation.
This presentation will bridge the divide between these separate but overlapping disciplines and help explain how to use Risk Management as an effective management decision support tool that includes safety. Risk Management is an over arching communication tool used by management to prioritize and effectively mitigate potential problems before they concur. Risk Management encompasses every kind of potential problem that can occur on a program or project. Some of these are safety issues such as hazards that have a specific likelihood and consequence that need to be controlled and included to show an integrated picture of accepted) mitigated, and residual risk. Integrating safety and other assurance disciplines is paramount to accurately representing a program s or projects risk posture. Risk is made up of several components such as technical) cost, schedule, or supportability. Safety should also be a consideration for every risk. The safety component can also have an impact on the technical, cost, and schedule aspect of a given risk. The current formats used for communication of safety and risk issues are not consistent or integrated. The presentation will explore the history of these disciplines, current work to integrate them, and suggestions for integration for the future.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) continues to surpass its operational target goals of supporting users; delivering fast, reliable computational ecosystems; creating innovative solutions for high-performance computing (HPC) needs; contributing to the community to build the next generation HPC workforce, and managing risks, safety, and security associated with operating some of the most powerful computers in the world. The results can be seen in the cutting-edge science conducted by users and the praise from the research community. Calendar year (CY) 2021 saw continued excellence in research supported by the OLCF’s leadership-class computing resources, including Summit (the nation’s most powerful supercomputer), the global scratch file system Alpine, the Scalable Protected Infrastructure (SPI), the Exploratory Visualization Environment for Research in Science and Technology (EVEREST), and the archival mass-storage resource High-Performance Storage System (HPSS). While maintaining access and exceptional user support for Summit, the OLCF continued to make progress on the installation and deployment of Frontier, which will be the nation’s first exascale system when it comes online at the start of CY 2023. Users have already begun running and optimizing scientific codes on Crusher, the OLCF test and development system equipped with Frontier’s architecture. Throughout the year, the OLCF maintained a strong culture of operational excellence, including risk management, workplace safety, and cybersecurity. The OLCF’s rigorous risk management strategy anticipated and mitigated risks, and at this time there are no high-priority operational risks. Similarly, ORNL and the OLCF were committed to operating under the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) safety regulations that ensure a safe workplace. Technical staff tracked and monitored existing threats and vulnerabilities within the OLCF while continually developing tools and practices to enhance operations without increasing the facility’s risk. CY 2021 was filled with outstanding results and accomplishments, including a very high rating from users on overall satisfaction for the eighth consecutive year; a tremendous number of node hours delivered to 1,671 researchers on Summit; and the successful delivery of the allocation split of roughly 60%, 20%, and 20% of core-hours offered for the Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment (INCITE), Advanced Scientific Computing Research Leadership Computing Challenge (ALCC), and Director’s Discretionary (DD) programs, respectively (Section 2). COVID-19 research remained a focus in 2021, and the ALCC and DD programs allocated over 1 million Summit hours to the COVID-19 High Performance Computing Consortium. These accomplishments, coupled with the high utilization rates (i.e., overall and capability usage), represent the fulfillment of the promise of leadership class machines: efficient facilitation of leadership-class computational applications.
This tutorial gives an overview of AdvoCATE - the assurance case automation toolset - which provides a suite of features for safety risk management, including hazard analysis, the linking of hazards to requirement logs, risk modeling using bow tie diagrams, structured arguments, and evidence logs. In this tutorial we show how these related assurance artifacts can be combined with each other in an integrated assurance case.
The Mission Control Center (MCC) at Johnson Space Center (JSC) has a rich legacy of supporting Human Space Flight operations throughout the Apollo, Shuttle and International Space Station eras. Through the evolution of ground operations and the Mission Control Center facility, NASA has gained a wealth of experience of what it takes to manage the risk in Safety Critical Operations, especially when human life is at risk. The focus of the presentation will be on the processes (training, operational rigor, team dynamics) that enable the JSC/MCC team to be so successful. The presentation will also share the evolution of the Mission Control Center architecture and how the evolution was introduced while managing the risk to the programs supported by the team. The details of the MCC architecture (e.g., the specific software, hardware or tools used in the facility) will not be shared at the conference since it would not give any additional insight as to how risk is managed in Space Operations.
Returning samples from Mars has long been a major planetary science objective due to the high scientific value and transformative potential of the resulting data. An exciting dimension of this objective is the potential for the detection of ancient microbiological life, and the possibility of improving our understanding of the evolution of habitable environments on Mars and the development of life on Earth. To ensure that returned samples meet stringent planetary protection requirements and do not expose Earth to potential biohazards, the joint NASA/ESA Sample Receiving Project (SRP) assembled the Sample Safety Assessment Protocol Tiger Team (SSAP-TT). Members were recruited with the specific goal of creating a multi-disciplinary and internationally distributed team of experts in their respective fields across the federal government, academia, and private industry. This team was chartered with reassessing previous sample safety assessment strategies, defining what constitutes a biological hazard, developing a protocol to test for potential biohazards, and establishing a statistical framework to determine if samples are “safe” for release. The team developed a three-step protocol, supported by a Bayesian statistical framework, to assess whether returned samples contain potential biohazards that could present a risk to Earth’s biosphere. Initial conclusions indicated that an effective and comprehensive safety assessment protocol is feasible using modern techniques and does not require an excessive amount of sample consumption or traditional microbiological detection methodology. Herein, we will present an overview of the MSR SRP, the proposed safety assessment protocol, and how aspects of this novel approach can be applied to biological assessment in healthcare product manufacturing practices.
The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), is charged by Congress with developing the concepts and plans for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (NASSP), developed by the Safety Working Group of the JPDO, focuses on establishing the goals, objectives, and strategies needed to realize the safety objectives of the NextGen Integrated Plan. The three goal areas of the NASSP are Safer Practices, Safer Systems, and Safer Worldwide. Safer Practices emphasizes an integrated, systematic approach to safety risk management through implementation of formalized Safety Management Systems (SMS) that incorporate safety data analysis processes, and the enhancement of methods for ensuring safety is an inherent characteristic of NextGen. Safer Systems emphasizes implementation of safety-enhancing technologies, which will improve safety for human-centered interfaces and enhance the safety of airborne and ground-based systems. Safer Worldwide encourages coordinating the adoption of the safer practices and safer systems technologies, policies and procedures worldwide, such that the maximum level of safety is achieved across air transportation system boundaries. This paper introduces the NASSP and its development, and focuses on the Safer Systems elements of the NASSP, which incorporates three objectives for NextGen systems: 1) provide risk reducing system interfaces, 2) provide safety enhancements for airborne systems, and 3) provide safety enhancements for ground-based systems. The goal of this paper is to expose avionics and air traffic management system developers to NASSP objectives and Safer Systems strategies.
This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.
This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.
The National Airspace System undergoes continuous change including in the Upper Class E airspace involving increasingly complex operations and a widening diversity of vehicles. To secure a safe future system, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that is extensible to Upper E. Current Air Traffic Management is not cost-effective to scale for future Upper E operations and diversity of vehicles so the Federal Aviation Administration developed an Upper E Traffic Management ConOps to safely integrate the diverse operations and vehicles having different performance characteristics and flight missions without disrupting current operations including space launch and reentry, suborbital flights, supersonic and hypersonic flights, slow moving or stationary unmanned balloons, and long endurance fixed wing vehicles that are slow, stationary, or high speed. IASMS integrates state-of-the-art predictive modeling with reactive and proactive analytics to detect hazards and mitigate risk precursors for Upper E operators. IASMS identifies emergent safety risks exposed by transformation of the NAS with new and increasingly complex operations. Safety intelligence will also expand the data available and offer insight to new approaches for implementing safety improvements to mitigate risk with more seamless “in-time” integration across the policy, risk management, safety assurance, and promotion pillars of SMS.
In FY 1991, the NASA Safety Division continued efforts to enhance the quality and productivity of its safety oversight function. Recent initiatives set forth in areas such as training, risk management, safety assurance, operational safety, and safety information systems have matured into viable programs contributing to the safety and success of activities throughout the Agency. Efforts continued to develop a centralized intra-agency safety training program with establishment of the NASA Safety Training Center at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). The objective is to provide quality training for NASA employees and contractors on a broad range of safety-related topics. Courses developed by the Training Center will be presented at various NASA locations to minimize travel and reach the greatest number of people at the least cost. In FY 1991, as part of the ongoing efforts to enhance the total quality of NASA's safety work force, the Safety Training Center initiated development of a Certified Safety Professional review course. This course provides a comprehensive review of the skills and knowledge that well-rounded safety professionals must possess to qualify for professional certification. FY 1992 will see the course presented to NASA and contractor employees at all installations via the NASA Video Teleconference System.