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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2013

A literature review of safety culture.

Workplace safety has been historically neglected by organizations in order to enhance profitability. Over the past 30 years, safety concerns and attention to safety have increased due to a series of disastrous events occurring across many different industries (e.g., Chernobyl, Upper Big-Branch Mine, Davis-Besse etc.). Many organizations have focused on promoting a healthy safety culture as a way to understand past incidents, and to prevent future disasters. There is an extensive academic literature devoted to safety culture, and the Department of Energy has also published a significant number of documents related to safety culture. The purpose of the current endeavor was to conduct a review of the safety culture literature in order to understand definitions, methodologies, models, and successful interventions for improving safety culture. After reviewing the literature, we observed four emerging themes. First, it was apparent that although safety culture is a valuable construct, it has some inherent weaknesses. For example, there is no common definition of safety culture and no standard way for assessing the construct. Second, it is apparent that researchers know how to measure particular components of safety culture, with specific focus on individual and organizational factors. Such existing methodologies can be leveraged for future assessments. Third, based on the published literature, the relationship between safety culture and performance is tenuous at best. There are few empirical studies that examine the relationship between safety culture and safety performance metrics. Further, most of these studies do not include a description of the implementation of interventions to improve safety culture, or do not measure the effect of these interventions on safety culture or performance. Fourth, safety culture is best viewed as a dynamic, multi-faceted overall system composed of individual, engineered and organizational models. By addressing all three components of safety culture, organizations have a better chance of understanding, evaluating, and making positive changes towards safety within their own organization.

Cole, Kerstan Suzanne↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Culture at the World’s Premier Multi-User Spaceport

NASA’s Agency-wide Safety Culture is implemented at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a unique strategy due an unparalleled approach in making human spaceflight history. Kennedy Space Center, the world’s premier multi-user spaceport, enables U.S. government and commercial space access, while providing the world a resource to allow the exploration of and the ability to work in space. A consistently healthy safety culture at KSC is imperative for mission success: desired achievements, protection of space flight hardware, and ultimately, the preservation of human life requires the support of a healthy safety culture. Emphasis on the NASA Agency-wide development of Safety Culture began with the conception of the NASA Agency Safety Culture Working Group. After the devastating loss of life and mission of the Space Shuttle Colombia, a broken safety culture was identified as an organizational cause by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Thus, the Agency Safety Culture Working Group was developed in 2009 to assess the status of the Agency’s Safety Culture, while addressing safety culture concerns at the NASA Center-level. A Five-factor model was developed to serve as the guiding principles for Safety Culture: 1) Reporting Culture, 2) Just Culture, 3) Flexible Culture, 4) Learning Culture, and 5) Engaged Culture. These five factors are included in the NASA Safety Culture logo, which was intentionally designed as a DNA double helix to prompt the permeation of safety into day-to-day work. KSC specifically implements the NASA Agency-wide Safety Culture principles in a tailored approach that is relevant to the diversity of work being performed. An emphasis is placed on the implementation to include safety at home, not exclusively at work. This emphasis is a KSC-specific element that has been intentionally added to promote a closed loop Safety Culture. To advertise the safety culture, various safety and health events are held throughout the calendar year, providing innovative speakers and engaging activities, while also promoting a wide range of curated safety initiatives. Development and continuous improvement of the KSC safety tracking database, allows for advanced tracking-to-closure, along with providing data sets used to identify areas of emphasis. Other safety initiatives rely solely on employee participation, such as the photo challenges; participants are encouraged to identify and capture themselves, coworkers, or family members participating in safe or healthy activities to share with others within the Center and at Agency levels. Fabrication of exclusive videos and graphics are utilized to advertise and inform employee of safety initiatives, upcoming safety events, and general dispersion of safety information. In addition, an anonymous Agency-wide Safety Culture Survey is advertised, administered, and analyzed at Kennedy Space Center, with the purpose of receiving basic feedback on Safety Culture perceptions to help prevent future incidents from occurring. Through these briefly identified means, and many other forms of employee engagement, Kennedy Space Center aims to maintain safety in the forefront, while creating an environment where everyone trusts that safety is a priority.

Larrin E. Moody↗
DOE OSTI2019

I Asked 30,000 People in the Nuclear Industry About Safety Culture; This is What I Learned - 19204

Organizations in the nuclear industry place a high value on maintaining the safety of the workforce and community. Some of these organizations do a better job than others when it comes to developing and sustaining a healthy safety culture. We spent six years studying nuclear organizations to better understand the factors that influence safety culture. We used mixed methods to evaluate perceptions of safety culture in these organizations including administering a valid and reliable safety culture survey, conducting one-on-one interviews with managers, and facilitating focus groups with members of the workforce. We analyzed the quantitative and qualitative data collected from more than 30,000 workers in U.S. based organizations. All of the organizations had a nuclear component to their operations. They operated nuclear reactors, processed nuclear materials, decontaminated and decommissioned buildings with radiological contamination, cleaned-up hazardous/mixed waste, and conducted basic science research and development. We talked to craft workers, technicians, engineers, scientific professionals, support personnel, production workers, supervisors and managers. We conducted extensive statistical analysis and learned that, with rare exception, there is a gap between the perceptions of managers and the workforce that they manage. Managers almost always have a more positive perception of safety culture than the people that are actually performing the work. It is not a question of whether there will be a gap; it is simply a matter of the magnitude of the gap. We also learned through exploratory factor analysis that there is one dominant factor that accounted for almost all (75%) of the variance in the perceptions of safety culture. It was the behavior of the leaders, the decisions they made, and the systems they implemented that most influenced the workforce's perception of safety culture. Personal accountability for safety accounted for 14% of the variance, communication and reporting accounted for another 6%. Everything else accounted for the remaining 5%. Management systems, decision making and behavior is the dominant factor and managers almost always have a more positive perception than the people that work for them. People that work in organizations where management exhibits positive decision-making and safety-related behaviors tend to have more positive perceptions of safety culture. Based upon these results, we developed a theory that there were a few important factors on which management could focus on if they sought to influence the safety culture in their organization. Our experience and research suggests that management often fails to recognize five root causes of employee discontent. Employees seek: - To be recognized as an individual; - To be respected; - A sense of stability; - Fairness; - To make a difference. Understanding the perceptions of the workforce is critical because perceptions influence attitudes, which contribute to behaviors that determine individual performance. An organisation's performance is simply the sum of the performance of all of the members of that organization. To change an organisation's safety culture, interventions should target management behavior and decision making for the greatest return on investment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 117: Panel: Operational Excellence Through a Strong Safety Culture (R9.1)

This panel focused on the what the Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors are doing to promote safety and excellence. The Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) is crucial, but additional support provided by the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG), DOE, and environmental, safety, and health (ES and H) professionals in the field are equally imperative. The panelists discussed the importance of sharing lessons learned as well as are developing performance metrics to track operational and safety successes. This panel focused on current trends in building a strong operational safety culture and will include results from recent national workshops. Safety culture is the foundation of strong operational performance. Panel discussion included best practices from industry, DOE, and US NRC and also review tools being used to measure and evaluate safety culture programs. Panelists with presentations: Strong Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence (Kliss McNeel, Patricia Hughes); Safety Culture (Patricia Allen); DOE Safety Culture Improvement (Julie Goeckner); Supporting Safety Culture on the Front Line (Jan Preston); Interdependence of Safety Culture and Organizational Performance (Rizwan Shah)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA's Journey to Safety Culture

One of the organizational causes of the Shuttle Columbia mishap found by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report was a "Broken Safety Culture". Since its release, NASA has strived to improve its Safety Culture In 2009, the Chief of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance asked a member of the Air Force Safety Center and of the CAIB for assistance to develop a NASA Safety Culture Program. This presentation describes the journey that NASA personnel has taken developing a NASA Safety Culture Program to "repair" its Safety Culture.

Dillinger, Tracy↗
DOE OSTI2012

Critical Drivers for Safety Culture: Examining Department of Energy and U.S. Army Operational Experiences - 12382

Evaluating operational incidents can provide a window into the drivers most critical to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture, thereby minimizing the potential project risk associated with safety incidents. By examining U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) versus U.S. Army drivers in terms of regulatory and contract requirements, programs implemented to address the requirements, and example case studies of operational events, a view of the elements most critical to making a positive influence on safety culture is presented. Four case studies are used in this evaluation; two from DOE and two from U.S. Army experiences. Although the standards guiding operations at these facilities are different, there are many similarities in the level of hazards, as well as the causes and the potential consequences of the events presented. Two of the incidents examined, one from a DOE operation and the other from a U.S. Army facility, resulted in workers receiving chemical burns. The remaining two incidents are similar in that significant conduct of operations failures occurred resulting in high-level radioactive waste (in the case of the DOE facility) or chemical agent (in the case of the Army facility) being transferred outside of engineering controls. A review of the investigation reports for all four events indicates the primary causes to be failures in work planning leading to ineffective hazard evaluation and control, lack of procedure adherence, and most importantly, lack of management oversight to effectively reinforce expectations for safe work planning and execution. DOE and Army safety programs are similar, and although there are some differences in contractual requirements, the expectations for safe performance are essentially the same. This analysis concludes that instilling a positive safety culture comes down to management leadership and engagement to (1) cultivate an environment that values a questioning attitude and (2) continually reinforce expectations for the appropriate level of rigor in work planning and procedure adherence. A review of the root causes and key contributing causes to the events indicate: - Three of the four root cause analyses cite lack of management engagement (oversight, involvement, ability to recognize issues, etc.) as a root cause to the events. - Two of the four root cause analyses cite work planning failures as a root cause to the events and all cause analyses reflect work planning failures as contributing factors to the events. - All events with the exception of the Tuba City plant shutdown indicate procedure noncompliance as a key contributor; in the case of Tuba City the procedure issues were primarily related to a lack of procedures, or a lack of sufficiently detailed procedures. - All events included discussion or suggestion of a lack of a questioning attitude, either on the part of management/supervision, work planners, or workers. This analysis suggests that the most critical drivers to safety culture are: - Management engagement, - Effective work planning and procedures, and - Procedure adherence with a questioning attitude to ensure procedural problems are identified and fixed. In high-hazard operational environments the importance of robust work planning processes and procedure adherence cannot be overstated. However, having the processes by themselves is not enough. Management must actively engage in expectation setting and ensure work planning that meets expectations for hazard analysis and control, develop a culture that encourages incident reporting and a questioning attitude, and routinely observe work performance to reinforce expectations for adherence to procedures/work control documents. In conclusion, the most critical driver to achieving a workforce culture that supports safe and effective project performance can be summarized as follows: 'Management engagement to continually reinforce expectations for work planning processes and procedure adherence in an environment that cultivates a questioning attitude'. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Importance of a Safety Culture

Objectives: By the end of this offering, participants will be able to: Identify what does and does not define culture; Specify the main drivers of why we need a Nuclear Safety Culture; Detail the primary contributors to LANL's Nuclear Safety Culture history; Explain how LANL's values, behaviors, and actions demonstrate our commitment to a Nuclear Safety Culture; Indicate at least one new piece of knowledge as a result of this course.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
NASA NTRS1996

Enhancing the Flight Safety Culture Through Training

In the 1970's, flight safety professionals became profoundly concerned about the prevalence of crew-caused accidents and incidents, and the role of human error in flight operations. As result, they initiated a change in the flight safety culture which has grown to significant proportions today. At the heart of the evolution were crew concepts such as flightdeck management, crew coordination, and cockpit resource management, concepts which seemed to target critical deficiencies. In themselves, the concepts were not new but their incorporation into training as a direct means of changing the flight safety culture was an untried, almost 'grassroots' approach. The targeted crew concepts and skills were not an integral part of the typical training program; the methods, curriculum, media, and even course content itself, would have to be developed and implemented from the bottom up. A familiar truism in the pilot culture is that you should 'Train the way you fly; Fly the way you train'. In short, training was expected to provide the pilot with practical operational skills that were consistent with the performance standards they were required to maintain and the operational demands they met on a daily basis. In short, one could not simply command crews to use good CRM; one would have to research and define these skills operationally as well as develop and implement a consistent and effective training program. Furthermore, one would need active support and collaboration among the research, industry and government communities in order to ensure acceptance and continued commitment. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating safety culture and risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Mishap↗
NASA NTRS1991

Rebuilding a safety culture

The development of a culture of safety and NASA since the Challenger accident is reviewed. The technical elements of the strengthened NASA safety program are described, including problem reporting, risk/assessment/risk management, operational safety, and safety assurance are addressed. Future directions in the development of safety are considered.

Rodney, George A.↗
DOE OSTI2016

Improving the Safety Culture by Strengthening Leadership Skills - 16563

As a primary contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is managing a team of approximately 1,400 employees at the Hanford Site in Southeast Washington. The work on this 10-year, $5.7 billion contract ranges from design and construction to decommissioning and cleanup. In 2013, CH2M began the second half of its contract and expanded its leadership development program to focus on succession planning and strengthening the leadership skills of its employees. The goal is to create and sustain qualified leaders to lead the Hanford cleanup mission today and into the future. CH2M launched the Leadership Impact Initiative, a training program modeled from best practices used at other CH2M projects, including the Idaho Cleanup Project. Based on the results of a CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company site-wide safety culture survey, the company developed an improvement strategy focused on leadership development with emphasis on the front-line leadership. The strategy stresses core leadership principles and skill development to help managers more effectively engage the workforce. The two-day workshop gives employees the opportunity to build leadership on the job in an audience of their peers. CH2M expanded the workshops to include employees from all levels of the organization, including bargaining unit employees. The workshops are reinforced at quarterly all-manager meetings, communications among team members and regular sharing of lessons learned and experiences in the field. The Leadership Impact Initiative advances CH2M's vision of quality leadership and project delivery anchored by health and safety performance excellence. Since 2013, CH2M hosted more than 25 Leadership Impact Initiative workshops, reaching approximately 500 participants. Meanwhile, the company achieved the best safety record since the start of its contract, and results from its 2015 safety culture survey show improvements in the safety climate. A DOE assessment of the CH2M worker health and safety culture for the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) found the workshop was a contributing factor to the contractor achieving VPP Star and VPP Star of Excellence Status. This paper summarizes the strategy behind the leadership development program, the outcomes and its relevance for other companies, particularly those on DOE Environmental Management decommissioning projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Extending Safety Culture Development through Communication - 12366

The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority has been implementing a regulatory support program in the Russian Federation for over 10 years, as part of the Norwegian government's Plan of Action for enhancing nuclear and radiation safety in northwest Russia. The overall long-term objective is the enhancement of safety culture. The project outputs have included appropriate regulatory threat assessments, to determine the hazardous activities which are most in need of enhanced regulatory supervision; and development of the norms, standards and regulatory procedures, necessary to address the often abnormal conditions at nuclear legacy sites. Project outputs have been prepared and subsequently confirmed as official regulatory documents of the Russian Federation. The continuing program of work focuses on practical application of the enhanced regulatory framework as applied to legacy sites, including safe management of radioactive wastes arising in the process of site remediation. One of the lessons learnt from this practical application is the importance of effective communication at all levels: - between managers and shop workers; - between different operators - e.g. waste producers and waste disposal organisations; - between operators and regulators; - between nuclear safety regulators, radiation protection regulators and other pollution and safety regulators; - between scientists, policy makers and wider stakeholders; and - between all of those mentioned above. A key message from this work is that it is not just an issue of risk communication; rather all aspects of communication can contribute to safety culture enhancement to support effective and efficient risk management, including the role of regulatory supervision. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Loyd, David↗
DOE OSTI2014

Safety Culture And Best Practices At Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2014

Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗