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At least 19 records

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NASA NTRS2010

2009 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

This year, NASA Range Safety transitioned to a condensed annual report to allow for Secretariat support to the Range Safety Group, Risk Committee. Although much shorter than in previous years, this report contains full-length articles concerning various subject areas, as well as links to past reports. Additionally, summaries from various NASA Range Safety Program activities that took place throughout the year are presented, as well as information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be done in the future. The sections include a program overview and 2009 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range Safety Policy; Independent Assessments Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1992

Independent verification and validation for Space Shuttle flight software

The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Software was asked by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Office of Space Flight to determine the need to continue independent verification and validation (IV&V) for Space Shuttle flight software. The Committee found that the current IV&V process is necessary to maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated vehicles. Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for the IV&V effort in fiscal year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software development process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as currently practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both now and in the future. Furthermore, the Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the manpower to replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, nor will building this expertise elsewhere necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee does not recommend moving IV&V functions to other organizations within NASA unless the current IV&V is maintained for as long as it takes to build comparable expertise in the replacing organization.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2014

Airspace Safety Threshold Study: Status Update to SC-228 DAA Safety Sub-Group

Risk ratio↗

NASA NTRS1991

SSTAC/ARTS review of the draft Integrated Technology Plan (ITP). Volume 5: Human Support

Viewgraphs of briefings from the Space Systems and Technology Advisory Committee (SSTAC)/ARTS review of the draft integrated technology plan (ITP) on human support are included. Topics covered include: human support program; human factors; life support technology; fire safety; medical support technology; advanced refrigeration technology; EVA suit system; advanced PLSS technology; and ARC-EVA systems research program.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2015

Airspace Safety Threshold Study: NAS-Wide Encounter Rate Evaluation Using Historical Radar Data and ACES

encounter geometry↗

NASA NTRS2016

Flight Test 4 Preliminary Results: NASA Ames SSI

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) Project conducted flight test program, referred to as Flight Test 4, at Armstrong Flight Research Center from April -June 2016. Part of the test flights were dedicated to the NASA Ames-developed Detect and Avoid (DAA) System referred to as JADEM (Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling). The encounter scenarios, which involved NASA's Ikhana UAS and a manned intruder aircraft, were designed to collect data on DAA system performance in real-world conditions and uncertainties with four different surveillance sensor systems. Flight test 4 has four objectives: (1) validate DAA requirements in stressing cases that drive MOPS requirements, including: high-speed cooperative intruder, low-speed non-cooperative intruder, high vertical closure rate encounter, and Mode CS-only intruder (i.e. without ADS-B), (2) validate TCASDAA alerting and guidance interoperability concept in the presence of realistic sensor, tracking and navigational errors and in multiple-intruder encounters against both cooperative and non-cooperative intruders, (3) validate Well Clear Recovery guidance in the presence of realistic sensor, tracking and navigational errors, and (4) validate DAA alerting and guidance requirements in the presence of realistic sensor, tracking and navigational errors. The results will be presented at RTCA Special Committee 228 in support of final verification and validation of the DAA MOPS.

Detect-And-Avoid (DAA)↗

NASA NTRS1975

Safety management of a complex R and D ground operating system

A perspective on safety program management was developed for a complex R&D operating system, such as the NASA-Lewis Research Center. Using a systems approach, hazardous operations are subjected to third-party reviews by designated-area safety committees and are maintained under safety permit controls. To insure personnel alertness, emergency containment forces and employees are trained in dry-run emergency simulation exercises. The keys to real safety effectiveness are top management support and visibility of residual risks.

Connors, J. F.↗

NASA NTRS1975

Safety management of a complex R&D ground operating system

A perspective on safety program management has been developed for a complex R&D operating system, such as the NASA-Lewis Research Center. Using a systems approach, hazardous operations are subjected to third-party reviews by designated area safety committees and are maintained under safety permit controls. To insure personnel alertness, emergency containment forces and employees are trained in dry-run emergency simulation exercises. The keys to real safety effectiveness are top management support and visibility of residual risks.

Connors, J. F.↗

NASA NTRS2014

ACES Study of DAA-Mitigated UAS Operations SC-228 Requirements Sub Group

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. A recent study conducted using NASA's ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability begins to address questions surrounding the development of draft MOPS for DAA systems by assessing DAA performance in a NAS-wide context. ACES analyses were conducted to determine the impact of varying elements of UAS pilot performance and uncertainty mitigations on DAA system performance. Simulations were conducted with recorded cooperative and non-cooperative VFR (Visual Flight Rules) traffic to accurately model UAS encounters with other NAS traffic (ATC (Air Traffic Control) being responsible for separation with other IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) aircraft) and with roughly 25, 000 simulated UAS operations The number of Loss of Well Clear (LoWC) events were recorded across the range of independent variables: pilot response time, horizontal LoWC prediction buffer and horizontal LoWC resolution buffer. The number of LoWC events was compared to the unmitigated case (without the benefit of a DAA system) to determine the resultant risk-ratio for each of 8 simulation conditions. The parameter trades presented by the resultant DAA system performance (risk ratio) will be used by SC 228 to inform decisions about future requirements development and validation efforts.

Detect-and-Avoid↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Planetary Protection Program Overview and Update

NASA has an integrated planetary protection strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guide-lines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. The Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance, which in-cludes NASA’s Oÿce of Planetary Protection, depends on these activities to support NASA’s missions in the assurance of crew safety and mission success while protecting the public and planetary environment from harmful contamination. This report will detail the overall planetary protection policy development perspective to sup-port NASA’s upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include crewed Mars and sam-ple return missions. NASA continues to evolve its strategies, policies, and standards. NASA’s support in the COSPAR workshop series on Refining Planetary Protection Requirements for Crewed Missions to Mars have resulted in a NASA interim directive and paved the way for the development of NASA planetary protection roadmaps. These Agency level roadmaps address technology development and testing required to fill knowledge gaps for developing responsive policy guidelines and quantitative technical standards. In addition to workshops and tech-nology management strategies, NASA is also leveraging the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection to serve as a source of advice on planetary protection measures. Finally, the report will include how the Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance is incorporating planetary protection into existing and new multi-agency partnerships.

Frank Groen↗

NASA NTRS2012

Simulation Modeling Requirements for Loss-of-Control Accident Prevention of Turboprop Transport Aircraft

In-flight loss of control remains the leading contributor to aviation accident fatalities, with stall upsets being the leading causal factor. The February 12, 2009. Colgan Air, Inc., Continental Express flight 3407 accident outside Buffalo, New York, brought this issue to the forefront of public consciousness and resulted in recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board to conduct training that incorporates stalls that are fully developed and develop simulator standards to support such training. In 2010, Congress responded to this accident with Public Law 11-216 (Section 208), which mandates full stall training for Part 121 flight operations. Efforts are currently in progress to develop recommendations on implementation of stall training for airline pilots. The International Committee on Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) is currently defining simulator fidelity standards that will be necessary for effective stall training. These recommendations will apply to all civil transport aircraft including straight-wing turboprop aircraft. Government-funded research over the previous decade provides a strong foundation for stall/post-stall simulation for swept-wing, conventional tail jets to respond to this mandate, but turboprops present additional and unique modeling challenges. First among these challenges is the effect of power, which can provide enhanced flow attachment behind the propellers. Furthermore, turboprops tend to operate for longer periods in an environment more susceptible to ice. As a result, there have been a significant number of turboprop accidents as a result of the early (lower angle of attack) stalls in icing. The vulnerability of turboprop configurations to icing has led to studies on ice accumulation and the resulting effects on flight behavior. Piloted simulations of these effects have highlighted the important training needs for recognition and mitigation of icing effects, including the reduction of stall margins. This paper addresses simulation modeling requirements that are unique to turboprop transport aircraft and highlights the growing need for aerodynamic models suitable for stall training for these configurations. A review of prominent accidents that involved aerodynamic stall is used to illustrate various modeling features unique to turboprop configurations and the impact of stall behavior on susceptibility to loss of control that has led to new training requirements. This is followed by an overview of stability and control behavior of straight-wing turboprops, the related aerodynamic characteristics, and a summary of recent experimental studies on icing effects. In addition, differences in flight dynamics behavior between swept-wing jets and straight-wing turboprop configurations are discussed to compare and contrast modeling requirements. Specific recommendations for aerodynamic models along with further research needs and data measurements are also provided. 1

Crider, Dennis↗

NASA NTRS2006

Conducting Closed Habitation Experiments: Experience from the Lunar Mars Life Support Test Project

The Lunar-Mars Life Support Test Project (LMLSTP) was conducted from 1995 through 1997 at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) to demonstrate increasingly longer duration operation of integrated, closed-loop life support systems that employed biological and physicochemical techniques for water recycling, waste processing, air revitalization, thermal control, and food production. An analog environment for long-duration human space travel, the conditions of isolation and confinement also enabled studies of human factors, medical sciences (both physiology and psychology) and crew training. Four tests were conducted, Phases I, II, IIa and III, with durations of 15, 30, 60 and 91 days, respectively. The first phase focused on biological air regeneration, using wheat to generate enough oxygen for one experimental subject. The systems demonstrated in the later phases were increasingly complex and interdependent, and provided life support for four crew members. The tests were conducted using two human-rated, atmospherically-closed test chambers, the Variable Pressure Growth Chamber (VPGC) and the Integrated Life Support Systems Test Facility (ILSSTF). Systems included test articles (the life support hardware under evaluation), human accommodations (living quarters, kitchen, exercise equipment, etc.) and facility systems (emergency matrix system, power, cooling, etc.). The test team was managed by a lead engineer and a test director, and included test article engineers responsible for specific systems, subsystems or test articles, test conductors, facility engineers, chamber operators and engineering technicians, medical and safety officers, and science experimenters. A crew selection committee, comprised of psychologists, engineers and managers involved in the test, evaluated male and female volunteers who applied to be test subjects. Selection was based on the skills mix anticipated for each particular test, and utilized information from psychological and medical testing, data on the knowledge, experience and skills of the applicants, and team building exercises. The design, development, buildup and operation of test hardware and documentation followed the established NASA processes and requirements for test buildup and operation.

Barta, Daniel J.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Conducting Closed Habitation Experiments: Experience from the Lunar Mars Life Support Test Project

The Lunar-Mars Life Support Test Project (LMLSTP) was conducted from 1995 through 1997 at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) to demonstrate increasingly longer duration operation of integrated, closed-loop life support systems that employed biological and physicochemical techniques for water recycling, waste processing, air revitalization, thermal control, and food production. An analog environment for long-duration human space travel, the conditions of isolation and confinement also enabled studies of human factors, medical sciences (both physiology and psychology) and crew training. Four tests were conducted, Phases I, II, IIa and III, with durations of 15, 30,60 and 91 days, respectively. The first phase focused on biological air regeneration, using wheat to generate enough oxygen for one experimental subject. The systems demonstrated in the later phases were increasingly complex and interdependent, and provided life support for four crew members. The tests were conducted using two human-rated, atmospherically-closed test chambers, the Variable Pressure Growth Chamber (VPGC) and the Integrated Life Support Systems Test Facility (ILSSTF). Systems included test articles (the life support hardware under evaluation), human accommodations (living quarters, kitchen, exercise equipment, etc.) and facility systems (emergency matrix system, power, cooling, etc.). The test team was managed by a lead engineer and a test director, and included test article engineers responsible for specific systems, subsystems or test articles, test conductors, facility engineers, chamber operators and engineering technicians, medical and safety officers, and science experimenters. A crew selection committee, comprised of psychologists, engineers and managers involved in the test, evaluated male and female volunteers who applied to be test subjects. Selection was based on the skills mix anticipated for each particular test, and utilized information from psychological and medical testing, data on the knowledge, experience and skills of the applicants, and team building exercises. The design, development, buildup and operation of test hardware and documentation followed the established NASA processes and requirements for test buildup and operation.

Barta, Daniel J.↗

NASA NTRS1939

A Glimpse of Scientific Research on Fundamental Problems of Military and Civil Aeronautics

Among the outstanding accomplishments of the last century is man's conquest of the air. That conquest began in 1903 when the Wright brothers made the first successful flight of an airplane at Kitty Hawk, N. C. Five years later the United States Government purchased its first airplane for the use of the Army, and began the training of officers for military flying. During the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the World War the Government and a meager aircraft industry had made important progress, but the Government, practically the only customer, had purchased less than 100 airplanes. In the meantime, leading European nations, sensing acutely the potentialities of aircraft in warfare, had made greater progress and had begun laying the foundations for the new science of aeronautics. The World War gave a remarkable impetus to the development of aeronautics and emphasized the need for organized research on the fundamental problems of flight. By act of Congress approved March 3, 1915, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics was created and charged with the duty of supervising, directing, and conducting fundamental scientific research and experiment in aeronautics. With the farsighted support of the Congress the Committee has led the world in the development of unique aeronautical research facilities in its laboratories at Langley Field, Va. The research programs include problems initiated by the Committee and its subcommittees and also investigations requested by the Army, the Navy, and the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The results of researches conducted under one control, serve without duplication of effort, the needs of all branches of aviation, civil and military, and exert a profound influence on the progress of aeronautics by improving the performance, efficiency, and safety of aircraft. A brief description of the results of some of the committee's researches and of the equipment employed will be found in the following pages.

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NASA NTRS1997

An Exposure Prevention Plan for an Anhydrous Ammonia Handling System

In July of 1996, the Industrial Hygiene Team of the Environmental Management Office at NASA Lewis Research Center was contacted by the Space Station Program Office to conduct ammonia awareness training for a team of engineers and technicians. The team was tasked with assembling and operating an ammonia handling system for testing of a photovoltaic radiator at the NASA Plum Brook Station Space Power Facility. The ammonia handling system supports a radiator designed to radiate excess heat from a photovoltaic array module used to provide power to the International Space Station. The system would consist of a hazardous materials trailer equipped with an anhydrous ammonia tank, heater, accumulator, chiller, and flow bench. Meetings were held with representatives from the Space Station Program Office, the engineers and Plum Brook safety personnel. Guidance was also provided by representatives from Kennedy Space Center. Determinations were made concerning the locations and types of potential exposures and a plan was developed which included training, personal protective equipment, engineering controls and emergency response. Various organizations including the Plum Brook Safety Committee, the Lewis Environmental Management Office, the Test Readiness Review Board and the Program Office all had requirements that had to be met in order to satisfy themselves that all personnel involved in the operation of the system would be safe. What resulted was a comprehensive plan that provided more than adequate safety measures and succeeded in protecting all personnel from the hazards of the ammonia system. Testing of the photovoltaic radiator was successful and although ammonia leaks were detected and maintenance of the system was ongoing, no one was injured. It was felt that the training and controls in place allowed for a comfort level that did not interfere with the operations.

Cathy L Padolewski↗

NASA NTRS1998

Research Lasers and Air Traffic Safety: Issues, Concerns and Responsibilities of the Research Community

The subject of outdoor use of lasers relative to air traffic has become a diverse and dynamic topic. During the past several decades, the use of lasers in outdoor research activities have increased significantly. Increases in the outdoor use of lasers and increases in air traffic densities have changed the levels of risk involved. To date there have been no documented incidents of air traffic interference from research lasers; however, incidents involving display lasers have shown a marked increase. As a result of the national response to these incidents, new concerns over lasers have arisen. Through the efforts of the SAE G-10T Laser Safety Hazards Subcommittee and the ANSI Z136.6 development committee, potential detrimental effects to air traffic beyond the traditional eye damage concerns have been identified. An increased emphasis from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Center for Devices and Radiological Hazards (CDRH), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) along with increased concern by the public have resulted in focused scrutiny of potential hazards presented by lasers. The research community needs to rethink the traditional methods of risk evaluation and application of protective measures. The best current approach to assure adequate protection of air traffic is the application of viable hazard and risk analysis and the use of validated protective measures. Standards making efforts and regulatory development must be supported by the research community to assure that reasonable measures are developed. Without input, standards and regulations can be developed that are not compatible with the needs of the research community. Finally, support is needed for the continued development and validation of protective measures.

Nessler, Phillip J., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Recommended techniques for effective maintainability. A continuous improvement initiative of the NASA Reliability and Maintainability Steering Committee

This manual presents a series of recommended techniques that can increase overall operational effectiveness of both flight and ground based NASA systems. It provides a set of tools that minimizes risk associated with: (1) restoring failed functions (both ground and flight based); (2) conducting complex and highly visible maintenance operations; and (3) sustaining a technical capability to support the NASA mission using aging equipment or facilities. It considers (1) program management - key elements of an effective maintainability effort; (2) design and development - techniques that have benefited previous programs; (3) analysis and test - quantitative and qualitative analysis processes and testing techniques; and (4) operations and operational design techniques that address NASA field experience. This document is a valuable resource for continuous improvement ideas in executing the systems development process in accordance with the NASA 'better, faster, smaller, and cheaper' goal without compromising safety.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2016

Evaluating Alerting and Guidance Performance of a UAS Detect-And-Avoid System

A key challenge to the routine, safe operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is the development of detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems to aid the UAS pilot in remaining "well clear" of nearby aircraft. The goal of this study is to investigate the effect of alerting criteria and pilot response delay on the safety and performance of UAS DAA systems in the context of routine civil UAS operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). A NAS-wide fast-time simulation study was conducted to assess UAS DAA system performance with a large number of encounters and a broad set of DAA alerting and guidance system parameters. Three attributes of the DAA system were controlled as independent variables in the study to conduct trade-off analyses: UAS trajectory prediction method (dead-reckoning vs. intent-based), alerting time threshold (related to predicted time to LoWC), and alerting distance threshold (related to predicted Horizontal Miss Distance, or HMD). A set of metrics, such as the percentage of true positive, false positive, and missed alerts, based on signal detection theory and analysis methods utilizing the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves were proposed to evaluate the safety and performance of DAA alerting and guidance systems and aid development of DAA system performance standards. The effect of pilot response delay on the performance of DAA systems was evaluated using a DAA alerting and guidance model and a pilot model developed to support this study. A total of 18 fast-time simulations were conducted with nine different DAA alerting threshold settings and two different trajectory prediction methods, using recorded radar traffic from current Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations, and supplemented with DAA-equipped UAS traffic based on mission profiles modeling future UAS operations. Results indicate DAA alerting distance threshold has a greater effect on DAA system performance than DAA alerting time threshold or ownship trajectory prediction method. Further analysis on the alert lead time (time in advance of predicted loss of well clear at which a DAA alert is first issued) indicated a strong positive correlation between alert lead time and DAA system performance (i.e. the ability of the UAS pilot to maneuver the unmanned aircraft to remain well clear). While bigger distance thresholds had beneficial effects on alert lead time and missed alert rate, it also generated a higher rate of false alerts. In the design and development of DAA alerting and guidance systems, therefore, the positive and negative effects of false alerts and missed alerts should be carefully considered to achieve acceptable alerting system performance by balancing false and missed alerts. The results and methodology presented in this study are expected to help stakeholders, policymakers and standards committees define the appropriate setting of DAA system parameter thresholds for UAS that ensure safety while minimizing operational impacts to the NAS and equipage requirements for its users before DAA operational performance standards can be finalized.

UAS Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) System↗