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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Deep Borehole Disposal Safety Case

The safety case for deep borehole disposal of nuclear wastes contains a safety strategy, an assessment basis, and a safety assessment. The safety strategy includes strategies for management, siting and design, and assessment. The assessment basis considers site selection, pre-closure, and post-closure, which includes waste and engineered barriers, the geosphere/natural barriers, and the biosphere and surface environment. The safety assessment entails a pre-closure safety analysis, a post-closure performance assessment, and confidence enhancement analyses. This work outlines the assessment basis and safety assessment aspects of a deep borehole disposal safety case. The safety case presented here is specific to deep borehole disposal of Cs and Sr capsules, but is generally applicable to other waste forms, such as spent nuclear fuel. The safety assessments for pre-closure and post-closure are briefly summarized from other sources; key issues for confidence enhancement are described in greater detail. These confidence enhancement analyses require building the technical basis for geologically old, reducing, highly saline brines at the depth of waste emplacement, and using reactive-transport codes to predict their movement in post-closure. The development and emplacement of borehole seals above the waste emplacement zone is also important to confidence enhancement.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Continuous Improvement and the Safety Case for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Geologic Repository - 13467

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geologic repository 2150 feet (650 m) below the surface of the Chihuahuan desert near Carlsbad, New Mexico. WIPP permanently disposes of transuranic waste from national defense programs. Every five years, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) submits an application to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to request regulatory-compliance re-certification of the facility for another five years. Every ten years, DOE submits an application to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) for the renewal of its hazardous waste disposal permit. The content of the applications made by DOE to the EPA for re-certification, and to the NMED for permit-renewal, reflect any optimization changes made to the facility, with regulatory concurrence if warranted by the nature of the change. DOE points to such changes as evidence for its having taken seriously its 'continuous improvement' operations and management philosophy. Another opportunity for continuous improvement is to look at any delta that may exist between the re-certification and re-permitting cases for system safety and the consensus advice on the nature and content of a safety case as being developed and published by the Nuclear Energy Agency's Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) expert group. DOE at WIPP, with the aid of its Science Advisor and teammate, Sandia National Laboratories, is in the process of discerning what can be done, in a reasonably paced and cost-conscious manner, to continually improve the case for repository safety that is being made to the two primary regulators on a recurring basis. This paper will discuss some aspects of that delta and potential paths forward to addressing them. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2014

Safety Case for Service Contracts

Safety cases developed for the Facilities Management and Operations Center (FMOC) are based on the requirements in MN471021, Work Planning and Control Criteria for Safe Design and Operations. The FMOC performs maintenance activities in various locations at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM). SNL/NM consists of more than 6,000,000 square feet of buildings, structures, and site infrastructure on approximately 13,000 acres of land. The FMOC performs approximately 7500 service contract work orders a year to assist with operations and maintenance at the SNL/NM site and facilities. As part of the continual improvement process, this Safety Case will be reviewed and updated, as needed, or at a minimum every three years. People tend to underestimate the probability of an accident if none have occurred previously or if the person performing the work is skilled, and they tend to trust each other’s competence. Human error within systems must be identified and considered. The FMOC uses failure mode analysis (FMA) to determine how a system might fail and cause accidents, as well as the amount and types of controls needed. The FMOC includes interconnected elements, such as people, environment, procedures, facilities, equipment, and the hazards identified in the work analysis. A daily pre-task plan is required prior to any work activity. Changes in work practices will be communicated clearly to all service contractors and personnel by way of contractor pre-task planning, activity-specific plans, contract amendments, and/or training. The FMOC has created a safe-by-design intent approach for service contract execution starting at the planning stage and extending through the execution phase. The Safety Program (see Figure 2) summarizes how the FMOC connects work analysis elements with service contracts.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Deep Borehole Disposal Safety Case

This report describes the current status of the safety case for the deep borehole disposal (DBD) concept. It builds on the safety case presented in Freeze et al. (2016), presenting new information and identifying additional information needs for specific safety case elements. At this preliminary phase of development, the DBD safety case focuses on the generic feasibility of the DBD concept. It is based on potential system designs, waste forms, engineering, and geologic conditions; however, no specific site or regulatory framework exists. Updated information is provided for the following safety case elements: (1) pre-closure basis and safety analysis, (2) post-closure basis and performance assessment, and (3) confidence enhancement. This research was performed as part of the deep borehole field test (DBFT). Based on revised U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) priorities in mid-2017, the DBFT and other research related to a DBD option was discontinued; ongoing work and documentation were closed out by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2017. This report was initiated as part of the DBFT and documented as an incomplete draft at the end of FY 2017. The report was finalized by Sandia National Laboratories in FY2018 without DOE funding, subsequent to the termination of the DBFT, and published in FY2019.

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DOE OSTI2013

A Safety Case Approach for Deep Geologic Disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in Bedded Salt - 13350

The primary objective of this study is to investigate the feasibility and utility of developing a defensible safety case for disposal of United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) high-level waste (HLW) and DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a conceptual deep geologic repository that is assumed to be located in a bedded salt formation of the Delaware Basin [1]. A safety case is a formal compilation of evidence, analyses, and arguments that substantiate and demonstrate the safety of a proposed or conceptual repository. We conclude that a strong initial safety case for potential licensing can be readily compiled by capitalizing on the extensive technical basis that exists from prior work on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), other U.S. repository development programs, and the work published through international efforts in salt repository programs such as in Germany. The potential benefits of developing a safety case include leveraging previous investments in WIPP to reduce future new repository costs, enhancing the ability to effectively plan for a repository and its licensing, and possibly expediting a schedule for a repository. A safety case will provide the necessary structure for organizing and synthesizing existing salt repository science and identifying any issues and gaps pertaining to safe disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in bedded salt. The safety case synthesis will help DOE to plan its future R and D activities for investigating salt disposal using a risk-informed approach that prioritizes test activities that include laboratory, field, and underground investigations. It should be emphasized that the DOE has not made any decisions regarding the disposition of DOE HLW and DOE SNF. Furthermore, the safety case discussed herein is not intended to either site a repository in the Delaware Basin or preclude siting in other media at other locations. Rather, this study simply presents an approach for accelerated development of a safety case for a potential DOE HLW and DOE SNF repository using the currently available technical basis for bedded salt. This approach includes a summary of the regulatory environment relevant to disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in a deep geologic repository, the key elements of a safety case, the evolution of the safety case through the successive phases of repository development and licensing, and the existing technical basis that could be used to substantiate the safety of a geologic repository if it were to be sited in the Delaware Basin. We also discuss the potential role of an underground research laboratory (URL). (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Actinide Containment Safety Case in a TRU/HLW Repository in Salt - 16369

The safety case for the permanent isolation of actinides in a salt nuclear repository is discussed. The need for actinide and brine chemistry research is driven by the regulatory process that requires an accounting of low-probability 'worst case' scenarios to show that the release criteria are met under these unexpected conditions. An overview of the WIPP approach to establish the actinide source term, which is defined by the oxidation state distribution, solubility and tendency to form colloidal species, is presented for the key actinides. This approach is then discussed in the context of extending the salt repository concept to defense high level waste (HLW) and possibly spent fuel (SF) to identify key needs and gaps. It is an overall conclusion of this review that the WIPP serves as a good template for the HLW/SF case and the safety case can be readily extended to this repository concept with proper repository design and supporting experimental results. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Evaluation of Current Knowledge for Building the Dutch Salt Safety Case - 16024

This paper provides an overview of an evaluation for building the Safety Case of geological disposal of radioactive waste in rock salt in the Netherlands. The evaluation comprises the present knowledge about the safety and feasibility of geological disposal designs considered in the past, thereby classifying the information taking into account the methodology and structure of a Safety Case. The evaluation is performed as part of the Dutch research programme OPERA (OnderzoeksProgramma Eindberging Radioactief Afval - Dutch acronym for Research Programme into Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste) by a consortium consisting of GRS from Germany, and TNO and NRG from the Netherlands. Basis of the evaluation is the available Dutch and international scientific-technical information about geological disposal in rock salt, especially from the German and US programmes. The evaluations have shown that although much knowledge on the topic exists, the available information need to be integrated in order to develop a Dutch Safety Case on rock salt. For example, the characteristics of the Dutch radioactive waste investigated for disposal have changed considerably since the last Dutch research programme ended in 2000. This implies that the previously considered Dutch facility concepts for geological disposal in rock salt need to be adapted to the newly regarded waste types such as spent fuel from research reactors and large amounts of LLW, including depleted uranium. Introducing these aspects into the iteration towards a salt Safety Case would also require an update of the post-closure safety assessment. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Safety Case Considerations for Deep Borehole Disposal of Cs/Sr Capsules - 16294

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) performed an assessment of disposal options that recommended the consideration of deep borehole disposal of smaller DOE-managed waste forms, such as cesium (Cs) and strontium (Sr) capsules. To assess the feasibility of the deep borehole disposal concept for Cs/Sr capsules, safety case considerations are identified and examined. A safety case includes quantitative (e.g., safety assessments) and qualitative information related to both pre-closure (operational) and post-closure safety. For deep borehole disposal of Cs/Sr capsules, pre-closure safety considers potential hazards associated with waste package surface handling and downhole emplacement activities; post-closure safety considers scenarios for long-term radionuclide transport to the biosphere. A preliminary list of qualitative indicators of pre-closure and post-closure safety is presented. Research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) activities that can provide a quantitative basis for these indicators are discussed. In particular, DOE-NE has initiated a Deep Borehole Field Test, using surrogate test packages without radioactive waste, to further investigate various aspects of site characterization, deep drilling, and waste package handling and emplacement that would be needed for a full-scale disposal facility for Cs/Sr capsules or other DOE-managed waste forms. Finally, preliminary results from pre-closure hazard analyses and post-closure performance assessment (PA) calculations are presented as examples of supporting information for the quantitative safety case considerations. These preliminary results suggest that a favorable safety case can be developed for deep borehole disposal of Cs/Sr capsules. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

The Importance of Getting it Right - Lessons from the Failure and Subsequent Approval of the LLWR Environmental Safety Case - 16691

The Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) in the UK submitted an Environmental Safety Case in 2002 which was rejected by the Environment Agency 3 years later. Almost a decade after the rejection, the LLWR submitted a completely different document which was approved in November 2015. This paper looks at the lessons learned from the failed submission and documents the strategy employed by the Site's new contractor to overcome both the challenging technical issues that led to the initial rejection and overcome the resistance to long term disposal by the local community. It will describe the journey it has taken to move from a flawed safety case, to a technically sound safety case, to one that is approved by the regulator, and accepted by the community. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Towards a defensible safety case for deep geologic disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in bedded salt

The primary objective of this study is to investigate the feasibility and utility of developing a defensible safety case for disposal of United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) high-level waste (HLW) and DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a conceptual deep geologic repository that is assumed to be located in a bedded salt formation of the Delaware Basin. A safety case is a formal compilation of evidence, analyses, and arguments that substantiate and demonstrate the safety of a proposed or conceptual repository. A safety case also provides the necessary structure for organizing and synthesizing existing knowledge in order to help DOE prioritize its future research and development (R&D) activities. We conclude that a defensible initial safety case for potential licensing could be readily compiled by capitalizing on the extensive technical basis that exists from prior work on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), work on other repository development programs, and the work published through international efforts in salt repository programs such as in Germany.

Mackinnon, Robert James↗
DOE OSTI2012

The LLWR's 2011 Environmental Safety Case - 12143

The Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) is the United Kingdom's principal facility for the disposal of LLW. The LLWR recently submitted an Environmental Safety Case (ESC), which will support applications to regulatory and government authorities to dispose of LLW and to start to install final closure engineering. The ESC is a major submission, with important implications for the future of the LLWR and the United Kingdom's management of LLW. The paper describes the context of the ESC, the ESC, its results and conclusions, and its implementation. The description shows that our ESC is a modern safety case developed as a range of safety arguments concerning our management, scientific and technical understanding, optimisation of the facility, as well as assessment calculations. The LLWR's 2011 ESC is a major submission, with important implications for the future of the LLWR and the United Kingdom's management of LLW. The description given of the scope of the ESC shows that it is a modern safety case developed as a range of safety arguments concerning our management, scientific and technical understanding, optimisation of the facility, as well as assessment calculations. A number of key advances have been made since the previous submission. In particular, the 2011 ESC addresses the criticisms made by the regulator on the previous submission in 2002, including those relating to lack of demonstration of optimisation, high calculated doses and risks compared with guidance levels, treatment of coastal erosion, and treatment of uncertainty. The ESC is being reviewed by the environmental regulator and it is hoped that a new permit for disposal of LLW and installation of closure engineering, along with the appropriate planning permission, will be obtained during 2013. The ESC, including its proposed waste acceptance arrangements, is already being implemented by the LLWR where consistent with our current Permit. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Enhancements to a dissolver burn up credit safety case to reduce further GD use in the thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP), Sellafield - 14229

THORP reprocesses fuel from Britain's Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) and fuel from Light Water Reactors (LWRs). The THORP dissolvers use nitric acid poisoned with Gadolinium (Gd) to ensure criticality safety. The dissolver criticality safety case uses a burnup credit approach to determine a minimum required Gd concentration. The burn up credit approach followed originates from a time when fuel receipts for THORP were ongoing and hence models a deliberately conservative and artificial fuel type to cover all potential fuel receipts. External fuel receipts have now ceased and detailed information on post irradiation U and Pu isotopics is available for all fuel scheduled for reprocessing. Work has therefore been undertaken to determine whether the burn up credit safety case could be revised to be more representative of the fuel actually remaining for reprocessing and hence to reduce further the required Gd concentration for the dissolvers. This would ultimately reduce the quantity of high active liquid waste requiring treatment and storage. The great majority of fuel remaining for reprocessing in THORP is AGR fuel, for which the typical burnup is known to be much higher than was previously assumed in the safety case. Pu and U isotopics for irradiated AGR fuel were examined with the fuel inventory code FISPIN. Modelling with the code MONK then showed that the Gd requirement for irradiated AGR fuel of a given burnup was much lower than in the previous safety case due to the change in Pu:U ratio and Pu{sup 240} in Pu for AGR fuel compared with the previous conservative assumptions. The burnup of all remaining LWR fuel was found to be high and hence lower dissolver Gd concentrations could also be tolerated for reprocessing this fuel. The work has concluded that the THORP dissolver Gd concentration can be halved for all remaining LWR and AGR fuel campaigns with a consequent cost saving of ∼ UK pound 4 m in Gd and high active waste processing time. Implementation of this improvement is currently ongoing on the plant. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Update on the review of the LLWR 2011 environmental safety case

The UK Low Level Waste Repository has submitted a fully revised Environmental Safety Case (ESC) to the Environment Agency for the continued operation of the site. The Environment Agency is reviewing the submission. As part of the review of the ESC, we have been engaging with the Environment Agency to answer questions and provide further clarification where required. Once the review is complete, LLWR will apply for a revised permit for the continued operation of the site. We are required by our current Permit to operate the site in accordance with the assumptions of the ESC. We have developed a process for the implementation and maintenance of the ESC as a 'live' safety case under formal change control, and the development of waste acceptance arrangements identified as necessary to ensure that the repository is operated in a safe and optimised way, consistent with the assumptions and results of the ESC. Engagement with waste consignors has been essential in the development of revised waste acceptance criteria. Additional work has also been carried out in the development of an Article 37 submission, presenting the ESC to local stakeholders and developing of waste emplacement strategies. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2012

Implementing Stakeholders' Access to Expertise: Experimenting on Nuclear Installations' Safety Cases - 12160

In 2009 and 2010, the Institute for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (IRSN) led two pilot actions dealing with nuclear installations' safety cases. One concerned the periodical review of the French 900 MWe nuclear reactors, the other concerned the decommissioning of a workshop located on the site of Areva's La Hague fuel-reprocessing plant site in Northwestern France. The purpose of both these programs was to test ways for IRSN and a small number of stakeholders (Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) members, local elected officials, etc.) to engage in technical discussions. The discussions were intended to enable the stakeholders to review future applications and provide valuable input. The test cases confirmed there is a definite challenge in successfully opening a meaningful dialogue to discuss technical issues, in particular the fact that most expertise reports were not public and the conflict that exists between the contrary demands of transparency and confidentiality of information. The test case also confirmed there are ways to further improvement of stakeholders' involvement. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

ORNL Evaluation of Electrabel Safety Cases for Doel 3 / Tihange 2: Final Report

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) performed a detailed technical review of the 2015 Electrabel (EBL) Safety Cases prepared for the Belgium reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) at Doel 3 and Tihange 2 (D3/T2). The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) in Belgium commissioned ORNL to provide a thorough assessment of the existing safety margins against cracking of the RPVs due to the presence of almost laminar flaws found in each RPV. Initial efforts focused on surveying relevant literature that provided necessary background knowledge on the issues related to the quasilaminar flaws observed in D3/T2 reactors. Next, ORNL proceeded to develop an independent quantitative assessment of the entire flaw population in the two Belgian reactors according to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure, New York (1992 and 2004). That screening assessment of all EBL-characterized flaws in D3/T2 used ORNL tools, methodologies, and the ASME Code Case N-848, Alternative Characterization Rules for QuasiLaminar Flaws . Results and conclusions from the ORNL flaw acceptance assessments of D3/T2 were compared with those from the 2015 EBL Safety Cases. Specific findings of the ORNL evaluation of that part of the EBL structural integrity assessment focusing on stability of the flaw population subjected to primary design transients include the following: ORNL s analysis results were similar to those of EBL in that very few characterized flaws were found not compliant with the ASME (1992) acceptance criterion. ORNL s application of the more recent ASME Section XI (2004) produced only four noncompliant flaws, all due to LOCAs. The finding of a greater number of non-compliant flaws in the EBL screening assessment is due principally to a significantly more restrictive (conservative) criterion for flaw size acceptance used by EBL. ORNL s screening assessment results (obtained using an analysis methodology different from that of EBL) are interpreted herein as confirming the EBL screening results for D3/T2. ORNL s independent refined analysis demonstrated the EBL-characterized flaw 1660, which is non-compliant in the ORNL and EBL screening assessment, is rendered compliant when modeled as a more realistic individual quasi-laminar flaw using a 3-D XFEM analysis approach. ORNL s and EBL s refined analyses are in good agreement for the flaw 1660 close to the clad/base metal interface; ORNL is not persuaded that repeating this exercise for more than one non-compliant flaw is necessary to accept the EBL conclusions derived from the aggregate of EBL refined analysis results. ORNL General Conclusions Regarding the Structural Integrity Assessment (SIA) Conducted by EBL for D3/T2 Based on comparative evaluations of ORNL and EBL SIA analyses and on consideration of other results, ORNL is in agreement with the general conclusions reported by Electrabel in their RPV D3/T2 Technical Summary Note of April 14, 2015: More than 99 percent of flaws in D3/T2 meet the defined screening criterion, rendering them benign with respect to initiation in the event of a design transient. Refined analyses of non-compliant flaws from the screening assessment indicate that only 11 of the 16196 detected flaws have a critical reference-temperature material index (designated RTNDT) that implies the possibility of the initiation of cleavage fracture at some future time. For those 11 2 flaws, the calculated margin in RTNDT (a measure of acceptable embrittlement relative to end-ofservice-life conditions) is significant, being greater than 80 C. Fatigue crack growth is not a concern in the flaw-acceptability analyses. Primary stress re-evaluation confirms that the collapse pressure is more than 1.5 times the design pressure in the presence of defects detected in D3/T2. Sufficient conservatisms are built into the input data and into the different steps of the SIA; in some cases, those conservatisms are quantified and imply that additional margins exist in the SIA. Taken as a whole, the foregoing results and conclusions confirm the structural integrity of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 under all design transients with ample margin in the presence of the 16196 detected flaws.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Deep Isolation-Development of the Safety Case for Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Horizontal Boreholes - 20028

Deep Isolation has developed a safe, secure, and permanent geological disposal method for high-level waste, including spent nuclear fuel as well as sealed sources and other highly radioactive materials. The method leverages well established directional drilling technology to create horizontal repositories deep underground. The combination of great depth (1-3 km) and the ability to precisely position repositories in a horizontal orientation provides access to geologic strata that are inaccessible for typical mined and deep vertical borehole repositories. A number of potential direct and indirect safety benefits accrue including:1) greater depth below regional freshwater aquifers; 2) increased flexibility and more geologic options for siting; 3) access to deep formations with persistent and sustained reducing conditions. In addition there are a number of safety elements related specifically to the horizontal repository geometry including: 1) passive direction of thermally driven fluid and radionuclide movement away from the vertical access hole and toward the 'dead end' portion of the repository; 2) mitigation of seismic hazards by orienting repositories parallel to local and regional fault structures. In this paper we explore and discuss some of the key technologic, geologic and hydrologic elements that support the deep horizontal borehole safety case. The stalemate seen across the globe on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste can be broken. Deep Isolation offers a novel option for safe, secure, and permanent deep geological disposal of nuclear waste that can be developed as centralized repositories or adapted to smaller regional or site-specific repositories located near waste sources. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

The Approach of the Environmental Consequences and Impacts during Transport of Radioactive Materials (RAM)-A Safety Case - 16420

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works, together with Member States (MS), to provide a strong, sustainable and visible global nuclear safety and security framework, protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. In the announcement of this IAEA Conference it is underlined that 'nuclear safety and security are to a great extent scientific in nature, a regulatory body with responsibilities for nuclear facilities and other licensed activities involving radioactive material needs to have permanent access to supporting expertise'. This can be provided internally to the regulatory body or through an external entity such as a TSO in order to provide a competent and timely response to regulatory needs, and the development and maintenance of an appropriate knowledge base and associated tools and services, including training and tutoring services, are the main areas on which the conference will focus. This paper presents certain results obtained during carrying out the IAEA-Romanian Scientific Research Contract entitled: 'Romanian Contribution to the Development of Methodology for Risk Assessment and State Management of Nuclear Security Regime (Risk and Radiological Consequences)' where the author served as CSI (Chief Scientific Investigator) a part of the IAEA CRP-(Coordinated Research Project) on the: 'Development of Methodology for Risk Assessment and State Management of Nuclear Security Regime'. Also, potential risks and their possible radiological consequences to peoples and environment must not be underestimated. However, the assessment of risk must be realistic and quantified, and the requirements placed on the appropriate. The IAEA regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2012 Edition, Specific Safety Requirements, SSR-6, are applicable to the national and international carriage of radioactive material by all modes of transport- by road, by rail, by air, by sea or by inland waters. The Radioactive Material to be transported must be categorized on the basis of its activity concentration, total activity, fissile characteristics (if any) and other relevant subsidiary characteristics. Packaging and package requirements are then specified on the basis of the hazard of the contents and range from normal commercial packaging (for low hazard contents) to strict design and performance requirements (for higher hazard contents). (authors)

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