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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Standards Roadmapping for Mission Assurance in Commercial Spaceflight

This paper explores the application of established roadmapping approaches in standards planning and roadmap development to support mission assurance objectives. Mission assurance requires proactive planning across multiple domains including technical, schedule, cost, organizational, and policy. The intersection of these domains happens at the enterprise level, and enterprise systems engineering processes can systematically guide mission assurance activities, including development of standards roadmaps. Standards planning and development is a critical contributor to an effective mission assurance strategy, although standards are often developed and adopted reactively. Technology and standards planning is a key Enterprise Process Management activity, as identified by the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge, and technology and standards roadmaps are strategic tools used to enable that process. Technology roadmapping has proven effective in guiding enterprise architecture and concept design, and standards planning supports enterprise requirements definition and management. However, there are limited methodologies to guide such standards planning activities. The application of technology roadmapping principles to standards planning formalizes the process and establishes a repeatable framework for standards development and integration. The framework development described in this paper fills a methodological gap by adapting proven roadmapping techniques to standards planning. Through a comparison of roadmapping methodologies and a case study analysis, this approach outlines a systematic process for anticipating and planning standards needs. In the case of developing a standards integration roadmap for NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), technology roadmapping principles were adapted to develop a roadmap framework to allow NASA and OSMA to define an agency-wide standards integration plan for commercial and industry safety and mission assurance standards. The outcome highlights key adaptations required for roadmapping in a standards context and describes the process steps to formalize a standards planning activity. The roadmapping framework adapted for standards development and integration enables more strategic, forward-looking standards planning and allows for better alignment between evolving capabilities and mission assurance requirements. Beyond its application to mission assurance, this methodology can be transferred to other domains requiring standards development, providing a systematic approach that integrates systems engineering principles into policy strategy and decision-making processes.

Enterprise Systems Engineering↗
NASA NTRS2002

Research Reports: 2001 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program

For the thirty-seventh consecutive year, a NASA/ASEE (American Society for Engineering Education) Summer Faculty Fellowship Program was conducted at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The program was conducted by The University of Alabama in Huntsville and MSFC during the period May 29 - August 3, 2001. Operated under the auspices of the American Society for Engineering Education, the MSFC program, as well as those at other NASA Centers, was sponsored by the University Affairs Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. The basic objectives of the programs, which are in the thirty-seventh year of operation nationally, are (1) to further the professional knowledge of qualified engineering and science faculty members; (2) to stimulate an exchange of ideas between participants and NASA; (3) to enrich and refresh the research and teaching activities of the participants' institutions; and (4) to contribute to the research objectives of the NASA Centers. The Faculty Fellows spent ten weeks at MSFC engaged in a research project compatible with their interests and background and worked in collaboration with a NASA MSFC colleague. This document is a compilation of Fellows' reports on their research during the summer of 2001.

Avionics↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Application of System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to a NASA Concept Electric Aircraft Battery System

System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a systems-based hazard analysis method that identifies unsafe interactions and control deficiencies in complex systems but has been rarely used for NASA programs in favor of more well-established hazard analyses. To evaluate its applicability, a NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) team applied the STPA method to an early-stage hybrid electrified aircraft concept, focusing on the energy storage system and electric powertrain. Objectives include assessing STPA’s value relative to traditional methods and its suitability for early design phases. Activities include team training, system review, detailed STPA execution, and comparison with traditional analyses. Findings show STPA provides a structured, comprehensive hazard evaluation and can identify additional risks by expanding analysis boundaries. However, traditional methods can yield similar results when applied rigorously, though they typically require more mature designs. Overall, STPA is a valuable addition, particularly for early development, informing safety requirements and supporting preliminary hazard analyses. Further pilot applications are recommended.

Electric Aviation↗
NASA NTRS2024

Performance of Two Battery Prognostic Applications used by Two Octocopters for Safe Low Altitude Autonomous Flight Operations

This paper addresses the problem of building trust in online predictions of the remaining available flying time for two different electric Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (eUAVs) powered by lithium-ion-polymer batteries. Flight tests for various automation research missions for the two vehicles were monitored using two on-board battery health management applications to make predictions of the remaining flying time (RFT) for each eUAV and to predict the state of the battery. Playback of the voltage, current and temperature profiles of the battery discharge were used to assess the accuracy of the estimation of the voltage and the charge states of the models as well as the estimate of the RFT. The reference ground truth values were the observed landing time and the measured battery pack resting pack voltage 20 minutes after the flight. The predicted RFT, state of charge (SoC), and state of energy (SoE) were compared with the observed results. Noise values of one standard deviation from the mean values of the internal charge states of the battery model during a reference run were used to vary the states during simulation. One application used an equivalent circuit model of the electrical dynamics of the battery pack, and the other application used a reduced-order electrochemistry model. The variation of the model state components was compared to the variation in the estimate of the RFT and the variation in the SoE to estimate a confidence factor. Variation in the estimates caused by factors affecting the off-line laboratory parameter identification experiments is considered. Variation in the estimates due to environmental factors are discussed.

Assurance↗
NASA NTRS1997

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program Update

The objectives of NASA's Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program is to: develop, maintain and provide tools for the validation and assessment of aerospace battery technologies; accelerate the readiness of technology advances and provide infusion paths for emerging technologies; provide NASA projects with the required database and validation guidelines for technology selection of hardware and processes relating to aerospace batteries; disseminate validation and assessment tools, quality assurance, reliability, and availability information to the NASA and aerospace battery communities; and ensure that safe, reliable batteries are available for NASA's future missions.

Manzo, Michelle↗
DOE OSTI1975

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2003

Introduction to Radiation Issues for International Space Station Extravehicular Activities: Chapter 1

The International Space Station (ISS) provides significant challenges for radiation protection of the crew due to a combination of circumstances including: the extended duration of missions for many crewmembers, the exceptionally dynamic nature of the radiation environment in ISS orbit, and the necessity for numerous planned extravehicular activities (EVA) for station construction and maintenance. Radiation protection requires accurate radiation dose measurements and precise risk modeling of the transmission of high fluxes of energetic electrons and protons through the relatively thin shielding provided by the space suits worn during EVA. Experiments and analyses have been performed due to the necessity to assure complete radiation safety for the EVA crew and thereby ensure mission success. The detailed characterization described of the material and topological properties of the ISS space suits can be used as a basis for design of space suits used in future exploration missions. In radiation protection practices, risk from exposure to ionizing radiation is determined analytically by the level of exposure, the detrimental quality of the radiation field, the inherent radiosensitivity of the tissues or organs irradiated, and the age and gender of the person at the time of exposure. During low Earth orbit (LEO) EVA, the relatively high fluxes of low-energy electrons and protons lead to large variations in exposure of the skin, lens of the eye, and tissues in other shallow anatomical locations. The technical papers in this publication describe a number of ground-based experiments that precisely measure the thickness of the NASA extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) and Russian Zvezda Orlan-M suits using medical computerized tomography (CT) X-ray analysis, and particle accelerator experiments that measure the minimum kinetic energy required by electrons and photons to penetrate major components of the suits. These studies provide information necessary for improving the understanding of the current ISS space suits and provide insights into improved approaches for the design of future suits. This chapter begins with a summary of the dynamic ionizing radiation environment in LEO space and introduces the concepts and quantities used to quantify exposure to space radiation in LEO. The space suits used for EVA and the experimental partial human phantom are described. Subsequent chapters report results from measured charged particle fields before and after incident protons and secondary particles are transported through the space suits and into organs and tissues.

M R Shavers↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as "before return to flight." These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not "before return to flight" recommendations, they can be viewed as "continuing to fly" recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term.

CAIB↗
NASA NTRS1992

Nickel hydrogen common pressure vessel battery development

Our present design for a common pressure vessel (CPV) battery, a nickel hydrogen battery system to combine all of the cells into a common pressure vessel, uses an open disk which allows the cell to be set into a shallow cavity; subsequent cells are stacked on each other with the total number based on the battery voltage required. This approach not only eliminates the assembly error threat, but also more readily assures equal contact pressure to the heat fin between each cell, which further assures balanced heat transfer. These heat fin dishes with their appropriate cell stacks are held together with tie bars which in turn are connected to the pressure vessel weld rings at each end of the tube.

Jones, Kenneth R.↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Battery Certification Testbed for Small Satellite Missions

A battery pack consisting of standard cylindrical 18650 lithium-ion cells has been chosen for small satellite missions based on previous flight heritage and compliance with NASA battery safety requirements. However, for batteries that transit through the International Space Station (ISS), additional certification tests are required for individual cells as well as the battery packs. In this manuscript, we discuss the development of generalized testbeds for testing and certifying different types of batteries critical to small satellite missions. Test procedures developed and executed for this certification effort include: a detailed physical inspection before and after experiments; electrical cycling characterization at the cell and pack levels; battery-pack overcharge, over-discharge, external short testing; battery-pack vacuum leak and vibration testing. The overall goals of these certification procedures are to conform to requirements set forth by the agency and identify unique safety hazards. The testbeds, procedures, and experimental results are discussed for batteries chosen for small satellite missions to be launched from the ISS.

Certification↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume Four

Volume IV of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in Volume I. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The documents are compiled in this volume in the interest of establishing a complete record, but they do not necessarily represent the views of the Board. Volume I contains the Board's findings, analysis, and recommendations. The documents in Volume III through V are also contained in their original color format on the DVD disc in the back of Volume II. Volumes II – VI contain a number of conclusions and recommendations, several of which were adopted by the Board in Volume I. The other conclusions and recommendations drawn in Volumes II – VI do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Board, but are included for the record. When there is conflict, Volume I takes precedence.

NASA↗
NASA NTRS2014

Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements

This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA Engineering Safety Center NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group 2007 Proactive Task Status

In 2007, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) chartered the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group to bring forth and address critical battery-related performance/manufacturing issues for NASA and the aerospace community. A suite of tasks identifying and addressing issues related to Ni-H2 and Li-ion battery chemistries was submitted and selected for implementation. The current NESC funded are: (1) Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries (2) Binding Procurement (3) NASA Lithium-Ion Battery Guidelines (3a) Li-Ion Performance Assessment (3b) Li-Ion Guidelines Document (3b-i) Assessment of Applicability of Pouch Cells for Aerospace Missions (3b-ii) High Voltage Risk Assessment (3b-iii) Safe Charge Rates for Li-Ion Cells (4) Availability of Source Material for Li-Ion Cells (5) NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop This presentation provides a brief overview of the tasks in the 2007 plan and serves as an introduction to more detailed discussions on each of the specific tasks.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS1983

The Galileo probe Li/SO2 battery: The safest battery on Jupiter

The unique power requirement of NASA's Galileo Jupiter Probe are most readily met by a Li/SO2 battery; however, because this battery system is not space flight proven, extensive effort was required to qualify this device from the stand point of performance and safety. Due to the rather checkered safety record of the Li/SO2 system, safety has been foremost among the design considerations and has been addressed at the cell, battery and system level. The mission requirements which led to the choice of the Li/SO2 battery and the safety engineering which went into the battery and power system design are described.

Marcoux, L. S.↗
NASA NTRS2008

NASA Battery Working Group - 2007-2008: Battery Task Summary Report

This presentation provides a summary of the 2007-2008 NASA Battery Working Group efforts completed in support of the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC). The effort covered a series of pro-active tasks that address the following: Binding Procurements -- guidelines related to requirements for the battery system that should be considered at the time of contract award Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries -- issues/strategies for effective storage and impact of long-term storage on performance and life Generic Guidelines for Lithium-ion Safety, Handling and Qualification -- Standardized approaches developed and risk assessments (1) Lithium-ion Performance Assessment -- survey of manufacturers and capabilities to meet mission needs. Guidelines document generated (2) Conditions Required for using Pouch Cells in Aerospace Missions -- focus on corrosion, thermal excursions and long-term performance issues. Document defining requirements to maintain performance and life (3) High Voltage Risk Assessment -- focus on safety and abuse tolerance of battery module assemblies. Recommendations of features required for safe implementation (4) Procedure for Determination of Safe Charge Rates -- evaluation of various cell chemistries and recommendation of safe operating regimes for specific cell designs

Manzo, Michelle↗
DOE OSTI2026

Progress Report on SFR Metallic Fuel Data Qualification

This report summarizes the progress of SFR metallic fuel qualification related activities, which are focused on providing quality assurance relevant information applicable to experiments irradiated during the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program. An overview of the metallic fuel performance data and the associated databases, including the EBR-II Fuels Irradiation & Physics Database (FIPD), Out-of-Pile Transient Database (OPTD), and TREAT Experimental Relational Database (TREXR) is included. The legacy data in the databases, including as-built, post-irradiation examination (PIE), operating parameters, and out-of-pile experiment post-test data are introduced. The SFR metallic fuel Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) and its implementation to qualify these legacy data is described in detail. Important PIE data QA documents and the specifications of seven types of PIE measurements (contact profilometry, laser profilometry, neutron radiography, gamma scan, fission gas release fission gas chemistry, and metallography) are provided. Examples of the implementation of the QAPP to qualify each of those types of PIE data are provided.

Mo, Kun [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Argonn↗
DOE OSTI2026

ORNL Report of Analysis for the Verification of NRMP CRM U030A

In support of the Certified Reference Material (CRM) program managed by the Nuclear Reference Material Program (NRMP), the Material Signatures and Isotopic Standards (MSIS) group of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was asked to prepare a set of CRM U030A units for use as standards for isotopic analysis using multicollector thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) instruments. This report documents the results of the verification measurements performed on three randomly selected units by the MSIS group’s ISO/IEC 17025:2017 accredited operating procedure CSD-AM-CIMS-IN20, Determination of Uranium and Plutonium Isotopic Composition using Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry [1], and in accordance with the quality assurance plan as described in QAP-X-96-CSD/RML-001, Nuclear Analytical Chemistry Laboratory Section Quality Assurance Plan [2].

Mathew, Kattathu [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (O↗
DOE OSTI2026

Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are assessed for safety and security using separate models that cannot capture how an attacker's decisions and a plant's response unfold together in real time, leaving regulators and operators without a complete picture of true plant vulnerability. Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods treat adversarial events as fixed initiators with predetermined outcomes, and are structurally incapable of representing the time-dependent interplay between physical security events, safety system response, and operator mitigative actions. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), I contributed to the development and validation of Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). Where static PRA relies on event-tree logic that cannot evolve mid-scenario, MASS-DEF couples a time-dependent dynamic PRA tool EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams) with attack simulation software, allowing attacker behavior, plant system states, and operator actions to interact across time. My work focused on validating a general Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. I traced model logic against PWR plant to identified errors in logic and confirm accuracy. I then built and tested attack scenarios against a general PWR model to verify that the model produced expected outcomes across all logical pathways. I also contributed a section to a related technical paper applying the same EMRALD platform to radiation dose modeling. Results show that MASS-DEF can quantitatively demonstrate that many plants exceed their regulatory security thresholds. This demonstrated margin provides a technically defensible basis for reducing the number of guards without compromising regulatory compliance. Physical security costs represent roughly 10% of annual operating budgets, making such reductions directly meaningful to INL's mission of sustaining existing commercial NPPs. This internship strengthened my understanding of nuclear systems, probabilistic modeling, and technical writing, and has solidified my pursuit of a career at a national laboratory.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗