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Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel

Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC. For the nuclear industry to reap the benefits of SBD (i.e. avoid cost overruns and construction schedule slippages), nuclear facility designers and operators should work closely with the State Regulatory Authority and IAEA as soon as a decision is taken to build a new nuclear facility. Ideally, this interaction should begin during the conceptual design phase and continue throughout construction and start-up of a nuclear facility. Such early coordination and planning could influence decisions on the design of the nuclear material processing flow-sheet, material storage and handling arrangements, and facility layout (including safeguards equipment), etc.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Alliance of Advanced Process Control and Accountability – A Future Safeguards-By-Design Tool

For any chemical separation process producing a valuable product, a material balance is an important process control measurement. That is particularly true for the separation of actinides from irradiated nuclear fuel, not only for their intrinsic value but also because an incomplete material balance may indicate diversion for unauthorized use. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy is currently carrying out at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory an experimental measurement of how well and with what precision current technologies can implement near real-time actinide material balances. This measurement effort is called the CoDCon project. It involves the separation of a product with a 70/30 uranium/plutonium mass ratio. Initial tests will use dissolved fuel simulants prepared with pure uranium and plutonium nitrates at the same input ratios as irradiated fuel. Subsequent testing with actual irradiated fuel would be done to verify the results obtained with simulants. The experiments will use advanced on-line instrumentation supported by dynamic process models. Since accountability uncertainties could mask diversions, the aim of the project is not only to measure present-day capabilities but also, through sensitivity analyses, to identify those measurements with the greatest potential for overall material-balance improvements. The latter results will help identify priorities for future fuel cycle R&D programs. Advanced separations process control and material accountability technologies thus have a common goal: to provide the best tools available for safeguards-by-design [defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the integration of the design of a new nuclear facility through planning, construction, operation and decommissioning]. Since the potential domestic use of CoDCon results may be later than their possible foreign applications, arrangements may be feasible for possible bilateral or multinational cooperation in the CoDCon project.

Lumetta, Gregg J.↗

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Utilizing a Virtual Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor Digital Twin to Aid in Diversion Pathway Analysis for International Safeguards Applications

We report digital twin technology has the potential to improve the effectiveness of international safeguards inspectors by providing a tool which can: first, perform an accurate diversion path analysis, identify their indicators, and required sensors to detect them; and second, monitor facilities in real-time using critical data streams that benefit from this safeguards-by-design approach. Safeguards inspectors are required to visit facilities and verify the nuclear material to ensure no diversion has taken place and detect misuse of the facility; however, this analysis and verification effort is time consuming, and with limited funding it is imperative that time spent at a nuclear facility is focused on key areas. A virtual digital twin of three prototypic sodium fast reactors was developed, where diversion and misuse scenarios were explored to determine how a digital twin could provide inspectors with an understanding of how proliferation may occur and where the most likely areas for proliferation would be. For each of the three reactors, an optimization algorithm was able to find core designs which would be difficult to detect via sensors alone; however, the use of a machine learning adapter provided by the digital twin was able to show general trends in where proliferation as likely to take place.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nondestructive Assay for Nuclear Safeguards [Slides]

The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Currently, the IAEA is working to achieve universal acceptance of the AP, safeguards-by-design, unattended monitoring & data integration, and state-level concept/approach. We are trying to verify special nuclear material (SNM) is where it should be, and in the proper amount.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) NFE-18-07194 with TerraPower LLC (Final Report)

Because of the potential economic and safety benefits of the molten salt reactor (MSR) concept, development of several designs has been initiated around the world over the past decade. New international nuclear safeguards needs and verification challenges are likely to arise because of the commercial interests in MSRs and the number of MSR design variants. As a result, work was undertaken to explore the cross-cutting issues specific to the application of international nuclear safeguards (i.e., safeguards) to liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (LFMSRs). Through a public-private partnership, a report was developed that focuses on the TerraPower Molten Chloride Fast Reactor (MCFR) design that has received a funding award from the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The report is intended to provide a preliminary analysis for a safeguards-by-design (SBD) effort to inform designers about how safeguards could be applied to LFMSRs by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Although the report specifically focuses on the TerraPower design, the conclusions are applicable to the main design features of LFMSRs and can be used to extrapolate how existing IAEA safeguards measures for other fuel cycle facilities can be appropriately applied or modified. The report evaluates the appropriate safeguards approaches for LFMSRs, presents existing safeguards inspection technologies are still valid for LFMSRs, and identifies new challenges that will require novel measurement instruments to meet verification standards of the IAEA and the international safeguards regime. This document summarizes the results of the work performed under the full report developed as part of the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA). This summary does not contain any protected CRADA information and is intended for public release.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Sandia National Laboratories Early Career University Faculty Mentoring Program in International Safeguards

An international safeguards mentoring program was established by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for early career university faculty. The inaugural year of the program focused on course material development and connecting faculty to experts at national laboratories. Two faculty members were selected for participation; one developed a safeguards-by-design course, and the other created lecture material related to unmanned robotic systems in safeguards for integration in existing courses. Faculty members were paired with SNL subject matter experts based on the topic of their individual projects. The program also included a two week visit to SNL. The structure of this program not only supported the development of new course material, but also provided junior faculty members with an opportunity to make connections and build collaborations in the field of international safeguards. Programs like this are important for professional development of faculty members and to help strengthen connections between universities and the national laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards Considerations for Coated Particle Fuel Fabrication Facilities

This study aims to identify where existing fuel fabrication safeguards are limited in application to coated particle fuel fabrication facilities; perform a review of techniques that may be appropriate to address these limitations; and identify where further study is required. The purpose is to ensure the necessary technology and safeguards developments are established to facilitate safeguards-by-design for coated particle fuel fabrication facilities, analogous to the research and development (R&D) efforts in the advanced reactor space, including those requiring coated particle fuels and progress to higher technology readiness levels. Finally, this study will also help meet high priority objectives set forth by the IAEA in establishing safeguards R&D precedence and measurement/procedural standards at emerging fuel fabrication facilities. To achieve these objectives, the report is formatted to (1) distill relevant background information on fuel fabrication of oxide and coated particle fuels; (2) provide an overview of the fuel fabrication techniques for a reference oxide fuel fabrication facility and two selected TRISO fuel fabrication facilities; (3) develop facility models of safeguards approaches for the reference facility and the two TRISO facilities; and (4) identify any observed technology needs or gaps from this analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗