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Conceptual design study of neutron detectors for safeguards measurement of an irradiated pebble
Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) of pebble-bed reactors (PBRs) is challenging because a PBR utilizes hundreds of thousands of identical, unmarked pebbles that are continuously recirculated through the core. To develop tools that enable the implementation of international safeguards, especially in the context of MC&A of spent pebbles, we designed and simulated three neutron detection concepts to determine fissile content in individual pebbles: a differential die-away (DDA) detector, a californium interrogation prompt neutron (CIPN) detector, and a passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) detector using Monte Carlo calculations. Burnup calculations were performed on the spent pebbles from the PBMR-400 classic PBR. The varying neutron and gamma source terms, and isotopic compositions in the spent pebbles calculated at various burnup levels were used in the neutron detector models. DDA was found to be sensitive to the number of passes a pebble has had through the core and to the fissile content contained in a spent pebble. Optimization in the DDA design further increased the neutron count rates and thus reduced counting uncertainty. Meanwhile, passive neutron counting using the same detector body could distinguish pebbles with different numbers of passes, but its response was dominated by neutron-emitting actinides and was not sensitive to fissile content. On the other hand, the PNAR technique was not viable for a single pebble but performed reasonably for a 27-pebble array, which suggested potential use for verification measurements of containers filled with 27 or more spent pebbles.
Nuclear Security Risks for HALEU Fuels
There is growing interest in high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in advanced nuclear reactors as a high-energy fuel source. The primary objectives of this report are to identify the security risks that directly result from HALEU and to identify the gaps and challenges it presents from a theft and sabotage perspective. This study focuses on HALEU security risks for the front end of the fuel cycle and includes a review of the supply chain, fuel fabrication, and transport for terrestrial reactors.
Analysis of Liquids Using the Submerged Plasma for Isotopic Detection and Elemental Resolution (SPIDER)
We developed a sensor called the Submerged Plasma for Isotopic Detection and Elemental Resolution (SPIDER) probe, which uses an atmospheric pressure glow discharge below the surface of liquids to excite species in the liquid. Through emission spectroscopy of molten salts, liquid metals, and heavy water, we demonstrated the SPIDER probe’s high resolution, accuracy, and versatility. We successfully identified trace concentrations of transition and rare-earth metals in molten salts and detected the isotopic shift of the H β → D β emission line. Our analysis revealed unconventional spectral alkali line shapes, indicating two competing excitation modes: film explosion and droplet vaporization. The film explosion mode, characterized by dense plasma, exhibited self-reversal and broadband continuum emission, while the droplet vaporization mode, associated with diffusive plasma, produced narrow-line emissions. Furthermore, by analyzing circuit transients alongside individual plasma events, we observed that film explosions generate higher currents, likely due to a shorter plasma length as the current preferentially flows through the thin liquid layer. Altogether, our results highlight the SPIDER probe’s efficacy and flexibility, making it well-suited for online material quantification of liquids in extreme environments.
Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are assessed for safety and security using separate models that cannot capture how an attacker's decisions and a plant's response unfold together in real time, leaving regulators and operators without a complete picture of true plant vulnerability. Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods treat adversarial events as fixed initiators with predetermined outcomes, and are structurally incapable of representing the time-dependent interplay between physical security events, safety system response, and operator mitigative actions. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), I contributed to the development and validation of Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). Where static PRA relies on event-tree logic that cannot evolve mid-scenario, MASS-DEF couples a time-dependent dynamic PRA tool EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams) with attack simulation software, allowing attacker behavior, plant system states, and operator actions to interact across time. My work focused on validating a general Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. I traced model logic against PWR plant to identified errors in logic and confirm accuracy. I then built and tested attack scenarios against a general PWR model to verify that the model produced expected outcomes across all logical pathways. I also contributed a section to a related technical paper applying the same EMRALD platform to radiation dose modeling. Results show that MASS-DEF can quantitatively demonstrate that many plants exceed their regulatory security thresholds. This demonstrated margin provides a technically defensible basis for reducing the number of guards without compromising regulatory compliance. Physical security costs represent roughly 10% of annual operating budgets, making such reductions directly meaningful to INL's mission of sustaining existing commercial NPPs. This internship strengthened my understanding of nuclear systems, probabilistic modeling, and technical writing, and has solidified my pursuit of a career at a national laboratory.
Roadmap and Benchmarking: Privacy in Federated Load Forecasting
Data-driven techniques for energy demand forecasting continue to emerge with promising impacts on distribution grid planning. However, the development of robust and generalizable machine learning models requires that representative high quality training data are available. Distributed energy resources have begun to embed intelligence, gathering large amounts of data on customer demand, behavior, and household devices that are connected to the grid. Though utilities aggregate meter-level demand data for load shaping, demand response, outage management, reliability planning, and billing applications, there lies an inherent privacy concern in sharing consumption data that may identify individual consumer behavioral patterns. Hence, while sharing the data is crucial, the private sensitive customer data must be safeguarded from being exposed or manipulated. In this study, we propose a roadmap for implementing a based privacy preserving framework to support the advancement of data-driven analytics in data-sensitive distributed energy resources environments. The roadmap incorporates federated learning–a distributed training framework, differential privacy–a statistical framework that provides guarantees to safeguard the leakage of sensitive data, secure multiparty computation and homomorphic encryption– techniques for encrypting model gradients and applying secure aggregation on the server. Moreover, we perform baseline experiments on the federated short-term load forecasting (STLF) task using open-source residential load profile datasets, offering insights into the challenges of integrating differential privacy into federated learning.
Single particle – MC-ICP-MS for isotopic analysis of uranium particles
Single particle – multi-collector – inductively coupled plasma – mass spectrometry (SP-MC-ICP-MS) was employed to measure a suspension of 1 µm U3O8 particles (∼1.3 pg total U/particle) to determine their individual isotopic compositions of 234U/238U, 235U/238U, and 236U/238U. The effects of different detector combinations for 235U and 238U, including secondary electron multipliers (SEM) and Faraday detectors (1011 and 1013 Ω amplifiers), were explored for accuracy and precision optimization on the observed 235U/238U. The minor isotopic ratios (i.e., 234U/238U and 236U/238U) were analyzed such that the 234U and 236U were monitored on SEM detectors and the 238U was monitored on a Faraday (1011 Ω) detector. Various integration times (5, 10, 25, and 50 ms) were investigated in all detector configurations to gain a better understanding of their impact on sensitivity, accuracy, and precision. For 235U/238U ratios of 1 µm U3O8 particles, a dual Faraday detector measurement with 1011 Ω was the optimal choice; measurement of 1021 particles yielded an average 235U/238U ratio of 0.00170 (14), a −1.8% relative difference (% RD) from the reference value. The minor isotopic compositions were determined to be 0.0000070 (14) and 0.0000758 (48) for the 234U/238U and 236U/238U, respectively. These measurements correspond to <8% and <1% RD from their reference value for the 234U/238U and 236U/238U, respectively. SP-MC-ICP-MS was also able to provide insight into measurement sensitivity. In these individual particles, merely 15 and 165 atto-grams (ag) of 234U and 236U were present (calculated). Initial limits of detection for SP-MC-ICP-MS were determined to be ∼1.0 ag (when measured via SEM detectors). This valuable approach is applicable to areas including nuclear forensics, nuclear safeguards, and geochemical analysis, which require high-precision measurements of uranium within micron-sized particles.