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Deployment of Community Scale Solar Photovoltaic Energy Systems in Forest County Potawatomi Community

FCPC is a federally recognized tribe with a membership of more than 1400. The Tribe has a reservation in Forest County, Wisconsin, and tribal trust lands in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, with significant governmental and business operations in both areas. Until relatively recently, FCPC was one of the poorest tribes in the Midwest. Due to its successful gaming operations, it now has improved its financial situation and is using its resources to benefit both its members and the general public through environmental and other community efforts, many of which are long-delayed because of the extended period of abject poverty. The Tribe has developed the long-term goal of becoming energy independent using renewable resources. In order to meet this goal, the Tribe has taken several important steps. As an interim step, FCPC is purchasing nearly 55 million kilowatt hours of renewable energy certificates (“RECs”) annually from certified renewable energy facilities in the United States. These RECs offset more than 100% of the present electricity use at all of the Tribe’s facilities. The Tribe is currently ranked number 11 on the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Top 20 Local Government list of green power purchasers and is a member of the EPA’s Green Power Partnership. The original project suggested small scale installations on tribal homes and certain government buildings. The Tribe suggested that the project would result in 730 kw installed. By revising the project, the Tribe was able to install 938 kw and owns the largest installation in Northern Wisconsin with the 800 kW installation at the Potawatomi Carter Casino Hotel (“PCCH”). The PCCH installation, in summer months, can provide near 90% of the use during daylight hours. Although tracking was not immediately available FCPC has since confirmed significant production with certain quarterly savings nearing $210,000. These installations provide a reduction in facility costs providing more revenue for Tribal services including cultural, health, sustainable food sources, environmental preservation and other Tribal initiatives. Further, the installations have resulted in positive steps towards the Tribe’s goals of energy sovereignty and the use of 100% renewable clean energy. Finally, the PCCH project, specifically, has had the additional benefit of providing a likely area for a microgrid. The size of the installation and offset achieved have pushed the Tribe toward planning for storage and a microgrid system that would both further the Tribe’s energy goals and provide a safe haven for the Community during times of need.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Abnormally Malicious Autonomous Systems and their Internet Connectivity

While many attacks are distributed across botnets, investigators and network operators have recently targeted malicious networks through high profile autonomous system (AS) de-peerings and network shut-downs. In this paper, we explore whether some ASes indeed are safe havens for malicious activity. We look for ISPs and ASes that exhibit disproportionately high malicious behavior using ten popular blacklists, plus local spam data, and extensive DNS resolutions based on the contents of the blacklists. We find that some ASes have over 80% of their routable IP address space blacklisted. Yet others account for large fractions of blacklisted IP addresses. Several ASes regularly peer with ASes associated with significant malicious activity. We also find that malicious ASes as a whole differ from benign ones in other properties not obviously related to their malicious activities, such as more frequent connectivity changes with their BGP peers. Overall, we conclude that examining malicious activity at AS granularity can unearth networks with lax security or those that harbor cybercrime.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Secure Route: Roadway Risk Mapping for Transportation Planners

The secure transport of sensitive materials across U.S. road networks pose unique challenges for local, state, and federal agencies. Threats range from random events (e.g., accidents, medical emergencies, mechanical failures) to opportunistic or organized tactical assaults. Although the probability of such attacks is very low, the consequences of material loss to foreign states or terrorists can be catastrophic, qualifying these scenarios as “grey swan” events—low-probability, high-impact occurrences that are predictable but difficult to quantify. Traditional risk assessments struggle in these contexts, necessitating a shift toward subjective risk perception to inform planning. Risk perception in transport planning is shaped by various factors, including knowledge of adversarial capabilities, vehicle defenses, manifest details, and geographic features along the route. Geographic features such as bridges, tunnels, roadside elevation, and gaps in cellular coverage introduce vulnerabilities, while mitigative features include safe havens, police stations, and medical services. Temporal variables such as congestion, accidents, and weather further complicate route planning. Despite their importance, existing routing tools like Google Maps and commercial software do not explicitly account for geographic risk features, requiring planners to rely on personal familiarity with routes—a time-intensive, non-scalable approach. This work addresses these gaps by: (1) developing datasets that catalog geographic risk features along U.S. roadways, (2) eliciting risk perceptions from experienced transportation security experts, and (3) linking these perceptions to roadway conditions and geographic data. We implement these capabilities within Secure Route a novel mapping tool for classifying route segment risks associated with roadway conditions. This system provides transportation planners with an intuitive interface to assess and contextualize risk along potential routes, improving decision-making for secure transport. We present current progress in this effort and identify next steps.

Stewart, Robert [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000281867559)↗

Malicious Hubs: Detecting Abnormally Malicious Autonomous Systems

While many attacks are distributed across botnets, investigators and network operators have recently targeted malicious networks through high profile autonomous system (AS) de-peerings and network shut-downs. In this paper, we explore whether some ASes indeed are safe havens for malicious activity. We look for ISPs and ASes that exhibit disproportionately high malicious behavior using 12 popular blacklists. We find that some ASes have over 80% of their routable IP address space blacklisted and others account for large fractions of blacklisted IPs. Overall, we conclude that examining malicious activity at the AS granularity can unearth networks with lax security or those that harbor cybercrime.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Development and Testing of Techniques for In-Ground Stabilization, Size Reduction and Safe Removal of Radioactive Wastes Stored in Large Containments in Burial Grounds - 13591

Radioactive waste materials, including Transuranic (TRU) wastes from laboratories have been stored below ground in large containments at a number of sites in the US DOE Complex, and at nuclear sites in Europe. These containments are generally referred to as caissons or shafts. The containments are in a range of sizes and depths below grade. The caissons at the DOE's Hanford site are cylindrical, of the order of 2,500 mm in diameter, 3,050 mm in height and are buried about 6,000 mm below grade. One type of caisson is made out of corrugated pipe, whereas others are made of concrete with standard re-bar. However, the larger shafts in the UK are of the order of 4,600 mm in diameter, 53,500 mm deep, and 12,000 below grade. This paper describes the R and D work and testing activities performed to date to evaluate the concept of in-ground size reduction and stabilization of the contents of large containments similar to those at Hanford. In practice, the height of the Test Facility provided for a test cell that was approximately 22' deep. That prevented a 'full scale mockup' test in the sense that the Hanford Caisson configuration would be an identical replication. Therefore, the project was conducted in two phases. The first phase tested a simulated Caisson with surrogate contents, and part of a Chute section, and the second phase tested a full chute section. These tests were performed at VJ Technologies Test Facility located in East Haven, CT, as part of the Proof of Design Concept program for studying the feasibility of an in-situ grout/grind/mix/stabilize technology for the remediation of four caissons at the 618-11 Burial Ground at US Department of Energy Hanford Site. The test site was constructed such that multiple testing areas were provided for the evaluation of various tools, equipment and procedures under conditions that simulated the Hanford site, with representative soils and layout dimensions. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

International Low Level Waste Disposal Practices and Facilities

The safe management of nuclear waste arising from nuclear activities is an issue of great importance for the protection of human health and the environment now and in the future. The primary goal of this report is to identify the current situation and practices being utilized across the globe to manage and store low and intermediate level radioactive waste. The countries included in this report were selected based on their nuclear power capabilities and involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This report highlights the nuclear waste management laws and regulations, current disposal practices, and future plans for facilities of the selected international nuclear countries. For each country presented, background information and the history of nuclear facilities are also summarized to frame the country's nuclear activities and set stage for the management practices employed. The production of nuclear energy, including all the steps in the nuclear fuel cycle, results in the generation of radioactive waste. However, radioactive waste may also be generated by other activities such as medical, laboratory, research institution, or industrial use of radioisotopes and sealed radiation sources, defense and weapons programs, and processing (mostly large scale) of mineral ores or other materials containing naturally occurring radionuclides. Radioactive waste also arises from intervention activities, which are necessary after accidents or to remediate areas affected by past practices. The radioactive waste generated arises in a wide range of physical, chemical, and radiological forms. It may be solid, liquid, or gaseous. Levels of activity concentration can vary from extremely high, such as levels associated with spent fuel and residues from fuel reprocessing, to very low, for instance those associated with radioisotope applications. Equally broad is the spectrum of half-lives of the radionuclides contained in the waste. These differences result in an equally wide variety of options for the management of radioactive waste. There is a variety of alternatives for processing waste and for short term or long term storage prior to disposal. Likewise, there are various alternatives currently in use across the globe for the safe disposal of waste, ranging from near surface to geological disposal, depending on the specific classification of the waste. At present, there appears to be a clear and unequivocal understanding that each country is ethically and legally responsible for its own wastes, in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Therefore the default position is that all nuclear wastes will be disposed of in each of the 40 or so countries concerned with nuclear power generation or part of the fuel cycle. To illustrate the global distribution of radioactive waste now and in the near future, Table 1 provides the regional breakdown, based on the UN classification of the world in regions illustrated in Figure 1, of nuclear power reactors in operation and under construction worldwide. In summary, 31 countries operate 433 plants, with a total capacity of more than 365 gigawatts of electrical energy (GW[e]). A further 65 units, totaling nearly 63 GW(e), are under construction across 15 of these nations. In addition, 65 countries are expressing new interest in, considering, or actively planning for nuclear power to help address growing energy demands to fuel economic growth and development, climate change concerns, and volatile fossil fuel prices. Of these 65 new countries, 21 are in Asia and the Pacific region, 21 are from the Africa region, 12 are in Europe (mostly Eastern Europe), and 11 in Central and South America. However, 31 of these 65 are not currently planning to build reactors, and 17 of those 31 have grids of less than 5 GW, which is said to be too small to accommodate most of the reactor designs available. For the remaining 34 countries actively planning reactors, as of September 2010: 14 indicate a strong intention to precede with introduction of nuclear power; 7 are preparing but haven't made a final decision, 10 have made a decision and are preparing infrastructure, 2 have ordered a new nuclear power plant, and 1 has a plant under construction. In all countries interested in pursuing nuclear power, it is necessary for the governments to create an environment for investment and advancement of nuclear power, including development of a professional and independent regulatory framework and regime, knowledge and refinement of skills in nuclear safety and control, definition of policies on nuclear waste management and decommissioning, and participation in international non-proliferation measures. Specifically related to radioactive waste management, nuclear facilities and industries that utilize radioactive material work to well-established safety standards for the management of their waste.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integrated geological, economic, and risk assessment of underground hydrogen storage

Underground hydrogen storage (UHS) is a promising option to buffer variable renewable power and support the hydrogen economy. Yet this technology is early-stage, and key uncertainties remain about how coupled processes such as geochemical and geomechanical impacts affect long-term storage security. In this paper, we seek to integrate the results from a large, multi-scale research program to quantify core feasibility metrics and situate these studies within ongoing efforts. Through this work, we evaluate hydrogen recoverability during storage by assessing diffusive losses, losses to geochemical interactions and their subsequent impact on geomechanical properties, and losses to residual saturation during injection and withdrawal. Molecular and laboratory studies show that lithologic heterogeneity, pore geometry, and mineral surface chemistry govern hydrogen–rock interactions, controlling loss pathways. High-pressure coreflooding is used to estimate relative permeabilities and measure parameters needed for reservoir-scale sensitivity analyses. These core-scale experiments found early hydrogen breakthrough at low saturations driven by capillary and viscous fingering, which limits pore-space utilization at early times, while repeated injection and withdrawal cycles improve deliverability over time. Technoeconomic factors and purity requirements for end uses are also considered as part of our comprehensive feasibility analysis. Finally, we underscore the importance of geophysical monitoring and tailored injection strategies to maintain integrity and efficiency. Together, these results provide a quantitative foundation for safe, scalable deployment of UHS and highlight priorities for future integrated studies.

08 HYDROGEN↗