Section 106 Recordation, Interpretation, and Documentation for the Demolition of Buildings 3008, 3012, 3044, 3503, 3504, 3508, and 3592 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
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Because of past military operations, lack of upkeep and looting there are now enormous radioactive waste problems in Iraq. These waste problems include destroyed nuclear facilities, uncharacterized radioactive wastes, liquid radioactive waste in underground tanks, wastes related to the production of yellow cake, sealed radioactive sources, activated metals and contaminated metals that must be constantly guarded. Iraq currently lacks the trained personnel, regulatory and physical infrastructure to safely and securely manage these facilities and wastes. In 2005 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to organize an international cooperative program to assist Iraq with these issues. Soon after, the Iraq Nuclear Facility Dismantlement and Disposal Program (the NDs Program) was initiated by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to support the IAEA and assist the Government of Iraq (GOI) in eliminating the threats from poorly controlled radioactive materials. The Iraq NDs Program is providing support for the IAEA plus training, consultation and limited equipment to the GOI. The GOI owns the problems and will be responsible for implementation of the Iraq NDs Program. Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) is a part of the DOS's team implementing the Iraq NDs Program. This report documents Sandia's support of the Iraq NDs Program, which has developed into three principal work streams: (1) training and technical consultation; (2) introducing Iraqis to modern decommissioning and waste management practices; and (3) supporting the IAEA, as they assist the GOI. Examples of each of these work streams include: (1) presentation of a three-day training workshop on 'Practical Concepts for Safe Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste in Arid Settings;' (2) leading GOI representatives on a tour of two operating low level radioactive waste disposal facilities in the U.S.; and (3) supporting the IAEA's Technical Meeting with the GOI from April 21-25, 2008. As noted in the report, there was significant teaming between the various participants to best help the GOI. On-the-ground progress is the focus of the Iraq NDs Program and much of the work is a transfer of technical and practical skills and knowledge that Sandia uses day-to-day. On-the-ground progress was achieved in July of 2008 when the GOI began the physical cleanup and dismantlement of the Active Metallurgical Testing Laboratory (LAMA) facility at Al Tuwaitha, near Baghdad.
Several years ago, SRS completed a four year mission to decommission {approx}250 excess facilities. As part of that effort, SRS deactivated multiple facilities (e.g. Building 247-F, Naval Fuels Facility, and Building 211-F, Outside Facilities for F-Canyon) that contained extensive piping systems filled with hazardous material (e.g. nitric acid). Draining of hazardous materials from piping was successfully completed in all facilities without incident. In early 2009, the decommissioning program at SRS was restarted as a result of funding made available by the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Under ARRA, draining of piping containing hazardous material was initiated in multiple facilities including Building 221-1F (or A-Line). This paper describes and reviews the draining of piping containing hazardous materials at A-Line, with emphasis on an incident involving the draining of nitric acid. The paper is intended to be a resource for engineers, planners, and project managers, who face similar draining challenges.
This report presents estimates of dispersion coefficients and effective dose for potential air dispersion scenarios of uncontrolled releases from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) buildings 3026C, 3026D, and 3140 prior to or during the demolition of the 3026 Complex. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) AERMOD system1-6 was used to compute these estimates. AERMOD stands for AERMIC Model, where AERMIC is the American Meteorological Society-EPA Regulatory Model Improvement Committee. Five source locations (three in building 3026D and one each in building 3026C and the filter house 3140) and associated source characteristics were determined with the customer. In addition, the area of study was determined and building footprints and intake locations of air-handling systems were obtained. In addition to the air intakes, receptor sites consisting of ground level locations on four polar grids (50 m, 100 m, 200 m, and 500 m) and two intersecting lines of points (50 m separation), corresponding to sidewalks along Central Avenue and Fifth Street. Three years of meteorological data (2006 2008) were used each consisting of three datasets: 1) National Weather Service data; 2) upper air data for the Knoxville-Oak Ridge area; and 3) local weather data from Tower C (10 m, 30 m and 100 m) on the ORNL reservation. Annual average air concentration, highest 1 h average and highest 3 h average air concentrations were computed using AERMOD for the five source locations for the three years of meteorological data. The highest 1 h average air concentrations were converted to dispersion coefficients to characterize the atmospheric dispersion as the customer was interested in the most significant response and the highest 1 h average data reflects the best time-averaged values available from the AERMOD code. Results are presented in tabular and graphical form. The results for dose were obtained using radionuclide activities for each of the buildings provided by the customer.7 Radiation dose was calculated assuming complete release of the building inventory as information was lacking regarding the portion of the building inventory expected to be released. Thus the results are derived using an extremely conservative release as documented in the Preliminary Hazard Screening report.7 To more closely approximate the result of a release, one must estimate the fraction of the total inventory released and multiply the results described above by that fraction. An example of how this calculation is accomplished is provided. Should an actual uncontrolled release occur, the results of this modeling effort could only be used to establish a rough order-of-magnitude for the event.
Operations at various U.S. Department of Energy sites have resulted in substantial radiological contamination of tools, equipment, and facilities. It is essential to use remote technologies for characterization and decommissioning to keep worker exposures as low as reasonably achievable in these highly contaminated environments. A significant initial step in planning and implementing D&D of contaminated facilities involves the development of an accurate assessment of the radiological, chemical, and structural conditions inside of the facilities. Collected information describing facility conditions using remote technologies could reduce the conservatism associated with planning initial worker entry (and associated cost).
In recognition of the increasing attention being focused on In Situ Decommissioning (ISD or entombment) as an acceptable and beneficial decommissioning end state, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is developing guidance for the implementation of ISD of excess facilities within the DOE complex. Consistent with the overarching DOE goals for increased personnel and environmental safety, reduced technical uncertainties and risks, and overall gains in efficiencies and effectiveness, EM's Office of Deactivation and Decommissioning and Facility Engineering (EM-23) initiated efforts to identify the technical barriers and technology development needs for the optimal implementation of ISD. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), as the EM Corporate Laboratory, conducted an ISD Technology Needs Workshop to identify the technology needs at DOE sites. The overall goal of the workshop was to gain a full understanding of the specific ISD technical challenges, the technologies available, and those needing development. The ISD Workshop was held December 9-10, 2008 in Aiken, SC. Experienced decommissioning operations personnel from Richland Operations Office (RL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Savannah River Site (SRS) along with scientists and engineers specific expertise were assembled to identify incremental and 'game changing' solutions to ISD technology challenges. The workshop and follow-up activities yielded 14 technology needs statements and the recommendation that EM-23 prioritize and pursue the following specific technology development and deployment actions. For each action, the recommended technology acquisition mechanisms (competitive solicitation (CS) or direct funding (TCR)) are provided. Activities that are time critical for ISD projects, or require unique capabilities that reside in the DOE Laboratory system will be funded directly to those institutions. Activities that have longer lead times and where the private sector, universities or other agencies are expected to have greater expertise will be accomplished through an open, competitive solicitation process. Several areas will require joint efforts from the two classes of resources.
With the implementation of DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and DOE-STD-3007-2007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities', a new requirement was imposed that all criticality safety controls be evaluated for inclusion in the facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and that the evaluation process be documented in the site Criticality Safety Program Description Document (CSPDD). At the Hanford site in Washington State the CSPDD, HNF-31695, 'General Description of the FH Criticality Safety Program', requires each facility develop a linking document called a Criticality Control Review (CCR) to document performance of these evaluations. Chapter 5, Appendix 5B of HNF-7098, Criticality Safety Program, provided an example of a format for a CCR that could be used in lieu of each facility developing its own CCR. Since the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is presently undergoing Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D), new procedures are being developed for cleanout of equipment and systems that have not been operated in years. Existing Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) are revised, or new ones written, to develop the controls required to support D&D activities. Other Hanford facilities, including PFP, had difficulty using the basic CCR out of HNF-7098 when first implemented. Interpretation of the new guidelines indicated that many of the controls needed to be elevated to TSR level controls. Criterion 2 of the standard, requiring that the consequence of a criticality be examined for establishing the classification of a control, was not addressed. Upon in-depth review by PFP Criticality Safety staff, it was not clear that the programmatic interpretation of criterion 8C could be applied at PFP. Therefore, the PFP Criticality Safety staff decided to write their own CCR. The PFP CCR provides additional guidance for the evaluation team to use by clarifying the evaluation criteria in DOE-STD-3007-2007. In reviewing documents used in classifying controls for Nuclear Safety, it was noted that DOE-HDBK-1188, 'Glossary of Environment, Health, and Safety Terms', defines an Administrative Control (AC) in terms that are different than typically used in Criticality Safety. As part of this CCR, a new term, Criticality Administrative Control (CAC) was defined to clarify the difference between an AC used for criticality safety and an AC used for nuclear safety. In Nuclear Safety terms, an AC is a provision relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility. A CAC was defined as an administrative control derived in a criticality safety analysis that is implemented to ensure double contingency. According to criterion 2 of Section IV, 'Linkage to the Documented Safety Analysis', of DOESTD-3007-2007, the consequence of a criticality should be examined for the purposes of classifying the significance of a control or component. HNF-PRO-700, 'Safety Basis Development', provides control selection criteria based on consequence and risk that may be used in the development of a Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) to establish the classification of a component as a design feature, as safety class or safety significant, i.e., an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), or as equipment important to safety; or merely provides defense-in-depth. Similar logic is applied to the CACs. Criterion 8C of DOE-STD-3007-2007, as written, added to the confusion of using the basic CCR from HNF-7098. The PFP CCR attempts to clarify this criterion by revising it to say 'Programmatic commitments or general references to control philosophy (e.g., mass control or spacing control or concentration control as an overall control strategy for the process without specific quantification of individual limits) is included in the PFP DSA'. Table 1 shows the PFP methodology for evaluating CACs. This evaluation process has been in use since February of 2008 and has proven to be simple and effective. Each control identified in the applicable new/revised CSE is evaluated via the table. The results of this evaluation are documented in tables attached to the CCR as an appendix, for each CSE, to the base document.
This report is part of the planning process for the demolition of the 234-5Z, 236-Z, 242-Z, and 291-Z-1 structures at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) supports the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) demolition planning effort by making engineering estimates of potential releases for various potential demolition alternatives. This report documents an analysis considering open-air demolition using standard techniques. It does not document any decisions about the decommissioning approaches; it is expected that this report will be revisited as the final details of the demolition are developed.
The Surveillance and Monitoring Program is a joint Los Alamos National Laboratory/Savannah River Site effort funded by the Department of Energy-Environmental Management to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5,000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metal and oxide to very impure oxide. The performance of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on 54 samples of plutonium, with 53 chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper summarizes the characterization data, moisture analysis, particle size, surface area, density, wattage, actinide composition, trace element impurity analysis, and shelf life surveillance data and includes origin and process history information. Limited characterization data on fourteen nonrepresentative samples is also presented.
The Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SMP) is a joint LANL/SRS effort funded by DOE/EM to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metal and oxide to very impure oxide. The performance of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. The chlorides (NaCl, KCl, CaCl{sub 2}, and MgCl{sub 2}) range from less than half of the impurities present to nearly all the impurities. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on over 60 samples of plutonium chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper will summarize the characterization data, including the origin and process history, particle size, surface area, density, calorimetry, chemical analysis, moisture analysis, prompt gamma, gas generation and corrosion behavior.
The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project (SPD, Project Y744) requested the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to perform a series of leak and durability tests on sphincter seals that were designed to process blend cans and shield cans into an SPD glovebox. Each sphincter seal assembly consisted of a stainless-steel outer sleeve weldment that was bolted onto the test enclosure and an aluminum inner sleeve that housed seven to nine Neoprene seals. All tests were executed to determine long term effects from processing approximately a year’s worth of blend and shield cans through the sphincter seals.
The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.
The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems.
The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)
In 1999, the Nuclear Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.
In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.
The purpose of the Nuclear Materials Management Plan (herein referred to as “this Plan”) is to integrate and document the activities required to disposition the legacy and/or surplus Enriched Uranium (EU) and Plutonium (Pu) and other nuclear materials already stored or anticipated to be received by facilities at the Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) as well as the activities to support the DOE Tritium mission. It establishes a planning basis for EU and Pu processing operations in Environmental Management Operations (EMO) facilities through the end of their program missions and for the tritium through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Defense Programs (DP) facilities. Its development is a joint effort among the Department of Energy - Savannah River (DOE-SR), DOE – Environmental Management (EM), NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3), NNSA Savannah River Field Office (SRFO), and the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS). Life-cycle program planning for Nuclear Materials Stabilization and Disposition and the Tritium Enterprise may use this Plan as a basis for the development of the nuclear materials disposition scope and schedule. This Plan assumes full funding to accomplish the required project and operations activities. It is recognized that some aspects of this Plan are pre decisional with regard to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); in such cases new NEPA actions will be required.
In support of the Department of Energy’s continued plans to de-inventory and reduce the footprint of Cold War era weapons’ material production sites, the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility, located in the K-Area Complex (KAC) at the Savannah River Site reservation, has expanded since its startup authorization in 2000 to accommodate DOE’s material consolidation mission. During the facility’s growth and expansion, KAMS will have expanded its authorization capability of material types and storage containers to allow up to 8200 total shipping containers once the current expansion effort completes in 2014. Recognizing the need to safely and cost effectively manage other surplus material across the DOE Complex, KAC is constantly evaluating the storage of different material types within K area. When modifying storage areas in KAC, the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) must undergo extensive calculations and reviews; however, without an extensive and proven security posture the possibility for expansion would not be possible. The KAC maintains the strictest adherence to safety and security requirements for all the SNM it handles. Disciplined Conduct of Operations and Conduct of Projects are demonstrated throughout this historical overview highlighting various improvements in capability, capacity, demonstrated cost effectiveness and utilization of the KAC as the DOE Center of Excellence for safe and secure storage of surplus SNM.