An Executable Plan for Stockpile Modernization: Reviewing the U.S. Stockpile Life Extension Plans and the Risk of Fiscal Austerity.
Abstract not provided.
Wartman, Derek↗
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Results for “STOCKPILES”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
An Introduction to Risk with a Focus on Design Diversity in the Stockpile
The maintenance and security of nuclear weapons in the stockpile involves decisions based on risk analysis and quantitative measures of risk. Risk is a factor in all decisions, a particularly important factor in decisions of a large scale. One example of high-risk decisions we will discuss is the risk involved in design diversity within the stockpile of nuclear weapons arsenal. Risk is defined as 'possibility of loss or injury' and the 'degree of probability of such loss' (Kaplan and Garrick 12). To introduce the risk involved with maintaining the weapons stockpile we will draw a parallel to the design and maintenance of Southwest Airlines fleet of Boeing 737 planes. The clear benefits for cost savings in maintenance of having a uniform fleet are what historically drove Southwest to have only Boeing 737s in their fleet. Less money and resources are need for maintenance, training, and materials. Naturally, risk accompanies those benefits. A defect in a part of the plane indicates a potential defect in that same part in all the planes of the fleet. As a result, safety, business, and credibility are at risk. How much variety or diversity does the fleet need to mitigate that risk? With that question in mind, a balance is needed to accommodate the different risks and benefits of the situation. In a similar way, risk is analyzed for the design and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. In conclusion, risk must be as low as possible when it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk, and to help balance options in stockpile stewardship.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Stockpile Stewardship at Los Alamos(U)
Stockpile stewardship is the retention of nuclear weapons in the stockpile beyond their original design life. These older weapons have potential changes inconsistent with the original design intent and military specifications. The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires us to develop high-fidelity, physics-based capabilities to predict, assess, certify and design nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test. Each year, the Lab Directors are required to provide an assessment of the safety, security, and reliability our stockpile to the President of the United States. This includes assessing whether a need to return to testing exists. This is a talk to provide an overview of Stockpile Stewardship's scientific requirements and how stewardship has changed in the absence of nuclear testing. The talk is adapted from an HQ talk to the War college, and historical unclassified talks on weapon's physics.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future
The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doing this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
The GSFC Combined Approach of ODC Stockpiling and Tribological Testing to Mitigate the Risks of ODC Elimination
In response to the elimination of production of several Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ODC's) which have been widely used in successful space flight mechanism cleaning and lubricating procedures, GSFC developed and implemented an overall philosophy of mitigating the risks to flight hardware during the transition phase to ODC-free cleaning procedures. The short term leg of the philosophy was the stockpiling of an appropriate amount of ODC solvents such that all short term GSFC missions will be able to stay with or revert to heritage cleaning and lubricating procedures in the face of life issues. The long-term leg of that philosophy was the initiation of a several tier testing program that will deliver increasing amounts of information over the next few years, starting with accelerated lubricant life tests that compare lubricant life on surfaces cleaned with ODC solvents with lubricant life on surfaces cleaned with ODC-free solvents. While tribological testing, mechanism life testing and space-flight experience will ultimately bring us into the 21st century with environmentally friendly means of cleaning long-life precision mechanism components, many satellites will be launched over the next few years before a number of important tribological questions can be answered. In order to prepare for this challenge, the Materials Engineering Branch in cooperation with the Electromechanical Branch launched an intensive review of all ongoing missions. The failure risk was determined for each long-life lubricated mechanism based on a number of parameters, including 4 comparison of flight solvents used to clean the heritage/life test hardware. Also studied was the ability of the mechanism manufacturers to stockpile ODC's based on state laws and company policies. A stockpiling strategy was constructed based on this information and subsequently implemented. This paper provides an overview of the GSFC ODC elimination risk mitigation philosophy as well as a detailed examination of the development of the ODC stockpiling plan.
Predmore, Roamer↗
The GSFC Combined Approach of ODC Stockpiling and Tribological Testing to Mitigate the Risks of ODC Elimination
In response to the elimination of production of several Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ODCs) which have been widely used in successful space flight mechanism cleaning and lubricating procedures, GSFC developed and implemented an overall philosophy of mitigating the risks to flight hardware during the transition phase to ODC-Free cleaning procedures. One leg of that philosophy is the initiation of a several tier testing program which will deliver increasing amounts of information over the next few years, starting with original surface analysis comparisons between ODC and various ODC-Free cleaning technologies. The other leg is the stockpiling of an appropriate amount of ODC solvents such that all short term GSFC missions will be able to stay with or revert to heritage cleaning and lubricating procedures in the face of life issues. While tribological testing, mechanism life testing and space-flight experience will ultimately bring us into the 21st century with environmentally friendly means of cleaning long-life precision mechanism components, many satellites will be launched over the next few years with a number of important tribological questions unanswered. In order to prepare for this challenge, the Materials Engineering Branch in cooperation with the Electromechanical Branch launched an intensive review of all ongoing missions. The failure risk was determined for each long-life mechanism based on a number of parameters, including a comparison of flight solvents used to clean the heritage/life test hardware. Also studied was the ability of the mechanism manufacturers to stockpile ODCs based on state laws and company policies. A stockpiling strategy was constructed based on this information and subsequently implemented. This paper provides an overview of the GSFC ODC elimination risk mitigation philosophy as well as a detailed examination of the development of the ODC stockpiling plan.
Predmore, Roamer↗
FY 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan - Biennial Plan Summary
This year’s summary report updates the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2016 SSMP), the 25-year strategic program of record that captures the plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure necessary to ensure the success of NNSA’s nuclear weapons mission. The SSMP is a companion to the Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2017-2021) report, the planning document for NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission. New versions of both reports are published each year in response to new requirements and challenges. Much was accomplished in FY 2015 as part of the program of record described in this year’s SSMP. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify for the twentieth time that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the need for underground nuclear explosive testing. The talented scientists, engineers, and technicians at the three national security laboratories, the four nuclear weapons production plants, and the national security site are primarily responsible for this continued success. Research, development, test, and evaluation programs have advanced NNSA’s understanding of weapons physics, component aging, and material properties through first-of-a-kind shock physics experiments, along with numerous other critical experiments conducted throughout the nuclear security enterprise. The multiple life extension programs (LEPs) that are under way made progress toward their first production unit dates. The W76-1 LEP is past the halfway point in total production, and the B61-12 completed three development flight tests. Critical to this success is the budget. The Administration’s budget request for NNSA’s Weapons Activities has increased for all but one of the past seven years, resulting in a total increase of approximately 45 percent since 2010. If adopted by Congress, the FY 2017 budget request will increase funding by $396 million (about 4.5 percent) from the enacted FY 2016 level. A significant portion of the increase would fund the research for multiple life extension programs, support the programs in Directed Stockpile Work, and modernize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise.
Source record↗
Stockpile Stewardship: How We Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent Without Testing
In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun, the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Prioritization of Stockpile Maintenance with Layered Pareto Fronts
Difficult choices are required for a decision-making process where resources and budgets are increasingly constrained. This study demonstrates a structured decision-making approach using layered Pareto fronts to identify priorities about how to allocate funds between munitions stockpiles based on their estimated reliability, the urgency of needing available units, and the consequences if adequate numbers of units are not available. This case study, while specific to the characteristics of a group of munitions stockpiles, illustrates the general process of structured decision-making based on first identifying appropriate metrics that summarize the important dimensions of the decision, and then objectively eliminating non-contenders from further consideration. Finally, the final subjective stage incorporates user priorities to select the four stockpiles to receive additional maintenance and surveillance funds based on understanding the trade-offs and robustness to various user priorities.
42 ENGINEERING↗
Risk in the Weapons Stockpile [Slides]
When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Without Testing: Stockpile Stewardship in the Second Nuclear Age
Stockpile stewardship is a topic dear to my heart. I’ve been fascinated by it, and I’ve lived it—mostly on the technical side but also on the policy side from 2009 to 2010 at Stanford University as a visiting scholar and the inaugural William J. Perry Fellow. At Stanford I worked with Perry, former secretary of defense, and Sig Hecker, former Los Alamos Lab director (1986–1997), looking at nuclear deterrence, nuclear policy, and stockpile stewardship and at where all this was headed.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Stockpile Stewardship: Los Alamos
"Heritage of Science" is a short video that highlights the Stockpile Stewardship program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Stockpile Stewardship was conceived in the early 1990s as a national science-based program that could assure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without the need for full-scale underground nuclear testing. This video was produced by Los Alamos National Laboratory for screening at the Lab's Bradbury Science Museum in Los Alamos, NM and is narrated by science correspondent Miles O'Brien.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship
A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program
The history of nuclear testing, the treaties associated with the decline and eventual elimination of testing, the inception of Stockpile Stewardship, how the enterprise conducts the program, and its future are explored in this paper. All the events that bring us to present time play in to how the nuclear enterprise will map out the future of our weapons stockpile.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Nuclear Posture Review and Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan [Slides]
This presentation provides an overview of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)m Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), and the Nuclear Posture Review and Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan group project.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
The Optics of Deterrence: How Science Assures the Nuclear Stockpile's Reliability In Lieu of Testing
When designing a product intended to perform a certain function and satisfy some set of criteria, the standard engineering method to assess its ability to perform is to test it. This nearly universal concept works consistently, assuring proper function and generally avoiding or mitigating the consequence of failure to within acceptable limits. What would happen if the product developers were told that they must continue to certify and validate the performance without testing it, that the landscape in which the product must serve its purpose is constantly evolving, and that the product in question is the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile? This is the position the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) finds itself in; the reliability of the stockpile must be verified without actually testing it to see if it works as intended.
43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
W-DO Unclassified Talk Series: W-Division Military & Stockpile Operations Office (W-MSO) [Slides]
LANL W-MSO (W-Division Military & Stockpile Operations Office) is designated by LANL W-DO to act as the interface within LANL to respond with capacity to fulfill their DA responsibilities on specific matters relating to field and stockpile support. They share responsibility with SNL-ML for NNSA interface with DOD for certain military activities, such as NW fielding, component exchange, and issues in support of USAF, USN, and UK trident programs. They are also a single point agent to SNL-ML, which is the primary DOD interface for the NNSA. W-MSO is designated by W-DO to act as the LANL interface for issues that arise with LANL designed components.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment
Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗