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At least 19 records

Partial defect verification of spent fuel assemblies by PDET: Principle and field testing in Interim Spent fuel Storage Facility (CLAB) in Sweden

Here, the need for the development of a credible method and instrument for partial defect verification of spent fuel has been emphasized over a few decades in the safeguards communities as the diverted spent fuel pins can be the source of nuclear terrorism or devices. The need is increasingly more important and even urgent as many countries have started to transfer spent fuel to so called "difficult-to-access" areas such as dry storage casks, reprocessing or geological repositories. Partial defect verification is required by IAEA before spent fuel is placed into "difficult-to-access" areas. Earlier, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has reported the successful development of a new, credible partial defect verification method for pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent fuel assemblies without use of operator data, and further reported the validation experiments using commercial spent fuel assemblies with some missing fuel pins. The method was found to be robust as the method is relatively invariant to the characteristic variations of spent fuel assemblies such as initial fuel enrichment, cooling time, and burn-up. Since then, the PDET system has been designed and prototyped for 17×17 PWR spent fuel assemblies, complete with data acquisition software and acquisition electronics. In this paper, a summary description of the PDET development followed by results of the first successful field testing using the integrated PDET system and actual spent fuel assemblies performed in a commercial spent fuel storage site, known as Central Interim Spent fuel Storage Facility (CLAB) in Sweden will be presented. In addition to partial defect detection initial studies have determined that the tool can be used to verify the operator declared average burnup of the assembly as well as intra-assembly bunrup levels.

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Development of the Licensing Procedure and Regulatory Framework for the Spent Fuel Storage facility in Korea - 16423

The Public Engagement Commission on SNF management (PECOS) published the recommendation report on the spent fuel management of Korea in June, 2015. Based on this report, the future national policy for spent fuel management of Korea has been established, taking into consideration the national/international trends on policy and technology development. Regardless of the recommendation report of PECOS, Spent fuel storage casks are necessary in Korea. Therefore, various types of spent fuel storage casks are now being developed by Korea vendors. For example, Concrete storage casks and dual purpose metal casks are now under development by the KORAD (Korea Radioactive waste agency) for future use in the interim storage facility. Unfortunately, there is no independent licensing procedure for spent fuel storage casks in Nuclear Safety Act (NSA) because is the casks are considered an integral part of the interim storage facility safety equipment. Furthermore, the definition of radioactive waste in the NSA was changed recently. Now, spent fuel is separated from the definition of 'radioactive waste'. Spent fuel can only become radioactive waste by the decision through the meeting of the relative ministers of Korea government. For that reason, the licensing procedure for interim spent fuel storage facilities was separated from the current 'disposal facility, etc.' in accordance with the article 63 of NSA. The aim of this study is to develop the licensing procedure for the storage cask, and also to develop a revised draft of interim storage facility procedure within the NSA. Once this independent licensing procedure on the spent fuel storage cask is introduced to the NSA, it is expected that developers or operators can develop and commercialize the storage cask in Korea. In this study, an independent licensing procedure for the spent fuel storage facility was developed including the storage cask licensing procedure for the NSA. The procedure was composed of the permit for construction and operation of interim storage facility, criteria for permit, inspection criteria, periodic safety review, and decommissioning criteria, etc. The detailed contents of these requirements were also developed to introduce the regulatory framework for the interim storage facility. Particularly, periodic safety review and decommissioning criteria were developed in accordance with the recommendation of IRRS (International Regulatory Review Service) of IAEA. The developed licensing procedure for spent fuel storage facility will be introduced in NSA in response to the revised definition of NSA and the recommendation report of PECOS. (authors)

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Long-term Prediction of Spent Fuel Storage Canisters - Issues and Approaches - 18112

The considerations involved in aging management of stainless steel canisters used in dry cask storage of spent fuel are discussed in this paper in a probabilistic framework. The two important modes of degradation in the long-term performance of the casks are localized corrosion and stress corrosion cracking initiating from the external surface. These degradation modes are determined by the evolution of the electrochemical behavior and the strain rate of the stainless steel. Laboratory data suggest that Type 304L/316L stainless steels should suffer from localized corrosion and SCC under salt deposits. However, field inspection of the canisters has not indicated extensive pitting or stress corrosion cracking. This discrepancy can be understood in terms of the joint probabilities of various factors that must come together to cause these failure modes. A Bayesian network approach is suggested as the framework for modeling the probability of failure of canisters and long-term management of aging. The gaps in knowledge to conduct a Bayesian network analysis are discussed. (authors)

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Thermal Evaluations for Hypothetically Drain-Down Spent Fuel Storage Facility at SRS

The L-Area Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) underwater storage facility at Savannah River Site (SRS), referred to as L-Basin SNF facility, has an array of Vertical Tube Storage (VTS) racks and a group of High Flux Irradiation Reactor (HFIR) fuel cores. The underwater facility is integrally designed as a wet SNF storage system with a chemically-controlled water pool. The SNF storage racks are seismically qualified. The L-Basin pool holds about 3.4 million gallons of water with concrete wall thickness of about 5 ft and water depths of 17 ft to 30 ft. The facility has mainly two different elevation levels of 30 ft and 17 ft below the ground level. At the level 30 ft below the ground, a maximum of 110 racks of VTS and 5 racks of Dry Cave can be stored. At the level of 17 ft below the ground, 120 HFIR cores can be stored, considering that each rack contains two HFIR cores. In case of a hypothetical accident, all cooling water in the storage pool may be drained away, resulting in dry SNF storage condition. The primary objective of the work is to estimate the maximum fuel temperature in a conservative manner when the L-Basin facility is completely dry due to the hypothetical drain-down of the pool water. A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling approach was taken for the thermal evaluations of the water-drained SNF storage facility. The modeling calculations were performed, assuming that all of the storage racks in L-Basin are fully loaded with SNF assemblies containing decay heat sources. In the case of full loading, the L-Basin facility stores 14,600 SNF assemblies in VTS racks and 120 cores in HFIR racks. The thermal analysis results of the L-Basin model yielded maximum temperatures of VTS and HFIR fuel assemblies for different fuel loading scenarios and boundary conditions of the SNF storage racks.

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Assessing the release, transport, and retention of radioactive aerosols from hypothetical breaches in spent fuel storage canisters

Interim dry storage of spent nuclear fuel involves storing the fuel in welded stainless-steel canisters. Under certain conditions, the canisters could be subjected to environments that may promote stress corrosion cracking leading to a risk of breach and release of aerosol-sized particulate from the interior of the canister to the external environment through the crack. Research is currently under way by several laboratories to better understand the formation and propagation of stress corrosion cracks, however little work has been done to quantitatively assess the potential aerosol release. The purpose of the present work is to introduce a reliable generic numerical model for prediction of aerosol transport, deposition, and plugging in leak paths similar to stress corrosion cracks, while accounting for potential plugging from particle deposition. The model is dynamic (changing leak path geometry due to plugging) and it relies on the numerical solution of the aerosol transport equation in one dimension using finite differences. The model’s capabilities were also incorporated into a Graphical User Interface (GUI) that was developed to enhance user accessibility. Model validation efforts presented in this paper compare the model’s predictions with recent experimental data from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and results available in literature. We expect this model to improve the accuracy of consequence assessments and reduce the uncertainty of radiological consequence estimations in the remote event of a through-wall breach in dry cask storage systems.

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Accident analysis of spent fuel storage and transportation cask with Gd based neutron absorber

The shortage of nuclear spent fuel storage pool has been issued. The spent fuel storage and transportation cask is one of the major alternatives for storing spent fuel. The use of advanced neutron absorber is important for effective storage of spent fuel in spent fuel cask. Gadolinium based neutron absorber is chosen since it has high neutron absorption cross section in thermal neutron region compared to boron and it does not produce any gas element when it reacts with a neutron. The major requirement for neutron absorbing materials in the spent fuel cask system is to maintain subcriticality in normal, off-normal and accident conditions. In this study, the criticality calculations under accident conditions are conducted to ensure the safety of spent fuel cask. Major accident conditions are flood and cask tip-over. The full and partial flooded condition is analyzed and 100% flooded condition has the highest reactivity. The water density is selected as 1 g/cm{sup 3} because k{sub eff} is highest at this condition. When the cask tip-over, the flux trap reduces. In this case, a huge increase in reactivity of 800 pcm takes place. (authors)

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Structural Health Monitoring of Nuclear Spent Fuel Storage Facilities

Interim storage of spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites has gained additional importance and urgency for resolving waste-management-related technical issues. To ensure that nuclear power remains clean energy, monitoring has been identified by DOE as a high priority cross-cutting need, necessary to determine and predict the degradation state of the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) important to safety (ITS). Therefore, nondestructive structural condition monitoring becomes a need to be installed on existing or to be integrated into future storage system to quantify the state of health or to guarantee the safe operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) during their extended life span. In this project, the lead university and the collaborating national laboratory teamed to develop a nuclear structural health monitoring (n-SHM) system based on in-situ piezoelectric sensing technologies that can monitor structural degradation and aging for nuclear spent fuel DCSS and similar structures. We also aimed to identify and quantify possible influences of nuclear spent fuel environment (temperature and radiation) to the piezoelectric sensor system and come up with adequate solutions and guidelines therefore. We have therefore developed analytical model for piezoelectric based n-SHM methods, with considerations of temperature and irradiation influence on the model of sensing and algorithms in acoustic emission (AE), guided ultrasonic waves (GUW), and electromechanical impedance spectroscopy (EMIS). On the other side, experimentally the temperature and irradiation influence on the piezoelectric sensors and sensing capabilities were investigated. Both short-term and long-term irradiation investigation with our collaborating national laboratory were performed. Moreover, we developed multi-modal sensing, validated in laboratory setup, and conducted the testing on the We performed multi-modal sensing development, verification and validation tests on very complex structures including a medium-scale vacuum drying chamber and a small-scale mockup canister available for the desired testing. Our work developed the potential candidate for long term structural health monitoring of spent fuel canister through piezoelectric wafer sensors and provided the sensing methodologies based on AE and GUW methodologies. It overall provides an innovative system and methodology for enhancing the safe operation of nuclear power plant. All major accomplishments planned in the original proposal were successfully achieved.

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Research and Experiment on the Key Technologies of the Spent Fuel Storage in HTR-PM - 18486

High Temperature Reactor demonstration project of China (HTR-PM) is one of the major national science and technology projects, some key technologies for the design and operation of the demonstration project are formed to research according to the main technology. The spent fuel storage system is one of the main systems of the HTR-PM. In order to solve the technical problems related to the operation of spent fuel, several experiments have been conducted, including: spent fuel loading, getting back, spent fuel canister hoisting, storage well cover hoisting, storage canister drop and so on. In the study process, the test facility has been set up to carry on the operation and the experiment verification to ensure the reliability and safety of the spent fuel storage system. Spent fuel storage system undertakes spent fuel receiving, spent fuel canister transfer, storage, lifting and other functions in HTR-PM, the project research need to solve several major technical problems related to the spent fuel operation, which mainly include: Develop the transportable spent fuel canister for HTR-PM, the canister is corrosion resistance, impact resistance, and is in subcritical condition when loaded with fuel. Develop the spent fuel canister hoister, which could hoist the spent fuel canister safely and reliably. Develop the spent fuel storage well cover hoister, which could hoist the well cover safely and reliably. Study the small probability of the spent fuel canister in extreme condition of canister hoist falling accidents, to ensure the radiation protect safety and residual heat removal safety of the canister in case of the canister drop when lifting. Develop the spent fuel charging device and return device, which could load the spent fuel elements into the spent fuel canister, and could take out the fuel elements from the canister. The key technology and equipment of the spent fuel storage system in HTR-PM would be solved through the research of the project. Project research is very important for the implementation and safe operation of the HTR-PM project. (authors)

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Extending Spent Fuel Storage until Transport for Reprocessing or Disposal

Spent fuel (SF) must be stored until an end point such as reprocessing or geologic disposal is imple-mented. Selection and implementation of an end point for SF depends upon future funding, legisla-tion, licensing and other factors that cannot be predicted with certainty. Past presumptions related to the availability of an end point have often been wrong and resulted in missed opportunities for properly informing spent fuel management policies and strategies. For example, dry cask storage systems were originally conceived to free up needed space in reactor spent fuel pools and also to provide SFS of up to 20 years until reprocessing and/or deep geological disposal became available. Hundreds of dry cask storage systems are now employed throughout the world and will be relied upon well beyond the originally envisioned design life. Given present and projected rates for the use of nuclear power coupled with projections for SF repro-cessing and disposal capacities, one concludes that SF storage will be prolonged, potentially for several decades. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently considered 300 years of storage to be appropriate for the characterization and prediction of ageing effects and ageing management issues associated with extending SF storage and subsequent transport. This paper encourages addressing the uncertainty associated with the duration of SF storage by de-sign – rather than by default. It suggests ways that this uncertainty may be considered in design, li-censing, policy, and strategy decisions and proposes a framework for safely extending spent fuel storage until SF can be transported for reprocessing or disposal – regardless of how long that may be. The paper however is not intended to either encourage or facilitate needlessly extending spent fuel storage durations. Its intent is to ensure a design and safety basis with sufficient margin to accommodate the full range of potential future scenarios. Although the focus is primarily on storage of SF from commercial operation, the principles described are equally applicable to SF from research and production reactors as well as high-level radioactive waste.

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Criticality safety analysis of spent fuel storage or handling disposals using burnup credit - loading curve calculation - 14445

MILLENNIUM and REEL SAS Companies have shared their own experience to develop a neutron and criticality calculations chain in order to perform isotopic composition predictions of spent fuel after irradiation in a reactor and criticality analysis of fuel storages taking into account burnup credit. The whole calculation sequence is divided into three steps, all calling SCALE 6.1.2 modules. The first two steps are dedicated to the evaluation of isotopic compositions of burnt fuel. As transport and depletion calculations in three dimensions appears to be way too long for the whole core (about several months), dealing with each fuel assembly one by one is the alternative solution MILLENNIUM and REEL SAS commonly chose to study. Therefore, the first step aims at determining the axial burnup profile of a given fuel assembly using a 3-D model with infinite reflections on lateral axes. The T6-depl sequence of TRITON module coupling KENO-VI and ORIGEN-S was used in this step. Sensitivity studies confirmed that addition of the 8 closest neighbors of the studied fuel assembly in the model has an insignificant impact on the axial burnup profile. However, fuel assemblies in the peripheral zone of the core must be treated separately with a model including the nearest fuel assemblies and the effect of peripheral water. Then, the second phase evaluates the isotopic compositions of each fuel assemblies at the center of the active height with a 2-D model under conservative core conditions. The T-depl sequence of the TRITON module coupling NEWT to ORIGEN-S is called in this step. Each fuel assembly must be studied separately to consider loading pattern changes occurring at each cycle. An infinite model with reflections on lateral axes is used and the closest neighbors of the fuel assembly are limited to 2 pins - which is around the size of the neutrons mean free path in the core. This is an innovative physical trick aiming at compensating for a limited computing power. Finally, isotopic compositions calculated are combined with the axial burnup profile of the first step to extrapolate the concentrations along the whole active length. Data can then be added in any criticality model, such as a spent fuel pit or any disposal handling fuel assemblies. Criticality analyses of burnt fissile material using burnup credit can be managed within a reasonable amount of time, on condition that sufficient proofs of code qualification for the studied range of parameters are provided, especially on fission products isotopic compositions calculation. (authors)

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ORIGAMI Automator Primer. Automated ORIGEN Source Terms and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Analysis

Source terms and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage pool decay heat load analyses for operating nuclear power plants require a large number of Oak Ridge Isotope Generation and Depletion (ORIGEN) calculations. SNF source term calculations also require a significant amount of bookkeeping to track quantities such as core and assembly operating histories, spent fuel pool (SFP) residence times, heavy metal masses, and enrichments. The ORIGEN Assembly Isotopics (ORIGAMI) module in the SCALE code system provides a simple scheme for entering these data. However, given the large scope of the analysis, extensive scripting is necessary to convert formats and process data to create thousands of ORIGAMI input files (one per assembly) and to process the results into formats readily usable by follow-on analysis tools. This primer describes a project within the SCALE Fulcrum graphical user interface (GUI) called ORIGAMI Automator that was developed to automate the scripting and bookkeeping in large-scale source term analyses. The ORIGAMI Automator enables the analyst to (1) easily create, view, and edit the reactor site and assembly information, (2) automatically create and run ORIGAMI inputs, and (3) analyze the results from ORIGAMI. ORIGAMI Automator uses the standard ORIGEN binary concentrations files produced by ORIGAMI, with concentrations available at all time points in each assembly’s life. The GUI plots results such as mass, concentration, activity, and decay heat using a powerful new ORIGEN Post-Processing Utility for SCALE (OPUS) GUI component. This document includes a description and user guide for the GUI, a step-by-step tutorial for a simplified scenario, and appendices that document the file structures used.

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Evaluation and Demonstration of Intrusion Detection for Spent Fuel Storage Facilities

The IAEA recommends dual containment and surveillance (C/S) systems for difficult to access or difficult to measure spent fuel storage areas. However, many storage areas have limitations that prevent traditional secondary C/S systems, such as radiation levels too high for inspectors to apply individual Tamper Indicating Devices (TID) or have physical impedances to the use of TIDs. Recent developments in C/S technology include Laser Curtain for Containment (LCCT) technology implemented at Atucha-1 power plant in Argentina. The LCCT is a new approach to perimeter-wide C/S and the IAEA has granted provisional approval for its use as one of two required C/S systems. This proposal focuses on investigating and testing new and evolving completely passive (or ultra-low power) tamper indicating systems that will provide backup C/S to the LCCT even during power outages. An investigation of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technology will be conducted to identify readily available options. Optically Stimulated Luminescence (OSL) fibers will also be investigated. OSL fibers are a passive technology that can measure radiation dose by knocking an electron into a metastable state where it remains until the fiber is interrogated with light. The goal of this project would be to investigate COTS technologies that can be used in low or no power scenarios for radiation detection as well as test and evaluate OSL technology, which can operate passively in no power scenarios. Limitations for each technology will be determined and documented in an effort to determine the best technology for spent fuel storage monitoring.

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Vacuum drying of spent fuel storage canisters/casks - 'just how much water could be left in there, anyway?' - 15233

The process of moving spent fuel assemblies from wet storage in the spent fuel pool to dry storage in an inert gas environment within a canister or cask typically involves two main stages. In the first stage, the bulk of the water is removed by a draining or siphoning operation, conducted with pressure inside the canister maintained at 1.3 to 2 atm. This process removes most of the water in the cask cavity, but residual water can be left behind, in three main regions. The largest region, typically, is the bottom of the cavity below the end of the siphon tube. A second general class of locations, also located at the bottom of the cask cavity, consists of the 'dashpots' at the ends of the various non-fuel tubular structures within the fuel assemblies. For PWR assemblies, these are the control rod guide sleeve tubes and instrumentation thimbles. For BWR assemblies, these are the water rods of various designs and control blade ends in some configurations. A third class of locations consists of porous material within the cavity that can absorb water, such as thin ceramic neutron poison plates, and ostensibly intact fuel rods that nevertheless might have pinholes or fine cracks in the cladding that could allow pool water to creep inside the fuel rod. To remove residual water from these locations, the second stage of drying operations utilizes vacuum drying, by reducing the pressure sufficiently to convert the water to vapor that can then be pumped out of the canister cavity. In this operation, the cask cavity pressure is slowly reduced from the nominal condition of (1.3-2.0 atm (1000-1520 torr), to a final target pressure below 3 torr (0.004 atm). This is typically accomplished in three to five stages, with prescribed 'hold' points defined in procedures or in the Technical Specifications, to preclude sudden pressure spikes due to flashing of water to steam, or development of large local temperature gradients in the fuel rods or other cask internal components. This paper discusses the various locations in the system where residual water may 'hang up' in the cask, and presents a discussion of the physical basis for the effectiveness of vacuum drying for removing it. Results and conclusions based on realistic qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the transient heat transfer behavior of the system are presented, based on detailed modeling of a range of spent fuel canister designs and decay heat loads, most notably the 24P Dry Shielded Canisters (DSCs) stored at the Rancho Seco Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), the NAC-MPC modules at Maine Yankee, the 24P DSCs stored at Calvert Cliffs, and the Holtec HI-STORM modules at Hope Creek. The evaluations presented here show that ice formation within a spent fuel canister is highly unlikely, due to the availability of a large thermal source term in the form of the decay heat load of the spent fuel. The formation of ice is an operational concern, since it mainly affects operation of equipment external to the canister (i.e., the hoses, valves, and fittings of the vacuum drying equipment.) Evaluations are presented for quantifying the amount of residual water that could remain in the cask cavity, even after successful drying operations, since vacuum drying is a limit process, and by definition, cannot remove all of the water from the cavity, no matter how long the operation goes on, even if all of it is in vapor form. (authors)

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COBRA-SFS thermal-hydraulic analysis code for spent fuel storage and transportation casks: Models and methods

COBRA-SFS, a thermal-hydraulics code developed for steady-state and transient analysis of multi-assembly spent-fuel storage and transportation systems, has been incorporated into the Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System tool as a module devoted to spent fuel package thermal analysis. This paper summarizes the basic formulation of the equations and models used in the COBRA-SFS code, showing that COBRA-SFS fully captures the important physical behavior governing the thermal performance of spent fuel storage systems, with internal and external natural convection flow patterns, and heat transfer by convection, conduction, and thermal radiation. Of particular significance is the capability for detailed thermal radiation modeling within the fuel rod array.

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Improved Hybrid Modeling of Spent Fuel Storage Facilities

This work developed a new computational method for improving the ability to calculate the neutron flux in deep-penetration radiation shielding problems that contain areas with strong streaming. The “gold standard” method for radiation transport is Monte Carlo (MC) as it samples the physics exactly and requires few approximations. Historically, however, MC was not useful for shielding problems because of the computational challenge of following particles through dense shields. Instead, deterministic methods, which are superior in term of computational effort for these problems types but are not as accurate, were used. Hybrid methods, which use deterministic solutions to improve MC calculations through a process called variance reduction, can make it tractable from a computational time and resource use perspective to use MC for deep-penetration shielding. Perhaps the most widespread and accessible of these methods are the Consistent Adjoint Driven Importance Sampling (CADIS) and Forward-Weighted CADIS (FW-CADIS) methods. For problems containing strong anisotropies, such as power plants with pipes through walls, spent fuel cask arrays, active interrogation, and locations with small air gaps or plates embedded in water or concrete, hybrid methods are still insufficiently accurate. In this work, a new method for generating variance reduction parameters for strongly anisotropic, deep penetration radiation shielding studies was developed. This method generates an alternate form of the adjoint scalar flux quantity, Φ Ω , which is used by both CADIS and FW-CADIS to generate variance reduction parameters for local and global response functions, respectively. The new method, called CADIS-Ω, was implemented in the Denovo/ADVANTG software. Results indicate that the flux generated by CADIS-Ω incorporates localized angular anisotropies in the flux more effectively than standard methods. CADIS-Ω outperformed CADIS in several test problems. This initial work indicates that CADIS- may be highly useful for shielding problems with strong angular anisotropies. This is a benefit to the public by increasing accuracy for lower computational effort for many problems that have energy, security, and economic importance.

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COBRA-SFS Version 6.2.1 User Guide: A Thermal Hydraulic Analysis Code for Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks

This document is an updated and reduced version of the complete documentation of the COBRA-SFS thermal analysis code (COolant Boiling in Rod Arrays – Spent Fuel Storage) (Michener et al. 1995). This manual provides the analyst with input instructions and fundamental guidelines for contrasting models using COBRA-SFS. COBRA-SFS is designed to analyze the dry storage and transportation casks that house spent or used nuclear fuel. The primary focus and application is on square light water reactor fuel assemblies, however the code also has the capability to model hexagonal assemblies and is will suited to any geometry that can be defined as an extruded 2-D map.

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Regulatory perspective of boiling water reactor peak reactivity credit in spent fuel storage and transportation - 14592

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performs reviews of applications for spent nuclear fuel transportation packages and storage casks to ensure pertinent safety regulations are met. Among other acceptance criteria, these regulations require that the package be subcritical under a variety of normal, off-normal and accident conditions. Currently, all spent nuclear fuel transportation packages and storage casks assume fresh fuel (i.e., the fuel is unirradiated) in their criticality safety analyses for boiling water reactor (BWR) fuels. Reviews using this conservative assumption are less complex. The fresh fuel assumption for BWR fuel does not allow the presence of gadolinium (often called the 'fresh fuel no-Gad' assumption), an integral burnable absorber present in nearly all BWR fuel assemblies. More recently, applicants began requesting credit for the reactivity reduction due to depletion. This credit is commonly referred to as 'burnup credit' (BUC). As of today, NRC recommends that only analyses for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) spent fuel implement BUC. This is due to the fact there is limited directly applicable data available to benchmark codes for depletion and reactivity calculations for BWR BUC analyses, and determining the most reactive irradiation conditions is much less straightforward than for PWR BUC analyses. Similar to what was done for PWR BUC, the NRC staff and its contractors have begun identifying and prioritizing significant technical issues so that a technical basis for the allowance of BWR BUC can be developed. BWR fuel exhibits a peak in reactivity where initial gadolinium is depleted. Crediting burnup at this point is generally referred to as using a 'peak reactivity method'. This is a conservative approach and a method routinely used in BWR spent fuel pool criticality analyses. NRC is implementing a two-phased approach in investigating BWR BUC. Phase 1 investigates peak reactivity credit and Phase 2 evaluates BUC at a typical discharge exposure. This paper discusses peak reactivity credit and its history in regulatory analyses, challenges the NRC expects in reviewing an application requesting peak BWR reactivity credit for a spent fuel transportation package or storage cask, the work that is being performed by NRC contractors to address these challenges, and future work on peak reactivity credit and full BWR BUC. (authors)

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