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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF– 24138

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Drop Analysis of Department of Energy Standard Canister with Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF at the INL site for ?road-ready dry storage?. ?Road-ready dry storage? is a SNF management concept where SNF is packaged into dry and sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transportation. The forward-looking goal of the Demonstration is establishing the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. The Demonstration will first package Fort Saint Vrain SNF currently stored at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters. These Standard Canisters will then be loaded into another commercial transportation or storage containment system (e.g., storage cask or transportation package). The Standard Canister is a class of standardized canisters designed for containing the large variety of DOE-managed SNF during interim storage, transportation and/or disposal at a geological repository. One critical aspect of road-ready dry storage is the ability to license the DOE Standard Canisters and its associated transportation package to 10 CFR 71. Depending on the SNF and transportation strategy, the Standard Canisters may have to maintain structural integrity under normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident scenarios (i.e., drop events). The Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs. However, no analysis has been completed to support the recent Demonstration. This analysis will consider the Ø0.5 m × 5.1 m Standard Canister under drop scenario(s) considered in previous INL tests and analyses, including the 9 m drop at 80 degree off vertical. However, this analysis will consider the more recent Fort Saint Vrain loading configurations proposed for the Demonstration. This analysis will performed using strain-based acceptance criteria established by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 3. It will be compared to previous analyses and form the foundation of further formal calculations that will be used to support licensing efforts of the road-ready dry storage system at INL.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

miss-SNF: a multimodal patient similarity network integration approach to handle completely missing data sources

Abstract Motivation Precision medicine leverages patient-specific multimodal data to improve prevention, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of diseases. Advancing precision medicine requires the non-trivial integration of complex, heterogeneous, and potentially high-dimensional data sources, such as multi-omics and clinical data. In the literature, several approaches have been proposed to manage missing data, but are usually limited to the recovery of subsets of features for a subset of patients. A largely overlooked problem is the integration of multiple sources of data when one or more of them are completely missing for a subset of patients, a relatively common condition in clinical practice. Results We propose miss-Similarity Network Fusion (miss-SNF), a novel general-purpose data integration approach designed to manage completely missing data in the context of patient similarity networks. miss-SNF integrates incomplete unimodal patient similarity networks by leveraging a non-linear message-passing strategy borrowed from the SNF algorithm. miss-SNF is able to recover missing patient similarities and is “task agnostic”, in the sense that can integrate partial data for both unsupervised and supervised prediction tasks. Experimental analyses on nine cancer datasets from The Cancer Genome Atlas (TCGA) demonstrate that miss-SNF achieves state-of-the-art results in recovering similarities and in identifying patients subgroups enriched in clinically relevant variables and having differential survival. Moreover, amputation experiments show that miss-SNF supervised prediction of cancer clinical outcomes and Alzheimer’s disease diagnosis with completely missing data achieves results comparable to those obtained when all the data are available. Availability and implementation miss-SNF code, implemented in R, is available at https://github.com/AnacletoLAB/missSNF.

Biochemistry & Molecular Biology↗
DOE OSTI2023

Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY22) Appendix I: SNF Aerosols Released During Rod Fracture

As a part of the DOE NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods, are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin Zirc-4, ZIRLO, and M5. The DEs are being conducted to obtain a baseline of the HBU rods’ condition before dry storage and are focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability. Fuel rods and defueled cladding will be tested to derive material properties. Although the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, one primary goal for obtaining the post-irradiation examination data and the associated measured mechanical properties is to support SNF dry storage licensing and relicensing activities by (1) addressing identified knowledge gaps and (2) enhancing the technical basis for post-storage transportation, handling, and subsequent disposition. This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase 1 DE activities related to the collection of SNF aerosol particles released during fuel rod fracture in 4-point bending in Phase 1 of the sister rod test program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY23) Appendix I: SNF Aerosols Released During Rod Fracture

This report documents work performed under the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). This work was performed to fulfill Level 3 Milestone M3SF-23OR010201026, “FY23 M3 draft report on results from testing in FY23,” within work package SF-23OR01020102 and is an updated to the work reported in M2SF-23OR010201024, M2SF-22OR010201047, M2SF-21OR010201032, M2SF-19ORO010201026, and M2SF-19OR010201028. As a part of the DOE NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods, are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin Zirc-4, ZIRLO, and M5. The DEs are being conducted to obtain a baseline of the HBU rods’ condition before dry storage and are focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability. Fuel rods and defueled cladding will be tested to derive material properties. Although the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, one primary goal for obtaining the post-irradiation examination data and the associated measured mechanical properties is to support SNF dry storage licensing and relicensing activities by (1) addressing identified knowledge gaps and (2) enhancing the technical basis for post-storage transportation, handling, and subsequent disposition.This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase 1 DE activities related to the collection of SNF aerosol particles released during fuel rod fracture in 4-point bending in Phase 1 of the sister rod test program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impurity gas detection for SNF canisters using probabilistic deep learning and acoustic sensing *

Abstract Monitoring impurity gases in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters is a novel structural health monitoring approach for SNF in dry storage. The SNF canisters are sealed containers that do not facilitate visual access to the inside. Acoustic sensing can be deployed by taking advantage of the pathways unobstructed by internal hardware. Although the ultrasonic time-of-flight measurement can provide valuable information, it is limited in its ability to discern the concentration of only one impurity gas. As such, deep learning algorithms, particularly convolutional neural networks (CNNs), offer a promising solution. In this study, CNN-based probabilistic deep learning models were implemented to detect and quantify multiple impurity gases in helium. An experimental platform was established to simulate canister conditions, and ultrasonic test data were collected. The presence of argon and air in helium at concentrations ranging from 0% to 1.2% at increments of 0.05% was considered. The multi-layer perceptron, decision tree, and logistic regression classifiers achieved high accuracies when distinguishing pure helium from helium with impurities. CNN with dropout layers and CNN using maximum likelihood estimation showed a similar performance, indicating their ability to capture uncertainties. The ensemble CNN model exhibited improved predictions and the ability to balance individual gas concentration by integrating 1D- and 2D-CNN models. These findings contribute probabilistic deep learning solutions for impurity gas detection and analysis within SNF canisters, thus ensuring safe storage and management of SNFs.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Computational and Experimental Investigation of Thermal-Mechanical- Chemical Mechanisms of High-burnup Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Processes at Elevated Temperatures and Degradation Behavior in Geologic Repositories

The overarching goal of the combined computational and experimental R&D activities proposed in this project is to enhance understanding of the mechanisms and thermal-mechanical-chemical (TMC) parameters controlling the instant release fraction (IRF) and matrix dissolution of high-burnup (HB; burnup) spent nuclear fuels (SNFs) and the subsequent formation, stability, and phase transformations of SNF alteration products under long-term storage and geological disposal conditions. Uranium dioxide may undergo oxidative corrosion/alteration, and the IRF may be increased for HB SNF, both of which may affect environmental systems associated with SNF long-term storage and disposal. The oxidative matrix dissolution may form various complex uranyl-based phases, including a rich variety of oxides, silicates, carbonates and other secondary minerals in varied geological environments (e.g., studtite, metastudtite, amorphous uranyl peroxide, uranium trioxide, triuranium octoxide, schoepite, dehydrated schoepite, metaschoepite, becquerelite, soddyite, rutherfordine,...). These uranyl phases generally have higher mobility UO 2 +2 species than less soluble U 4+ phases. However, limited information on the thermodynamic properties and formation kinetics of these uranyl-bearing phases is available to predict explicitly paragenesis under the conditions relevant to long-term storage or disposal. The proposed project draws on complementary expertise and research backgrounds from the team members: (i) to apply a combined ab initio modeling (UNLV/UTEP and SNL) and experimental (UNLV) strategy investigating the high-temperature TMC mechanisms of alteration of SNF under α-radiolysis conditions; (ii) to investigate the mechanistic of phase transformations in UNF degradation products under various conditions expected in long-term storage systems (e.g. (UO 2 )O 2 (H 2 O) 4 → (UO 2 )O 2 (H 2 O) 2 → U 2 O 7 → UO 3 → U 3 O 8 ); (iii) to determine high-accuracy TMC parameters for complex uranyl-based phases formed in storage or geological disposal environments (e.g. UO 3 (H 2 O) 2 , Ca[(UO 2 ) 6 O 4 (OH) 8 ] 8 H 2 O, (UO 2 ) 2 (SiO 4 ) 3 2H 2 O,…). The unforeseen COVID-19 pandemic led to the laboratory/campus closure since March 2020, that resulted in a significant delay in reaching milestones in a satisfactory manner, due to (i) the statewide recommendation from stop-working to later limited work in the lab and work-from-home (WFH), (ii) no in-person interactions, and (iii) a hiring freeze at UNLV. Therefore, a no cost extension (10/01/2021- 9/30/2022) was requested to help make up the time we lost during the global pandemic in 2020-2021, leading to paradigm shifts in the focus of the project in the following three main tasks: Task 1 (Computational), Task 2 (Experimental), and Task 3 (Final report, due on 12/29/2022).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Remaining Life Prediction of SNF Storage Canisters Exposed to CISCC Environments

• DOE Standardized SNF Storage Canisters o DOE designed standard spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage canisters for storage of DOE SNF. o DOE canisters are significantly different from commercial MultiPurpose Canisters (MPC) in size. o MPC canisters are large, a height = 15.8 ft, OD = 68”, WT = 0.5”. o DOE canisters are small with 18” / 24” diameter, 10’ / 15’ length. • Integrity Evaluation of DOE versus MPC Canisters o Many investigations have been performed for MPC canisters. o Limit investigations were performed for DOE standard canisters. Most were done at Idaho National Lab (INL). o DOE has sponsored integrity studies to evaluate weld integrity using drop tests and FEA simulations. o No evaluation on CISCC/service life of DOE canister in literature. o MPC canister: 4 axial welds, 1 center girth weld, 2 closing welds.

ZHU, Xiankui↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Effect of DPC Fillers on FEPs Relevant to Disposal of SNF

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is investigating the use of different materials that could be used to fill the void space inside a dual-purpose canister (DPC) loaded with spent nuclear fuel (SNF) just before it is emplaced in a deep geologic repository. The purpose of adding filler material is to maintain subcritical conditions in the repository during the postclosure period, which can span up to 1,000,000 years. Several types of materials have been proposed, including metals, cements, particulates, and glass. Part of this investigation addresses how the presence of filler material inside a DPC will affect the performance of the repository with respect to the repository features; the consequences of events that may occur; and the multiple thermal, hydrologic, chemical, and mechanical processes that may occur in a deep geologic repository over long timescales. This report describes some of the filler materials that have been proposed and studied; identifies 11 features, 6 events, and 25 processes that may be affected by the presence of filler materials; and discusses the effects that may require consideration for each feature, event, or process. The results of this study can be used to direct appropriate research and to develop suitable models if the DOE decides to use fillers to maintain subcritical conditions in DPCs used to dispose of SNF.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations (FY22 Status Update)

High-level purpose of this work: This report summarizes work carried out by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in the fiscal year 2022 (FY22) to evaluate the potential occurrence of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters. The U.S. currently lacks a repository for permanent disposal of SNF; thus, dry storage systems will be in use for much longer time periods than originally intended. Gap analyses by the US Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB), and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) have all determined that an improved understanding of the occurrence and risk of canister SCC is critical to demonstrating the safety of long-term dry storage. Should canister penetration by SCC occur, the containment boundary represented by the canister would be breached. A loss of the inert environment (helium) within the canister could occur and intrusion of air and moisture could react with and damage the fuel within the canister. For this reason, the DOE is funding an effort to evaluate the potential occurrence and consequences of dry storage canister SCC and to develop prevention, mitigation, and repair technologies for this degradation mechanism.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Flaw Tolerance Assessment for DOE Standard SNF Dry Storage Canisters - 26550

The U.S. DOE has designed four spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters for storing DOE standardized SNFs. The DOE standard canisters are cylindrical shells with a diameter of 24 inches (610 m) or 18 inches (457 m), a wall thickness of 0.5 inches (12.7 m) or 0.375 inches (9.53 m), and a length of 15 feet (4.57 m) or 10 feet (3.05 m). These DOE canister geometries are completely different from commercial canisters. The latter may experience chloride-induced stress cracking corrosion (CI-SCC) because they are stored near coastal regions. The former may not experience CI-SCC but face different challenges because they are stored in the SNF storage facilities. Because of large residual stresses, mechanical flaws may occur in the DOE canisters during long-distance transportation or lifting handling. To date, only limited structural integrity analyses were carried out through drop tests on the DOE canisters, but a more general flaw tolerance assessment has not been performed. Therefore, the failure assessment diagram (FAD)-based fracture mechanics method, as codified by the latest API 579-1/ASME FFS-1-2021 Edition, is adopted in this work to assess surface flaw tolerance for DOE canisters under operation loading and welding residual stresses (WRS), where the new code-recommended WRS distributions are used. To more adequately consider the transverse distribution of WRS, an equivalent WRS distribution is proposed to account for the WRS reduction with distance from the weld centerline. Moreover, the closed-form solutions of stress intensity factor K, which serves as the crack driving force during subcritical crack growth, are developed from the tabular data of the K factors provided in API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 and used to determine more accurate flaw sizes at flaw instability. Subsequently, the Level 2 assessment procedures with 12 assessment steps, as codified and detailed in API 579-1 and ASME FFS-1, are followed to assess the flaw tolerance for the surface flaws in the DOE standard canisters with consideration of normal or accident operation loads combined with WRS. The assessment results show that the four designs of DOE standard canisters can tolerate all surface flaws that meet the code permitted maximum sizes of a flaw length of 8 inches (i.e., 200 mm) and a flaw depth of 80% wall thickness. This demonstrates that all designs of DOE standard canisters are robust and reliable.

DOE standard canister↗
DOE OSTI2023

FY23 Status Report: SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations

Work evaluating spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canister surface environments and canister corrosion progressed significantly in FY23, with the goal of developing a scientific understanding of the processes controlling initiation and growth of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) cracks in stainless steel canisters in relevant storage environments. The results of the work performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) will guide future work and will contribute to the development of better tools for predicting potential canister penetration by SCC.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of the Potential for Precipitation of Solids during Storage of Non-Aluminum SNF Solutions

Non-aluminum clad spent nuclear fuels (NASNF) stored in the L-Area basin will be dissolved in H-Canyon using the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver. The solutions will be stored in either the hot or warm canyon until the preparation of a sludge batch for the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Spent nuclear fuel solutions could be stored for 1-2 years before transfer to the H-Area Tank Farm depending on the interval between sludge batches. The solution level in the storage tanks will be maintained; therefore, precipitation of solids due to evaporation is not an issue. However, the precipitation of solids from completely dissolved SNF due to solution instabilities has been observed during intermediate storage of solutions generating hydrated oxides.The presence of fissile material in these solids is generally associated with zirconium molybdate, which is known to act as a host lattice for Pu and can carry the actinides upon precipitation. The formation of zirconium molybdate solids which carry fissile material is a potential concern for the storage of NASNF solutions. To address this concern, the Savannah River National Laboratory performed a literature review to identify knowledge gaps which may require experimental work to determine if the formation of solids is a concern during storage of these solutions. Based on the literature review, the precipitation of zirconium molybdate solids from the Campaign 1 NASNF solutions during intermediatestorage is expected. This conclusion is supported by the identification of zirconium molybdate solids found on the H-Canyon 6.1D Dissolver MK-12 insert spacer. The formation of the zirconium molybdate solids is attributed to hydrolysis and radiolytic processes in the nitric acid solution. As the molybdate solids form, U and Pu can substitute for Zr in the crystal lattice resulting in co-precipitation. Generally, the Pu substitutes directly into the crystal lattice during precipitation while the U associated with the molybdate solids more likely absorbs from the solution. The U in the NASNF solutions is present as uranyl nitrate, a 2+ cation which will not substitute as easily into the molybdate crystal lattice for the Zr 4+ ion.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

316L Stainless Steel Wire Arc Additive Manufacturing and Characterization for Potential SNF Canister Production

In this paper, 316L stainless steel (316L SS) straight walls, curved walls, and vessels were printed by wire arc additive manufacturing (WAAM) using the 316L SS welding wire, to demonstrate the feasibility of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters using this advanced manufacturing technique. Helium leak test with leak tight criteria of 1 × 10-7 ref-cc/s were performed on printed vessels with various wall thickness, and testing pressures were from 0.345 MPa (50 psi) to 1.724 MPa (250 psi). Printed wall microstructures were characterized using optical microscopy (OM) and scanning electron microscopy (SEM). Tensile specimens were machined out from printed walls along the length, height, and thickness directions, respectively, and tested at different temperature conditions, room temperature, 80 °C, 150 °C and 250 °C, respectively. Results showed t hat, all five WAAM-printed canisters with different thickness passed the helium leaktight criteria of radioactive materials containers by the ANSI N14.5; Dispersed micrometer-level size inclusions/voids were observed at printed wall cross sections, dendritic microstructures were found with grain size variation through the welding torch shifting direction, and very small amount of δ-ferrite and σ-phase were also observed in those cross sections; The printed walls were ductile, all tensile specimens broke with large plastic deformation/elongation and without brittle failure, and printed specimens yield strengths and tensile strengths under room temperature and 80 °C conditions are higher than minimum values of 316L SS for pressure vessels and for general applications at room temperature required by the ASTM standard, respectively.

Tang, Wei↗