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Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light- and heavy-water-moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, and breeder reactors, with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and condition of SNF, a robust canister termed the DOE Standardized SNF Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard SNF Canister had four variations consisting of a 10- or 15-foot length and an 18- or 24-inch diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository these canisters were to be grouped with 24-inch diameter HLW canisters in a codisposal waste package. The 18-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The 24-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister would take the place of one the five HLW canister on the outer ring in the codisposal waste package. No DOE Standardized SNF Canisters have been loaded, and many fuel types can be loaded in multiple canisters. Depending on the selected diameter of the DOE Standardized SNF Canister for a particular fuel, the number of potential codisposal waste packages could vary. In addition, different types of DOE SNF may be able to be combined in a single canister. This could significantly change the number of DOE SNF canisters that are loaded and result in a decrease of the number of total potential codisposal waste packages. Ultimately, if too many HLW canisters need disposition, then a reduction in the number of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will change the final total of codisposal waste packages very little. Likewise, if the ratio of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters to HLW canister produced is too high, then DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will not have enough HLW canisters to surround them in the codisposal waste package. This paper examines the results of differing loading strategies for a few DOE SNFs. It also compares the ranges of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters that may be produced to the ranges of HLW canisters that may be produced in order to determine potential scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Probability of Pinching Failure in PWR SNF after Long-Term Storage

A probabilistic assessment was performed on pinching failure of PWR SNF rod cladding under accidental SNF cask transport conditions. a set of 3,000 rod pinching scenarios was analyzed, with different geometrical, material, and loading parameters, using a Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS). The investigated accidents include train derailments leading to cask collisions or cask drops. Pinching failure was related to cladding offset strain, defined as the plastic deformation interval in radial cladding direction normalized with respect to the outer cladding diameter. Finite element (FE) models were used to compute SNF rod deformations and the offset strain demand OSD in each of the assessed pinching scenarios. The numerical models account for the contribution of the degraded fuel pellets to rod pinching stiffness. The offset strain capacity OSC was computed using regression and interpolation models based on ring compression (RCT) test results, and account for hydride-related effects on cladding ductility. The results show a low probability of pinching failure. Hydride-related cladding embrittlement affects the structural integrity of PWR SNF rods after long-term dry storage of up to 300 years. Radial hydride patterns or large amounts of circumferentially oriented hydrides reduce the cladding ductile deformation capability when pinched at low material temperatures. The probability of hydride-related pinching failure of PWR cladding is estimated after long-term dry storage to address: How do PWR SNF rod conditions like hydrogen content, vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress σ{sub θ}, and cladding material temperature affect cladding ductility? Is hydride-related cladding embrittlement a material degradation mechanism that affects the structural integrity of PWR SNF rods under pinching loading? What are the controlling parameters for deformation demands in PWR SNF rods under pinching loading? Is the pinching load amplitude an important parameter that controls the probability of pinching failure? How do parameters like pellet-cladding gap or fuel pellet degradation affect the pinching loading capacity of PWR SNF rods? Statistical modelling of PWR SNF rod conditions in U.S. inventory: A pseudo rod database was generated based on EIA database. Analysis of train accident scenarios: a probability density function (pdf) of a pinching load distribution P{sub 9m} of a 9-m cask drop is linearly scaled to generate a more representative: distribution P{sub AS}. The new distribution considers train collision velocities, cask drops for on- and off-bridge accidents, and cask impact orientation. LHS generates 3,000 rod pinching scenarios based on nine independent geometrical, material, and loading parameters. Probabilistic FE Analysis: The LHS realizations are used to generate 3,000 FE models. The FE analysis is conducted for P{sub 9m}, and P{sub AS}. The workflow is automatized. The OSC is computed with regression and interpolation models, as a function of the hydrogen content C{sub H}, vacuum drying peak σ{sub θ}, and SNF temperature T{sub FR}: The regression data was obtained in RCTs on PWR cladding. The OSD is derived from the cladding deformations in the FE models. Cladding failure was identified via a comparison of OSC and OSD. A 300 and a 30 years-of-dry-storage duration is investigated: The dry-storage period affects the expected SNF temperature and consequently, the OSC and the OSD. The material temperature LHS population is adapted to account for a SNF temperature variation. The probability of hydride-related, ductile cladding failure during a severe transportation accident is not significantly affected by the pinching load amplitude: The probability is slightly reduced from a range of less than 0.0333% to 0.1667% for P{sub 9m}, to a range of less than 0.0333% to 0.1333% for P{sub AS}, depending on the vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress modelling assumptions. Further, the SNF dry-storage duration does not significantly affect the probability of ductile pinching failure. Based on available train accidents data, the pinching failure probability for a 5,000 km long transportation route ranges from less than 1.62 E-7 to a value of 6.47 E-7, depending on the vacuum drying peak cladding hoop stress modelling assumptions. The pinching load amplitude is not a controlling parameter for the probability of ductile cladding pinching failure, and does not control the cladding deformations once pellet-cladding contact is established, The pellet-cladding gap width, however, plays a key role. Fuel pellet degradation only affects the deformation capacity, if the pellet stiffness is significantly reduced (more than 90%). Only highly embrittled cladding is likely to fail. The deformation demands on the cladding under pinching loading are small.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program for SNF Wet Storage Life Extension - 20489

Approximately 27 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management is stored in the L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This 'DOE SNF' is comprised of approximately 12,000 aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel assemblies (∼7 MTHM), and approximately 2000 non-aluminum fuel assemblies (∼20 MTHM). A program is in progress to perform Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) of the fuel and their storage containers to characterize the materials' condition, and to evaluate the effects of service to enable continued safe wet storage of the SNF. The Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP), a two-part program to develop and implement remote underwater Non-Destructive Examination of the aluminum SNF, and of the containers of the non-aluminum SNF, respectively, is aimed at the characterization and evaluation of corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel and container materials. The predominant design of the aluminum SNF (ASNF) stored in L Basin is the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) equivalent design, a plate fuel design. These SNF are stored in 5'' diameter tubes or 5'' x 5'' squares (called bundles) that are nominally 12' or up to 14' long. The SNF is de-bundled and inspected using a custom-designed MTR Fuel Inspection Table. The inspection table provides for indexed fuel positioning for a video camera examination with controlled lighting. A total of 10 of the SNF originating from foreign research and test reactors were selected for examination based on burnup, enrichment, and prior damage caused by service/storage history. A special inspection campaign of these 10 assemblies is in progress. The observed corrosion damage included minor to moderate attack from general corrosion, pitting, crevice, end grain and galvanic corrosion. Example results from the completed inspections are shown and discussed. The focus is a comparison of the as-received condition versus the as-found current storage condition that will serve to validate Water Chemistry and Corrosion Monitoring Programs. The non-aluminum SNF (NASNF) stored in L Basin are of diverse design that includes various geometries with claddings of stainless steel, Zircaloy, and Hastelloy. The fuel core materials include uranium alloys, oxides/mixed oxides, and carbides. These SNF materials, originating from early experimental and test reactors, are in various physical forms including single fuel elements and cut pieces. The fuel is stored in L Basin in various configurations including in direct bundled storage in aluminum tubes and in isolation cans that are in the bundles or in a larger over-size storage container (OSC). Concern with inside-out corrosion and the potential loss of configuration control and ability to handle the storage containers prompted the development of remote NDE methods that include visual and UT technologies to assess the condition of the containers. Candidate stored materials were selected for a special inspection campaign; the development of the NDE methods for the inspection for galvanic, crevice and sediment-induced corrosion (inside-out) are discussed. A summary of the SNF storage in L Basin at the SRS, and an overview of the AMCAP to enable continued safe storage of DOE SNF are described. (authors)

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Preparation for the Recovery of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia - 13309

Andreeva Bay is located near Murmansk in the Russian Federation close to the Norwegian border. The ex-naval site was used to de-fuel nuclear-powered submarines and icebreakers during the Cold War. Approximately 22,000 fuel assemblies remain in three Dry Storage Units (DSUs) which means that Andreeva Bay has one of the largest stockpiles of highly enriched spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the world. The high contamination and deteriorating condition of the SNF canisters has made improvements to the management of the SNF a high priority for the international community for safety, security and environmental reasons. International Donors have, since 2002, provided support to projects at Andreeva concerned with improving the management of the SNF. This long-term programme of work has been coordinated between the International Donors and responsible bodies within the Russian Federation. Options for the safe and secure management of SNF at Andreeva Bay were considered in 2004 and developed by a number of Russian Institutes with international participation. This consisted of site investigations, surveys and studies to understand the technical challenges. A principal agreement was reached that the SNF would be removed from the site altogether and transported to Russia's reprocessing facility at Mayak in the Urals. The analytical studies provided the information necessary to develop the construction plan for the site. Following design and regulatory processes, stakeholders endorsed the technical solution in April 2007. This detailed the processes, facilities and equipment required to safely remove the SNF and identified other site services and support facilities required on the site. Implementation of this strategy is now well underway with the facilities in various states of construction. Physical works have been performed to address the most urgent tasks including weather protection over one of the DSUs, installation of shielding over the cells, provision of radiation protection infrastructure and general preparation of the site for construction of the facilities for the removal of the SNF. This paper describes the development and implementation of the strategy and work to improve the safe and secure management of SNF, preparing it for retrieval and removal from Andreeva Bay. (authors)

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Initial Site-Specific Studies for Removing SNF from Six Shutdown Sites - 18042

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is exploring options for developing a large-scale transportation system for the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste to future storage or disposal facilities. This complex, large-scale transportation system will involve coordinated, integrated activities. Interfaces with various transportation and non-transportation activities must be defined, and systems must be developed to ensure successful integration when the system becomes operational. To provide an understanding of the tasks and interfaces required for the complete de-inventory of particular sites where SNF is stored, DOE solicited bids from integrating contractors to develop initial site-specific de-inventory reports. The reports were developed for several nuclear power plant sites selected to represent a range of geographic locations, existing on-site SNF storage systems, and expected transportation modal options. Each report is presented in a self-contained narrative describing a potential campaign for removing all SNF and greater-than-class-C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) from each specified site. Each study narrative includes site information; an analysis of the near-site transportation infrastructure; a concept of operations for the de-inventory; an estimated budget and schedule for the duration of operations; and a safety and security plan with site-specific considerations, emergency response considerations, and recommendations for the next steps DOE could take to de-inventory the site. The reports provide cost estimates for analytical purposes only; they do not attempt to specify the party or parties responsible for the costs. These reports present a first look at how an integrating contractor might recommend removing SNF from particular sites. They are written from the perspective of the contractor and do not represent DOE's plans. At this writing, six sites have been studied: - Connecticut Yankee, - Big Rock Point, - Humboldt Bay, - Maine Yankee, - Trojan, - Kewaunee. DOE may develop de-inventory reports for all reactor sites, with an initial focus on shutdown reactor sites. The order in which sites have been selected for study should not be considered an indicator of the order used by DOE to remove SNF from the sites. Since the SNF's destination is not important for the purpose of this work, DOE tasked the contractor with planning transportation of the SNF from the site to a generic railroad location in the approximate geographical center of the United States. These reports represent an initial study of the specific sites. Per the terms of the contract, the contractor was not permitted to engage in dialogue with power plant site personnel; near-site railroad personnel; or any local, state, or regional stakeholders about the studies. DOE provided site-specific data. The contractor was tasked to rely on past corporate experience, data available from DOE, and publicly available data when making site-specific recommendations for removing all SNF from each site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF– 24138

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Developments in the Regulatory Framework of Nuclear Waste Management in Germany - Licensing Procedures for storage of SNF and Public Involvement - 19612

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act (AtG), storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel requires a license. The competent licensing authority in this field is the Federal Office for Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE). According to the Act for selecting a repository site for heat-generating radioactive waste (HAW) (Site Selection Act - StandAG) dating from 2017, BfE has been assigned the task of developing, conducting, and evaluating public participation procedures in the process of site search and selection for a deep geological repository for radioactive waste and SNF. Article 6 AtG applies to interim storage of SNF. If the legally defined licensing conditions by article 6 (2) AtG are met, the storage license applied for has to be granted. For on-site facilities, interim storage has been limited to 40 years. The licensing procedures for interim storage of SNF are carried out in accordance with the general administrative procedural rules. In certain cases due to the Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA Act), an EIA has to be carried out. In these cases, a formalized licensing procedure including an involvement of the public is conducted. The Nuclear Licensing Procedure Ordinance (AtVfV) originating from 1977 and reformulated in 1995 defines formalized rules for the public participation procedure which have to be followed strictly. These include a public hearing. The risen objections are evaluated by the licensing authority and taken account of in the licensing decision. The process of repository site selection defined by the StandAG exceeds these formalized procedures significantly: The objective of this process is to achieve a broad social consensus about the site selection procedure and about a repository site that will offer the best possible safety for one million years. Therefore, the process has to be particularly transparent, and involvement of the public - including newly developed forms of public involvement - is an essential part of it. BfE as competent authority in both the fields of repository site search and selection and licensing of interim storage of SNF has recently developed new strategies of involving the public concerning interim storage of SNF. Supplementing the standard licensing procedures, BfE presently informs and involves the public about topical issues regarding the present state and recent developments in the field of interim storage of SNF. Current central topics are for example the return of HAW and MAW from reprocessing of SNF in France and UK as well as perspective longer interim storage periods on the interface with final disposal. Regarding longer interim storage, host communities of interim storage facilities are concerned that interim storage might be extended indefinitely. Additionally, there is a strong fear of transports of radioactive waste and SNF from one place to another. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Drop Analysis of Department of Energy Standard Canister with Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF at the INL site for ?road-ready dry storage?. ?Road-ready dry storage? is a SNF management concept where SNF is packaged into dry and sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transportation. The forward-looking goal of the Demonstration is establishing the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. The Demonstration will first package Fort Saint Vrain SNF currently stored at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters. These Standard Canisters will then be loaded into another commercial transportation or storage containment system (e.g., storage cask or transportation package). The Standard Canister is a class of standardized canisters designed for containing the large variety of DOE-managed SNF during interim storage, transportation and/or disposal at a geological repository. One critical aspect of road-ready dry storage is the ability to license the DOE Standard Canisters and its associated transportation package to 10 CFR 71. Depending on the SNF and transportation strategy, the Standard Canisters may have to maintain structural integrity under normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident scenarios (i.e., drop events). The Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs. However, no analysis has been completed to support the recent Demonstration. This analysis will consider the Ø0.5 m × 5.1 m Standard Canister under drop scenario(s) considered in previous INL tests and analyses, including the 9 m drop at 80 degree off vertical. However, this analysis will consider the more recent Fort Saint Vrain loading configurations proposed for the Demonstration. This analysis will performed using strain-based acceptance criteria established by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 3. It will be compared to previous analyses and form the foundation of further formal calculations that will be used to support licensing efforts of the road-ready dry storage system at INL.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

miss-SNF: a multimodal patient similarity network integration approach to handle completely missing data sources

Abstract Motivation Precision medicine leverages patient-specific multimodal data to improve prevention, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of diseases. Advancing precision medicine requires the non-trivial integration of complex, heterogeneous, and potentially high-dimensional data sources, such as multi-omics and clinical data. In the literature, several approaches have been proposed to manage missing data, but are usually limited to the recovery of subsets of features for a subset of patients. A largely overlooked problem is the integration of multiple sources of data when one or more of them are completely missing for a subset of patients, a relatively common condition in clinical practice. Results We propose miss-Similarity Network Fusion (miss-SNF), a novel general-purpose data integration approach designed to manage completely missing data in the context of patient similarity networks. miss-SNF integrates incomplete unimodal patient similarity networks by leveraging a non-linear message-passing strategy borrowed from the SNF algorithm. miss-SNF is able to recover missing patient similarities and is “task agnostic”, in the sense that can integrate partial data for both unsupervised and supervised prediction tasks. Experimental analyses on nine cancer datasets from The Cancer Genome Atlas (TCGA) demonstrate that miss-SNF achieves state-of-the-art results in recovering similarities and in identifying patients subgroups enriched in clinically relevant variables and having differential survival. Moreover, amputation experiments show that miss-SNF supervised prediction of cancer clinical outcomes and Alzheimer’s disease diagnosis with completely missing data achieves results comparable to those obtained when all the data are available. Availability and implementation miss-SNF code, implemented in R, is available at https://github.com/AnacletoLAB/missSNF.

Biochemistry & Molecular Biology↗

Evaluation of Neutron Absorbers in the DOE Standardized SNF Canister

The goal of this evaluation was to evaluate different options for a neutron absorber in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standardized spent nuclear fuel (SNF) Canister. This was accomplished by taking the two most relevant criticality evaluations and replacing the advanced neutron absorber (ANA) basket material with borated stainless steel. This work was initiated, because alternative storage options for DOE SNF has become a priority for DOE. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is initiating activities to ensure the continued operation of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) by providing alternative and redundant storage options for spent ATR fuel. In addition, the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) has recently initiated studies to understand and improve the technical basis for long-term dry storage of aluminum clad SNF (e.g., ATR, High Flux Isotope Reactor [HFIR]) (Connolly 2018). While currently in the lab-scale phase, the next step involves validation and verification (V&V) of the lab-scale results. One method to perform V&V is to load aluminum-clad spent fuel in an instrumented DOE Standardized SNF Canister as a demonstration. In order to minimize the need for repackaging before disposal and to provide a representative environment in a demonstration, the fuel is planned to be loaded with an appropriate criticality control mechanism, such as neutron absorbing basket material. While ANA was originally selected as the basket material for ATR fuel in the Yucca Mountain Repository, it has never been produced on a large scale. Therefore, incorporating this material in the DOE Standardized SNF Canister as part of a near-term demonstration could be more challenging than moving forward with a commercially available material, such as borated stainless steel. Past evaluations eliminated borated stainless steel as a long-term neutron absorbing material, because it corroded too quickly and may not always remain in the waste package after degradation. This led to the invention and selection of ANA for use as the basket material in the DOE Standardized SNF Canister. After selecting ANA, new corrosion tests were performed on borated stainless steel using a different method for fabrication. This method of fabrication significantly improved the corrosion resistance properties of borated stainless steel, so much so that it out-performed ANA in corrosion testing. Researchers used the information obtained from these tests to select borated stainless steel as the neutron absorber in the Transportation, Aging, and Disposal Canister (TAD) designed for commercial SNF. This evaluation compares the criticality control of borated stainless steel to ANA. In every case and scenario, the calculated effective neutron multiplication factor (k eff ) using a borated stainless steel basket was lower than that using an ANA basket, though the borated stainless steel must be thicker due to corrosion effects over the regulatory time period. Although the borated stainless steel performed better than the ANA, it still required additional neutron-absorbing material, gadolinium shot, for the calculated k eff to fall below the upper critical limit of 0.93 in a few cases evaluated. More research using thicker baskets or inserts could be performed in an attempt to lower the k eff without the use of gadolinium shot. In addition, a reevaluation of the degraded ATR material used in the previous evaluations may prove that the original assumptions were over-conservative.

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SNF Data Visualization on the Centralized Used Fuel Resource for Information Exchange (CURIE) Website

To better inform stakeholders regarding the nature of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at utility sites, an online data visualization system has been created for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy (DOENE). The data visualization system is part of the Centralized Used Fuel Resource for Information Exchange (CURIE) website, hosted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for DOE-NE. The visualization employs a database that is part of an analysis tool known as the Used Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST[and]DARDS). Because many of the previous document management and sharing tools related to SNF have been terminated (or are inaccessible), a new tool, the CURIE, was developed for DOE-NE and launched on March 1, 2013 at http://curie.ornl.gov. In addition to supporting DOE SNF programs, CURIE is a national resource that is accessible to industry, vendor, federal, and laboratory partners, as well as other stakeholders. CURIE's architecture was initially based on previous work that supported DOE's Bioenergy Technologies Office on the Bioenergy Knowledge Discovery Framework (KDF). The site uses an open-source search engine, Apache Solr, which provides intuitive search results based on a faceted search method similar to that used by Amazon.com{sup R}. This algorithm helps to ensure that finding documents and data is straightforward. SNF data visualization capability was added to the CURIE website which provides a capability to post and access documents and data related to the management of SNF. CURIE currently maintains over 4,100 documents and the Siting Experience Database (SED), which was developed in response to a near-term recommendation by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC). The SED is a database of the experience that has been gained and relevant documentation that has been produced in efforts to site nuclear waste facilities, both in the US and abroad. Most of these documents are publicly accessible. In addition, CURIE maintains a current calendar of related events, an SNF image gallery, featured documents, and external links to related databases and websites. CURIE also maintains private groups (or communities) to facilitate collaborative development through sharing and editing documents that are not publicly available. There are more than 250 registered users in 23 different communities within CURIE.ORNL has also been developing UNF-ST[and]DARDS to provide a controlled source of technical data for various waste management system analysis/evaluation tools, access to key technical data, and analysis capabilities for characterizing the SNF inventory. UNF-ST[and]DARDS also provides enhanced capabilities to assess safety, risk, and uncertainty throughout the integrated waste management system. This paper describes the UNF-ST[and]DARDS data available for visualization and the associated visualization techniques used by CURIE to display this data.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Structural, Criticality, and Radiation Dose Calculations to Support SNF Loading into a DOE Standard Canister

The DOE Standard Canister Demonstration Project includes the development of an internal support structure (ISS) for the 4.6-m-long and 45.7-cm-diameter canister. This study presents structural evaluations, criticality safety assessments, and dose rate calculations conducted within the scope of the ISS design process to support smooth canister loading operations and to ensure safe storage, transportation, and disposal of Peach Bottom 1 Core II (PB2) and Fort St. Vrain (FSV) SNF, currently stored at INL’s CPP-603 facility. The ISS includes a 316L stainless-steel basket that holds 12 PB2 SNF rods. The PB2 basket rests on top of six individual, 78.7-cm-long, 316L stainless-steel columns that are equally spaced and welded to the inner canister wall at the lower end of the shell. These columns represent the FSV basket and can hold one FSV SNF element. An A92014 T6 aluminum spacer disc is bolted to the bottom plate of the PB2 basket to vertically restrain the FSV SNF element after the PB2 basket is placed inside the canister above the FSV basket. The structural evaluations of the ISS followed applicable ASME BPVC.III.3 guidelines and included finite element (FE) analyses of the PB2 basket structure; analyses of welds and bolds; buckling analyses of selected components, and acceptability assessments of the expected basket deformations under loading operations. The criticality safety assessments used the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software architecture Version 6.2, including ENDF/B-V continuous-energy cross-section libraries, considering intact SNF in a single storage overpack or two multistorage overpack configurations and intact or failed SNF configured for disposal. The dose rate computations are based on source terms taken from the DOE Spent Fuel Database. The isotopic composition was decay corrected for the year 2022 using the ORIGEN module in the SCALE suite. A 19-group photon spectrum and a 27-group neutron-source spectrum were generated and used in MCNP to calculate estimated dose-equivalent rates, both on DOE Standard Canister contact and at a radial distance of 1 m from the canister surface. The results of this study indicate a structurally sound system that can uphold its criticality safety functions throughout its intended operational phases. Furthermore, this study provides confidence that sufficient radiological protection is technically achievable.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Structural, Criticality, and Radiation Dose Calculations to support SNF Loading into a DOE Standard Canister

The DOE Standard Canister Demonstration Project includes the development of an internal support structure (ISS) for the 4.6-m long and 45.7-cm diameter canister. This study presents structural evaluations, criticality safety assessments, and dose rate calculations conducted within the scope of the ISS design process to support smooth canister loading operations and to ensure safe storage, transportation, and disposal of Peach Bottom 1 Core II (PB2) and Fort St. Vrain (FSV) SNF, currently stored at the CPP-603 facility of the INL. The ISS includes a 316L stainless steel basket that holds twelve PB2 SNF rods. Further, six individual, 78.7-cm long, 316L stainless steel columns are equally spaced and welded to the inner canister wall at the lower end of the shell. These columns represent the FSV basket and can hold one FSV SNF element. An A92014 T6 aluminum spacer disc is bolted to the bottom plate of the PB2 basket to vertically restrain the FSV SNF element after the PB2 basket is placed inside the canister on top of the FSV basket. The structural evaluations of the ISS followed applicable ASME BPVC.III.3 guidelines and included finite element (FE) analyses of the PB2 basket structure; analyses of welds and bolds; buckling analyses of selected components, and acceptability assessments of the expected basket deformations under loading operations. The criticality safety assessments used the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software architecture version 6.2 including ENDF/B-V continuous energy cross-section libraries, considering intact SNF in a single storage overpack or two multi-storage overpack configurations, and intact or failed SNF configured for disposal. The dose rate computations are based on source terms taken from the DOE Spent Fuel Database. The isotopic composition was decay corrected for the year 2022 using the ORIGEN module in the SCALE suite. A 19-group photon spectrum and 27-group neutron-source spectra were generated and used in MCNP to calculate estimated dose-equivalent rates, both on DOE Standard Canister contact and at a radial distance of from the canister surface. The results of this study indicate a structurally sound system that can uphold its criticality safety functions throughout its intended operational phases. Further, they increase confidence that sufficient radiological protection is technically achievable.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal properties and phase transition in the fluoride, (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}SnF{sub 7}

Calorimetric, dilatometric and differential thermal analysis studies were performed on (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}SnF{sub 7} for a wide range of temperatures and pressures. Large entropy (δS{sub 0}=22 J/mol K) and elastic deformation (δ(ΔV/V){sub 0}=0.89%) jumps have proven that the Pa-3↔Pm-3m phase transition is a strong first order structural transformation. A total entropy change of ΔS{sub 0}=32.5 J/mol K is characteristic for the order–disorder phase transition, and is equal to the sum of entropy changes in the related material, (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}TiF{sub 7}, undergoing transformation between the two cubic phases through the intermediate phases. Hydrostatic pressure decreases the stability of the high temperature Pm-3m phase in (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}SnF{sub 7}, contrary to (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}TiF{sub 7}, characterised by a negative baric coefficient. The effect of experimental conditions on the chemical stability of (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}SnF{sub 7} was observed. - Graphical abstract: Strong first order structural transformation Pa-3↔Pm-3m in (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}SnF{sub 7} is associated with very large total entropy change of ΔS{sub 0}=32.5 J/mol K characteristic for the ordering processes and equal to the sum of entropy changes in the related (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}TiF{sub 7} undergoing transformation between the same two cubic phases through the intermediate phases. - Highlights: • (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}SnF{sub 7} undergoes strong first order Pa-3↔Pm-3m phase transition. • Anomalous behaviour of ΔC{sub p} and ΔV/V exists far below phase transition temperature. • Structural distortions are accompanied by huge total entropy change ΔS≈Rln50. • High pressure strongly increases the stability of Pa-3 phase in (NH{sub 4}){sub 3}SnF{sub 7}. • Entropy of the Pa-3↔Pm-3m phase transition does not depend on pressure.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evolution and expression of core SWI / SNF genes in red algae

Red algae are the oldest identifiable multicellular eukaryotes, with a fossil record dating back more than a billion years. During that time two major rhodophyte lineages, bangiophytes and florideophytes, have evolved varied levels of morphological complexity. These two groups are distinguished, in part, by different patterns of multicellular development, with florideophytes exhibiting a far greater diversity of morphologies. Interestingly, during their long evolutionary history, there is no record of a rhodophyte achieving the kinds of cellular and tissue‐specific differentiation present in other multicellular algal lineages. To date, the genetic underpinnings of unique aspects of red algal development are largely unexplored; however, they must reflect the complements and patterns of expression of key regulatory genes. Here we report comparative evolutionary and gene expression analyses of core subunits of the SWI / SNF chromatin‐remodeling complex, which is implicated in cell differentiation and developmental regulation in more well studied multicellular groups. Our results suggest that a single, canonical SWI / SNF complex was present in the rhodophyte ancestor, with gene duplications and evolutionary diversification of SWI / SNF subunits accompanying the evolution of multicellularity in the common ancestor of bangiophytes and florideophytes. Differences in how SWI / SNF chromatin remodeling evolved subsequently, in particular gene losses and more rapid divergence of SWI 3 and SNF 5 in bangiophytes, could help to explain why they exhibit a more limited range of morphological complexity than their florideophyte cousins.

Stiller, John W.↗