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DOE O 472.2A, Personnel Security: Reporting Requirement Changes for Clearance Holders and Applicants [Slides]
Security Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) 3, Reporting Requirements for Personnel With Access to Classified Information or Who Hold a Sensitive Position, was implemented by the Director of National Intelligence in 2017. SEAD 3 establishes standardized reporting requirements for employees who have access to classified information/matter.
Multilayered Network Models for Security: Enhancing System Security Engineering with Orchestration
Security engineering approaches can often focus on a particular domain—physical security, cyber security, or personnel security, for example. Yet, security systems engineering consistently faces challenges requiring socio-technical solutions to address evolving and dynamic complexity. While some drivers of this complexity stem from complex risk environments, innovative adversaries, and disruptive technologies, other drivers are endogenous and emerge from the interactions across security engineering approaches. In response, INCOSE's Systems Security Working Group identified the need to better coordinate “disparate security solutions [that] operate independently” as one of eleven key concepts in their IS21 FuSE Security Roadmap. From this perspective, this need for “security orchestration” aligns with the perspective that security is a property that emerges from interactions within complex systems. Current efforts at Sandia National Laboratories are developing a systems security engineering approach that describes high consequence facility (HCF) security as a multidomain set of interacting layers. The result is a multilayered network (MLN)-based approach that captures the interactions between infrastructure, physical components, digital components, and humans in nuclear security systems. This article will summarize the MLN-based approach to HCF security and describe two preliminary results demonstrating potential benefits from incorporating interactions across disparate security solutions. Here, leveraging the logical structure of networks, this MLN model-based approach provides an example of how security orchestration provides enhanced systems security engineering solutions.
Statistical language analysis for automatic exfiltration event detection.
This paper discusses the recent development a statistical approach for the automatic identification of anomalous network activity that is characteristic of exfiltration events. This approach is based on the language processing method eferred to as latent dirichlet allocation (LDA). Cyber security experts currently depend heavily on a rule-based framework for initial detection of suspect network events. The application of the rule set typically results in an extensive list of uspect network events that are then further explored manually for suspicious activity. The ability to identify anomalous network events is heavily dependent on the experience of the security personnel wading through the network log. Limitations f this approach are clear: rule-based systems only apply to exfiltration behavior that has previously been observed, and experienced cyber security personnel are rare commodities. Since the new methodology is not a discrete rule-based pproach, it is more difficult for an insider to disguise the exfiltration events. A further benefit is that the methodology provides a risk-based approach that can be implemented in a continuous, dynamic or evolutionary fashion. This permits uspect network activity to be identified early with a quantifiable risk associated with decision making when responding to suspicious activity.
Enhanced Images for Checked and Carry-on Baggage and Cargo Screening
The current X-ray systems used by airport security personnel for the detection of contraband, and objects such as knives and guns that can impact the security of a flight, have limited effect because of the limited display quality of the X-ray images. Since the displayed images do not possess optimal contrast and sharpness, it is possible for the security personnel to miss potentially hazardous objects. This problem is also common to other disciplines such as medical Xrays, and can be mitigated, to a large extent, by the use of state-of-the-art image processing techniques to enhance the contrast and sharpness of the displayed image. The NASA Langley Research Center's Visual Information Processing Group has developed an image enhancement technology that has direct applications to this problem of inadequate display quality. Airport security X-ray imaging systems would benefit considerably by using this novel technology, making the task of the personnel who have to interpret the X-ray images considerably easier, faster, and more reliable. This improvement would translate into more accurate screening as well as minimizing the screening time delays to airline passengers. This technology, Retinex, has been optimized for consumer applications but has been applied to medical X-rays on a very preliminary basis. The resultant technology could be incorporated into a new breed of commercial x-ray imaging systems which would be transparent to the screener yet allow them to see subtle detail much more easily, reducing the amount of time needed for screening while greatly increasing the effectiveness of contraband detection and thus public safety.
Enhanced Images for Checked and Carry-on Baggage and Cargo Screening
The current X-ray systems used by airport security personnel for the detection of contraband, and objects such as knives and guns that can impact the security of a flight, have limited effect because of the limited display quality of the X-ray images. Since the displayed images do not possess optimal contrast and sharpness, it is possible for the security personnel to miss potentially hazardous objects. This problem is also common to other disciplines such as medical X-rays, and can be mitigated, to a large extent, by the use of state-of-the-art image processing techniques to enhance the contrast and sharpness of the displayed image. The NASA Langley Research Centers Visual Information Processing Group has developed an image enhancement technology that has direct applications to this problem of inadequate display quality. Airport security X-ray imaging systems would benefit considerably by using this novel technology, making the task of the personnel who have to interpret the X-ray images considerably easier, faster, and more reliable. This improvement would translate into more accurate screening as well as minimizing the screening time delays to airline passengers. This technology, Retinex, has been optimized for consumer applications but has been applied to medical X-rays on a very preliminary basis. The resultant technology could be incorporated into a new breed of commercial x-ray imaging systems which would be transparent to the screener yet allow them to see subtle detail much more easily, reducing the amount of time needed for screening while greatly increasing the effectiveness of contraband detection and thus public safety.
Project Boeing SGS (Final Report)
Boeing and its partner, PJM Interconnection, teamed to bring advanced “defense-grade” technologies for cyber security to the US regional power grid through demonstration in PJM’s energy management environment. Under this cooperative project with the Department of Energy, Boeing and PJM have developed and demonstrated a host of technologies specifically tailored to the needs of PJM and the electric sector as a whole. The team has demonstrated to the energy industry a combination of processes, techniques and technologies that have been successfully implemented in the commercial, defense, and intelligence communities to identify, mitigate and continuously monitor the cyber security of critical systems. Guided by the results of a Cyber Security Risk-Based Assessment completed in Phase I, the Boeing-PJM team has completed multiple iterations through the Phase II Development and Phase III Deployment phases. Multiple cyber security solutions have been completed across a variety of controls including: Application Security, Enhanced Malware Detection, Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) Optimization, Continuous Vulnerability Monitoring, SCADA Monitoring/Intrusion Detection, Operational Resiliency, Cyber Range simulations and hands on cyber security personnel training. All of the developed and demonstrated solutions are suitable for replication across the electric sector and/or the energy sector as a whole. Benefits identified include; Improved malware and intrusion detection capability on critical SCADA networks including behavioral-based alerts resulting in improved zero-day threat protection; Improved Security Incident and Event Management system resulting in better threat visibility, thus increasing the likelihood of detecting a serious event; Improved malware detection and zero-day threat response capability; Improved ability to systematically evaluate and secure in house and vendor sourced software applications; Improved ability to continuously monitor and maintain secure configuration of network devices resulting in reduced vulnerabilities for potential exploitation; Improved overall cyber security situational awareness through the integration of multiple discrete security technologies into a single cyber security reporting console; Improved ability to maintain the resiliency of critical systems in the face of a targeted cyber attack of other significant event; Improved ability to model complex networks for penetration testing and advanced training of cyber security personnel
Advancing Aviation Security
Air travel is a popular mode of transportation. Each year, more than 600 million people board U.S. flights for business or pleasure. As demonstrated on 9/11, a coordinated terrorist strike on commercial airlines has devastating consequences where many lives could be lost and the nation’s economy could be crippled. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has worked diligently to enhance security at airports and on flights so that people and cargo can continue to move freely. Today, all passengers and every piece of checked or carry-on luggage are screened before they are permitted on an aircraft. X-ray systems and walk-through metal detectors allow security personnel to identify dangerous metal objects, such as guns and knives. A more complex problem is the detection of explosives, where detection technologies such as multiple-energy X-ray radiography, computed tomography (CT), full body scanners using millimeter wave and X-ray backscatter and other techniques are used to screen for explosives hidden in luggage, in cargo and on the people boarding the aircraft. Scientists and engineers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) are working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), Explosives Division (EXD) to help improve aviation security by evaluating and enhancing the performance of next-generation explosives detection technologies. LLNL is providing subject matter expertise to TSA for their multi-billion dollar procurements of explosive detection system (EDS) for the nation’s airports and provides recommendations for process and system improvements. To further improve aviation security, EXD is funding research at LLNL to develop advanced explosives detection technologies that can more accurately discriminate between a wide range of explosives and non-threat materials. One challenge with scanning for explosives is that some nonthreatening materials share similar characteristics with actual threats, leading to false positives or false alarms. When an alarm is generated, security personnel must review the scan images to clear the alarm or manually open and verify the bag’s contents, which can increase labor costs and lead to passenger delays. The Livermore efforts currently focus on CT-based applications. First developed for the medical field as a method for diagnosing disease, X-ray CT has become instrumental in various industrial Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) applications. Explosives detection equipment that incorporates CT uses a broad-spectrum X-ray beam to capture projections of an object, in particular, the objects inside a piece of luggage. The CT system then applies complex reconstruction algorithms to the projections to produce a three-dimensional representation of the luggage and its contents. Automated threat-detection algorithms (also referred to as threat-recognition algorithms) further process the images to separate each item and flag potential threats for further review (see Figure 1). Transportation security officers can then examine these images and the relevant data to determine whether further interrogation is needed. LLNL has also performed research on advanced X-ray carry-on bag inspection systems and is helping to better understand the performance of X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave passenger screening systems.
A Counter-IED Preparedness Methodology for Large Event Planning
Since 2009, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been involved in a project sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate aimed at improving preparedness against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) at large sporting events. Led by the University of Southern Mississippi (USM) as part of the Southeast Region Research Initiative, the project partners have been developing tools and methodologies for use by security personnel and first responders at sports stadiums. ORNL s contribution has been to develop an automated process to gather and organize disparate data that is usually part of an organization s security plan. The organized data informs a table-top exercise (TTX) conducted by USM using additional tools developed by them and their subcontractors. After participating in several pilot TTXs, patterns are beginning to emerge that would enable improvements to be formulated to increase the level of counter-IED preparedness. This paper focuses on the data collection and analysis process and shares insights gained to date.
Nuclear Fundamentals Orientation Module 1: LANL Security Overview [Slides]
The presentation covers the following areas: Personnel Security; Substance Abuse Program; Physical Security; Prohibited and Controlled Articles; Information Protection & Cyber Security; Operations Security (OPSEC); Policies and Resources; and, Questions and Answers.
Education in Safeguards and Security Technology Meeting Challenges with Technology and Experience
Education and hands-on experience are crucial to ensuring a workforce of safeguards and security professionals who can meet the challenges currently faced in global nuclear safeguards and security. Global demand for nuclear energy and technology, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the cleanup of Cold War facilities have resulted in an increased need for trained safeguards and security personnel. At the same time, the global community is facing a growing shortage of experienced workers with hands-on knowledge of nuclear material processing. Limited access to operating facilities has dramatically reduced the opportunities for next-generation practitioners to obtain hands-on training experience. To address these needs, the Safeguards Technology Integration Center (STIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was created as a Department of Energy User Facility to provide access both to the latest technology and to field-experienced professionals. The STIC provides real-world conditions, process equipment mock-ups, and controlled access to encapsulated radioactive materials (including highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for training and technology evaluation encompassing various techniques and skills, such as Radiation Inspection Systems, Containment and Surveillance Systems, Nondestructive Assay, Security System Performance Testing, and System Design and Analysis. The STIC facilities, laboratories, test beds, and training facilities are described along with the more notable aspects of the training program, which has included more than 1000 participants in the last four years.
Hybrid methods for cybersecurity analysis :
Early 2010 saw a signi cant change in adversarial techniques aimed at network intrusion: a shift from malware delivered via email attachments toward the use of hidden, embedded hyperlinks to initiate sequences of downloads and interactions with web sites and network servers containing malicious software. Enterprise security groups were well poised and experienced in defending the former attacks, but the new types of attacks were larger in number, more challenging to detect, dynamic in nature, and required the development of new technologies and analytic capabilities. The Hybrid LDRD project was aimed at delivering new capabilities in large-scale data modeling and analysis to enterprise security operators and analysts and understanding the challenges of detection and prevention of emerging cybersecurity threats. Leveraging previous LDRD research e orts and capabilities in large-scale relational data analysis, large-scale discrete data analysis and visualization, and streaming data analysis, new modeling and analysis capabilities were quickly brought to bear on the problems in email phishing and spear phishing attacks in the Sandia enterprise security operational groups at the onset of the Hybrid project. As part of this project, a software development and deployment framework was created within the security analyst work ow tool sets to facilitate the delivery and testing of new capabilities as they became available, and machine learning algorithms were developed to address the challenge of dynamic threats. Furthermore, researchers from the Hybrid project were embedded in the security analyst groups for almost a full year, engaged in daily operational activities and routines, creating an atmosphere of trust and collaboration between the researchers and security personnel. The Hybrid project has altered the way that research ideas can be incorporated into the production environments of Sandias enterprise security groups, reducing time to deployment from months and years to hours and days for the application of new modeling and analysis capabilities to emerging threats. The development and deployment framework has been generalized into the Hybrid Framework and incor- porated into several LDRD, WFO, and DOE/CSL projects and proposals. And most importantly, the Hybrid project has provided Sandia security analysts with new, scalable, extensible analytic capabilities that have resulted in alerts not detectable using their previous work ow tool sets.
J. Robert Oppenheimer: The Atomic Energy Commission and His Security Clearance, Selected Documents
On April 14, 1954, Laboratory employees were formally notified by a “Special Bulletin to All Employees” (Appendix A) that the Atomic Energy Commission had convened a Personnel Security Board, at the request of J. Robert Oppenheimer, to investigate “substantial derogatory information” about their former director. Long on procedural detail and short on specifics, the Bulletin served primarily as an announcement that “A board was accordingly established for the purpose of hearing the case and advising the Commission as to whether or not suspension of clearance of Dr. Oppenheimer should be made permanent.”
Women in Nuclear Security: The United Arab Emirates Story
Historically in the United Arab Emirates, security personnel stationed at nuclear sites were typically men with military or policing backgrounds. Although these groups bring important, transferrable skills and experience to the nuclear security mission, some Emirati stakeholders recognize the increased benefit of a greater diversity of voices and backgrounds within the nuclear security team hierarchy. By recruiting from a wider range of disciplines and encouraging gender diversity, the security team could develop broader insight into security challenges, and a greater variety of perspectives could bring forth more innovative solutions. When aligning a diverse, multinational workforce with a common mission, all members of a security organization must fundamentally change their individual approaches to the work; the entire staff must be on the same page. This can be particularly challenging for some people who find it difficult to transition from a framework of beliefs because of past experiences based on prescriptive, exclusionary, hierarchical thought. Also, national cultural values are learned early, held deeply, and change slowly over the course of generations, and inherent biases rooted in these values can create barriers to the collective progress of a team. Creating a more open, diverse, and transparent culture for the team by accepting a unique, egalitarian, professional nuclear security culture that all members adhere to can be a challenging task for some. In this article, I share my experiences related to professional roadblocks, personal challenges, and lessons learned, particularly those regarding the empowerment of women in science and engineering, while developing and establishing the United Arab Emirates nuclear security program. I also discuss the support (and underrepresentation) of women, including those currently in critical leadership positions, and their careers in nuclear security.
Human Reliability Program Workshop
A Human Reliability Program (HRP) is designed to protect national security as well as worker and public safety by continuously evaluating the reliability of those who have access to sensitive materials, facilities, and programs. Some elements of a site HRP include systematic (1) supervisory reviews, (2) medical and psychological assessments, (3) management evaluations, (4) personnel security reviews, and (4) training of HRP staff and critical positions. Over the years of implementing an HRP, the Department of Energy (DOE) has faced various challenges and overcome obstacles. During this 4-day activity, participants will examine programs that mitigate threats to nuclear security and the insider threat to include HRP, Nuclear Security Culture (NSC) Enhancement, and Employee Assistance Programs. The focus will be to develop an understanding of the need for a systematic HRP and to discuss challenges and best practices associated with mitigating the insider threat.