A Do It Yourself Guide to Multi-Platform Security Featuring CA-ACF2 Automated Updates
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This session will detail a procedure to automate the synchronization of user information across.
Increasing penetrations of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric power system are expanding the power system attack surface. Maloperation or malicious control of DER equipment can now cause substantial disturbances to grid operations. Fortunately, many options exist to defend and limit adversary impact on these newly-created DER communication networks, which typically traverse the public internet. However, implementing these security features will increase communication latency, thereby adversely impacting real-time DER grid support service effectiveness. In this work, a collection of software tools called SCEPTRE were used to create a co-simulation environment where SunSpec-compliant PV inverters were deployed as virtual machines and interconnected to simulated communication network equipment. Network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defence security features were deployed on the control network to evaluate their influence on cybersecurity metrics and power system performance. The results indicated that adding these security features did not impact DER-based grid control systems but improved the cybersecurity posture of the network when implemented appropriately.
Strong industry interest in the SEL-FLT/FLR products has led to a large number of customers conducting various lab and field trial evaluations of the system. These trials are on-going but have allowed SEL to collect enough information about operation and deployment and security capabilities of the system to conclude the field demo phase of the project. The field-testing topical report has been completed and submitted. SEL has also prepared a SEL-FLT/FLR best practices guide based on learnings from the field demo phase of the project. This best practice guide has also been submitted. The final deliverable from this phase of the project is an economic and operational benefits white paper, which has also been written and submitted. The overall objective of the project, extending the cyber security capabilities of utility wired networks into last mile wireless networks has been successfully achieved. SEL chose to target a sensor network for implementation of this capability because it was one area of last mile networking where there was substantial need and opportunity. Based on customer interest in the product these efforts have been a success. Interest in, and support for many of the security features of the product has been expressed by customers trialing the product system. Key security features customers value are strong data encryption, sensor white listing, and use of secure account based log on for access to the system. These and other features of the product have gained strong acceptance from customers interested in purchasing these products. All project deliverables and tasks are now complete, and the project can be closed out.
An increasing number of public utility commissions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. The recently updated national standard, IEEE 1547-2018, requires all DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5, or IEEE 1815 communication interface in order to provide local and bulk power system services. Those communication protocols and associated information models will ensure system interoperability for PV and storage systems, but these new utility-to-DER communication networks must be deployed with sufficient cybersecurity to protect the U.S. power system and other critical infrastructure reliant on dependable power. Unlike bulk generators, DER are commonly connected to grid operators via public internet channels. These DER networks are exposed to a large attack surface that may leverage sophisticated techniques and infrastructure developed on IT systems, including remote exploits and distributed attacks. Although DER make up a growing portion of the national generation mix, they have limited processing capabilities and do not typically support modern security features such as encryption or authentication. In this work, Sandia National Laboratories constructed simulated DER communication net- works with a range of security features in order to study the security posture of different communication approaches. The experimental test environment was created in a Sandia-developed co-simulation platform, called SCEPTRE, which emulated Sun Spec-compliant DER equipment, the utility DER management system, communication network, and distribution power system. Adversary-based assessments were conducted and a quantitative scoring criteria was applied to evaluate the resilience of various architectures against cyber attacks and to measure the systemic impact during such attacks. The team found that network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defense improved the security of these networks and would be recommended for utility, aggregator, and local DER networks.
NASA's new unmanned SLR2000 system is designed to track, with millimeter precision and using single photon returns, a constellation of roughly 24 retroreflector-equipped satellites, which range in altitude from about 300 km to 20,000 km. Totally autonomous operation and a common engineering configuration are expected to greatly reduce station operations costs relative to NASA's current manned systems. The system has also been designed with a goal of significantly lowering replication costs. All of the prototype components and subsystems have been completed and tested and have substantially met the original specifications. The prototype system is presently undergoing final integration and testing in a dedicated shelter with an azimuth tracking dome synchronized to the optical tracking mount. The facility also features a number of security features such as security cameras and sensors designed to detect power or thermal control problems or entry by unauthorized personnel. Field tests are in progress. The present paper provides an overview of the various subsystems and test results to date. The meteorological subsystem, which has operated successfully in the field for almost three years, consists of several sensors which measure: (1) pressure, temperature, and relative humidity; (2) wind speed and direction; (3) ground visibility and precipitation; and (4) local cloud cover as a function of station azimuth and elevation (day and night). A "pseudo-operator" software program interprets the sensor readings and modifies satellite tracking priorities based on local meteorological conditions.
Recently developed Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interoperability standards include communication and cyber security requirements. In 2018, the US national interconnection standard, IEEE 1547, was revised to require DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5 (Smart Energy Profile, SEP 2.0), or IEEE 1815 (DNP3) communication interface but does not include any normative overarching cybersecurity requirements. IEEE 2030.5 and associated implementation requirements for California, known as the California Smart Inverter Profile (CSIP), prescribe the greatest security features - including encryption, authentication, and key management requirements. Sun Spec Modbus and IEEE 1815 security requirements are not as comprehensive, leading to implementation questions throughout the industry. Further, while the security features in IEEE 2030.5 are commonly used in computing platforms, there are still questions of how well the technologies will scale in highly-distributed, computationally-limited inverter environments. In this paper, (a) the elements of IEEE 2030.5 encryption, authentication, and key management guidelines are analyzed, (b) potential scalability gaps are identified, and (c) alternative technologies are explored for possible inclusion in DER interoperability or cyber security standards.
There is an increasing awareness that efficient and effective nuclear facility design is best achieved when requirements from the 3S disciplines Safety, Safeguards, and Security - are balanced and intrinsic to the facility design. This can be achieved when policy, processes, methods, and technologies are understood and applied in these areas during all phases of the design process. For the purposes of this paper, Security-by-design will be defined as the system level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new or retrofitted nuclear power plant (NPP) or nuclear facility (NF) resulting in intrinsic security. Security-by-design can also be viewed as a framework to achieve robust and durable security systems. This paper reports on work performed to date to create a Security-by-Design Handbook, under a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan, specifically, a review of physical protection principles and best practices, and a decommissioning to better understand where these principles and practices can be applied. This paper describes physical protection principles and best practices to achieve security-by- design that were gathered from International, Japanese, and U.S. sources. Principles are included for achieving security early in the design process where security requirements are typically less costly and easier to incorporate. The paper then describes a generic design process that covers the entire facility lifecycle from scoping and planning of the project to decommissioning and decontamination. Early design process phases, such as conceptual design, offer opportunities to add security features intrinsic to the facility design itself. Later phases, including design engineering and construction, are important for properly integrating security features into a coherent design and for planning for and assuring the proper performance of the security system during the operation and decommissioning of the facility. The paper also describes some future activities on this bilateral project to create a Security-by-Design Handbook. When completed, the Handbook is intended to assist countries with less experience in nuclear power programs to apply principles and best practices in an effective and efficient manner as early in the design as possible to achieve robust and durable security.
Implementing a secure development lifecycle (SDL) presents increasing challenges to software developers as they must ensure software correctly integrates both underlying operating system security features while also managing dependencies on third-party libraries or executables. There are a growing number of security functions that require a close integration between the OS security features and software builds to ensure strong protection. Furthermore, as software platforms grow in complexity, they present many opportunities for misconfigurations and inadequate defenses. This challenge is especially prevalent for industrial control systems (ICS), which oten depend on both legacy sotware platforms, or out of date operating systems. This paper presents the AttackSurface Host Analyzer (AHA) tool, which is used to assess the security of a software platform through its integration with a host operating system. The tool collects data from the various platforms running on an OS, evaluates an array of security properties, and then introduces metrics and visualizations to provide feedback on the system's attack surface based on the external interconnections and the completeness of the available security protections. The paper then explores the attack surface of a variety of industry-standard ICS platforms to provide insight into the current degree of protection enabled by them.
This is the repository for Building Energy Management Open Source Software (BEMOSS), which is an open source operating system that is engineered to improve sensing and control of equipment in small- and medium-sized commercial buildings. BEMOSS offers the following key features: (1) Open source, open architecture – BEMOSS is an open source operating system that is built upon VOLTTRON – a distributed agent platform developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). BEMOSS was designed to make it easy for hardware manufacturers to seamlessly interface their devices with BEMOSS. Software developers can also contribute to adding additional BEMOSS functionalities and applications. (2) Plug & play – BEMOSS was designed to automatically discover supported load controllers (including smart thermostats, VAV/RTUs, lighting load controllers and plug load controllers) in commercial buildings. (3) Interoperability – BEMOSS was designed to work with load control devices form different manufacturers that operate on different communication technologies and data exchange protocols. (4) Cost effectiveness – Implementation of BEMOSS deemed to be cost-effective as it was built upon a robust open source platform that can operate on a low-cost single-board computer, such as Odroid. This feature could contribute to its rapid deployment in small- or medium-sized commercial buildings. (5) Scalability and ease of deployment – With its multi-node architecture, BEMOSS provides a distributed architecture where load controllers in a multi-floor and high occupancy building could be monitored and controlled by multiple single-board computers hosting BEMOSS. This makes it possible for a building engineer to deploy BEMOSS in one zone of a building, be comfortable with its operation, and later on expand the deployment to the entire building to make it more energy efficient. (6) Ability to provide local and remote monitoring – BEMOSS provides both local and remote monitoring ability with role-based access control. (7) Security – In addition to built-in security features provided by VOLTTRON, BEMOSS provides enhanced security features, including BEMOSS discovery approval process, encrypted core-to-node communication, thermostat anti-tampering feature and many more. (8) Support from the Advisory Committee – BEMOSS was developed in consultation with an advisory committee from the beginning of the project. BEMOSS advisory committee comprises representatives from 22 organizations from government and industry.
This is the repository for Building Energy Management Open Source Software (BEMOSS), which is an open source operating system that is engineered to improve sensing and control of equipment in small- and medium-sized commercial buildings. BEMOSS offers the following key features: (1) Open source, open architecture – BEMOSS is an open source operating system that is built upon VOLTTRON – a distributed agent platform developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). BEMOSS was designed to make it easy for hardware manufacturers to seamlessly interface their devices with BEMOSS. Software developers can also contribute to adding additional BEMOSS functionalities and applications. (2) Plug & play – BEMOSS was designed to automatically discover supported load controllers (including smart thermostats, VAV/RTUs, lighting load controllers and plug load controllers) in commercial buildings. (3) Interoperability – BEMOSS was designed to work with load control devices form different manufacturers that operate on different communication technologies and data exchange protocols. (4) Cost effectiveness – Implementation of BEMOSS deemed to be cost-effective as it was built upon a robust open source platform that can operate on a low-cost single-board computer, such as Odroid. This feature could contribute to its rapid deployment in small- or medium-sized commercial buildings. (5) Scalability and ease of deployment – With its multi-node architecture, BEMOSS provides a distributed architecture where load controllers in a multi-floor and high occupancy building could be monitored and controlled by multiple single-board computers hosting BEMOSS. This makes it possible for a building engineer to deploy BEMOSS in one zone of a building, be comfortable with its operation, and later on expand the deployment to the entire building to make it more energy efficient. (6) Ability to provide local and remote monitoring – BEMOSS provides both local and remote monitoring ability with role-based access control. (7) Security – In addition to built-in security features provided by VOLTTRON, BEMOSS provides enhanced security features, including BEMOSS discovery approval process, encrypted core-to-node communication, thermostat anti-tampering feature and many more. (8) Support from the Advisory Committee – BEMOSS was developed in consultation with an advisory committee from the beginning of the project. BEMOSS advisory committee comprises representatives from 22 organizations from government and industry.
This paper discusses security issues as they relate to the NASA Electronic Library System which is currently in use as the repository system for AdaNET System Version 3 (ASV3) being operated by MountainNET, Inc. NELS was originally designed to provide for public, development, and secure collections and objects. The secure feature for collections and objects was deferred in the initial system for implementation at a later date. The NELS system is now 9 months old and many lessons have been learned about the use and maintenance of library systems. MountainNET has 9 months of experience in operating the system and gathering feedback from the ASV3 user community. The user community has expressed an interest in seeing security features implemented in the current system. The time has come to take another look at the whole issue of security for the NELS system. Two requirements involving security have been put forth by MountainNET for the ASV3 system. The first is to incorporate at the collection level a security scheme to allow restricted access to collections. This should be invisible to end users and be controlled by librarians. The second is to allow inclusion of applications which can be executed only by a controlled group of users; for example, an application which can be executed by librarians only. The requirements provide a broad framework in which to work. These requirements raise more questions than answers. To explore the impact of these requirements a top down approach will be used.
In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) directly monitor and control a physical process such as nuclear power plants, gas pipelines, and water treatment. They are equipped with a control logic written in IEC-61131 languages (e.g., ladder logic and structured text) that defines how a PLC should control a physical process. A PLC's control logic is a usual target of a cyberattack to sabotage a physical process. For instance, Stuxnet targets a control logic of a Siemens S7-300 PLC to damage a nuclear facility's centrifuges. The existing attacks in the literature generally focus only on injecting malicious control logic into a PLC. This paper presents a new dimension of control logic attacks that target the control logic engine (responsible for running a control logic) of a PLC. It demonstrates that a cyberattack can disable the control logic engine successfully by exploiting inherent PLC features such as program mode and starting/stopping engine. We develop two novel case studies on control logic engine attacks by employing the MITRE ATT\&CK knowledge base on the real-world PLCs used in industry settings, i.e., 1) Schweitzer Engineering Laboratory (SEL)'s Real-Time Automation Controller (SEL-3505 RTAC) equipped with security features such as encrypted traffic and device-level access control, and 2) traditional PLCs, i.e., Schneider Electric's Modicon M221, Allen-Bradley's MicroLogix 1400 and 1100 that do not have security features. The case studies present the internals of the logic engine attacks and facilitate the ICS research community and industry to understand the attack vectors on the control logic engine. We evaluate the effectiveness of the control engine attacks on a power substation, a 4-floor elevator, and a conveyor belt to demonstrate their real-world impact of halting a physical process.
This report summarizes the work performed under the project "Advanced Data Structures for Improved Cyber Resilience and Awareness in Untrusted Environments." The goal of the project was to design, analyze, and test new data structures for cybersecurity applications. We had two major thrusts: 1) using new/improved write-optimized data structures and/or algorithms to better man- age and analyze high-speed massive-volume cyberstreams, and 2) adding security features to data structures at minimum cost. Write optimization allows data structures to better use secondary memory to store and search a larger amount of useful information. Secondary memory is large compared to main memory, but data movement to and from secondary memory must be carefully managed to run quickly enough to keep up with fast streams. The first thrust included managing cyberstreams in parallel, both multi-threaded and distributed, and improving the benchmarking infrastructure for testing new streaming data structures. We considered both (near) real-time discovery of particular patterns, and improved logging for improved forensics. We considered two kinds of security-feature problem. The first was high-performance history- independent external-memory data structures. These provide certain protections to data if a disk is stolen. We also prove some trade-offs between speed and security in this setting. The second data-security problem is more secure data look-up in secret-shared data bases. This report summarizes the project's major accomplishments, with the background to under- stand these accomplishments. It gathers the abstracts and references for the six refereed publications that have appeared as part of this work. We summarize several accomplishments that will be submitted for publication. We then archive one piece of partial work that is not likely to be published in the near future: validation of history-independent data structure implementations.
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This report presents the regulatory requirements and directions on the physical security of advanced nuclear reactors in USA. Presently, a rule is being proposed that allows for a performance-based analysis. In determining the physical security requirements for an advanced reactor, new tools may be desired to conduct a performance-based analysis. These tools should incorporate dynamic analysis methods to provide as much realism as possible. In comparison, the security requirements for existing light water reactors (LWRs) are much more prescriptive and the analysis conducted to establish the required physical security strategies were more easily performed with static analysis. In order to achieve the cost goals that advanced reactors require for adoption; the nuclear security force required should not be excessive. Dynamic physical security analysis methods and tools have been developed by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. This report details how the dynamic risk analysis tools developed in the LWRS program using the dynamic risk modelling tool, EMRALD, may be adapted for use in analyzing the physical security designs for advanced reactors accounting for variable performance-based requirements. This report provides an example analysis of a hypothetical SFR using publicly available information and generic assumptions to demonstrate the methods and potential presentation and analysis of the results. No actual plant information is used in this example analysis. Future work in this area will create additional models that can be adapted for any advanced reactor concept and use various security features to create a physical security system that provides adequate protection from radiological theft and sabotage.
Four programs deal with intruders and resource managment. Package available from COSMIC provides DEC VAX-11/780 with certain "deterent" security features. Although packages is not comprehensive security system, of interest for any VAX installation where security is concern.