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The Off-Site Source Recovery Program Capabilities in Recovering Transuranic Sealed Sources - 17599

Over the past 16 years, the mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) has been recovering disused radioactive sealed sources in the interest of national security, public health and safety. This program, which is sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Material Security's Office of Radiological Security, is managed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory and has recovered sources worldwide. To date, OSRP has recovered more than 38,000 sources from over 1,300 locations worldwide. Since its inception, OSRP has grown from recovering only sealed sources containing one transuranic (TRU) isotope, Pu-239, in the early days of the program, to recovering sealed sources containing several other TRU and non-TRU isotopes. Primarily, OSRP's mission includes Pu-238, Pu-239, Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Sr-90, Cs-137, Co-60, Ir-192 and Ra-226 sources that are US-origin, defense related and not commercially disposable. Over the lifetime of this program the types of recoveries performed have expanded from a single site to multi-site round-up recoveries. An additional approach, referred to as self-ship recoveries, is also used in cases where only a few sources may be present at a licensee's site. In these situations, the licensee ships their source(s) to an OSRP staging facility for ultimate consolidation and disposal. OSRP recovers sources from many types of licensees, with the majority of sources being removed from industry, universities and hospitals. These include sealed sources used in industrial radiological devices like moisture-density gauges and thickness gauges, medical devices such as blood irradiators and radiotherapy devices and sealed sources from nuclear power plants, among others. The recovery and management of sealed sources is a complex process covering multidisciplinary areas, including source construction, characteristics of the radioactive material, source packaging and transportation per DOT regulations, safe and secure storage, and final disposition per waste acceptance criteria of repository sites. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Offsite source recovery project - ten years of sealed source recovery and disposal

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) has been recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources for ten years. In January 2009, GTRI announced that the project had recovered 20,000 sealed radioactive sources (this number has since increased to more than 23,000). This project grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover and disposition excess Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) sealed sources that were distributed in the 1960s and 1970s under the Atoms for Peace Program. Decades later, these sources began to exceed their special form certifications or fall out of regular use. As OSRP has collected and stored sealed sources, initially using 'No Path Forward' waste exemptions for storage within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, it has consistently worked to create disposal pathways for the material it has recovered. The project was initially restricted to recovering sealed sources that would meet the definition of Greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) low-level radioactive waste, assisting DOE in meeting its obligations under the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments (PL 99-240) to provide disposal for this type of waste. After being transferred from DOE-Environmental Management (EM) to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, OSRP's mission was expanded to include not only material that would be classified as GTCC when it became waste, but also any other materials that might constitute a 'national security consideration.' It was recognized at the time that the GTCC category was a waste designation having to do with environmental consequence, rather than the threat posed by deliberate or accidental misuse. The project faces barriers to recovery in many areas, but disposal continues to be one of the more difficult to overcome. This paper discusses OSRP's disposal efforts over its 10-year history. For sources meeting the DOE definition of 'transuranic,' OSRP has achieved many milestones, including defense determinations for various isotopes, a WIPP RCRA permit modification to accommodate headspace gas sampling requirements, and approval of a peer-reviewed non-assay radiological characterization methodology. For non-transuranic sources, which OSRP began to recover in 2004, OSRP has achieved NEP A coverage for storage and implemented consolidated storage at both DOE and commercial locations, as well as completing several specific disposal operations. The closure of the Barnwell low-level waste disposal site in 2008 has left 36 states with absolutely no commercial disposal pathway for most sealed sources, increasing the demands on OSRP. This and other current challenges and future work will also be discussed.

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Sealed source peer review plan

Sealed sources are known quantities of radioactive materials that have been encapsulated in quantities that produce known radiation fields. Sealed sources have multiple uses ranging from instrument calibration sources to sources that produce radiation fields for experimental applications. The Off-Site Source Recovery (OSR) Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), created in 1999, under the direction of the Waste Management Division of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Albuquerque has been assigned the responsibility to recover and manage excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources from the public and private sector. LANL intends to ship drums containing qualified sealed sources to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. Prior to shipping, these drums must be characterized with respect to radiological content and other parameters. The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires that ten radionulcides be quantified and reported for every container of waste to be disposed in the WIPP. The methods traditionally approved by the EPA include non-destructive assay (NDA) in accordance with Appendix A of the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (DOE, 2002) (CH WAC). However, because of the nature and pedigree of historical records for sealed sources and the technical infeasibility of performing NDA on these sources, LANL proposes to characterize the content of these waste drums using qualified existing radiological data in lieu of direct measurement. This plan describes the process and documentation requirements for the use of the peer review process to qualify existing data for sealed radiological sources in lieu of perfonning radioassay. The peer review process will be performed in accordance with criteria provided in 40 CFR {section} 194.22 which specifies the use of the NUREG 1297 guidelines. The plan defines the management approach, resources, schedule, and technical requirements for the subject peer review.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Radiological Risk From Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19083

Sealed sources are radioactive nuclear substances encased in a sealed capsule or in a cover to which the substance is bonded, and are used for a variety of activities, such as medical, industrial, academic and research, as well as commercial applications. While most sources are of relatively low activity, there are many of medium or very high activity. In use radioactive sealed sources after time become disused sources according to several reasons like, if the source activity became less than the desired activity (unfit for the intended application), if the model of the instrument became old fashion and no longer uses, if the source had been damaged, and if the user company was shut down and no longer in business. In developing countries, thousands of radium needles, teletherapy sources, oil well logging neutron sources, and miscellaneous industrial radioactive gauges are annually collected as waste and stored in centralized waste facilities. Although these sources become disused, it still dangerous and the mismanagement of high activity sources is responsible for most of the radiological accidents that result in loss of life or disabling injuries. On the other hand, these sources may be a target for criminal acts in countries where final disposal options are unavailable. Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (EAEA) represented in Hot Labs and Waste Management Center (HLWMC) is responsible by the national nuclear law (law No. 7 /2010) for management of all kinds of radioactive waste including disused radioactive sealed sources from all Egyptian territories. Categorization of disused sources is necessary to ensure that the controls and security measures that are applied to the sources are adequate with its radiological risk. The aim of this work is to use the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) categorization system to provide a simple, logical system for grading disused radioactive sealed sources in Egypt as well as to update the inventory of such sources which already collected as waste in Egypt. The categorizations of radioactive sealed sources are based on their potential to cause harm to human health. This study revealed that nearly 980 sources have been defined in Egypt as disused sources with a total activity of 46100 Ci according to available data in July 2018. (author)

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Conditioning and Repackaging of Spent Radioactive Cs-137 and Co-60 Sealed Sources in Egypt - 13490

Radioactive Sealed sources (RSSs) are widely use all over the world in medicine, agriculture, industry, research, etc. The accidental misuse and exposure to RSSs has caused significant environmental contamination, serious injuries and many deaths. The high specific activity of the materials in many RSSs means that the spread of as little as microgram quantities can generate significant risk to human health and inhibit the use of buildings and land. Conditioning of such sources is a must to protect humans and environment from the hazard of ionizing radiation and contamination. Conditioning is also increase the security of these sources by decreasing the probability of stolen and/or use in terrorist attacks. According to the law No.7/2010, Egyptian atomic energy authority represented in the hot laboratories and waste management center (centralized waste facility, HLWMC) has the responsibility of collecting, conditioning, storing and management of all types of radioactive waste from all Egyptian territory including spent radioactive sealed sources (SRSSs). This paper explains the conditioning procedures for two of the most common SRSSs, Cs{sup 137} and Co{sup 60} sources which make up more than 90% of the total spent radioactive sealed sources stored in our centralized waste facility as one of the major activities of hot laboratories and waste management center. Conditioning has to meet three main objectives, be acceptable for storage, enable their safe transport, and comply with disposal requirements. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

An ideal sealed source life-cycle

In the last 40 years, barriers to compliant and timely disposition of radioactive sealed sources have become apparent. The story starts with the explosive growth of nuclear gauging technologies in the 1960s. Dozens of companies in the US manufactured sources and many more created nuclear solutions to industrial gauging problems. Today they do not yet know how many Cat 1, 2, or 3 sources there are in the US. There are, at minimum, tens of thousands of sources, perhaps hundreds of thousands of sources. Affordable transportation solutions to consolidate all of these sources and disposition pathways for these sources do not exist. The root problem seems to be a lack of necessary regulatory framework that has allowed all of these problems to accumulate with no national plan for solving the problem. In the 1960s, Pu-238 displaced Pu-239 for most neutron and alpha source applications. In the 1970s, the availability of inexpensive Am-241 resulted in a proliferation of low energy gamma sources used in nuclear gauging, well logging, pacemakers, and X-ray fluorescence applications for example. In the 1980s, rapid expansion of worldwide petroleum exploration resulted in the expansion of Am-241 sources into international locations. Improvements of technology and regulation resulted in a change in isotopic distribution as Am-241 made Pu-239 and Pu-238 obsolete. Many early nuclear gauge technologies have been made obsolete as they were replaced by non-nuclear technoogies. With uncertainties in source end of life disposition and increased requirements for sealed source security, nuclear gauging technology is the last choice for modern process engineering gauging solutions. Over the same period, much was learned about licensing LLW disposition facilities as evident by the closure of early disposition facilities like Maxey Flats. The current difficulties in sealed source disposition start with adoption of the NLLW policy act of 1985, which created the state LLW compact system they we have today. This regulation created a new regulatory framework seen as promising at the time. However, now they recognize that, despite the good intentions, the NIJWP/85 has not solved any source disposition problems. The answer to these sealed source disposition problems is to adopt a philosophy to correct these regulatory issues, determine an interim solution, execute that solution until there is a minimal backlog of sources to deal with, and then let the mechanisms they have created solve this problem into the foreseeable future. The primary philosophical tenet of the ideal sealed source life cycle follows. You do not allow the creation (or importation) of any source whose use cannot be justified, which cannot be affordably shipped, or that does not have a well-delinated and affordable disposition pathway. The path forward dictates that we fix the problem by embracing the Ideal Source Life cycle. In figure 1, we can see some of the elements of the ideal source life cycle. The life cycle is broken down into four portions, manufacture, use, consolidation, and disposition. These four arbitrary elements allow them to focus on the ideal life cycle phases that every source should go through between manufacture and final disposition. As we examine the various phases of the sealed source life cycle, they pick specific examples and explore the adoption of the ideal life cycle model.

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Commercial sealed sources and timely disposal: Challenges and incentives - 15456

It is widely accepted as a radioactive material management best-practice that storage of disused sealed sources should be a temporary measure. Effective end-of-life management, including timely disposition of disused and unwanted sealed sources, is an important way to address national security, public health, and safety concerns presented by long-term storage of disused sealed sources. However, significantly increased disposal access since 2012 has not led commercial sealed source generators in the U.S. to dispose of their disused and unwanted sources as quickly as many had expected. As a result, policy-makers and non-government stakeholders are considering ways to incentivize sealed source generators to make more timely decisions regarding the disposition of their disused and unwanted sources. To help ensure that ongoing efforts to develop sealed source management and disposal incentives are efficient and effective, NNSA/GMS is engaging both public and private sector partners to better understand generator considerations, motivations, and challenges with regard to sealed source management and disposal decisions. The results of these engagements to date indicate potentially effective ways to encourage sealed source waste generators to disposition their sources in a timely fashion. (authors)

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Management of Disused Sealed Sources in Austria - 12147

The use of sealed radiation sources is regulated by the Austrian Radiation Protection Act and the General Radiation Protection Ordinance. The Austrian radiation protection legislation requires minimisation of radioactive waste. The preferred radioactive waste management option concerning sealed sources, both spent and disused, is the return to the manufacturer. If this is not possible a reuse by a third party is encouraged. According to this requirement, disused sealed sources shall, as far as possible, be stored on the site of the licence holder until a new owner is found. If this is not possible, disused sealed sources shall be transported to Nuclear Engineering Seibersdorf, which is a recognised storage facility for radioactive waste in Austria, for temporary storage pending reuse. Sources, which cannot be reused, are declared as radioactive waste. Since Austria is a Member State of the European Union, the Council Directive 122/2003/Euratom on High Activity Sealed Sources and Orphan Sources is applied. This directive defines high activity sealed sources on the basis of their total activity. The possession of such sources is subject to certain obligations. Therefore it is in the interest of the owner to return disused sources as soon as possible to the manufacturer or to deliver them to Nuclear Engineering Seibersdorf. In case of the loss and finding of an 'orphan' source the competent authority secures, recovers and stores the source at the cost of the owner of the source with recourse. In line with the directive the licensee of a High Activity Sealed Source has to notify the main data concerning this source to the Central Source Register which is maintained by the Federal Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management for all radioactive sources. This register was put into operation in 2006. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Sealed Source Security and Disposition: Progress and Prospects - 13515

Due to their high activity and portability, unsecured or abandoned sealed sources could cause significant health or environmental damage. Further, some of these sources could be used either individually or in aggregate in radiological dispersal devices commonly referred to as 'dirty bombs', resulting in significant social disruption and economic impacts in the billions of dollars. Disposal access for disused sealed sources, however, has been a serious challenge. From 2008 to 2012, sealed source disposal was available to only 14 states; additionally, waste acceptance criteria for sealed sources at the low-level waste disposal facilities in operation both prior to and after 2012 exclude some common yet potentially dangerous sealed sources. Recent developments, however, suggest that significant improvement in addressing this challenge is possible, although challenges remain. These developments include 1) the initiation of operations at the Waste Control Specialists (WCS) commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facility in Andrews County, Texas; 2) the potential for significant revisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) 1995 'Final Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation' (1995 BTP); and 3) the Utah Department of Environmental Quality's (UDEQ) approval of a license variance for sealed source disposal at the EnergySolutions LLRW disposal facility near Clive, Utah. (authors)

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Opening the Plutonium-Beryllium Neutron Sealed-Source RGMA1002-113

The radiograph of the PuBe neutron sealed-source was useful in determining dimensions and identifying construction details. This information gives the engineer and machinist a better idea of where to breach the outer container. It would be advantageous to use a higher energy radiography system to provide information about inner container dimensions, construction details, and nuclear material location to facilitate disassembly. Characterization of the inner and outer container materials would be useful for selecting proper cutting inserts to provide more efficient and cleaner cuts. A real-time, in-line method for qualitatively identifying metal compositions such as handheld x-ray fluorescent (XRF) may prove sufficient. The disassembly of PuBe sealed-sources generally involves numerous attempts to pry a lid or plug from the innermost container. The forces involved make it impractical to hold the source so this attempt must take place with the container held horizontally in the collet. The horizontal orientation risks the flow of PuBe materials out of the container when the plug is freed as occurred in this disassembly. To mitigate this risk, it was agreed that a small vise should be introduced into the glovebox to hold the container firmly in a vertical orientation for attempts to pry off lids or plugs. The vise should hold cylindrical containers firmly without inflicting scratches or gouges into sealed-source metal surfaces. Documentation of PuBe neutron sealed-source disassembly is effectively recorded with a series of professional photographs as presented in this report. Unfortunately, the prevalence of metal surfaces and materials combined with uneven, low light conditions reduce the contrast between disassembled parts and background. To improve the photographic record of disassembly, colored liner materials should be identified and introduced as a staged background for PuBe component pictures.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

End of Life Decisions for Sealed Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are encountered in a wide variety of settings – from household smoke detectors and instrument check sources, through fixed industrial gauges, industrial radiography and well logging sources, to irradiators and medical teletherapy devices. In general, the higher the level of activity in the sealed source, the stricter the regulatory control that is applied to its use, control and ultimate disposition. Lower levels of attention and oversight can and do lead to sources ending up in the wrong place – as orphan sources in uncontrolled storage, disposed in a sanitary landfill, melted down in metal recycling operations and incorporated into consumer products, or handled by an unsuspecting member of the public. There are a range of issues that contribute to the problem of improper disposal of sealed sources, and, in particular, to disused source disposal. General licensed sources and devices are particularly at risk of being disposed incorrectly. Higher activity general licensed sources, although required to be registered with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or Agreement State, receive limited regulatory oversight and are not tracked on a national scale. Users frequently do not consider the full life-cycle costs when procuring sources or devices and discover that they cannot afford to package, transport and dispose of their sources properly. The NRC requirements for decommissioning funding plans and financial assurance are not adequate to cover sealed source transport and disposal costs fully. While there are regulatory limits for storage of disused sources, enforcement is limited and there is no financial incentive for owners to dispose of the sources. In some cases, the lack of availability of approved Department of Transportation (DOT) Type B shipping casks also presents a barrier to sealed source disposal. The report of the Disused Sources Working Group does an excellent job of framing these issues. This article reviews both the issues and the report’s recommendations, which are designed to improve sealed source control and encourage proper disposal of disused sources.

disused source↗

Management of Ir-192 Disused Sealed Sources with Long-Lived Radioactive Contaminants

Iridium-192 sealed sources are the most widely used sealed source in industrial applications in Brazil. They are not recyclable and in the end of the useful life, they are discarded as radioactive waste. The recommended management strategy of this waste is decay in storage and disposal as exempt waste because the half-life is only 73.8 days. Presently, thousands of Ir- 192 sources are under storage waiting release. Surprisingly, sources that were under storage for more than ten years and for which no measurable contact dose rate was expected still present significant remaining radioactivity. The examination of the gamma spectra of these sources showed the presence of Co-60 and the gamma emission lines from the Ir-192m2 isomer, the metastable isotope with half-life of 241 years, which is also formed by the irradiation of natural iridium. The aim of the study reported in this paper is to characterize the Ir-192 disused sources under interim storage at the Radioactive Waste Management Department, considering the presence of minor contaminants in the irradiated iridium and the fraction of the total initial activity of the sources that is attributable to that metastable isotope. The radioactive inventories at the end of the irradiation and after the decay period were predicted using the Scale 6.0 code and the results were compared with activity measurements of the disused sources by gamma spectrometry. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 13512

The future safe development of nuclear energy and progressive increasing use of sealed sources in medicine, research, industry and other fields in Egypt depends on the safe and secure management of disused radioactive sealed sources. In the past years have determined the necessity to formulate and apply the integrated management program for radioactive sealed sources to assure harmless and ecological rational management of disused sealed sources in Egypt. The waste management system in Egypt comprises operational and regulatory capabilities. Both of these activities are performed under legislations. The Hot Laboratories and Waste Management Center HLWMC, is considered as a centralized radioactive waste management facility in Egypt by law 7/2010. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Management of Disused Sealed Sources in Hungary - 13077

Since 1976 the spent and disused radioactive sources arisen in Hungary are stored in a central storage facility called Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility operated by Public Limited Company for Radioactive Waste Management. The Facility is responsible for the record keeping, the waste acceptance procedure, the shipment and the storage or disposal (whether a certain source meets the waste acceptance criteria for disposal or not) of sources. Based on the more than 35 year old operation of the facility many experiences have been gathered regarding the technology for long-term storage of sources, the attitude of the users of sources, the evolution of the legislation and the national record keeping system. Recently a new legislation for the security of radioactive materials (including sources) was introduced, first in Central-Europe. It requires special security arrangements from the facility for transport and for storage. Due to the ongoing retrieval of radioactive waste formerly disposed of, partly containing sealed sources, there is a new challenge in the physical inventory control of historical waste. The paper would show the effect of the changes in the legislation system of record keeping or security on the users' attitude for discard of sources and on the management of the sources in the facility. The facility has a unique storage technology (shallow boreholes) in the narrow region. The sealed sources are placed into vertical pipes sunk into the surface. In the beginning, each of the sources were dropped into the pipe directly, recently they are placed in a metal tube first ensuring the retrieval. The lessons learned will be presented. There were several issues to introduce the new security arrangements (partly financially supported by US DOE) for storage and for transportation of sealed sources. These issues are addressed. In the past part of the sealed sources were disposed together with solid radioactive waste packaged in plastic bags. A waste retrieval campaign was fulfilled in 2008 to retrieve the sealed sources. The paper demonstrates the conditions of sealed sources after twenty-year disposal period. As a summary, the paper will share the main experiences of a 35-year old facility, managing radioactive sealed sources in Central Europe. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Radiation Safety of Sealed Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are used in a wide variety of occupational settings and under differing regulatory/licensing structures. The definition of a sealed radioactive source varies between US regulatory authorities and standard-setting organizations. Potential problems with sealed sources cover a range of risks and impacts. The loss of control of high activity sealed sources can result in very high or even fatal doses to members of the public who come in contact with them. Sources that are not adequately sealed, and that fail, can cause spread of contamination and potential intake of radioactive material. There is also the possibility that sealed sources may be (or threatened to be) used for terrorist purposes and disruptive opportunities. Until fairly recently, generally-licensed sealed sources and devices received little, if any, regulatory oversight, and were often forgotten, lost or unaccounted for. Nonetheless, generally licensed devices can contain fairly significant quantities of radioactive material and there is some potential for exposure if a device is treated in a way that it was never designed. Industrial radiographers use and handle high activity and/or high-dose rate sealed sources in the field with a high degree of independence and minimal regulatory oversight. Failure to follow operational procedures and properly handle radiography sources can and has resulted in serious injuries and death. Industrial radiographers have experienced a disproportionately large fraction of incidents that result in unintended exposure to radiation. Sources do not have to contain significant quantities of radioactive material to cause problems in the event of their failure. A loss of integrity can cause the spread of contamination and potential exposure to workers and members of the public. The NCRP has previously provided recommendations on select aspects of sealed source programs. Future efforts to provide recommendations for sealed source programs are discussed.

radioactive material↗

Global threat reduction initiative efforts to address transportation challenges associated with the recovery of disused radioactive sealed sources - 10460

Proper disposition of disused radioactive sources is essential for their safe and secure management and necessary to preclude their use in malicious activities. Without affordable, timely transportation options, disused sealed sources remain in storage at hundreds of sites throughout the country and around the world. While secure storage is a temporary measure, the longer sources remain disused or unwanted the chances increase that they will become unsecured or abandoned. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Off-Site Source Recovery Project (GTRIlOSRP), recovers thousands of disused and unwanted sealed sources annually as part of GTRl's larger mission to reduce and protect high risk nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. Faced with decreasing availability of certified transportation containers to support movement of disused and unwanted neutron- and beta/gamma-emitting radioactive sealed sources, GTRIlOSRP has initiated actions to ensure the continued success of the project in timely recovery and management of sealed radioactive sources. Efforts described in this paper to enhance transportation capabilities include: {sm_bullet} Addition of authorized content to existing and planned Type B containers to support the movement of non-special form and other Type B-quantity sealed sources; {sm_bullet} Procurement of vendor services for the design, development, testing and certification of a new Type B container to support transportation of irradiators, teletherapy heads or sources removed from these devices using remote handling capabilities such as the IAEA portable hot cell facility; {sm_bullet} Expansion of shielded Type A container inventory for transportation of gamma-emitting sources in activity ranges requiring use of shielding for conformity with transportation requirements; {sm_bullet} Approval of the S300 Type A fissile container for transport of Pu-239 sealed sources internationally; {sm_bullet} Technology transfer of field-sealable (non-welded) special form capsules for commercial use.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Experience and Lessons Learned from Conditioning of Spent Sealed Sources in Singapore - 13107

In 2010, IAEA requested KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) to support Singapore for conditioning spent sealed sources. Those that had been used for a lightning conductor, check source, or smoke detector, various sealed sources had been collected and stored by the NEA (National Environment Agency) in Singapore. Based on experiences for the conditioning of Ra-226 sources in some Asian countries since 2000, KAERI sent an expert team to Singapore for the safe management of spent sealed sources in 2011. As a result of the conditioning, about 575.21 mCi of Am-241, Ra-226, Co-60, and Sr-90 were safely conditioned in 3 concrete lining drums with the cooperation of the KAERI expert team, the IAEA supervisor, the NEA staff and local laborers in Singapore. Some lessons were learned during the operation: (1) preparations by a local authority are very helpful for an efficient operation, (2) a preliminary inspection by an expert team is helpful for the operation, (3) brief reports before and after daily operation are useful for communication, and (4) a training opportunity is required for the sustainability of the expert team. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Qualification tests for {sup 192}Ir sealed sources

This paper describes the results of qualification tests for {sup 192}Ir sealed sources, available in Testing and Nuclear Expertise Laboratory of National Institute for Physics and Nuclear Engineering 'Horia Hulubei' (I.F.I.N.-HH), Romania. These sources had to be produced in I.F.I.N.-HH and were tested in order to obtain the authorization from The National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). The sources are used for gammagraphy procedures or in gammadefectoscopy equipments. Tests, measurement methods and equipments used, comply with CNCAN, AIEA and International Quality Standards and regulations. The qualification tests are: 1. Radiological tests and measurements: dose equivalent rate at 1 m; tightness; dose equivalent rate at the surface of the transport and storage container; external unfixed contamination of the container surface. 2. Mechanical and climatic tests: thermal shock; external pressure; mechanic shock; vibrations; boring; thermal conditions for storage and transportation. Passing all tests, it was obtained the Radiological Security Authorization for producing the {sup 192}Ir sealed sources. Now IFIN-HH can meet many demands for this sealed sources, as the only manufacturer in Romania.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗