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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Technical Basis SAVY-4000® Series, 5.5G Container (Rev. 1)

The 5.5 Gallon (5.5G) SAVY-4000® nuclear material storage container is the latest in the SAVY-4000® series. The 5.5G is similar to that of a 1or 2Qt container in functionality with the exception of a larger volume deep drawn and spun form body achieved through increases in the depth and diameter of the container. Here, a technical basis using engineering equivalency analysis, calculation, and test data is presented to establish that the 5.5G SAVY-4000® Container is a DOE Manual 441.1-1 compliant container at a drop height of 9 feet (rather than the typical 12 ft of the other SAVY-4000® containers) and that a twenty-five year design life (as with the currently approved SAVY-4000® series) is justified.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Corrosion Analysis of 121103072 (SAVY-4000)

A surveillance feedlist for fiscal year (FY) 2022 was developed with the intent to target containers with contents known to generate corrosive gasses. One SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) container with a serial number 121103072 was selected due to the reasonable wattage and known molten salt extraction (MSE) material corrosive behavior. The material was measured at 3.08 W with approximately 200 g of material placed inside of the SAVY for 6.07 years. The inner packaging configuration included a ¼ Qt stainless steel slip top inner container and a sPVC bag-out bag enclosing the inner container. Visual observations of the container during retrieval revealed several concerning features on the exterior of the container, notably on the lid. Fig. 1 shows the container lid along with an inset image further magnifying the features of interest. The corroded tamper indicating device (TID) wire and the corroded radioactive material tag wire indicated that corrosive gas species for steel were produced during storage. Although the TID wire and rad tag wire are not the same composition as the SAVY body and lid, these are often used as an indicator of potential corrosion inside of the SAVY container. The oxide residing inside of the filter holes and significant buildup around one hole provided further evidence supporting the presence of corrosive species inside of the container.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Measuring 3D Profilometry of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers: Novacam TubeInspect Capabilities Report

The SAVY-4000 container series is a general-purpose interim storage container for nuclear materials, developed and maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It is the first vented, general-use nuclear material container to be demonstrated as meeting the requirements outlined in DOE M 441.1-1, the Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. Due to the challenging radiation, thermal, and corrosive storage conditions that the SAVY containers must endure, continuous surveillance techniques are employed to ensure the containers meet all safety standards and specifications. These inspections are typically performed by human operators, who check for issues such as corrosion, O-ring deterioration, corrosion, filter integrity, and potential manufacturing defects. However, human inspections alone are not sufficient, and automated inspection technologies, such as the ATIS system, as well as other automated systems are also utilized. The MicroCam TubeInspect, developed by Novacam Technologies Inc., is designed to address the challenges of understanding how manufacturing variations in the SAVY-4000 container series may affect performance. It is a 3D profilometry measurement system that enables detailed analysis of surface features, including defects, surface roughness, and manufacturing variations. This advanced tool significantly enhances rapid surveillance techniques for both pristine and used containers. In this study, container properties such as surface roughness, thickness, and geometric attributes like circularity are measured for SAVY-4000 containers. Artificially corroded or dented containers are examined to demonstrate the MicroCam's ability to quantify defects. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted, comparing the MicroCam results to those obtained using more precise instruments such as confocal microscopy. This comparison aims to provide valuable insights into container quality, durability, and potential improvements in manufacturing processes.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

SAVY-4000 Corrosion Evaluation Plan

Nuclear material packages, with few exceptions, outside of an approved engineered contamination barrier must meet packaging, surveillance, and testing requirements designed to protect workers from airborne contamination per Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging. The SAVY-4000 containers were developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in conjunction with Nuclear Filter Technology Inc. (NFT Inc.) as a general purpose vented manually-compliant container system for staging and storage of plutonium for LANL and the DOE complex. The SAVY-4000 containers have a 316L stainless steel containment barrier, which was selected based on its corrosion resistant properties. These containers were approved for use in 2014 with a five-year design life; LANL requested and DOE has approved lifetime extension from 5 to 15 years. The 10-year lifetime extension was proposed as a conservative recommendation based on the corrosion observations for the metal components in surveillance and results from laboratory studies. Extensive accelerated aging studies have been done on the SAVY-4000 O-ring with very little evidence of significant degradation when subjected to aggressive elevated temperature and radiation conditions. Therefore, our current conservative lifetime estimate for the O-ring and the filter is 40 years at 80°C. Additional work is ongoing in a phased approach to further extend the design life of the Manual compliant SAVY-4000 storage container; the limiting component for further life extension is still the 316L containment barrier.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of the Performance of the SAVY Container Subjected to Various Impact Events using Finite Element Methods

The SAVY container is a Safety Class Design Feature utilized both inside engineered features and outside engineered features (e.g. gloveboxes) at TA-55 Plutonium Facility Building 4. These containers were certified as low damage ratio containers by demonstrating their ability to retain material after exposure to impacts and elevated temperatures resulting from a design basis seismic event. Original testing of the SAVY did not evaluate the effects of various facility specific insults to the SAVY while within a DOT Type A Container, caused either by design basis accident or an operational mishap. These insults include: 1. Impact of a structural I-beam (drum upright & drum on side); 2. Impact of a section of Positive Pressure Chilled Water Pipe (PPCWS); 3. Forklift fork tine impact; 4. Fuel truck impact. Abaqus Explicit Dynamics Finite Element Analysis was performed on a nested SAVY/DOT Type 7A container configuration to assess the structural integrity of the SAVY under the accident conditions listed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Guide for Joint Participation in a DOE Complex Wide SAVY-4000 Surveillance Program

This document describes LANL Storage Program best practices when working with other User Sites to implement DOE M441.1-1 Manual requirements through the use of the SAVY nuclear material packaging system. It is a Manual directive for Field Element Managers to review and approve the SAVY-4000 container series design (with supporting technical basis) as a packaging system for use at their respective sites. This review and approval incorporates an evaluation of the User Site methodology for SAVY surveillance and the process for documenting its nuclear materials storage program. This document aims to assist the Field Element Mangers and User Sites in the processes necessary to credit LANL SAVY surveillance for key elements of the User Site surveillance plan.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Overview of SAVY-4000 Lifetime Extension Activities in Fiscal Year 2024

This report provides an overview of activities engaged in during the 2024 fiscal year in support of the SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) lifetime extension. As the final full year prior to the submittal of the technical basis, efforts were made to assess the current understanding regarding SAVY degradation in service as well as any knowledge that provided a more substantive view of the challenges that SAVYs face in storage. Close coordination with the stakeholders (i.e. LANL program office) ensured alignment with expectations regarding timelines for the remainder of the activities supporting the technical basis document for the lifetime extension request.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Full Submersion Water Testing of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers

SAVY-4000 (SAVY) containers are the primary container used at Technical Area (TA) TA-55 plutonium facility for the prevention of water ingress to mitigate against a criticality event. The basis for water resistance of these containers has long been attributed to the Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) membrane that is assembled on the outermost surface of the filter assembly. On August 22nd a test of a container used inside of a glovebox was performed that brought into question this long-standing-basis. This test was performed by inverting a SAVY-lid onto a specialized piece of equipment for evaluating the integrity of the PTFE membrane. During the test water was observed passing through the filter indicating that the filter membrane was no longer preventing the ingress of water through the filter. The assumption after making this observation was that alpha-particles were rapidly degrading the membrane creating a leak path through the underlying aluminosilicate media (Fiberfrax®). The apparatus used was designed to only test the lid rather than the entire SAVY assembly. A test plan, PA-PLAN-01921, was developed to investigate whether a fully assembled container with a fully degraded PTFE membrane would be capable of meeting the criteria defined in PA-RD-1009 of not allowing more than 200 ml of water to enter the container with a water column of 6-inches applied over a 2-hour period. This report provides the results of the testing performed against PA-PLAN-01921.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2026

Technical Basis Update for the Design Life Extension of the SAVY-4000® Series of Containers

This technical basis update focuses on the design life of the SAVY-4000® (hereafter “SAVY”) series of nuclear material storage container (e.g., used to store, transport, and handle special nuclear material outside of a glovebox), previously approved under DOE Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY is approved for storing all authorized contents for a period of 15 years. The lifetime extension technical basis is established on the compiled technical data from the on-going SAVY and Hagan surveillance programs, destructive analysis results, accelerated aging studies, and performance testing, in line with the regulatory rigor of DOE M441.1-1.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1992

Normalization of multidirectional red and NIR reflectances with the SAVI

Directional reflectance measurements were made over a semi-desert gramma grassland at various times of the growing season. View angle measurements from +40 to -40 degrees were made at various solar zenith angles and soil moisture conditions. The sensitivity of the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) and the Soil Adjusted Vegetation Index (SAVI) to bidirectional measurements was assessed for purposes of improving remote temporal monitoring of vegetation dynamics. The SAVI view angle response was found to be symmetric about nadir while the NDVI response was strongly anisotropic. This enabled the view angle behavior of the SAVI to be normalized with a cosine function. In contrast to the NDVI, the SAVI was able to minimize soil moisture and shadow influences for all measurement conditions.

Huete, A. R.↗
DOE OSTI2019

Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update for 2020

The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Five surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018, and one in 2019. This 2020 update documents what was actually done in 2019 and what is planned for 2020. Deviations from the 2019 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination. The goal of the surveillance program is to provide data to: evaluate container component performance over time against the initial baseline qualification; validate the current SAVY container design life; provide data for future design life extensions of components as indicated; identify indications of container degradation early and identify similar containers and/or contents that may need remediation; maintain and continuously improve the surveillance information system that documents the complete life cycle of the containers including the initial production baseline, usage history, surveillance, and disposition; identify container issues related to wear and tear that could indicate the need for a maintenance program for in-service containers prior to the end of the design life.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Pressurizing Hagan and SAVY containers to 30-psig (air) to measure the release of analytical cerium oxide test powder

In response to an ESS surrounding the storage of sealed sources at TA-55, personnel from RP-SVS (Radiation Protection Services) and ORI-2 (Operational Readiness & Execution) were approached by ES-55 (Facility System Engineering) to provide technical testing of known nuclear material storage containers. Testing criteria were determined by SB-PF (Safety Basis for Plutonium Facilities). Tests were conducted in conjunction with multiple related projects at the Aerosol Sciences Laboratory (TA-03-0130-0103). An experimental system was quickly developed to deliver a pressure pulse (30-psig) that mimics a sealed source burst scenario. A series of twelve tests was conducted. Six tests were done with two different 5QT SAVY-4000 containers, where each SAVY filter-lid combination was subjected to three successive test insults. Three tests were done with a (0.375" diameter filter) 8Q.T Hagan container, and three tests with a (0.625" diameter filter) 8QT Hagan container. An unused, fresh container filter was used for each tested Hagan container, each receiving only one test insult per filter. Cerium oxide (CeO 2 ) powder was loaded (100 grams per test) into a nozzle in the tested Hagan and SAVY containers, and the nozzle was hard-plumbed to a ball valve and a pressure source. This system was installed into the Los Alamos RRFMC (Respirable Release Measurement Chamber), which is an integrated multipurpose aerosol wind tunnel that satisfies NQA-1 subpart 2.4 for R&D work. The ball valve was fitted with a mechanical linkage for operation from outside the wind tunnel. An aerodynamic particle sizer counted the particle concentrations and size distributions of released aerosol. Respirable aerosol released during the tests was measured and a correction factor for wind tunnel flowrate and internal duct deposition was applied.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

SAVY-4000 Lifetime Extension Overview for FY23

The SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY) was granted a 15 year design life as of June 11, 2019. Since that time, a concerted effort to evaluate the SAVY lifetime beyond 15 years initiated. Several key gaps in knowledge were identified by subject matter expert reviewers across the complex, along with testing that should be included or addressed in the next technical basis. While surveillance has not fundamentally changed since the last life extension, many key techniques have since been identified as necessary to evaluate key container performance requirements not addressed previously (i.e. drop qualification release rate). FY23 provided an opportunity to establish the groundwork for the development of those key techniques that aid in addressing DOE Manual 441.1-1 (hereafter “Manual”) requirements for safe storage of nuclear material.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

SAVY O-ring characterization for lifetime extension

Los Alamos National Laboratory and Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. developed the SAVY-4000 nuclear material storage container, named after the designers Stone, Anderson, Viers, and Yarbro. The SAVY 4000 meets the requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) M 441.1-1,2 Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, to protect workers who handle nuclear materials against radiation exposures resulting from the leakage of stored materials. The SAVY-4000 is an innovative and creative design: it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without using torque wrenches and instead only a tire iron or equivalent prying tool; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates at 200 ACCM rated flow; and prevents the release of stored materials upon a 12- foot drop.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

An initial effort to study the influence of pitting in SAVY containers

As part of a broader effort to investigate a critical pit depth, below which SAVY containers fail a leak test after a drop test, surrogate testing using pristine SAVY container material was investigated. The original study involved producing pits in a SAVY wall to depths 35% to 55% of the wall thickness and subjecting the pitted container to a drop test under prototypic conditions. Subsequent leak testing after drop testing showed the container passed and that the pit size distribution and drop conditions were not sufficient to cause a leak test failure in this specific container.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRS1992

Mechanisms of the Space Active Vibration Isolation (SAVI)

The Space Active Vibration Isolation (SAVI) is a concept for vibration isolation of one body from another with simultaneous precise control in 6 Degrees Of Freedom (DOF). SAVI achieves this using a combination of electromechanical linear actuators and magnetic actuators. Other mechanisms of interest include a structure for simulating the body being pointed, an apparatus to simulate the body that is the vibration source, and mechanisms to off-load the weight of each of these two bodies from the experiment to approximate a zero-g condition. A SAVI was built and tested to demonstrate these capabilities.

Schmitt, Frank↗
DOE OSTI2022

Improving Non-Destructive Detection Technology Through SAVY Feature Detection

Surveillance of special nuclear material (SNM) storage containers is required by the DOE to assess their integrity across the Complex. This work aims to improve the task of container inspections by leveraging automation through machine learning (ML) tools to reduce the human-intensive effort and expert-level knowledge needed to assess container status. A field-deployable, non-destructive technology was designed using off-the-shelf components to collect multiple images from different perspectives of containers in storage to detect both spatial features of interest and anomalies of concern. Nine ML models were generated using unique training datasets and parameters. Learned features include SAVY surface regions including the body side wall, collar, lid, filter, and printed/etched information. Average Precision (AP) is used to calculate detection performance when both viewing previously seen environments and previously unseen environments. The application of image transformations and resolution scaling while training greatly improved the detection performance in unseen environments, and significantly increasing the number of computation iterations improved detection performance on previously seen environments. Additional capabilities were developed including the novel detection of procedural non-compliance and the ability to localize anomalies relative to SAVY surface features.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗