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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Offshore Wind Workforce Safety Standards and Training Resource

The standardization of safety training requirements for people working at sea to build and operate offshore wind energy projects, adoption of those standards, and alignment with offshore safety training curriculum development was identified as a high-priority workforce gap in the U.S. Offshore Wind Workforce Assessment (Stefek, 2022). Safety is a top priority for the offshore wind industry; however, there has been uncertainty surrounding what unique safety standards and training will be needed and how various offshore wind safety stakeholders will be involved. The scope of safety training for this resource includes workers who build and operate offshore wind energy projects at sea and defines the stakeholders in the complex ecosystem. This fact sheet aims to help reduce these uncertainties by: 1) Delineating jurisdictional lines, while clarifying roles and responsibilities amongst stakeholders; 2) Identifying key actions or partnerships that can encourage further success with safety training and workforce development.

offshore wind↗
NASA NTRS1997

NASA Software Safety Standard

If software is a critical element in a safety critical system, it is imperative to implement a systematic approach to software safety as an integral part of the overall system safety programs. The NASA-STD-8719.13A, "NASA Software Safety Standard", describes the activities necessary to ensure that safety is designed into software that is acquired or developed by NASA, and that safety is maintained throughout the software life cycle. A PDF version, is available on the WWW from Lewis. A Guidebook that will assist in the implementation of the requirements in the Safety Standard is under development at the Lewis Research Center (LeRC). After completion, it will also be available on the WWW from Lewis.

Rosenberg, Linda↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft (manned or unmanned) launched that did not have a computer on board that provided vital command and control services. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Led by the NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard (STD-18l9.13B) has recently undergone a significant update in an attempt to provide that consistency. This paper will discuss the key features of the new NASA Software Safety Standard. It will start with a brief history of the use and development of software in safety critical applications at NASA. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Working Group and the approach it took to revise the software engineering process across the Agency.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRS1997

An overview of revised NASA safety standard 1740.14

Following a broad review of the debris control guidelines outside of NASA and according to additional feedback on the guidelines from within NASA, revisions were made to the NASA safety standard 1740.14. The NASA policy to limit the generation of orbital debris on NASA missions, stated in the NASA management instruction 1700.8 and implemented in the form of the NASA safety standard (NSS) 1740.14 is described together with the revisions implemented. The overall direction of the guidelines is the same, but the details of many of the guidelines were changed, including: changes for tether programs and for the control of operational debris. The NASA will continue to review the guidelines as new measurements and improved models of the environment are obtained.

Reynolds, Robert↗
NASA NTRS1990

NASA safety standard for lifting devices and equipment

NASA's minimum safety requirements are established for the design, testing, inspection, maintenance, certification, and use of overhead and gantry cranes (including top running monorail, underhung, and jib cranes), mobile cranes, derrick hoists, and special hoist supported personnel lifting devices (these do not include elevators, ground supported personnel lifts, or powered platforms). Minimum requirements are also addressed for the testing, inspection, and use of Hydra-sets, hooks, and slings. Safety standards are thoroughly detailed.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2023

Conduct of Operations and Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards

Since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1943, there have been 22 criticality accidents in process facilities worldwide in which fissionable materials were processed by hand for various purposes. Of these 22 process criticality accidents, 16 involved faulty or flawed conduct of operations. Most of these process accidents (17 of 22) occurred before 1970, mostly due to the implementation of formal conduct of operations—such as the use of operating procedures and training—and the use of consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Obviously, the nuclear facilities applied lessons learned from their accident history, and the rate of criticality accidents was significantly reduced as a result. Over the years, it has been emphasized in NCS training courses and other venues in the United States that the consensus standards, such as ASA N6.1-1964, were the key contributors to this reduction in accidents. The formality of operations required to implement and apply the standards at a facility is also a crucial prerequisite that must be sufficiently robust to ensure NCS. This prerequisite is crucial to success fully implement the NCS consensus and other safety standards at a site.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Safety Standards for Fuel System and Fuel Container Integrity of Alternative Fuel Vehicles

There are two Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) in place that specify requirements for integrity of the fuel system and fuel container on compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel vehicles. These are FMVSS Nos. 303, “Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicles,” and FMVSS No. 304, “CNG fuel container integrity.” At this time, no FMVSS are defined for the fuel system and fuel container integrity of propane and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vehicles or fuel system integrity requirements for heavy-duty CNG vehicles on the road. However, there are voluntary industry design standards and best practices, as well as regulations defined in other countries. FMVSS No. 303 specifies requirements for the integrity of the CNG fuel system of light-duty vehicles and school buses, and FMVSS No. 304 specifies requirements for fuel container integrity on all CNG vehicles. FMVSS No. 304 applies to containers used for vehicle propulsion, whereas containers used to transport CNG and transportation of CNG containers are regulated by the DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304 are performance-based standards to consistently test and validate equipment and are not design restrictive. Despite the increasing number of natural gas and propane medium- and heavy-duty vehicles on the road, there are no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements beyond light-duty and school buses for CNG vehicles and no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements for propane vehicles. NHTSA is researching fuel system safety for medium- and heavy-duty natural gas and propane vehicles to update FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304. NHTSA is also researching current best practices and standards for high pressure fuel tanks in motor vehicles as they may apply to FMVSS No. 304.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Formality of Operations and Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards [Slides]

This presentation is on the formality of operations and nuclear criticality safety standards. This lecture starts with an Introduction then leads into a conversation on the dependencies of formality of operations. Secondly the presentation includes a review of past issues. Included is a Discussion about “credible” and “unlikely” – variables for process analysis in ANS-8.1, Section 4.1.2, and the double contingency principle, Section 4.2.2, respectively. The presentation finishes with some conclusions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1997

Safety Standard for Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems: Guidelines for Hydrogen System Design, Materials Selection, Operations, Storage and Transportation

The NASA Safety Standard, which establishes a uniform process for hydrogen system design, materials selection, operation, storage, and transportation, is presented. The guidelines include suggestions for safely storing, handling, and using hydrogen in gaseous (GH2), liquid (LH2), or slush (SLH2) form whether used as a propellant or non-propellant. The handbook contains 9 chapters detailing properties and hazards, facility design, design of components, materials compatibility, detection, and transportation. Chapter 10 serves as a reference and the appendices contained therein include: assessment examples; scaling laws, explosions, blast effects, and fragmentation; codes, standards, and NASA directives; and relief devices along with a list of tables and figures, abbreviations, a glossary and an index for ease of use. The intent of the handbook is to provide enough information that it can be used alone, but at the same time, reference data sources that can provide much more detail if required.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2015

Nuclear criticality safety standard for a fuel reprocessing plant assuming burnup credit published by the atomic energy society of Japan - 14591

In this paper an outline of the standard published in April 2015 by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) is presented. The standard gives basis of nuclear safety management of a spent fuel reprocessing plant that assumed burnup credit in nuclear criticality safety evaluation. Ten years ago the AESJ published Basic Items of Criticality Safety Control: 2004, AESJ-SC-F004:2004, which prescribed basic ideas, requirements and methods on nuclear criticality safety controls of facilities handling with nuclear fuel materials in general for preventing a nuclear criticality accident. However, it did not include any specific procedures for adopting burnup credit. Therefore, a new standard was envisaged as the first Standard for fuel reprocessing plants, which clarified the specific procedures to apply burnup credit to designers, operators, maintenance persons and administrators. The Standard, Procedures for Applying Burnup Credit to Criticality Safety Control of a Reprocessing Facility: 2014, AESJ-SC-F025: 2014, was developed by the AESJ after vital discussions of the Working Group on Nuclear Criticality Safety Control, which were followed by critical reviews of the Special Committee on Nuclear Fuel Cycle and those of the Standard Committee, where both committees were established under the AESJ. The followings are some features of the standard: 1. In many countries, application of burnup credit has been considered especially in transportation and storage of spent fuel. The standard applies to a reprocessing plant, especially to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan. The present edition of the Standard assumes the first phase of burnup credit, i.e., burnup credit considering reduction in {sup 235}U, production of {sup 239}Pu and changes in other actinides, but not considering neutron absorption effect of fission products. 2. This standard covers nuclear criticality safety management including safety design and safety control stages. It prescribes each procedure of nuclear safety management with emphasis on its necessity rather in detail. Attached to the standard are seven appendices, which give reference to it, and explanations, which provide supplemental information to the readers. Future needs of AESJ standards in the field of nuclear criticality safety will be discussed in the presentation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comparison of ISO and ANSI/ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards

This paper provides a high-level comparison between the international and domestic Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) standards, as requested by members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division. Currently, there are 18 enacted American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American National Standards (ANS) and 1 ANSI/ANS standard in progress. There are 11 NCS standards from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 (TC85) on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 (SC5) on Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Working Group 8 (WG8). There are NCS standard revisions in progress for both standards organizations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comparison of ISO and ANSI/ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards [Slides]

This paper provides a high-level comparison between the international and domestic nuclear criticality safety (NCS) standards, as requested by members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division. Currently, there are 18 enacted American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American National Standards (ANS) standards, and 1 ANSI/ANS standard, in progress. There are 11 NCS standards from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 (TC85) on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 (SC5) on Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Working Group 8 (WG8). NCS standard revisions are in progress for both standards organizations. The key differences between the ISO TC85/SC5/WG8 and ANSI/ANS-8 consensus NCS standards are summarized. The hard work done by the ANS-8 and WG8 volunteers allows for applicable, high-quality consensus standards for use by the NCS community. This paper defines the current status of each ANSI/ANS and ISO standard, the work in in progress, the revisions/amendments in progress, and WG8/ANS-8 non-standard business in progress. A forthcoming paper will compare the development process for ISO and ANSI/ANS standards.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2013

The Environmental Protection Agency's Safety Standards for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel: Potential Path Forward in Response to the Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future - 13388

Following the decision to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application, the Department of Energy created a Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future, tasked with recommending a national strategy to manage the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The BRC issued its final report in January 2012, with recommendations covering transportation, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF); potential reprocessing; and supporting institutional measures. The BRC recommendations on disposal of SNF and high-level waste (HLW) are relevant to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which shares regulatory responsibility with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): EPA issues 'generally applicable' performance standards for disposal repositories, which are then implemented in licensing. For disposal, the BRC endorses developing one or more geological repositories, with siting based on an approach that is adaptive, staged and consent-based. The BRC recommends that EPA and NRC work cooperatively to issue generic disposal standards-applying equally to all sites-early in any siting process. EPA previously issued generic disposal standards that apply to all sites other than Yucca Mountain. However, the BRC concluded that the existing regulations should be revisited and revised. The BRC proposes a number of general principles to guide the development of future regulations. EPA continues to review the BRC report and to assess the implications for Agency action, including potential regulatory issues and considerations if EPA develops new or revised generic disposal standards. This review also involves preparatory activities to define potential process and public engagement approaches. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Offshore Wind Electrical Safety Standards Harmonization (Workshop Proceedings)

Offshore wind (OSW) development activity is accelerating in the United States, with over 10 gigawatts (GW) of capacity likely to be installed on the Atlantic coast before 2030. In addition, states have committed to procure over 29 GW of offshore wind. Experienced European offshore wind energy developers are beginning to make large investments into offshore wind projects in American waters, and some U.S. developers have submitted key design documents for regulatory review. European offshore wind developers possess extensive experience in other geographic markets, which greatly increases confidence that the U.S. offshore wind industry will be successful. Nonetheless, existing U.S. electrical standards and European electrical standards are significantly different. If not addressed, these differences could potentially impact worker safety.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2017

Enhanced electrical penetration components meet the high safety standards required for China's HTR-PM Shidaowan and generation mPower small modular reactors - 300

Enhanced glass-to-metal feedthroughs will be used to carry key instrumentation and control (I and C) signals in China's high-temperature, gas-cooled pebble-bed modular reactor (HTR-PM) at Shidaowan, and in Small Modular Reactor (SMR) prototyping. Chinergy Co., Ltd and Jiamusi Electric Machine Co., Ltd will use the feedthroughs, also called electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs), at the Shidaowan twin-reactor high temperature reactor (HTR). These feedthroughs are manufactured using specialized processes that make them far more robust than counterparts made with organic or ceramic materials. Improved EPAs manufactured by SCHOTT are the only feedthrough solution that can be used in the primary loop of an HTR because organic seals cannot withstand the high temperatures and pressures of this environment. Glass-to-metal seals (GTMS) are made using inorganic, non-aging materials which enable a virtually unlimited lifespan in high-temperature, high-radiation and high-pressure applications. This I and C technology package is being enhanced by the development and testing of new mineral-insulated (MI) cable connectors and EPAs made of crystallized glass-ceramic combined with superalloys. The EPAs have a maintenance-free lifespan of over 60 years, preventing any outage time related to these components and subsequently reducing costs associated with shutdowns. They are far more robust than organic seals and provide increased safety at a lower lifetime cost. Resistance against high pressure and high temperature are especially ideal qualities that make EPAs a valuable choice for environments with high standards for fire protection, such as nuclear plants, subsea oil drilling, or any other underwater application. Due to their significant offering of safety-relevant qualities, the EPAs have also been chosen by BWXT for implementation in its mPower SMR. Small modular reactor requirements are complex and very challenging but are met by the new EPA components, which will help form a strong I and C safety chain. Unlike ordinary compression glass-to-metal seals, GTMS with crystallized glass-ceramic have the ability to withstand temperatures of over 350 deg. C / 662 deg. F and operating pressures of 3500 bar. Furthermore, their lifetime is qualified for up to 60 years, including pressure and radiation requirements in accordance with the latest IEC/IEEE standards. Higher-specification EPAs and MI cable connectors have been designed into severe accident I and C instruments, including advanced hydrogen and oxygen sensors that exceed the challenging requirements of both HTR and SMR applications. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Process Safety Standards and Regulations

The list of standards, best practice, and regulations below are intended to give insight into what resources are available for developing a chemical control regime as well as information on what regulations other countries have used to implement such a regime. This list is not intended to be all inclusive and other regulations and standards related to controlling hazardous chemicals exist and should be consulted.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗