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A literature review of safety culture.

Workplace safety has been historically neglected by organizations in order to enhance profitability. Over the past 30 years, safety concerns and attention to safety have increased due to a series of disastrous events occurring across many different industries (e.g., Chernobyl, Upper Big-Branch Mine, Davis-Besse etc.). Many organizations have focused on promoting a healthy safety culture as a way to understand past incidents, and to prevent future disasters. There is an extensive academic literature devoted to safety culture, and the Department of Energy has also published a significant number of documents related to safety culture. The purpose of the current endeavor was to conduct a review of the safety culture literature in order to understand definitions, methodologies, models, and successful interventions for improving safety culture. After reviewing the literature, we observed four emerging themes. First, it was apparent that although safety culture is a valuable construct, it has some inherent weaknesses. For example, there is no common definition of safety culture and no standard way for assessing the construct. Second, it is apparent that researchers know how to measure particular components of safety culture, with specific focus on individual and organizational factors. Such existing methodologies can be leveraged for future assessments. Third, based on the published literature, the relationship between safety culture and performance is tenuous at best. There are few empirical studies that examine the relationship between safety culture and safety performance metrics. Further, most of these studies do not include a description of the implementation of interventions to improve safety culture, or do not measure the effect of these interventions on safety culture or performance. Fourth, safety culture is best viewed as a dynamic, multi-faceted overall system composed of individual, engineered and organizational models. By addressing all three components of safety culture, organizations have a better chance of understanding, evaluating, and making positive changes towards safety within their own organization.

Cole, Kerstan Suzanne↗

I Asked 30,000 People in the Nuclear Industry About Safety Culture; This is What I Learned - 19204

Organizations in the nuclear industry place a high value on maintaining the safety of the workforce and community. Some of these organizations do a better job than others when it comes to developing and sustaining a healthy safety culture. We spent six years studying nuclear organizations to better understand the factors that influence safety culture. We used mixed methods to evaluate perceptions of safety culture in these organizations including administering a valid and reliable safety culture survey, conducting one-on-one interviews with managers, and facilitating focus groups with members of the workforce. We analyzed the quantitative and qualitative data collected from more than 30,000 workers in U.S. based organizations. All of the organizations had a nuclear component to their operations. They operated nuclear reactors, processed nuclear materials, decontaminated and decommissioned buildings with radiological contamination, cleaned-up hazardous/mixed waste, and conducted basic science research and development. We talked to craft workers, technicians, engineers, scientific professionals, support personnel, production workers, supervisors and managers. We conducted extensive statistical analysis and learned that, with rare exception, there is a gap between the perceptions of managers and the workforce that they manage. Managers almost always have a more positive perception of safety culture than the people that are actually performing the work. It is not a question of whether there will be a gap; it is simply a matter of the magnitude of the gap. We also learned through exploratory factor analysis that there is one dominant factor that accounted for almost all (75%) of the variance in the perceptions of safety culture. It was the behavior of the leaders, the decisions they made, and the systems they implemented that most influenced the workforce's perception of safety culture. Personal accountability for safety accounted for 14% of the variance, communication and reporting accounted for another 6%. Everything else accounted for the remaining 5%. Management systems, decision making and behavior is the dominant factor and managers almost always have a more positive perception than the people that work for them. People that work in organizations where management exhibits positive decision-making and safety-related behaviors tend to have more positive perceptions of safety culture. Based upon these results, we developed a theory that there were a few important factors on which management could focus on if they sought to influence the safety culture in their organization. Our experience and research suggests that management often fails to recognize five root causes of employee discontent. Employees seek: - To be recognized as an individual; - To be respected; - A sense of stability; - Fairness; - To make a difference. Understanding the perceptions of the workforce is critical because perceptions influence attitudes, which contribute to behaviors that determine individual performance. An organisation's performance is simply the sum of the performance of all of the members of that organization. To change an organisation's safety culture, interventions should target management behavior and decision making for the greatest return on investment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 117: Panel: Operational Excellence Through a Strong Safety Culture (R9.1)

This panel focused on the what the Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors are doing to promote safety and excellence. The Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) is crucial, but additional support provided by the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG), DOE, and environmental, safety, and health (ES and H) professionals in the field are equally imperative. The panelists discussed the importance of sharing lessons learned as well as are developing performance metrics to track operational and safety successes. This panel focused on current trends in building a strong operational safety culture and will include results from recent national workshops. Safety culture is the foundation of strong operational performance. Panel discussion included best practices from industry, DOE, and US NRC and also review tools being used to measure and evaluate safety culture programs. Panelists with presentations: Strong Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence (Kliss McNeel, Patricia Hughes); Safety Culture (Patricia Allen); DOE Safety Culture Improvement (Julie Goeckner); Supporting Safety Culture on the Front Line (Jan Preston); Interdependence of Safety Culture and Organizational Performance (Rizwan Shah)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SAFETY CULTURE IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE

In 2007, the Department of Energy (DOE) identified safety culture as one of their top Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) related priorities. A team was formed to address this issue. The team identified a consensus set of safety culture principles, along with implementation practices that could be used by DOE, NNSA, and their contractors. Documented improvement tools were identified and communicated to contractors participating in a year long pilot project. After a year, lessons learned will be collected and a path forward determined. The goal of this effort was to achieve improved safety and mission performance through ISMS continuous improvement. The focus of ISMS improvement was safety culture improvement building on operating experience from similar industries such as the domestic and international commercial nuclear and chemical industry.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Critical Drivers for Safety Culture: Examining Department of Energy and U.S. Army Operational Experiences - 12382

Evaluating operational incidents can provide a window into the drivers most critical to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture, thereby minimizing the potential project risk associated with safety incidents. By examining U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) versus U.S. Army drivers in terms of regulatory and contract requirements, programs implemented to address the requirements, and example case studies of operational events, a view of the elements most critical to making a positive influence on safety culture is presented. Four case studies are used in this evaluation; two from DOE and two from U.S. Army experiences. Although the standards guiding operations at these facilities are different, there are many similarities in the level of hazards, as well as the causes and the potential consequences of the events presented. Two of the incidents examined, one from a DOE operation and the other from a U.S. Army facility, resulted in workers receiving chemical burns. The remaining two incidents are similar in that significant conduct of operations failures occurred resulting in high-level radioactive waste (in the case of the DOE facility) or chemical agent (in the case of the Army facility) being transferred outside of engineering controls. A review of the investigation reports for all four events indicates the primary causes to be failures in work planning leading to ineffective hazard evaluation and control, lack of procedure adherence, and most importantly, lack of management oversight to effectively reinforce expectations for safe work planning and execution. DOE and Army safety programs are similar, and although there are some differences in contractual requirements, the expectations for safe performance are essentially the same. This analysis concludes that instilling a positive safety culture comes down to management leadership and engagement to (1) cultivate an environment that values a questioning attitude and (2) continually reinforce expectations for the appropriate level of rigor in work planning and procedure adherence. A review of the root causes and key contributing causes to the events indicate: - Three of the four root cause analyses cite lack of management engagement (oversight, involvement, ability to recognize issues, etc.) as a root cause to the events. - Two of the four root cause analyses cite work planning failures as a root cause to the events and all cause analyses reflect work planning failures as contributing factors to the events. - All events with the exception of the Tuba City plant shutdown indicate procedure noncompliance as a key contributor; in the case of Tuba City the procedure issues were primarily related to a lack of procedures, or a lack of sufficiently detailed procedures. - All events included discussion or suggestion of a lack of a questioning attitude, either on the part of management/supervision, work planners, or workers. This analysis suggests that the most critical drivers to safety culture are: - Management engagement, - Effective work planning and procedures, and - Procedure adherence with a questioning attitude to ensure procedural problems are identified and fixed. In high-hazard operational environments the importance of robust work planning processes and procedure adherence cannot be overstated. However, having the processes by themselves is not enough. Management must actively engage in expectation setting and ensure work planning that meets expectations for hazard analysis and control, develop a culture that encourages incident reporting and a questioning attitude, and routinely observe work performance to reinforce expectations for adherence to procedures/work control documents. In conclusion, the most critical driver to achieving a workforce culture that supports safe and effective project performance can be summarized as follows: 'Management engagement to continually reinforce expectations for work planning processes and procedure adherence in an environment that cultivates a questioning attitude'. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Importance of a Safety Culture

Objectives: By the end of this offering, participants will be able to: Identify what does and does not define culture; Specify the main drivers of why we need a Nuclear Safety Culture; Detail the primary contributors to LANL's Nuclear Safety Culture history; Explain how LANL's values, behaviors, and actions demonstrate our commitment to a Nuclear Safety Culture; Indicate at least one new piece of knowledge as a result of this course.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Improving the Safety Culture by Strengthening Leadership Skills - 16563

As a primary contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is managing a team of approximately 1,400 employees at the Hanford Site in Southeast Washington. The work on this 10-year, $5.7 billion contract ranges from design and construction to decommissioning and cleanup. In 2013, CH2M began the second half of its contract and expanded its leadership development program to focus on succession planning and strengthening the leadership skills of its employees. The goal is to create and sustain qualified leaders to lead the Hanford cleanup mission today and into the future. CH2M launched the Leadership Impact Initiative, a training program modeled from best practices used at other CH2M projects, including the Idaho Cleanup Project. Based on the results of a CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company site-wide safety culture survey, the company developed an improvement strategy focused on leadership development with emphasis on the front-line leadership. The strategy stresses core leadership principles and skill development to help managers more effectively engage the workforce. The two-day workshop gives employees the opportunity to build leadership on the job in an audience of their peers. CH2M expanded the workshops to include employees from all levels of the organization, including bargaining unit employees. The workshops are reinforced at quarterly all-manager meetings, communications among team members and regular sharing of lessons learned and experiences in the field. The Leadership Impact Initiative advances CH2M's vision of quality leadership and project delivery anchored by health and safety performance excellence. Since 2013, CH2M hosted more than 25 Leadership Impact Initiative workshops, reaching approximately 500 participants. Meanwhile, the company achieved the best safety record since the start of its contract, and results from its 2015 safety culture survey show improvements in the safety climate. A DOE assessment of the CH2M worker health and safety culture for the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) found the workshop was a contributing factor to the contractor achieving VPP Star and VPP Star of Excellence Status. This paper summarizes the strategy behind the leadership development program, the outcomes and its relevance for other companies, particularly those on DOE Environmental Management decommissioning projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Extending Safety Culture Development through Communication - 12366

The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority has been implementing a regulatory support program in the Russian Federation for over 10 years, as part of the Norwegian government's Plan of Action for enhancing nuclear and radiation safety in northwest Russia. The overall long-term objective is the enhancement of safety culture. The project outputs have included appropriate regulatory threat assessments, to determine the hazardous activities which are most in need of enhanced regulatory supervision; and development of the norms, standards and regulatory procedures, necessary to address the often abnormal conditions at nuclear legacy sites. Project outputs have been prepared and subsequently confirmed as official regulatory documents of the Russian Federation. The continuing program of work focuses on practical application of the enhanced regulatory framework as applied to legacy sites, including safe management of radioactive wastes arising in the process of site remediation. One of the lessons learnt from this practical application is the importance of effective communication at all levels: - between managers and shop workers; - between different operators - e.g. waste producers and waste disposal organisations; - between operators and regulators; - between nuclear safety regulators, radiation protection regulators and other pollution and safety regulators; - between scientists, policy makers and wider stakeholders; and - between all of those mentioned above. A key message from this work is that it is not just an issue of risk communication; rather all aspects of communication can contribute to safety culture enhancement to support effective and efficient risk management, including the role of regulatory supervision. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Culture And Best Practices At Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Division 1000 Safety Culture [Slides]

Division-wide email survey conducted in May. Survey questions chosen to provide some connection to the 2014 DuPont Safety Perception Survey and address key components of a safety culture.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Changing An Electrical Safety Culture - The Importance of Understanding Why.

Abstract – Electrical workers, regardless of experience, are faced with a major barrier when first introduced to NFPA 70E, “The Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace,” and an erroneous electrical safety culture pre-exists. This paper describes, from the author’s point of view, the barrier that he and other electrical workers have experienced and his insight into overcoming the barrier. The author in conclusion will present a series of techniques that can be used to assist other electrical workers in overcoming the barrier.

Barrier↗

CHANGING THE SAFETY CULTURE IN HANFORD TANK FARMS

In 2000 the Hanford Tank Farms had one of the worst safety records in the Department of Energy Complex. By the end of FY08 the safety performance of the workforce had turned completely around, resulting in one of the best safety records in the DOE complex for operations of its kind. This paper describes the variety of programs and changes that were put in place to accomplish such a dramatic turn-around. The U.S. Department of Energy's 586-square-mile Hanford Site in Washington State was established during World War II as part of the Manhattan Project to develop nuclear materials to end the war. For the next several decades it continued to produce plutonium for the nation's defense, leaving behind vast quantities of radioactive and chemical waste. Much of this waste, 53,000,000 gallons, remains stored in 149 aging single-shell tanks and 28 newer double-shell tanks. One of the primary objectives at Hanford is to safely manage this waste until it can be prepared for disposal, but this has not always been easy. These giant underground tanks, many of which date back to the beginning of the Manhattan Project, range in size from 55,000 gallons up to 1.1 million gallons, and are buried beneath 10 feet of soil near the center of the site. Up to 67 of the older single-shell tanks have leaked as much as one million gallons into the surrounding soil. Liquids from the single-shell tanks were removed by 2003 but solids remain in the form of saltcake, sludges and a hardened heel at the bottom of some tanks. The Department of Energy's Office of River Protection was established to safely manage this waste until it could be prepared for disposal. For most of the last seven years the focus has been on safely retrieving waste from the 149 aging single-shell and moving it to the newer double-shell tanks. Removing waste from the tanks is a difficult and complex task. The tanks were made to put waste in, not take it out. Because of the toxic nature of the waste, both chemically as well as radiologically, all retrieval operations must be performed using remote-controlled equipment which has to be installed in each tank, then removed when retrieval is completed. This process involves a variety of potentially hazardous construction activities including crane and rigging, excavation, electrical and piping work. It also requires strong attention to safety to avoid injuries to personnel and contamination of the environment.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

2017 ADEM SSIP Safety Culture 2

The overall purpose of the 2017 SSIP is to improve operational performance by fostering employee involvement in the development of solutions to issues that are important to the organization. While the cornerstone mechanism of our employee involvement is the Worker Safety and Security Teams (WSSTs); active guidance by management is also a key to success.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Materials and Fuels Complex Human Performance and Nuclear Safety Culture Pocket Guide

The facilities at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) contain a diverse collection of nuclear research and development capabilities which enable experiments and engineering to drive the world’s nuclear energy future. It is our responsibility to ensure safe, efficient, and reliable operation of MFC facilities to support INL’s nuclear science and technology and national security missions. The MFC management plan makes it clear that safely achieving this takes the right people using good processes.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Overcoming Production Disruption When Adopting New Technologies: Application of Macroergonomics and Safety Culture

Organizations are constantly responding to new technologies that require an appropriate response to remain competitive. Depending on the nature of the technologic changes, incremental changes may be adequate. However, at some point, the technical demands may be disruptive because the organization is unable to respond adequately. In this case study of a biotechnology production facility, rapidly changing customer and technological demands created a crisis manifested in rising employee injuries and production interruptions. The crisis was ultimately addressed through a comprehensive redesign of human-system relationships. Key ingredients included: a management willing to examine the entire production system, a multidisciplinary team coordinating efforts towards a common goal, engagement of staff at all levels of the organization, and the creation of feedback channels to better guide the actions of supervisors and managers. The methods used in this successful case study, involving a macroergonomics approach, can be applied to any private or public enterprise.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗