Integrated Uncertainty Quantification for Risk and Resource Management: Building Confidence in Design
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Occupational radiation exposure from the space environment may result in non-cancer or non-CNS degenerative tissue diseases, such as cardiovascular disease, cataracts, and respiratory or digestive diseases. However, the magnitude of influence and mechanisms of action of radiation leading to these diseases are not well characterized. Radiation and synergistic effects of radiation cause DNA damage, persistent oxidative stress, chronic inflammation, and accelerated tissue aging and degeneration, which may lead to acute or chronic disease of susceptible organ tissues. In particular, cardiovascular pathologies such as atherosclerosis are of major concern following gamma-ray exposure. This provides evidence for possible degenerative tissue effects following exposures to ionizing radiation in the form of the GCR or SPEs expected during long-duration spaceflight. However, the existence of low dose thresholds and dose-rate and radiation quality effects, as well as mechanisms and major risk pathways, are not well-characterized. Degenerative disease risks are difficult to assess because multiple factors, including radiation, are believed to play a role in the etiology of the diseases. As additional evidence is pointing to lower, space-relevant thresholds for these degenerative effects, particularly for cardiovascular disease, additional research with cell and animal studies is required to quantify the magnitude of this risk, understand mechanisms, and determine if additional protection strategies are required.The NASA PEL (Permissive Exposure Limit)s for cataract and cardiovascular risks are based on existing human epidemiology data. Although animal and clinical astronaut data show a significant increase in cataracts following exposure and a reassessment of atomic bomb (A-bomb) data suggests an increase in cardiovascular disease from radiation exposure, additional research is required to fully understand and quantify these adverse outcomes at lower doses (less than 0.5 gray (SI unit for ionizing radiation dosage, i.e. one joule of radiation energy per one kilogram of matter)) to facilitate risk prediction. This risk has considerable uncertainty associated with it, and no acceptable model for projecting degenerative tissue risk is currently available. In particular, risk factors such as obesity, alcohol, and tobacco use can act as confounding factors that contribute to the large uncertainties. The PELs could be violated under certain scenarios, including following a large SPE (solar proton event) or long-term GCR (galactic cosmic ray) exposure. Specifically, for a Mars mission, the accumulated dose is sufficiently high that epidemiology data and preliminary risk estimates suggest a significant risk for cardiovascular disease. Ongoing research in this area is intended to provide the evidence base for accurate risk quantification to determine criticality for extended duration missions. Data specific to the space radiation environment must be compiled to quantify the magnitude of this risk to decrease the uncertainty in current PELs and to determine if additional protection strategies are required. New research results could lead to estimates of cumulative radiation risk from CNS and degenerative tissue diseases that, when combined with the cancer risk, may have major negative impacts on mission design, costs, schedule, and crew selection. The current report amends an earlier report (Human Research Program Requirements Document, HRP-47052, Rev. C, dated Jan 2009) in order to provide an update of evidence since 2009.
The objective of a Mars sample return mission is to bring selected Mars surface materials to Earth. Numerous approaches for the Earth-return segment have been analyzed including propulsive or aerocapture return to low-Earth orbit followed by Space Shuttle rendezvous and direct entry. Of these approaches, ballistic entry of a small capsule terminating in a ground landing has been shown to be the lowest risk strategy. Over the past two years, significant work has been performed towards development of a robust direct entry vehicle for Mars sample return. In June 1999, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer provided initial guidance to the former Mars Sample Return Project. The sample return phase of the mission was assigned a restricted Earth return planetary protection classification. The draft mission requirement states that the total mean probability of release of unsterilized Mars material into the Earth;s biosphere must be less than 1.0E-06 (1 in a million). This strict requirement drives the approach and design of the Earth return system. To meet this requirement, selection of the Earth return strategy and development of the Earth return system must be guided by risk, not performance, based decisions. An initial Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to address the direct entry Earth return system containment assurance reliability and to identify high-risk elements of this system. The results of this PRA identified risk elements that include thermal protection system performance during entry, spin-eject orientation and aerodynamic stability during entry, structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and tracking/recovery of this system. This initial probabilistic risk quantification demonstrates that, with the proper development program, a prototypical direct entry design can satisfy the containment assurance reliability requirement. Through the current Mars Sample Return Advanced Technology Development effort, an extensive design, analysis, and test program is presently proceeding with the aim of reducing the containment assurance risk of this system. This technology development effort, guided by a continuing PRA, focuses on key risk areas of a direct entry Earth return system including: the thermal protection system, impact dynamics, structural performance, aerodynamic stability, and ground recovery. This development program will culminate in a system validation flight test, 1-2 years prior to launch of the flight system. This flight test would include the launch, entry, and recovery of a full-scale Earth return system, as a scientific validation of the key risk elements to verify nominal design performance. The results of the initial PRA suggested several dominant failure sequences that can be validated in a flight test. These include: demonstrating the thermal protection system reliability and performance during entry, demonstrating the spin-eject orientation and aero-dynamic stability during entry, demonstrating the structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and demonstrating tracking and recovery of the Earth return system. This single test will directly address over 50% of the total containment assurance risk elements. This presentation will begin by presenting the relative risk of various Earth return strategies. The results of the initial probabilistic risk assessment will be presented followed by a discussion of the development accomplishments and plans for demonstration of a highly reliable direct entry Earth return system.
Maintenance of human health on long-duration exploration missions is a primary challenge to mission designers. Indeed, human health risks are currently the largest risk contributors to the risks of evacuation or loss of the crew on long-duration International Space Station missions. We describe a quantitative assessment of the relative probabilities of occurrence of the individual risks to human safety and efficiency during space flight to augment qualitative assessments used in this field to date. Quantitative probabilistic risk assessments will allow program managers to focus resources on those human health risks most likely to occur with undesirable consequences. Truly quantitative assessments are common, even expected, in the engineering and actuarial spheres, but that capability is just emerging in some arenas of life sciences research, such as identifying and minimize the hazards to astronauts during future space exploration missions. Our expectation is that these results can be used to inform NASA mission design trade studies in the near future with the objective of preventing the higher among the human health risks. We identify and discuss statistical techniques to provide this risk quantification based on relevant sets of astronaut biomedical data from short and long duration space flights as well as relevant analog populations. We outline critical assumptions made in the calculations and discuss the rationale for these. Our efforts to date have focussed on quantifying the probabilities of medical risks that are qualitatively perceived as relatively high risks of radiation sickness, cardiac dysrhythmias, medically significant renal stone formation due to increased calcium mobilization, decompression sickness as a result of EVA (extravehicular activity), and bone fracture due to loss of bone mineral density. We present these quantitative probabilities in order-of-magnitude comparison format so that relative risk can be gauged. We address the effects of conservative and nonconservative assumptions on the probability results. We discuss the methods necessary to assess mission risks once exploration mission scenarios are characterized. Preliminary efforts have produced results that are commensurate with earlier qualitative estimates of risk probabilities in this and other operational contexts, indicating that our approach may be usefully applied in support of the development of human health and performance standards for long-duration space exploration missions. This approach will also enable mission-specific probabilistic risk assessments for space exploration missions.
A large fault-tolerance model of the main propulsion system of the US space shuttle has been developed. This model is being used to identify single components and pairs of components that will cause loss of shuttle critical functions. In addition, this model is the basis for risk quantification of the shuttle. The process used to develop and analyze the model is digraph matrix analysis (DMA). The DMA modeling and analysis process is accessed via a graphics-based computer user interface. This interface provides coupled display of the integrated system schematics, the digraph models, the component database, and the results of the fault tolerance and risk analyses.
What is Data Mining? - Data Mining is the process of finding actionable information hidden in raw data. - Data Mining helps find hidden patterns, trends, and important relationships often buried in a sea of data - Typically, automated software tools based on advanced statistical analysis and data modeling technology can be utilized to automate the data mining process
Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.
Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.
The presence of a causal association between the frequency of chromosomal aberrations in peripheral blood lymphocytes and the risk of cancer has been substantiated recently by epidemiological studies. Cytogenetic analyses of crew members of the Mir Space Station have shown that a significant increase in the frequency of chromosomal aberrations can be detected after flight, and that such an increase is likely to be attributed to the radiation exposure. The risk of cancer can be estimated directly from the yields of chromosomal aberrations, taking into account some aspects of individual susceptibility and other factors unrelated to radiation. However, the use of an appropriate technique for the collection and analysis of chromosomes and the choice of the structural aberrations to be measured are crucial in providing sound results. Based on the fraction of aberrant lymphocytes detected before and after flight, the relative risk after a long-term Mir mission is estimated to be about 1.2-1.3. The new technique of mFISH can provide useful insights into the quantification of risk on an individual basis.
Mission risk appraisal technique for identification and quantification of high risk areas for unmanned interplanetary missions
An evaluation is made of the consequences of the interaction of high-voltage spacecraft systems designed for use in orbit or on the lunar and Martian surfaces with such environmental components as electrically charged dust, low pressure atmospheres, ionospheric plasmas and neutral gas species, and chemically reactive species. An account is given of plausible means for obtaining the requisite data and developing priorities for the study of each of the identified interactions. Attention is given to the computational tools whose development is required for the simulation and quantification of risk factors for the various likely interactions.
A quantitative risk assessment system (QRAS) builds a risk model of a system for which risk of failure is being assessed, then analyzes the risk of the system corresponding to the risk model. The QRAS performs sensitivity analysis of the risk model by altering fundamental components and quantifications built into the risk model, then re-analyzes the risk of the system using the modifications. More particularly, the risk model is built by building a hierarchy, creating a mission timeline, quantifying failure modes, and building/editing event sequence diagrams. Multiplicities, dependencies, and redundancies of the system are included in the risk model. For analysis runs, a fixed baseline is first constructed and stored. This baseline contains the lowest level scenarios, preserved in event tree structure. The analysis runs, at any level of the hierarchy and below, access this baseline for risk quantitative computation as well as ranking of particular risks. A standalone Tool Box capability exists, allowing the user to store application programs within QRAS.
This presentation focuses on the identification of risk management, risk management processes such as: quantification and prioritization; mitigation planning; implementation of risk reduction; and tracking process. It develops examples and answers questions about Risk Management.
In preparation for future exploration missions to distant destinations (e.g., Moon, Near Earth Objects (NEO), and Mars), the NASA Human Research Program s (HRP) Behavioral Health and Performance Element (BHP) conducts and supports research to address four human health risks: Risk of Behavioral Conditions; Risk of Psychiatric Conditions; Risk of Performance Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team; and Risk of Performance Errors due to Sleep Loss, Fatigue, Circadian Desynchronization, and Work Overload (HRP Science Management Plan, 2008). BHP Research, in collaboration with internal and external research investigators, as well as subject matter experts within NASA operations including flight surgeons, astronauts, and mission planners and others within the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), identifies knowledge and technology gaps within each Risk. BHP Research subsequently manages and conducts research tasks to address and close the gaps, either through risk assessment and quantification, or the development of countermeasures and monitoring technologies. The resulting deliverables, in many instances, also support current Medical Operations and/or Mission Operations for the International Space Station (ISS).
Standard approaches to risk management in projects depend on the ability of teams to identify risks and quantify the probabilities and consequences of these risks (e.g., the 5 x 5 risk matrix). However, long before quantification does - or even can - occur, and long after, teams make decisions based on their pre-quantitative understanding of risk. These decisions can have long-lasting impacts on the project. While significant research has looked at the process of how to quantify risk, our understanding of how teams conceive of and manage pre-quantitative risk is lacking. This paper introduces the concept of pre-quantitative risk and discusses the implications of addressing pre-quantitative risk in projects.
Objective. Describe sources, practices and protocols that may be used to derive a composite generic failure rate supporting the quantification of early design risk and reliability models.
A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) aims to identify and assess potential risks to system technical performance requirements for the purpose of furnishing risk insights into project decisions. PRAs have traditionally been conducted manually using software with an isolated data model. As system complexity rises it becomes difficult to ensure consistency between a PRA, the evolving system design, and other engineering analyses; the techniques for conducting PRAs must evolve to meet this challenge. This work presents progress towards a methodology and tooling for conducting a PRA by leveraging data in the system model, embedded for other purposes and analyses, to conduct a PRA. An approach for identifying the appropriate probabilistic equation for each risk scenario from a standard library is presented, which is a significant step towards the quantification of the likelihood of a risk scenario occurrence. The final calculation of the likelihood of occurrence is left as an item of future work. We also present the development of preliminary tooling to carry out the methodology on a well-formed system model. The information needed to conduct the PRA is embedded in a consistent manner in a system model, so the model-based PRA can be regularly executed as the system model changes. The ability to modify the PRA in concert with lifecycle evolution affords a project the opportunity to track the extent to which system modification impacts compliance with requirements. These aspects of this model-based PRA methodology make it capable of managing risk in increasingly complex technical systems.
The objectives of the Space Station Advanced Development Program are related to the development of a set of design options and/or new capabilities to support Space Station development and operation, taking into account also a quantification of the performance and risk of key state-of-the-art technologies, and a reduction of the cost and schedule risk in Space Station development. Attention is given to the photovoltaic power system, a solar dynamic system, and aspects of power management and distribution. A major issue will be the selection of the power generation system. In view of the advantages of the solar dynamic system, it is attempted to resolve issues associated with this system.