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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Risk-Informed Approach to Trustworthiness Assessment in Digital Twins-Based Autonomous Control

In autonomous control systems, digital twins (DTs) are used to perform diagnostic and prognostic functions. The trustworthiness of these DTs is dependent on quality and coverage of the training data, model accuracy and integrity of sensor data. This work introduces a methodology to determine the trustworthiness of a DT system given faulty sensor data using a risk informed approach. Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are used to propagate uncertainties and determine the probability of trustable recommendations. The decision to trust the control action provided by the DT is based on the DT output, expert opinion, and severity of problems. The performance of DTs is reliant on the data they are trained on. When they encounter out of distribution data, the trustworthiness of the recommendations decreases. To address this issue, we include an expert component that provides input on sensor degradation. For this, we utilize a generative artificial intelligence (AI) model, such as Generative Pretrained Transformer (GPT). The GPT functions as an expert with broad knowledge. The GPT is fine-tuned to understand and discriminate sensor degradation scenarios using manufactured data. This methodology is demonstrated through a case study on a Nearly Autonomous Management and Control System (NAMAC) during a steady state scenario. Various sensor degradation types with different severity levels are considered. Degraded sensor data is processed by the DT system and the fine-tuned GPT. Finally, using the BBN, we combine the GPT information and the DT output with its sources of uncertainty. This provides an output regarding the trustworthiness of the DT recommendation.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Risk-Informed Approach for Event Selection and Component Classification

Develop a report summarizing a structured approach for the incorporation of risk insights when making facility safety assessments and regulatory decisions is proposed to supplement the deterministic approach, with the following expected benefits: Increased confidence that key safety issues have been fully identified and addressed Better understanding of safety margins Facilitates more structured dialogue among international regulators Reduced reliance on “expert judgement” through a rigorous, pre-defined process with more predictable outcomes Proposed outcome is development of a report summarizing the structure and key considerations for applying this approach that: Is inclusive of advanced reactor technologies Provides for flexible implementation recognizing unique and varying sovereign regulatory structures Builds upon existing/current GIF safety approaches (e.g., GIF Basic Safety Approach, Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Risk-Informed Approach for Regulatory Approval of Microreactor Transport

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is addressing the challenges associated with safe transport of microreactors including the development and evaluation of regulatory options. PNNL developed a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors in which irradiated nuclear fuel is part microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. A microreactor and its contents will likely not be able to meet all the federal regulatory requirements as a Type B or fissile material transportation package under 10 CFR Part 71 (“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”). However, the regulatory framework developed by PNNL lays out a viable risk-informed licensing options that are safe and feasible. Risk assessment such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to show comparable safety to that provided by a Type B or fissile material package for surface transport. The framework includes guidance on applicable regulations and discusses historical precedence in using risk information for transportation licensing. The framework includes guidance for performing a microreactor transportation PRA, use and development of risk evaluation criteria, and factors such of defense-in-depth and safety margin concepts. Key advantages of using the approach are (1) increasing the likelihood of successfully obtaining regulatory transportation package approval, (2) informing the design on the relative risk significance of microreactor containment and shielding, and (3) informing the need for transportation compensatory measures. This paper focuses on two primary elements of the framework which are development of a transportation PRA for microreactor packages and development of the risk acceptance guidelines to assess the results of the PRA for regulatory decision-making.

microreactor, micro nuclear power plant, MNPP, ris↗
NASA NTRS2019

A Risk Informed Approach to Reliability Requirements Tailoring

Every institution has their “recipe” for success. Cell phones and personal computers seem like they are designed to be obsolete in 2-3 years. Automobiles seem like they are designed to have a power train failure within 1000 miles of the extended warranty expiration; at least that’s been my experience. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is not any different. JPL has a tried and proven recipe for success because in space things can’t fail. Or else. However, in today’s competitive environment and funding limitations, that recipe for success is being challenged and the resultant increased risk accepted. This paper will describe JPL’s Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) approach to tailoring reliability requirements based on mission classification and other project characteristics.

Klohoker, John↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development and Demonstration of a Risk-Informed Approach to the Regulatory Required Fuel Reload Safety Analysis

The United States (U.S.) nuclear industry is facing a strong challenge to maintain regulatory-required levels of safety while ensuring economic competitiveness to stay in business. Safety remains a key parameter for all aspects related to the operation of light water reactor (LWR) nuclear power plants (NPPs) and can be achieved more economically by using a risk-informed ecosystem such as that being developed by the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program. The LWRS Program is promoting a wide range of research and development (R&D) activities with the goal to maximize both the safety and economically efficient performance of NPPs through improved scientific understanding, especially given that many plants are considering second license renewal. The RISA Pathway has two main goals: (1) the deployment of methodologies and technologies that enable better representation of safety margins and the factors that contribute to cost and safety; and (2) the development of advanced applications that enable cost-effective plant operation. The plant reload optimization framework development project aims to build an artificial intelligence, i.e., Genetic Algorithm (GA), based reactor core designing tool taking into account reactor safety and fuel performance analyses.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗
DOE OSTI2025

Risk-informed Graded Approach for Reliability and Performance Assessment for Advanced Condition Monitoring Techniques

With the shift away from time-based maintenance and toward condition-based maintenance, and to reduce overall maintenance costs, there has been an upsurge in the usage and development of advanced condition monitoring (ACM) techniques for real-time monitoring of nuclear power plant (NPP) components. ACM is particularly useful in the development of digital twins, which are designed to predict the failure or degradation of plant components. Successful implementation of ACM requires an assessment to inform the development of a risk-informed approach to evaluate the use of ACM to meet Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) regulations for in-service testing (IST) programs. This includes the monitoring and diagnostics of reactor components and systems in current, new, and advanced reactors. A key component in ACM is the usage of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms that can employ real-time data from instrumentation and sensors to detect and predict reactor component degradations. Such predictive capabilities enable early detection of component degradation so as to help plant personnel plan and execute necessary maintenance. For successful implementation of ML/AI in ACM such that regulatory requirements are met, a risk-informed graded approach is needed to assess the reliability and performance of ML/AI for ACM. The American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) developed their Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Code to provide guidance on safe, reliable O&M of NPPs. The IST section of the O&M Code specifically establishes requirements for IST and examination to gauge operational readiness of components in water-cooled NPPs. This paper presents a state-of-the-art review of how reliability and risk assessment can be integrated with ACM to assess component performance by non-nuclear industries. This is followed by different methodologies and approaches for conducting performance and reliability assessments so as to meet IST requirements for NPP components.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Risk-informed Graded Approach for Reliability and Performance Assessment of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence for Advanced Condition Monitoring Techniques

With the shift away from time-based maintenance and toward condition-based maintenance, and to reduce overall maintenance costs, there has been an upsurge in the usage and development of advanced condition monitoring (ACM) techniques for real-time monitoring of nuclear power plant (NPP) components. ACM is particularly useful in the development of digital twins, which are designed to predict the failure or degradation of plant components. Successful implementation of ACM requires an assessment to inform the development of a risk-informed approach to evaluate the use of ACM to meet Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) regulations for in-service testing (IST) programs. This includes the monitoring and diagnostics of reactor components and systems in current, new, and advanced reactors. A key component in ACM is the usage of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms that can employ real-time data from instrumentation and sensors to detect and predict reactor component degradations. Such predictive capabilities enable early detection of component degradation so as to help plant personnel plan and execute necessary maintenance. For successful implementation of ML/AI in ACM such that regulatory requirements are met, a risk-informed graded approach is needed to assess the reliability and performance of ML/AI for ACM. The American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) developed their Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Code to provide guidance on safe, reliable O&M of NPPs. The IST section of the O&M Code specifically establishes requirements for IST and examination to gauge operational readiness of components in water-cooled NPPs. This paper presents a state-of-the-art review of how reliability and risk assessment can be integrated with ACM to assess component performance by non-nuclear industries. This is followed by different methodologies and approaches for conducting performance and reliability assessments so as to meet IST requirements for NPP components.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Risk-informed Graded Approach for Reliability and Performance Assessment of Sensor and Instrumentation Systems within Advanced Condition Monitoring Technologies

Advanced condition monitoring (ACM) technologies, such as digital twins, are innovative strategies designed to provide real-time health insights, including the remaining useful life of components. The primary goal of ACM is to predict and alert operators to potential functional failures before they occur. ACM systems achieve this by integrating predictive models with various sensor instrumentation, analog-to-digital converters, data warehouses, and data pre-processors. These sensor and instrumentation systems (SIS) are essential for forming a comprehensive understanding of component conditions and ensuring the predictive success of ACM programs. Introducing new technologies like ACM involves varying degrees of risk that can impact plant reliability. Therefore, risk mitigation should be commensurate with the performance and reliability of the developed technology, following a risk-informed graded approach (RIGA). Establishing a RIGA process requires a clear understanding of the hazards and reliability of all subsystems, including their interdependencies and potential impacts on the overall system. Given the critical role of SIS in ACM, this work reviews hazard identification and reliability quantification methods for SIS. It also considers these methods' implications when developing a RIGA process for ACM.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗