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Risk Classification and Risk-based Safety and Mission Assurance

Recent activities to revamp and emphasize the need to streamline processes and activities for Class D missions across the agency have led to various interpretations of Class D, including the lumping of a variety of low-cost projects into Class D. Sometimes terms such as Class D minus are used. In this presentation, mission risk classifications will be traced to official requirements and definitions as a measure to ensure that projects and programs align with the guidance and requirements that are commensurate for their defined risk posture. As part of this, the full suite of risk classifications, formal and informal will be defined, followed by an introduction to the new GPR 8705.4 that is currently under review.GPR 8705.4 lays out guidance for the mission success activities performed at the Classes A-D for NPR 7120.5 projects as well as for projects not under NPR 7120.5. Furthermore, the trends in stepping from Class A into higher risk posture classifications will be discussed. The talk will conclude with a discussion about risk-based safety and mission assuranceat GSFC.

Risk Management

Risk Classification Modernization

NASA’s risk classification system dates back to an era when every new NASA space mission was a one-of-a-kind build, and the only way to obtain reliability was as a by-product through a combination of reliability analyses, extensive and stringent quality requirements, and extensive testing. Originally, there were very limited commercial capabilities to develop systems to work reliably in space, so NASA considered its own homegrown approach the only recipe for success. This approach involved very detailed and prescriptive piece-part controls and no reliance on (and to some extent a rejection of) any type of commercial practices. Often risk was considered to be the lowest when NASA had the maximum amount of control and prescription, and the highest when commercial practices were largely employed, and these principles drove risk classification in the agency. Over time, however, commercial capabilities grew, and many products became standardized and commercialized, while the agency maintained its tried-and-true approach, paying little attention to the evolution of the commercial sector. This presentation introduces GSFC’s new approach at risk classification, which includes classification of components and full spacecraft, as well as of constellations of spacecraft.

risk

Risk Classification Modernization

NASA’s risk classification system dates back to an era when every new NASA space mission was a one-of-a-kind build, and the only way to obtain reliability was as a by-product through a combination of reliability analyses, extensive and stringent quality requirements, and extensive testing. Originally, there were very limited commercial capabilities to develop systems to work reliably in space, so NASA considered its own homegrown approach the only recipe for success. This approach involved very detailed and prescriptive piece-part controls and no reliance on (and to some extent a rejection of) any type of commercial practices. Often risk was considered to be the lowest when NASA had the maximum amount of control and prescription, and the highest when commercial practices were largely employed, and these principles drove risk classification in the agency. Over time, however, commercial capabilities grew, and many products became standardized and commercialized, while the agency maintained its tried-and-true approach, paying little attention to the evolution of the commercial sector. This presentation introduces GSFC’s new approach at risk classification, which includes classification of components and full spacecraft, as well as of constellations of spacecraft.

risk

Modernizing NASA's Risk Classification System

NASA's risk classification system dates back to an era when every new NASA space mission was a one-of-a-kind build, and the only way to obtain reliability was as a by-product through a combination of reliability analyses, extensive and stringent quality requirements, and extensive testing. Originally, there were very limited commercial capabilities to develop systems to work reliably in space, so NASA considered its own homegrown approach the only recipe for success. This approach involved very detailed and prescriptive piece-part controls and no reliance on (and to some extent a rejection of) any type of commercial practices. Often risk was considered to be the lowest when NASA had the maximum amount of control and prescription, and the highest when commercial practices were largely employed, and these principles drove risk classification in the agency. Over time, however, commercial capabilities grew, and many products became standardized and commercialized, while the agency maintained its tried-and-true approach, paying little attention to the evolution of the commercial sector. In fact, the commercial sector was developing systems that have direct, proven reliability, established over time, while NASA still maintained the approach to ignore the reality of the commercialized aspects of standard products, label them as high risk, and attempt to change them to align with the agency's piece-part control practices. A table of mission classification vs lifetime for missions launched after 2000 indicates no correlation between lifetime and classification, with the few exceptions involving missions that have very limited objectives and no valid purpose to continue after they were met. This paper steps through some of the key historical elements in risk classification and NASA's overall approach to assurance, and presents some elements being brought forward to modernize the approach and take advantage of the growing capability in the commercial sector.

risk

Risk-Based SMA and Modernizing Risk Classification at GSFC

In 2014, in response to a large volume of feedback from industry, the science community, and internal to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), GSFC’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate began a transition to a risk-based implementation of SMA, departing from its longstanding practice of being primarily driven by a mostly static set of Mission Assurance Requirements. The transition started out with a pilot project involving risk-based acceptance of bare-printed circuit boards that was enormously successful, continued through a complete organizational transformation in 2015, and culminated with the baselining of formal Risk-Based SMA policy in 2016. In this presentation we will describe the risk-based SMA concept, segue into how it shapes a modernization of risk classification that GSFC has rolled out, and provide results from the original pilot project for risk-based SMA, involving the printed circuit board assurance process.

Jesse Leitner

A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions

The NASA risk classification system is meant to uide space mission development from formulation through completion of implementation. It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission. In order to be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which impacts mission schedule and cost. In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before. Once a project's risk classification level is established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be reviewed before a new system is proposed.NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing levels of risk. We argue that risk does not change between classes. What changes are the means available to reduce risk. In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without reducing margins. In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both. We then propose a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more effective guidance to program and project managers.

Bordi, Francesco

Class D Management Implementation Approach of the First Orbital Mission of the Earth Venture Series

A key element of the National Research Council's Earth Science and Applications Decadal Survey called for the creation of the Venture Class line of low-cost research and application missions within NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration). One key component of the architecture chosen by NASA within the Earth Venture line is a series of self-contained stand-alone spaceflight science missions called "EV-Mission". The first mission chosen for this competitively selected, cost and schedule capped, Principal Investigator-led opportunity is the CYclone Global Navigation Satellite System (CYGNSS). As specified in the defining Announcement of Opportunity, the Principal Investigator is held responsible for successfully achieving the science objectives of the selected mission and the management approach that he/she chooses to obtain those results has a significant amount of freedom as long as it meets the intent of key NASA guidance like NPR 7120.5 and 7123. CYGNSS is classified under NPR 7120.5E guidance as a Category 3 (low priority, low cost) mission and carries a Class D risk classification (low priority, high risk) per NPR 8705.4. As defined in the NPR guidance, Class D risk classification allows for a relatively broad range of implementation strategies. The management approach that will be utilized on CYGNSS is a streamlined implementation that starts with a higher risk tolerance posture at NASA and that philosophy flows all the way down to the individual part level.

Wells, James E.

Toward a Safety Risk-Based Classification of Unmanned Aircraft

There is a trend of growing interest and demand for greater access of unmanned aircraft (UA) to the National Airspace System (NAS) as the ongoing development of UA technology has created the potential for significant economic benefits. However, the lack of a comprehensive and efficient UA regulatory framework has constrained the number and kinds of UA operations that can be performed. This report presents initial results of a study aimed at defining a safety-risk-based UA classification as a plausible basis for a regulatory framework for UA operating in the NAS. Much of the study up to this point has been at a conceptual high level. The report includes a survey of contextual topics, analysis of safety risk considerations, and initial recommendations for a risk-based approach to safe UA operations in the NAS. The next phase of the study will develop and leverage deeper clarity and insight into practical engineering and regulatory considerations for ensuring that UA operations have an acceptable level of safety.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo

Risk-based Classification of Incidents

As the penetration of software into safety-critical systems progresses, accidents and incidents involving software will inevitably become more frequent. Identifying lessons from these occurrences and applying them to existing and future systems is essential if recurrences are to be prevented. Unfortunately, investigative agencies do not have the resources to fully investigate every incident under their jurisdictions and domains of expertise and thus must prioritize certain occurrences when allocating investigative resources. In the aviation community, most investigative agencies prioritize occurrences based on the severity of their associated losses, allocating more resources to accidents resulting in injury to passengers or extensive aircraft damage. We argue that this scheme is inappropriate because it undervalues incidents whose recurrence could have a high potential for loss while overvaluing fairly straightforward accidents involving accepted risks. We then suggest a new strategy for prioritizing occurrences based on the risk arising from incident recurrence.

Greenwell, William S.

A NASA GSFC Perspective on Class D

This presentation provides an overview of the mission risk classification "D" for NASA from the perspective of Goddard Space Flight Center, as viewed from developers and stakeholders.

Risk Classification

Alignment of NASA’s Human System Risks with Technological Capability Gaps to Enable Integrated Research and Technology Development Strategic Planning

BACKGROUND: Radiation, reduced gravity, distance from earth, isolation and confinement, and habitation within artificially created and controlled life support environments are hazards that present risk to human space explorers. NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) maintains a set of twenty-nine different Human System Risks with subject matter experts from across the agency providing regular updates to the estimated likelihood and consequence associated with each risk. The Human Research Program (HRP) has historically used these risk classifications as a primary basis for identifying and prioritizing human research investments aimed at characterizing and/or mitigating the respective human system risks. In many cases, technology development is required to mature and validate risk mitigation strategies, however, NASA’s primary technology development programs have not typically used Human System Risks as a basis for strategic planning. A primary function of the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) – Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System Capability Leadership Team (SCLT) is to continually identify, review, and update technological capability gaps and to establish and oversee multiyear strategic roadmaps aimed at guiding NASA’s technology development priorities in these areas. These roadmaps are intended to be agency-wide and independent of any program, directorate, or other organization within NASA. DESCRIPTION: The SCLT and HRP collaborated to establish a set of Human System Capability Gaps, which establish a formal linkage between the capability gaps used to prioritize investments across much of NASA, and the Human System Risks that are primarily used to inform and prioritize human research. This set of twenty-eight gaps was developed by subject matter experts, and each gap mapped to the primary associated Human System Risks. The gaps and risk mapping were then reviewed and approved via the HSRB, thereby formally aligning the research-focused Human System Risks with the technology-focused capability gaps. DISCUSSION: This effort has enabled development of integrated roadmaps and budget coordination with research and technology development activities that are formally linked to agency-recognized capability gaps and Human System Risks. Close and ongoing coordination between the SCLT, HRP, Mars Campaign Office, and the Health & Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) is essential to ensure alignment and prioritization of CHP-related research and technology development to enable NASA’s future exploration missions.

Andrew F J Abercromby

Third-Party Supplier Risk Re-Classification Using Multi-Model Semantic Voting and External Web Augmentation

Risk decisions in many third-party risk management (TPRM) workflows rely on static inherent risk questionnaires (IRQ). These static forms provide a snapshot of the vendor from the business users’ perspective, as these requests are processed without cross-referencing for evidence. Consequently, responses can be misinformed or embellished with inaccuracies, thereby masking the vendor’s true risk to the enterprise. This paper presents a multi-stage verification framework to augment IRQs with web evidence and a deterministic ensemble of large language model assessors to reclassify risk. In a case study of 100 submissions previously misclassified as low risk, the proposed framework correctly identified 76% of the cases as high risk, while the existing workflow identified none. McNemar’s continuity corrected statistics of 74 were obtained with a two sided p-value of 2.65 × 10-23, indicating a significantly more effective workflow compared to the legacy model.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf

Payload test philosophy

The general philosophy of how JPL views payload qualification/acceptance testing for programs that are done either in-house or by contractors is described. Particular attention is given to mission risk classifications, preliminary critical design reviews, environmental design requirements, the thermal and dynamics development tests, and the flight spacecraft system test.

Gindorf, T.

Emerging and Reemeriging Human Bunyavirus Infections and Climate Change

The Bunyaviridae family includes a growing number of viruses that have contributed to the burden of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases around the globe. Many of these viruses cause severe clinical outcomes in human and animal populations, the results of which can be detrimental to public health and the economies of affected communities. The threat to endemic and non-native regions is particularly high, and national and international public health agencies are often on alert. Many of the bunyaviruses cause severe clinical disease including hemorrhage, organ failure, and death leading to their high-risk classification. Hantaviruses and Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) (genus Phlebovirus) are National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Category A priority pathogens in the United States. Viral hemorrhagic fevers, a classification that includes many bunyaviruses, are immediately notifiable in the European Union. The emergence of new and reemerging bunyaviruses has resulted in numerous human and animal fatalities. Outbreaks of Rift Valley fever (RVF) in East Africa (1997/1998, 2006/2007), Sudan (2007), Southern Africa (2008-2010), Kenya (1997/1998, 2006/2007) (Anyamba et al., 2009, 2010; Breiman et al., 2010; Grobbelaar et al., 2011; Woods et al., 2002) and Saudi Arabia & Yemen (2000, 2010) (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2000; Hjelle and Glass, 2000; Madani et al., 2003) and the emergence of Sin Nombre virus (1993) (Hjelle and Glass, 2000) and most recently Schmallenberg virus (2011) (DEFRA, 2012) are prime examples of the devastating and worldwide toll bunyaviruses have on health and economies. Climate variability (precipitation and temperature in particular) greatly influence the ecological conditions that drive arboviral disease outbreaks across the globe. Several human and animal disease outbreaks have been influenced by changes in climate associated with the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon including the bunyaviruses RVFV and Sin Nombre (an etiologic agent of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS)), as well as Murray Valley encephalitis, chikungunya, and malaria to name but a few (Anyamba et al., 2009; Bouma and Dye, 1997; Chretien et al., 2007; Engelthaler et al., 1999; Kovats et al., 2003; Linthicum et al., 1999; Nicholls, 1986). Most bunyaviruses exhibit episodic outbreak patterns with seasonal or annual trends dependent upon climate conditions, vector abundance, and the proximity of a susceptible population. The implications for continued climate change are dire, especially with regard to vector-borne diseases, many of which can cause severe morbidity, sequelae, and death. Increased rainfall and widening endemicity as a result of climate change, compounded by the emergence of new viruses, poses a serious threat to a greater geographic range beyond the regions of endemicity.

Bunyavirus

NASA Lunar Lander Reference Design

With increased emphasis on lunar exploration and scientific investigation, there is a desire to deliver a wide variety of payloads to the lunar surface. Many of these payloads will require the use of surface mobility capability such as a rover. NASA has combined spacecraft and subsystem engineers from across the Agency to develop a ‘pallet’ lander design intended to deliver and easily deploy a medium-sized payload (~300 kg) to the polar regions of the Moon. The lander provides power to the payload from transit soon after lunar landing. The lander is not intended to survive the lunar night. The design of the lander was based on a minimum set of level 1 requirements where traditional risk, mass, and performance trade parameters were weighed lower than cost. In other words, the team did not sacrifice ‘good enough’ for ‘better’ or ‘best.’ As a NASA class D spacecraft (as defined in NPR 8705.4, Risk Classification for NASA Payloads, the lander employs single-string (i.e., zero-fault-tolerant) systems as a baseline. The design utilizes existing technologies and components where possible, though some enhancements have been targeted in areas such as precision autonomous landing and low-cost structural design/fabrication. It is important to note that these and other derived technologies are extensible to other lander designs and missions. This TP describes the requirements and approaches upon which the lander design is based; discusses key design decisions, analyses, and trades used to derive the design; provides a snapshot of each major subsystem; and identifies open items, issues, and challenges for which work is continuing.

L D Kennedy

Recommendations on Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions

The NASA Electronic Parts & Packaging Program Manager, requested a NASA Engineering and Safety Center independent assessment to summarize Commercial Crew Program and NASA Centers’ current and best practices, and lessons learned, on use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) for all mission risk classifications, and provide recommendations that could lead to future NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program and/or Agency guidance on COTS parts. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf