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Explosive Event in MON-3 Oxidizer System Resulting from Pressure Transducer Failure

In 2003, a Druck(Registered Trademark) pressure transducer failed catastrophically in a test system circulating nitrogen tetroxide at NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility. The cause of the explosion was not immediately obvious since the wetted areas of the pressure transducer were constructed of materials compatible with nitrogen tetroxide. Chemical analysis of the resulting residue and a materials analysis of the diaphragm and its weld zones were used to determine the chain of events that led to the catastrophic failure. Due to excessive dynamic pressure loading in the test system, the diaphragm in the pressure transducer suffered cyclic failure and allowed the silicon oil located behind the isolation diaphragm to mix with the nitrogen tetroxide. The reaction between these two chemicals formed a combination of 2,4-di and 2,4,6-trinitrophenol, which are shock sensitive explosives that caused the failure of the pressure transducer. Further research indicated numerous manufacturers offer similar pressure transducers with silicone oil separated from the test fluid by a thin stainless steel isolation diaphragm. Caution must be exercised when purchasing a pressure transducer for a particular system to avoid costly failures and test system contamination.

Baker, David L.↗

The effects of g-jitter and surface tension induced convection on float zones

The effects of g-jitter on nonencapsulated and encapsulated liquid bridges were investigated numerically, using fluid characteristics and parameters from three fluid systems: a silicone oil bridge, a methanol bridge, and a silicon melt. Results showed that complex flow patterns can arise in g-jitter environment which significantly modify the heat-transfer characteristics of the system. It was found that the nonencapsulated liquid bridges and float zone melts were dominated by surface-tension driven convection, with very little impact on the flows by residual and g-jitter accelerations. Zone encapsulation resulted in a sizeable drop in the maximum fluid velocities. The g-jitter computations on the encapsulated float zones resulted in significant augmentation of the maximum velocities and heat transfer, with the silicon melt being the least sensitive to g-jitter acceleration.

Ramachandran, N.↗

Mechanisms of Oxide Formation in the Self-Reacting Friction Stir Weld Process

The initial objective of this study was to evaluate the effect of an extended delay time between preweld cleaning and the completion of a self-reacting friction stir welding (SRFSW) process on the resulting quality of various thickness panels of AA2219-T87. The current NASA standard specifies no more than a 48 hour delay between preweld cleaning and actual welding. The concern is whether increasing the cleaning delay time results in development of the residual oxide defect (ROD) in SRFSW. This concern emanates from the possibility of increased time correlating with increased oxide layer thickness on the faying surfaces. Oxide content on the faying surfaces has been reported to correlate with the occurrence of the ROD which reduces mechanical properties. When the SRFSW process was first adopted by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), unexpected low tensile values that resulted were attributed to oxides within the weld that appeared to follow the former faying surface contours. Mitigation of the ROD was achieved through a combination of modifications to the processing parameters, tool designs, and incorporation of a weld seam offset. Two operations are involved in preweld cleaning: the first is removal of oil and grease, and the second is removal of surface oxides. In arc welding, improper cleaning of the faying surfaces of aluminum welded joints can increase the sensitivity toward development of defects. As the aluminum is locally melted, these contaminants contribute toward the development of porosity, inclusions, entrapped oxides, and other discontinuities which can degrade the strength of the weld joint. For weldment of large structures, the weld joint is typically cleaned, fit-up, and tack welded prior to the final full penetration welding pass. Because of the stringent joint fit-up requirements for mismatch and peaking for launch vehicle structures, the joint fit-up can sometimes contribute to lengthy delays between cleaning and tack welding, especially for circumferential weld joints on large diameter components. When the conventional friction stir welding (CFSW) process was introduced at the NASA MSFC, there was no procedure for cleaning prior to the solid-state joining process. As the process expanded to include SRFSW, preparation of the faying, crown, and root surfaces were implemented to overcome the ROD. Although the solid-state process is not expected to reach temperatures high enough for dissociation of the native oxide layer, concern remained regarding the redeposition of the native oxide layer within the stir zone. NASA has previously established the allowable time at 48 hours between preweld cleaning and a SRFSW process. The effect of potential 2 contamination resulting from an extended delay to 188 hours was subsequently evaluated for SRFSWs using tensile testing and metallographic imaging. Tensile specimens were tested at room temperature (RT), and at cryogenic conditions of liquid nitrogen (LN2) and liquid hydrogen. No detrimental effect on weld quality, as determined by weld strength, was reported for cleaning delays of 48, 120, 168, 240 or 288 hours. While no trends were established in this study, which extended the delay from 48 to 188 hours, there were a few outliers in terms of ultimate tensile strength (UTS). According to M. Fisher's 2014 Boeing Company Memo no. EYBF-MAF-14-029, all outliers were above the minimum acceptance criteria, but out of family with respect to the average values. As the robustness and reliability of any process ultimately depends on the average values as well as the outliers, an understanding of the cause of these outliers will ultimately improve the process. This report examines those outliers and their possible causes.

Schneider, J. A.↗