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Incorporating civilian radioxenon background estimates in anomaly detection
A nuclear explosion screening exercise in 2023 (Maurer et al., 2023) found challenges with discerning anomalous radioxenon activity concentrations relative to elevated background concentrations. Research has continued into methods to detect anomalous radioxenon concentrations by comparing samples to estimates of atmospheric radioxenon background concentrations caused by releases at nuclear reactors or medical isotope production facilities. A new approach estimates the sample concentrations using time-varying radioxenon release rates obtained using optimization techniques that constrain the facility release rates to plausible amounts based on historical data or facility knowledge. The purpose of the optimization is to determine whether any combination of plausible release rates from emitting facilities can explain a series of radioxenon measurements at one or more sampling stations. A case study uses radioxenon data collected at three locations in western Europe for a month in 2021 and considers releases from 77 locations. Fewer samples are identified as being anomalous using a simplistic flagging rule than from an application of the current International Monitoring System (IMS) activity concentration-level rule.
Analysis of measurements from an array of radioxenon samplers near to Hartlepool Nuclear Power Station
As part of a scientific research and development project, the radionuclide fingerprint of an operating advanced gas-cooled reactor 25 (AGR) has been studied across several facets (Goodwin et al., 2024). One part of this project was to deploy an array of 26 radioxenon samplers to the region for a period of around 1 year, to measure any radioxenon emissions from the reactors of the 27 Hartlepool nuclear power station at a range of tens of kilometres away. The array of 3 sensors was operational for around 12 28 months from March 2022 and detected many occurrences of isotopes of radioxenon. Here we provide a detailed analysis and 29 interpretation of the data and where possible, attribution of detections to a source or region. Whilst a key part of this work is to 30 measure any emissions of radioxenon from Hartlepool, this work presents one of the most comprehensive efforts to determine the 31 source of a great number of (mostly) 133Xe detections. A combination of different types of atmospheric dispersion modelling 32 techniques, including the use of stack monitoring data from nearby civil radioxenon-emitting nuclear facilities has enabled the 33 majority of detections to be attributed to one or more possible sources. Whilst emissions from Hartlepool have been detected on 34 the systems, the majority of detections are associated with a medical isotope production facility in Fleurus, Belgium (IRE).
A PIPS + SrI 2 (Eu) detector for atmospheric radioxenon monitoring
The PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is a prototype atmospheric radioxenon detection system designed at Oregon State University in support of international efforts towards monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon testing activities. This detector aims to address some shortcomings found in currently deployed beta–gamma atmospheric radioxenon detection systems, such as lackluster energy resolution and memory effect, by employing modern detection materials and readout. The system uses a PIPSBox, a silicon-based gas cell, for electron detection, and a pair of ultrabright, D-shaped SrI 2 (Eu) scintillators coupled to silicon photomultipliers for photon detection. A custom eight-channel digital pulse processor equipped with a field programmable gate-array (FPGA) identifies electron–photon coincidences between the volumes in near real-time. Gas samples of the four radioxenon isotopes of interest were independently measured with the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) detection system to determine energy resolution and efficiency. Application of FPGA-based coincidence discrimination in near real-time reduced the ambient background count rate by 95.85 ± 0.04%. Using parameters from the Xenon International gas processing unit and assuming a blank sample and zero memory effect the minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs) for the isotopes were calculated to be 0.12 ± 0.03, 0.27 ± 0.05, 0.15 ± 0.02, and 1.00 ± 0.08 mBq/m 3 air for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe, respectively. These MDC estimates compare well with other radioxenon detection systems employed in the International Monitoring System (IMS) and indicate that the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) sensitivity requirement of ≤ 1 mBq/m 3 for 133 Xe.
Characterization of PIPS detectors for measurement of radioxenon
The International Monitoring System arm of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization utilizes sampling of atmospheric radioxenon to scan the world for nuclear testing events. Current designs utilized in the field involve plastic scintillator cells run in coincidence with Sodium Iodide (NaI) or High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors. The use of plastic scintillators as electron detectors exhibit some issues in comparison to other materials. Silicon detectors are analyzed as an alternative to plastic scintillators for beta detection based on their higher energy resolution and lowered memory effect. A radioxenon detection setup was created with the intent of measuring radioxenon samples using coincidence counting between silicon and NaI detectors as well as silicon and HPGe. Finally, the absolute efficiency of both setups is calculated and compared.
Radioxenon signatures of molten salt reactors
Developments of molten salt reactor (MSR) technologies are making rapid progress across the globe. These reactor designs involve properly controlling radionuclides through off-gas systems. This work examines radioxenon emissions and assesses treaty detection technology to be used for monitoring. This work also includes a sensitivity study with ORIGEN on the nuclear forensic signals possible from a MSR. Multiple Isotope Ratio Comparison (MIRC) plots are used to compare the ratios of radioxenon isotopes in an MSR to a highly enriched uranium (HEU) reactor. Finally, the results show that MSR emissions may significantly overlap with signals produced in a HEU reactor and that changing reactor operations or retaining emissions in an off-gas system can significantly shift the radioxenon signature away from the HEU pulse.
A stilbene–strontium iodide based radioxenon detection system for monitoring nuclear explosions
Atmospheric measurement of noble gases has been extensively used for monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon explosions for many years. The ratios of four xenon isotopes of interest ( 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) help in discriminating regular reactor operations from nuclear tests. A new coincidence-based detection system using stilbene and strontium iodide [SrI 2 (Eu)] for electron and photon detection respectively was developed at Oregon State University to address some of the challenges of the radioxenon systems deployed in the field such as memory effect, and poor energy resolution. Silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) were used for sensing optical photons from all scintillation media. Real-time coincidence identification was achieved using the eight-channel digital pulse processor. The detection system was evaluated using lab check sources and Oregon State TRIGA reactor irradiated radioxenon samples. A 48-hour background coincidence spectrum was collected yielding a coincidence count rate and background rejection rate of 0.0174 ± 0.0003 counts per second (cps) and 98.9% respectively. The minimum detectable concentration (MDC) of the system was evaluated to be 0.11 ± 0.01, 0.13 ± 0.02, 0.20 ± 0.02, and 0.73 ± 0.08 for 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe respectively. The memory effect of the detection system was found to be 0.069 ± 0.015%, which is almost a 70-fold reduction compared to traditional plastic scintillators. Here, the detection elements, custom-designed electronics, and the detector response to radioxenon are detailed in this work.
Radioxenon Detection for Monitoring Subsurface Nuclear Explosion
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans the testing of nuclear weapons anywhere on the earth (atmospheric, surface, underwater and subsurface). Identification of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, surface, and underwater is relatively straightforward considering a wide range of signatures resulting from such an event. However, for a subsurface explosion, most of the signatures traditionally associated with a nuclear explosion are not readily available. Therefore, the international community has increasingly relied on the atmospheric measurement of noble gases to identify subsurface nuclear weapon explosions. This chapter initially covers the basic principles of subsurface nuclear explosion identification and the importance of detecting radioxenon. This is followed by reviewing some of the early radioxenon detection systems that were developed by research groups around the world in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The detection media employed, results from laboratory and field testing, and some challenges/drawbacks for these systems are detailed. The next section of the chapter is dedicated to innovative detector concepts that have emerged in the past ten to fifteen years using novel detection material, algorithms, and signal readout techniques. The advances achieved in terms of energy resolution, coincidence detection efficiencies, system performance, and the minimum detectable concentration are covered. The final section goes over some of the potential improvements that can be incorporated in the design to enhance detector sensitivity and new detection material that can be explored in the field of radioxenon detection.
Evaluation and Uncertainty of Radioxenon Transport with a Mesoscale Model after the February 2013 Underground Test in North Korea
Abstract The transport of radioxenon released from the February 2013 underground nuclear weapons test in North Korea was analyzed at two receptors—one at the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty site Rn58 in Russia (400 km downwind) and a second at Rn38 in Japan (1000 km downwind). Transport was modeled with two ensembles of mesoscale simulations, one generated with varying initial and lateral boundary conditions taken from the Global Forecasting System uncertainty ensemble, and a second created from different parameterizations and surface conditions. The wind variability was similar for the two ensembles and consistent with observations at 925 mb (1 mb = 1 hPa) but not at the surface. Biases in calculated surface winds and the radioxenon concentration in the ensembles were attributed mainly to poor simulation of the sea breeze at both locations and mountain lee affects at Rn38 in Japan. These wind regimes affected the timing of the surface radioxenon plume at Rn58 and its duration at Rn38. Surface wind variability induced by terrain and land–sea contrast (the sea breeze) also had a significant effect on the surface winds and plume dynamics, including blocking of flow approaching elevated terrain near Vladivostok and the west side of Japan. Increased plume uncertainty was seen at night because of surface wind variability. Measured surface chemical variability was larger than found in the first European Tracer Experiment in central Europe. The study found that horizontal model resolution contributes to uncertainty but not as much as vertical resolution, boundary layer parameterizations, and assimilation of surface meteorological data near the receptor.
A flow-through gamma detection system for sub-surface radioxenon tracer measurements in LYNM PE1
A continuous flow-through, real-time radioxenon sensor array has been designed to monitor either 127 Xe or 133 Xe tracer gas as part of a series of underground chemical explosions in the Low-Yield Nuclear Monitoring (LYNM) Physics Experiment 1 (PE1). The sensors are pairs of shielded thallium-doped sodium iodide gamma-ray detectors that surround a gas measurement chamber. Each measurement chamber is connected to a sampling location in the geology surrounding the chemical explosion or in the access tunnel. The first experiment in the series, PE1 A, occurred in 2023 and the system quantified the 127 Xe tracer gas in the gas sampling lines for four weeks following the experiment execution. The array generated a set of radioxenon concentration time series with a 15-minute resolution that will be used to refine subsurface gas transport models.
Using STAX data to predict IMS radioxenon concentrations
The noble gas collection and measurement stations in the International Monitoring System (IMS) are heavily influenced by releases from medical isotope production facilities. The ability to reliably model the movement of radioxenon from the points of release to these IMS samplers has improved enough that a routine aspect of the analysis of IMS radioxenon data should be the prediction of the effect of releases from civilian nuclear facilities on the sample concentrations. In this work, predicted concentrations at IMS noble gas systems in Germany and Sweden based on measured releases from Institute for Radioelements (IRE) in Belgium and atmospheric transport modeling for a four-month period are presented and discussed.
Photonuclear Production of Radioxenon for Air Samples
Radioxenon plays an important role in ensuring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty due to its ability to be transported through the atmosphere, as well as the fact that the half-lives of its isotopes provide a window long enough to be detected but not long enough that it could become background radiation. This allows it to be correlated with specific events that indicate the testing of nuclear weapons. Idaho National Laboratory supports this mission by providing spiked air samples for monitoring stations to enable instrument calibration and ensure measurement accuracy. We tested a photonuclear method of producing one of the main isotopes of radioxenon, Xe-135. We also tested the separation of Xe-135 from the parent isotope Xe-136 using the method of kinematic recoil. Aluminum coils were placed in quartz ampoules filled with enriched Xe-136 and were irradiated by a bremsstrahlung beam with an endpoint energy of 21 MeV. The results showed that we were not only successful in producing Xe-135 but also that the Xe-135 was deposited into the coil allowing it to be removed from the Xe-136 gas. The coil and the Xe-135 can then be chemically separated. At the time of counting the coil, it was calculated that there was about 18 Bq of activity from Xe-135 remaining in the coil. Future work includes determining the optimal material and geometry of the catcher to maximize the amount of Xe-135 captured.
Implications of Underground Nuclear Explosion Cavity Evolution for Radioxenon Isotopic Composition
Abstract Isotopic ratios of radioxenons sampled in the atmosphere or subsurface can be used to verify the occurrence of an underground nuclear explosion (UNE). Differences in the half-lives of radioactive xenon precursors and their decay-chain networks produce different time-dependent concentration profiles of xenon isotopes allowing isotopic ratios to be used for tracking UNE histories including estimating the time of detonation. In this study, we explore the potential effects of post-detonation cavity processes: precipitation of iodine precursors, gas seepage, and prompt venting on radioxenon isotopic evolution which influences UNE histories. Simplified analytical models and closed-form solutions yielding a potentially idealized radioactive decay/ingrowth chain in a closed and well-mixed system typically have limited application by not including the partitioning of the radionuclide inventory between a gas phase and rock melt created by the detonation and by ignoring gas transport from the cavity to host rock or ground surface. In reality, either subsurface transport or prompt release that is principally responsible for gas signatures violates the closed-system (or batch-mode) assumption. A closed-form solution representing time-dependent source-term activities is extended by considering the cavity partitioning process, slow seepage, and/or prompt release of gases from the cavity and applied to realistic systems.
Measurements of radioxenon activities during periods of gaseous release from an advanced gas-cooled reactor
Activities of radioxenon isotopes are reported from an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) during periods of gaseous release. Xenon isotopes are relevant to the monitoring regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These releases may affect detections from the International Monitoring System (IMS) by influencing the radioxenon background. Time series activity plots have been produced from both in-core monitoring and direct measurement at the point of release using a stack monitor system. Ratio plots using both data sets have been produced with results compared with a commonly chosen nuclear explosion “discrimination line.” The reported results improve the understanding of radionuclide emissions from civil nuclear power plants. This work is being performed as part of the Xenon Environmental Nuclide Analysis at Hartlepool (XENAH) collaboration between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE, UK), EDF Energy (UK), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, USA), and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).
Coincidence measurements of radioxenon using passive implemented planar silicon (PIPS) detector
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing and establishes the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the purpose of treaty verification. IMS is a detector network that confirms that global nuclear activity is peaceful in nature. These detector systems use β-γcoincidence measurements to characterize atmospheric samples containing radioxenon isotopes. The goal of this work is to use the system consisting of two sodium iodide detectors and two PIPSbox detectors to characterize isotopically pure samples of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe via β, γ, and β-γ coincidence measurements.
A target for production of radioxenons
A liquid cesium target has been developed which permits the production and identification of the neutron deficient isotopes of xenon. The thick target yields of Xe-127 and Xe-129 m were measured for proton energies between 28 and 40 MeV. Production of Xe-129 m, as indicated by the presence of a 196 keV line in the gamma ray spectra, occurred at all proton energies; Xe-127 was produced at proton energies above 33 MeV. Both accumulated on the target with the same time constant, and the cross sections were comparable in magnitude. The radioxenons were removed from the target by a stream of carrier gas so that chemical separation was unnecessary.
A Review of Global Radioxenon Background Research and Issues
Among the most important problems for the world-wide nuclear explosion monitoring is the interference of naturally occurring and man-made radionuclides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) frequently detects these interferences using sensitive radionuclide measurement equipment. We commonly refer to the presence of radionuclides that are relevant to the CTBT but do not originate from a nuclear explosion as “background”. Backgrounds are highest near the sources but are known to have regional and global effects on the IMS. This review paper summarizes much of the relevant work in the area of background and discusses issues of interest for nuclear explosion detection.
Third international challenge to model the medium- to long-range transport of radioxenon to four Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations
In 2015 and 2016, atmospheric transport modeling challenges were conducted in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification, however, with a more limited scope with respect to emission inventories, simulation period and number of relevant samples (i.e., those above the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC)) involved. Therefore, a more comprehensive atmospheric transport modeling challenge was organized in 2019. Stack release data of Xe-133 were provided by the Institut National des Radioéléments/IRE (Belgium) and the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories/CNL (Canada) and accounted for in the simulations over a three (mandatory) or six (optional) months period. Best estimate emissions of additional facilities (radiopharmaceutical production and nuclear research facilities, commercial reactors or relevant research reactors) of the Northern Hemisphere were included as well. Model results were compared with observed atmospheric activity concentrations at four International Monitoring System (IMS) stations located in Europe and North America with overall considerable influence of IRE and/or CNL emissions for evaluation of the participants’ runs. Participants were prompted to work with controlled and harmonized model set-ups to make runs more comparable, but also to increase diversity. It was found that using the stack emissions of IRE and CNL with daily resolution does not lead to better results than disaggregating annual emissions of these two facilities taken from the literature if an overall score for all stations covering all valid observed samples is considered. A moderate benefit of roughly 10% is visible in statistical scores for samples influenced by IRE and/or CNL to at least 50% and there can be considerable benefit for individual samples. Effects of transport errors, not properly characterized remaining emitters and long IMS sampling times (12–24 h) undoubtedly are in contrast to and reduce the benefit of high-quality IRE and CNL stack data. Complementary best estimates for remaining emitters push the scores up by 18% compared to just considering IRE and CNL emissions alone. Despite the efforts undertaken the full multi-model ensemble built is highly redundant. An ensemble based on a few arbitrary runs is sufficient to model the Xe-133 background at the stations investigated. The effective ensemble size is below five. An optimized ensemble at each station has on average slightly higher skill compared to the full ensemble. However, the improvement (maximum of 20% and minimum of 3% in RMSE) in skill is likely being too small for being exploited for an independent period.