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At least 19 records

Mechanistic Source Term Determination

Understand the function and performance of the different barriers to radionuclide release in HTGRs, how these are incorporated into reactor design and safety analyses, and approaches to estimate radionuclide release under specific reactor conditions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Facility Radionuclide Emission Points and Sampling Systems

Battelle—Pacific Northwest Division operates numerous research and development laboratories in Richland, Washington, including those associated with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) on the Department of Energy’s Hanford Site that have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. The National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP 40 CFR 61, Subparts H and I) requires an assessment of all effluent release points that have the potential for radionuclide emissions. Potential emissions are assessed annually. Sampling, monitoring, and other regulatory compliance requirements are designated based upon the potential-to-emit dose criteria found in the regulations. The purpose of this document is to describe the facility radionuclide air emission sampling program and provide current and historical facility emission point system performance, operation, and design information. A description of the buildings, exhaust points, control technologies, and sample extraction details is provided for each registered or deregistered facility emission point. Additionally, applicable stack sampler configuration drawings, figures, and photographs are provided.

radionuclide air emission↗

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Facility Radionuclide Emissions Units and Sampling Systems

Battelle–Pacific Northwest Division operates numerous research and development (R&D) laboratories in Richland, WA, including those associated with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s Hanford Site and PNNL Site that have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. The National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP 40 CFR 61, Subparts H and I) requires an assessment of all emission units that have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. Potential emissions are assessed annually by PNNL staff members. Sampling, monitoring, and other regulatory compliance requirements are designated based upon the potential-to-emit dose criteria found in the regulations. The purpose of this document is to describe the facility radionuclide air emission sampling program and provide current and historical facility emission unit system performance, operation, and design information. For sampled systems, a description of the buildings, exhaust units, control technologies, and sample extraction details is provided for each registered emission unit. Additionally, applicable stack sampler configuration drawings, figures, and photographs are provided. Deregistered emission unit details are provided as necessary for up to 5 years post closure.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Computational Materials Design for Ceramic Nuclear Waste Forms Using Machine Learning, First-Principles Calculations, and Kinetics Rate Theory

Ceramic waste forms are designed to immobilize radionuclides for permanent disposal in geological repositories. One of the principal criteria for the effective incorporation of waste elements is their compatibility with the host material. In terms of performance under environmental conditions, the resistance of the waste forms to degradation over long periods of time is a critical concern when they are exposed to natural environments. Due to their unique crystallographic features and behavior in nature environment as exemplified by their natural analogues, ceramic waste forms are capable of incorporating problematic nuclear waste elements while showing promising chemical durability in aqueous environments. Recent studies of apatite- and hollandite-structured waste forms demonstrated an approach that can predict the compositions of ceramic waste forms and their long-term dissolution rate by a combination of computational techniques including machine learning, first-principles thermodynamics calculations, and modeling using kinetic rate equations based on critical laboratory experiments. By integrating the predictions of elemental incorporation and degradation kinetics in a holistic framework, the approach could be promising for the design of advanced ceramic waste forms with optimized incorporation capacity and environmental degradation performance. Such an approach could provide a path for accelerated ceramic waste form development and performance prediction for problematic nuclear waste elements.

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Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Facility Radionuclide Emission Points and Sampling Systems

Battelle–Pacific Northwest Division operates numerous research and development laboratories in Washington State. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contracts to Battelle at Richland facilities on both the DOE Hanford Site and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Richland campus. These facilities have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. The PNNL contract with DOE also includes operations at the PNNL-Sequim campus in Sequim, where there is also the potential for radionuclide air emissions. This document is a periodic update that describes current PNNL facility emission units and sampling systems. The National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP [40 Code of Federal Regulations 61, Subpart H]) requires an assessment of all emission units that have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. Emission units are registered with the State of Washington. Potential emissions from emission units are assessed annually by PNNL staff. Sampling, monitoring, and other regulatory compliance requirements are designated based on the potential to-emit dose criteria, a graded approach to facility-identified potential impact categories, and regulatory requirements. The purpose of this document is to describe the facility radionuclide air emission sampling program and provide current and historical facility emission unit system performance, operation, and design information. For sampled emission units, the building, exhaust unit, control technologies, and sample extraction details are provided. Additionally, applicable configuration drawings, figures, and photographs are included. For non-sampled emission units, emission estimation and radionuclide source details are provided. Site-wide permits for the lowest potential impact category are described. Deregistered/transitioned emission unit details are also provided as necessary for at least 5 years post-closure/transition. Currently, five emission units are sampled continuously for particulate radionuclides at PNNL managed facilities on the PNNL-Richland campus (3 of the 5) and on the Hanford Site (2 of the 5). Four of these units have sampling systems that comply with the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1–2011 standard for sampling from stacks and ducts of nuclear facilities, and the fifth is grandfathered and compliant with the older ANSI N13.1–1969 standard. In addition, the PNNL-managed Hanford Site 325 Building EP 325-01-S stack is sampled continuously for emissions of tritium. No emissions sampling is required for the single licensed emission unit on the PNNL-Sequim campus.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Optimization of the Post-Operational Phase on Two Belgian Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants: the Case of the Non-Fissile Irradiated Core Items - 20156

The current legal framework in Belgium foresees the progressive phase out of nuclear power between October 2022 (Doel 3) and December 2025 (Doel 2). Upon its definitive shutdown, each unit of the Tihange and Doel sites will enter a Post-Operational Phase (POP) and be prepared for its Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D). Prior to obtaining the D and D license, the Operator Electrabel is legally required to remove any non-fissile irradiated core items stored in the deactivation pools. The non-fissile irradiated core items consist essentially of control rods, poison rods and source thimbles as well as thimble plugs and foreign materials irradiated during operation: - Their significant content in highly radiant radionuclides (up to 6 TBq of Co-60 per kg of irradiated material) renders all existing operational waste management processes inadequate due to insufficient biological shielding; - Their high concentrations in long-lived radionuclides call for their disposal in a geological repository for which no final design nor waste acceptance criteria are expected prior to 2050. Uncertainties in the Belgian energy supply and security, however, require the Operator to be prepared for a partial nuclear phase out, where one or more units would benefit from lifetime extension while the remaining units would undergo decommissioning. The present paper aims at presenting how Electrabel, in partnership with Tractebel, addressed this challenge by maximizing the use of synergies within the respective sites as well as between both sites themselves, all the while accounting for site specificities. The most recent results and state of progress of the project will be detailed and the first lessons learned will be shared. The project has been split in multiple tasks and phased as follows: - An inventory phase aimed at mapping the contents, origin, composition and history of the non-fissile irradiated core items; - A pre-characterization phase based on neutron activation models; - A waste sorting phase aimed at separating waste forms for which an evacuation route exists from those for which such route does not exist; - A feasibility phase aimed at exploring all possible scenarios for the management of non-fissile irradiated core items and identifying the optimal feasible solution for each site; - A preparation phase (currently ongoing), developing further the optimal solution and ensuring that back-up solutions are available for any foreseeable change of context (licensing issue, modification in the nuclear phase-out program, etc.) and initiating early contacts with potential subcontractors for segmentation works and cask manufacturers, as well as the Belgian regulatory body and waste management agency. This phase also foresees the investigation of destructive and non-destructive radiological measurements to support the detailed characterization of the waste forms; - A realization phase (future work). (authors)

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New ANSI standard for thyroid phantom

Here, a new ANSI standard titled “Thyroid Phantom Used in Occupational Monitoring” (Health Physics Society 2014) has been published. The standard establishes the criteria for acceptable design, fabrication, or modeling of a phantom suitable for calibrating in vivo monitoring systems to measure photon-emitting radionuclides deposited in the thyroid. The current thyroid phantom standard was drafted in 1973 (ANSI N44.3-1973), last reviewed in 1984, and a revision of the standard to cover a more modern approach was deemed warranted.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

SRNL All-Pathways Application

The Environmental Analysis and Performance Modeling group of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) performs performance assessments of the Savannah River Site (SRS) low-level waste facilities to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1. One of the performance objectives in the DOE Order is that the radiological dose to representative members of the public shall not exceed 25 mrem in a year total effective dose equivalent from all exposure pathways, excluding radon. Analysis to meet this performance objective is generally referred to as all-pathways analysis. SRNL performs detailed transient groundwater transport analysis for the waste disposal units, which has been used as input for the groundwater part of all-pathways analysis. The desire to better integrate all-pathways analysis with the groundwater transport analysis lead to the development of a software application named the SRNL All-Pathways Application. Another requirement of DOE Order 435.1 is to assess the impact of nuclear waste disposal on water resources, which SRS has interpreted for groundwater protection as meeting the EPA regulations for radionuclides in drinking water. EPA specifies four separate criteria as part of their implementation guidance for radionuclides, which are specified as maximum contaminant levels (MCL). 1. Beta/gamma emitters have a combined dose limit of 4 mrem/year. 2. Alpha emitters have a combined concentration limit of 15 pCi/L (called gross alpha), excluding uranium and radon, but including radium-226. 3. Combined radium-226 and radium-228 have a concentration limit of 5 pCi/L. 4. Isotopes of uranium have a combined concentration limit of 30 {mu}g/L. The All-Pathways Application was designed to be an easy-to-use software application that utilizes transient concentration results from groundwater transport analysis to (1) calculate the groundwater part of all-pathways dose and to (2) evaluate the four EPA criteria for groundwater protection. An application has been developed to streamline the assessment of performance objective criteria for groundwater using concentration results from groundwater transport analyses. The SRNL All-Pathways Application evaluates the groundwater portion of all-pathways analysis and also evaluates EPA groundwater protection criteria. The application can perform a calculation using a specified inventory to determine if that inventory meets performance objectives, or it can perform a sum of fractions calculation to provide results for each parent chain that are subsequently used to establish limits on the amount of parent radionuclides that can be placed in the waste disposal unit.

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Burnable absorbers in nuclear reactors – A review

Burnable absorbers can benefit nuclear reactors of virtually any design by providing reactivity control for extended fuel cycles, tritium production, burning of long-lived radionuclides, and reactor safety. When selecting the ideal burnable absorber type and its design, one must consider the resulting impact on the reactor’s fuel cycle design and cost, reactivity, thermal hydraulics, manufacturing, and radiation response. These selection criteria, as well as neutronic and thermophysical material property requirements, may be vastly different depending on whether the burnable absorber is intended for use in a commercial water-cooled reactor, a research reactor, or a next-generation advanced reactor system. A recent integration, synthesis, description of past and present technologies, and identification of existing gaps and areas of future research is lacking on these important topics. Here, this paper includes a fundamental description of the use of burnable absorbers and their impacts on reactivity, absorber depletion, self-shielding, basic thermophysical properties, and the use of burnable absorbers in next-generation nuclear applications..

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Performance Assessment for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1 require that a determination of continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA) (CP-60089), composite analysis (CA), and disposal authorization statement (DAS) be made on an annual basis, and that the determination must consider the results of data collection and analysis from research, field studies, and monitoring as well as the need to update any Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents. Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes that were generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are eight cells and two supercells in ERDF. Each supercell is the equivalent of two cells. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2022, extending from October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022), approximately 8.52E+04 metric tons (9.39E+04 U.S. tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2022, approximately 17.0 million metric tons (18.7 million U.S. tons) of waste has been disposed at ERDF, which equates to consumption of approximately 89.1% of the currently constructed disposal volume. According to the design of ERDF, the facility has the ability to be expanded as needed. As a condition of the DAS, disposal operations within ERDF must be in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria (ERDF-00011) that provide specific radionuclide disposal limits, waste form restrictions, and descriptions of acceptable waste packages in compliance with the requirements of DOE M 435-1.1. The ERDF waste acceptance criteria stipulate that waste destined for disposal at ERDF be controlled based on source, physical form, and contaminant concentration and activity levels. There have been no changes to the physical configuration of ERDF or to the waste forms (source, physical form, etc.). No new unreviewed disposal question screenings or evaluations have been generated in this reporting period. Therefore, there are no noted impacts to the PA, CA, DAS, or RWMB resulting from the evaluations and screenings. Sum-of-fractions analysis shows that the disposed inventory meets both the concentration and inventory threshold requirements. A sum-of-fractions value is computed for ERDF sensitive radionuclides contributing to the groundwater pathways and the air pathway inventory limits. Computed values were 5.50E-04 and 3.30E-03, respectively. The disposed waste inventory remained well under the PA imposed limits, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 in the main text of this report. Required monitoring was satisfactorily completed during the fiscal year reporting period. Compliance with performance objectives were met as each of the reported values were well below the established limit. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions or changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the DAS is maintained.

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Performance Assessment for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Annual Status Report FY 2021)

DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1 require that a determination of continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA) (CP-60089), composite analysis (CA), and disposal authorization statement (DAS) be made on an annual basis, and that the determination must consider the results of data collection and analysis from research, field studies, and monitoring as well as the need to update any Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents. Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes that were generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are eight cells and two supercells in ERDF. Each supercell is the equivalent of two cells. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2021, extending from October 1, 2020, through September 30, 2021), approximately 9.14E+04 metric tons (1.01E+05 U.S. tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2021, approximately 16.9 million metric tons (18.9 U.S. tons) of waste has been disposed of at ERDF, which equates to consumption of approximately 88.7% of the currently constructed disposal volume. According to the design of ERDF, the facility has the ability to be expanded as needed. As a condition of the DAS, disposal operation within ERDF must be in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria (ERDF-00011) that provide specific radionuclide disposal limits, waste form restrictions, and descriptions of acceptable waste packages in compliance with the requirements of DOE M 435-1.1. The ERDF waste acceptance criteria stipulate that waste destined for disposal at ERDF be controlled based on source, physical form, and contaminant concentration and activity levels. There have been no changes to the physical configuration of ERDF or to the waste forms (source, physical form, etc.). No new unreviewed disposal question screenings or evaluations have been generated in this reporting period. Therefore, there are no noted impacts to the PA, CA, DAS, or RWMB resulting from the evaluations and screenings. Sum-of-fractions analysis shows that the disposed inventory meets both the concentration and inventory threshold requirements. A sum-of-fractions value is computed for ERDF sensitive radionuclides contributing to the all pathways and the air pathway inventory limits. Computed values were 7.63E-03 and 1.49E-03, respectively. The disposed waste inventory remained well under the PA imposed limits, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 in the main text of this report. Required monitoring was satisfactorily completed during the fiscal year reporting period. Compliance with performance objectives were met as each of the reported values were well below the established limit. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions or changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the DAS is maintained.

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Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

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Evolution Of USDOE Performance Assessments Over 20 Years

Performance assessments (PAs) have been used for many years for the analysis of post-closure hazards associated with a radioactive waste disposal facility and to provide a reasonable expectation of the ability of the site and facility design to meet objectives for the protection of members of the public and the environment. The use of PA to support decision-making for LLW disposal facilities has been mandated in United States Department of Energy (USDOE) directives governing radioactive waste management since 1988 (currently DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management). Prior to that time, PAs were also used in a less formal role. Over the past 20+ years, the USDOE approach to conduct, review and apply PAs has evolved into an efficient, rigorous and mature process that includes specific requirements for continuous improvement and independent reviews. The PA process has evolved through refinement of a graded and iterative approach designed to help focus efforts on those aspects of the problem expected to have the greatest influence on the decision being made. Many of the evolutionary changes to the PA process are linked to the refinement of the PA maintenance concept that has proven to be an important element of USDOE PA requirements in the context of supporting decision-making for safe disposal of LLW. The PA maintenance concept represents the evolution of the graded and iterative philosophy and has helped to drive the evolution of PAs from a deterministic compliance calculation into a systematic approach that helps to focus on critical aspects of the disposal system in a manner designed to provide a more informed basis for decision-making throughout the life of a disposal facility (e.g., monitoring, research and testing, waste acceptance criteria, design improvements, data collection, model refinements). A significant evolution in PA modeling has been associated with improved use of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis techniques to support efficient implementation of the graded and iterative approach. Rather than attempt to exactly predict the migration of radionuclides in a disposal unit, the best PAs have evolved into tools that provide a range of results to guide decision-makers in planning the most efficient, cost effective, and safe disposal of radionuclides.

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Evolution of US DOE Performance Assessments Over 20 Years - 13597

Performance assessments (PAs) have been used for many years for the analysis of post-closure hazards associated with a radioactive waste disposal facility and to provide a reasonable expectation of the ability of the site and facility design to meet objectives for the protection of members of the public and the environment. The use of PA to support decision-making for LLW disposal facilities has been mandated in United States Department of Energy (US DOE) directives governing radioactive waste management since 1988 (currently DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management). Prior to that time, PAs were also used in a less formal role. Over the past 20+ years, the US DOE approach to conduct, review and apply PAs has evolved into an efficient, rigorous and mature process that includes specific requirements for continuous improvement and independent reviews. The PA process has evolved through refinement of a graded and iterative approach designed to help focus efforts on those aspects of the problem expected to have the greatest influence on the decision being made. Many of the evolutionary changes to the PA process are linked to the refinement of the PA maintenance concept that has proven to be an important element of US DOE PA requirements in the context of supporting decision-making for safe disposal of LLW. The PA maintenance concept is central to the evolution of the graded and iterative philosophy and has helped to drive the evolution of PAs from a deterministic compliance calculation into a systematic approach that helps to focus on critical aspects of the disposal system in a manner designed to provide a more informed basis for decision-making throughout the life of a disposal facility (e.g., monitoring, research and testing, waste acceptance criteria, design improvements, data collection, model refinements). A significant evolution in PA modeling has been associated with improved use of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis techniques to support efficient implementation of the graded and iterative approach. Rather than attempt to exactly predict the migration of radionuclides in a disposal unit, the best PAs have evolved into tools that provide a range of results to guide decision-makers in planning the most efficient, cost effective, and safe disposal of radionuclides. (authors)

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RESULTS FOR THE THIRD QUARTER 2011 TANK 50 WAC SLURRY SAMPLE: CHEMICAL AND RADIONUCLIDE CONTAMINANT RESULTS

The Saltstone Facility is designed and permitted to immobilize and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site. Low-level waste (LLW) streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), H-Canyon, and the decontaminated salt solution product from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Unit (ARP/MCU) process are stored in Tank 50 until the LLW can be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. The LLW must meet the specified waste acceptance criteria (WAC) before it is processed into saltstone. The specific chemical and radionuclide contaminants and their respective WAC limits are in the current Saltstone WAC. Waste Solidification Engineering (WSE) requested that Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) perform quarterly analysis on saltstone samples. The concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants are measured to ensure the saltstone produced during each quarter is in compliance with the current WAC. This report documents the concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants for the 2011 Third Quarter samples collected from Tank 50 on July 7, 2011 and discusses those results in further detail than the previously issued results report.

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Results for the Fourth Quarter 2011 Tank 50 WAC Slurry Sample: Chemical and Radionuclide Contaminant Results

The Saltstone Facility is designed and permitted to immobilize and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site. Low-level waste (LLW) streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), H-Canyon, and the decontaminated salt solution product from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Unit (ARP/MCU) process are stored in Tank 50 until the LLW can be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. The LLW must meet the specified waste acceptance criteria (WAC) before it is processed into saltstone. The specific chemical and radionuclide contaminants and their respective WAC limits are in the current Saltstone WAC. Waste Solidification Engineering (WSE) requested that Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) perform quarterly analysis on saltstone samples. The concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants are measured to ensure the saltstone produced during each quarter is in compliance with the current WAC. This report documents the concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants for the 2011 Fourth Quarter samples collected from Tank 50 on October 12, 2011 and discusses those results in further detail than the previously issued results report.

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RESULTS FOR THE THIRD QUARTER 2007 TANK 50H WAC SLURRY SAMPLE: CHEMICAL AND RADIONUCLIDE CONTAMINANT RESULTS

The Saltstone Facility is designed and permitted to immobilize and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site. Low activity wastewater streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), H-Canyon, and the high level waste (HLW) storage tanks, are stored as a mixture in Tank 50H until it can be pumped to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. Specific waste acceptance criteria (WAC) must be met for the transfer of low-level aqueous waste from Tank 50H to the Saltstone Facility. Low level waste which meets the WAC can be transferred, stored and treated in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) for subsequent disposal as saltstone in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Waste Solidification Engineering (WSE) has requested through a Technical Task Request (TTR) that the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) measure the concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants listed in the currently approved Saltstone Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). A Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan and Analytical Study Plan has been written for this request. WAC determinations are needed on a quarterly basis for chemical contaminants and every first and third quarter for radioactive contaminants. This memorandum presents the results for the chemical and radionuclide contaminants in the third quarter, from the samples taken from Tank 50 in September, 2007.

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RESULTS FOR THE SECOND QUARTER 2011 TANK 50 WAC SLURRY SAMPLE: CHEMICAL AND RADIONUCLIDE CONTAMINANT RESULTS

The Saltstone Facility is designed and permitted to immobilize and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site. Low-level waste (LLW) streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), H-Canyon, the DDA (Deliquification, Dissolution, and Adjustment) process, and the decontaminated salt solution product from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Unit (ARP/MCU) process are stored in Tank 50 until the LLW can be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. The LLW must meet the specified waste acceptance criteria (WAC) before it is processed into saltstone. The specific chemical and radionuclide contaminants and their respective WAC limits are listed in the current Saltstone WAC. Waste Solidification Engineering (WSE) requested that Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) perform quarterly analysis on saltstone samples. The concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants are measured to ensure the saltstone produced during each quarter is in compliance with the current WAC. This report documents the concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants for the 2011 Second Quarter samples collected from Tank 50 on April 4, 2011 and discusses those results in further detail than the previously issued results report. The following conclusions are drawn from the analytical results provided in this report: (1) The concentrations of the reported chemical and radioactive contaminants were less than their respective WAC targets or limits unless noted in this section. (2) The reported detection limit for {sup 59}Ni is above the requested limit from Reference 2 but below the established limit in Reference 3. (3) The reported detection limit for {sup 94}Nb is above the requested limit from Reference 2; however, it is below the established limits in Reference 3. (4) The reported concentration of {sup 242m}Am is above the target in Listed in Attachment 8.4 of the Saltstone WAC. (5) {sup 247}Cm and {sup 249}Cf are above the requested limits from Reference 2. However, they are below the limits established in Reference 3. (6) The reported detection limit for Norpar 13{sup 5} is greater than the limit from Table 4 and Attachment 8.2 of the WAC. (7) The reported detection limit for Isopar L is greater than the limit from Table 3 of the WAC. (8) Isopar L and Norpar 13 have limited solubility in aqueous solutions making it difficult to obtain consistent and reliable sub-samples. The values reported in this memo are the concentrations in the sub-sample as detected by the instrument; however, the results may not accurately represent the concentrations of the analytes in Tank 50.

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