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At least 19 records

Integrated Decision Methodology for Final Disposal of Radioactive Sources

Radioactive sources are used throughout the world, and their beneficial uses are many. Sources are at the core of many applications in different branches of industry, medicine, agriculture and research. Sources are present in a very wide range of equipment that is used for, inter alia, cancer treatment, killing bacteria in food, sterilizing medical supplies, measuring instruments such as gauges used to measure soil moisture and soil density and many other components, irradiating seeds for enhancing food production, protecting buildings from lightning strikes, mapping underground sources of water, prospecting for oil and gas reserves, measuring density of soil for construction projects, or even detecting smoke. At their “cradle” and when in use, radioactive sources are usually properly managed and controlled. It is when a source has reached the end of its useful life when they are at a higher risk of being under inadequate control, poorly managed, or even becoming orphan. Sources that have reached the end of their useful life must be carefully and safely managed. The “grave” of disused sources needs a proper disposal process to prevent them from posing a potential threat to people or the environment. To protect the public and the environment from the potential hazards of ionizing radiation, and to prevent disused sources from becoming orphan, a “cradle-to-grave” control of radioactive sources is essential, as promoted by the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. This approach requires a national policy and strategy, an adequate legal and regulatory framework, and adequate resources and infrastructure. Many IAEAMember States have expressed the need for effective solutions to this challenge. There is also a gap related to the life cycle costs of potential disposal practices. This paper proposes a multi-attribute decision making methodology to compare disposal options using both economic and non-economic criteria leading to a preferred option for disposal and a strategy for final disposal of disused radioactive sources that is specific and optimized for each IAEA Member State.

Beatty, Randy↗

Threat Identification Parameters for a Stolen Category 1 Radioactive Source

Radioactive sources are used very widely for research and practical applications across medicine, industry, government, universities, and agriculture. The risks associated with these sources vary widely depending on the specific radionuclide used to make the source, source activity, and its chemical and physical form. Sources are categorized by a variety of classification schemes according to the specific risk they pose to the public. This report specifically addresses sources that are classified in the highest category for health risk (category 1). Exposure to an unshielded or lightly shielded category 1 source is extremely dangerous to life and health and can be fatal in relatively short exposure times measured in seconds to minutes. A Category 1 source packaged according to the guidelines dictated by the NRC and U.S. Department of Transportation will typically be surrounded by a large amount of dense shielding material, but will still exhibit a significant dose rate in close proximity. Detection ranges for Category 1 gamma ray sources can extend beyond 5000 ft, but will depend mostly on the source isotope and activity, and the level of shielding around the source. Category 1 sources are easy to detect, but difficult to localize. Dose rates in proximity to an unshielded Category 1 source are extraordinarily high. At distances of a few hundred feet, the functionality of many commonly used handheld instruments will be extremely limited for both the localization and identification of the source. Radiation emitted from a Category 1 source will scatter off of both solid material (ground and buildings) and the atmosphere, a phenomenon known as skyshine. This scattering affects the ability to easily localize and find the source.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Development of Approach for Long-Term Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources - 13630

Radioactive sources are used widely throughout the world in a variety of medical, industrial, research and military applications. When such radioactive sources are no longer used and are not intended to be used for the practice for which an authorization was granted, they are designated as 'disused sources'. Whether appropriate controls are in place during the useful life of a source or not, the end of this useful life is often a turning point after which it is more difficult to ensure the safety and security of the source over time. For various reasons, many disused sources cannot be returned to the manufacturer or the supplier for reuse or recycling. When these attempts fail, disused sources should be declared as radioactive waste and should be managed as such, in compliance with relevant international legal instruments and safety standards. However, disposal remains an unresolved issue in many counties, due to in part to limited public acceptance, insufficient funding, and a lack of practical examples of strategies for determining suitable disposal options. As a result, disused sources are often stored indefinitely at the facilities where they were once used. In order to prevent disused sources from becoming orphan sources, each country must develop and implement a comprehensive waste management strategy that includes disposal of disused sources. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fosters international cooperation between countries and encourages the development of a harmonized 'cradle to grave' approach to managing sources consistent with international legal instruments, IAEA safety standards, and international good practices. This 'cradle to grave' approach requires the development of a national policy and implementing strategy, an adequate legal and regulatory framework, and adequate resources and infrastructure that cover the entire life cycle, from production and use of radioactive sources to disposal. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Decision-making Framework to Support the End-of-Life Management of High-Activity Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are used for an extremely wide range of purposes, including as radiation sources in various nuclear facilities, universities, hospitals, biomedical and industrial applications, as well as for geological prospecting and exploration. The proper management of these sealed radioactive sources once they have reached their end-of-life is still a global challenge. Very few field-tested Mobile Hot Cells (MHC) exist in the world to support the end-of-life management of disused high-activity radioactive sources. One of the critical challenges that a source recovery team encounters on each site is to find adequate space, and access to that space to complete the staging and recapture process with a MHC; this process is tedious, uncertain, and time-consuming. Therefore, it is essential to understand the planning and management of the MHC setup and takedown. Currently, there isn't an single capable planning tool that will provide an effective medium to plan, inform, educate, and communicate knowledge about the environment where the MHC will be deployed. We present a novel approach for the planning and management of the deployment of the MHC to several different sites that relies on technology. Furthermore, this planning tool will support collaboration, promote information sharing, and foster better decision making processes, resulting in a more efficient, and reliable setup and source recovery with the MHC.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

End of Life Decisions for Sealed Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are encountered in a wide variety of settings – from household smoke detectors and instrument check sources, through fixed industrial gauges, industrial radiography and well logging sources, to irradiators and medical teletherapy devices. In general, the higher the level of activity in the sealed source, the stricter the regulatory control that is applied to its use, control and ultimate disposition. Lower levels of attention and oversight can and do lead to sources ending up in the wrong place – as orphan sources in uncontrolled storage, disposed in a sanitary landfill, melted down in metal recycling operations and incorporated into consumer products, or handled by an unsuspecting member of the public. There are a range of issues that contribute to the problem of improper disposal of sealed sources, and, in particular, to disused source disposal. General licensed sources and devices are particularly at risk of being disposed incorrectly. Higher activity general licensed sources, although required to be registered with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or Agreement State, receive limited regulatory oversight and are not tracked on a national scale. Users frequently do not consider the full life-cycle costs when procuring sources or devices and discover that they cannot afford to package, transport and dispose of their sources properly. The NRC requirements for decommissioning funding plans and financial assurance are not adequate to cover sealed source transport and disposal costs fully. While there are regulatory limits for storage of disused sources, enforcement is limited and there is no financial incentive for owners to dispose of the sources. In some cases, the lack of availability of approved Department of Transportation (DOT) Type B shipping casks also presents a barrier to sealed source disposal. The report of the Disused Sources Working Group does an excellent job of framing these issues. This article reviews both the issues and the report’s recommendations, which are designed to improve sealed source control and encourage proper disposal of disused sources.

disused source↗

Radiation Safety of Sealed Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are used in a wide variety of occupational settings and under differing regulatory/licensing structures. The definition of a sealed radioactive source varies between US regulatory authorities and standard-setting organizations. Potential problems with sealed sources cover a range of risks and impacts. The loss of control of high activity sealed sources can result in very high or even fatal doses to members of the public who come in contact with them. Sources that are not adequately sealed, and that fail, can cause spread of contamination and potential intake of radioactive material. There is also the possibility that sealed sources may be (or threatened to be) used for terrorist purposes and disruptive opportunities. Until fairly recently, generally-licensed sealed sources and devices received little, if any, regulatory oversight, and were often forgotten, lost or unaccounted for. Nonetheless, generally licensed devices can contain fairly significant quantities of radioactive material and there is some potential for exposure if a device is treated in a way that it was never designed. Industrial radiographers use and handle high activity and/or high-dose rate sealed sources in the field with a high degree of independence and minimal regulatory oversight. Failure to follow operational procedures and properly handle radiography sources can and has resulted in serious injuries and death. Industrial radiographers have experienced a disproportionately large fraction of incidents that result in unintended exposure to radiation. Sources do not have to contain significant quantities of radioactive material to cause problems in the event of their failure. A loss of integrity can cause the spread of contamination and potential exposure to workers and members of the public. The NCRP has previously provided recommendations on select aspects of sealed source programs. Future efforts to provide recommendations for sealed source programs are discussed.

radioactive material↗

Mobile Hot Cell Digital Twin: End-of-life Management of Disused High Activity Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are used in various settings such as nuclear facilities, universities, hospitals, and industry. When these sources reach the end of their lifespan, they become waste and are recaptured and stored long-term. A digital twin can be used in the design of a solution for recapturing spent sources, offering benefits in deployment time, operator safety, and cost reduction. We propose a digital twin framework for managing the end-of-life process of disused high activity radioactive sources and have created a prototype implementation to demonstrate its feasibility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory General Radioactive Sources Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) General Radioactive Sources waste stream (ORNLSOURCES01, Revision 3) is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The ORNL General Radioactive Sources waste stream consists of sealed sources and solid radioactive sources that are no longer needed (ORNL 2015). The ORNL General Radioactive Sources waste stream required a special analysis because 26 radionuclides exceeded the NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Action Levels (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office [NNSA/NFO] 2015). However, review of the generator’s method to calculate waste concentration indicates that the concentrations are significantly overestimated. Waste concentrations are recalculated in this analysis using a list of individual sources provided by the generator. One radionuclide, radium-226 (226Ra), still exceeds its action level and a Special Analysis (SA) is required. The results indicate that all performance objectives can be met with disposal of the ORNL General Radioactive Sources in a SLB trench. Addition of the ORNL General Radioactive Sources inventory slightly increases the 222Rn flux density. The maximum mean and 95th percentile flux density remain less than the performance objective throughout the compliance period. The ORNL General Radioactive Sources waste stream had no significant effect on the maximum mean and 95th percentile for all other performance assessment results. The ORNL General Radioactive Sources waste stream is suitable for disposal by SLB at the Area 5 RWMS. However, because the activity concentrations on the waste profile sheet are significantly overestimated, approval of the sheet could potentially allow the disposal of high activity radiation sources. To ensure the generator does not include large radiation sources in its waste stream, a control is recommended on the maximum individual source activity from this generator.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory General Radioactive Sources at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) General Radioactive Sources (ORNLSOURCES01, Revision 6 [ORNL 2021]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the ORNL General Radioactive Sources meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The ORNL General Radioactive Stream is recommended for acceptance......

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Mobile Hot Cell Digital Twin: End-of-life Management of Disused High Activity Radioactive Sources – 23598

Sealed radioactive sources are utilized for a wide range of applications across nuclear facilities, universities, hospitals, and industry. When these sources reach the end of serviceable life, they become waste. As waste, this radioactive material then goes through a process of recapture and then transfer to long term storage. With the advancement of technology in conjunction with better accessibility of technology, industries are exploring the use of digital automation to enhance productivity, efficiency, and safety while minimizing operation and maintenance costs, health and environmental risks, and uncertainty in the project life cycles. One area for exploration is the use of a digital twin to help design a robust, versatile, and safe solution for recapturing spent sources. We believe this avenue can also provide further advantages in the operations aspect of end-of-life management of spent radioactive sources by reducing the deployment time, increasing operator safety, and reducing operation & maintenance cost. We present a novel digital twin framework for end-of-life management of disused high activity radioactive sources. We have designed and developed a framework that houses a digital twin for visualizing and monitoring the recapture process to inform the engineering and design of a new Mobile Hot Cell. Furthermore, we demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed framework by providing a prototypical implementation, supporting the Mobile Hot Cell and human-machine interface's virtual replication.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Regression for Radioactive Source Detection

Detection of radioactive sources is an important capability that led to the deployment of networks for detecting and localizing low-level, hazardous radiation sources. It is generally expected that such networks outperform the individual detectors by intelligently fusing information from several dispersed sensors. In this paper, we develop a network detection method that uses the slope of a linear regression fit as a test statistic for detecting a point radioactive source within a field of detectors. In our regression model, we compute a least-squared linear fit between the average radiation counts at the detectors and the inverse-squared distances of known detector locations to an estimated source location. We show that the slope of this regression fit is an estimate of the source intensity and can be used as a threshold for source detection purposes. We compare performance of our proposed detection method with that of a fusion-based Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) method. For performance analyses, two datasets from the Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofces Intelligence Radiation Sensors Systems (IRSS) outdoor tests are used. Each of these tests consists of several runs of a single radioactive source moving in and out of a detector network. We present receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves and optimal threshold values for the performance each detection method, and determine that our detection method using linear regression fit has slightly better overall performance than SPRT method.

Cordone, G.↗

Current Situation for Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Japan - 13025

As for the Sealed Radioactive Source currently used in Japan, many of them are imported from overseas. The U.S., Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Czech Republic are the main exporting States. Many of disused sealed radioactive sources are being returned to exporting States. The sealed radioactive sources which cannot be returned to exporting States are appropriately kept in the domestic storage facility. So, there are not main problem on the long term management of disused sealed radioactive sources in Japan. However, there are some difficulties on repatriate. One is reservation of a means of transport. The sea mail which conveys radioactive sources owing to reduction of movement of international cargo is decreasing in number. And there is a denial of shipment. Other one is that the manufacturer has already resigned from the work and cannot return disused sealed radioactive sources, or a manufacturer cannot specify and disused sources cannot be returned. The disused sealed radioactive source which cannot be repatriated is a little in term of radioactivity. As for the establishment of national measure of final disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources, in Japan, it is not yet installed with difficulty. Since there are many countries for which installation of a final disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources is difficult, the source manufacture country should respond positively to return the source which was manufactured and sold in the past. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Assessment on security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals of Thailand

Unsecured radioactive sources have caused deaths and serious injuries in many parts of the world. In Thailand, there are 17 hospitals that use teletherapy with cobalt-60 radioactive sources. They need to be secured in order to prevent unauthorized removal, sabotage and terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon. The security system of radioactive sources in Thailand is regulated by the Office of Atoms for Peace in compliance with Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), U.S. DOE, which has started to be implemented since 2010. This study aims to perform an assessment on the security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals in Thailand and the results can be used as a recommended baseline data for development or improvement of hospitals on the security system of a radioactive source at a national regulatory level and policy level. Results from questionnaires reveal that in 11 out of 17 hospitals (64.70%), there were a few differences in conditions of hospitals using radioactive sources with installation of the security system and those without installation of the security system. Also, personals working with radioactive sources did not clearly understand the nuclear security law. Thus, government organizations should be encouraged to arrange trainings on nuclear security to increase the level of understanding. In the future, it is recommended that the responsible government organization issues a minimum requirement of nuclear security for every medical facility using radioactive sources.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Effect of geometrical configuration of radioactive sources on radiation intensity in beta-voltaic nuclear battery system: A preliminary result

It is known that one main problem in the application of beta-voltaic nuclear battery system is its low efficiency. The efficiency of the beta-voltaic nuclear battery system mainly depends on three aspects: source of radioactive radiation, interface between materials in the system and process of converting electron-hole pair to electric current in the semiconductor material. In this work, we show the effect of geometrical configuration of radioactive sources on radiation intensity of beta-voltaic nuclear battery system.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory General Radioactive Sources Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) General Radioactive Sources (ORNLSOURCES01, Revision 5 [ORNL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the ORNL General Radioactive Sources meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999).The ORNL General Radioactive Sources waste stream is recommended for acceptance with the following conditions: The total waste stream tritium (3H) inventory shall not exceed 5E10 Bq. The total waste stream strontium-90 (90Sr) inventory shall not exceed 5E9 Bq. The total waste stream cesium-137 (137Cs) inventory shall not exceed 2E11 Bq. The total waste stream radium-226 (226Ra) inventory shall not exceed 2E10 Bq. The total waste stream protactinium-231 (231Pa) inventory shall not exceed 2E9 Bq. The total waste stream uranium-234 (234U) inventory shall not exceed 5E9 Bq.

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Development of the Mobile Systems for Conditioning of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Serbia - 20105

Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The challenge: Safe management on spent and disused sealed radioactive source in Thailand - 15654

When sealed radioactive sources are no longer in use, they should be returned back to the country of origin. However, most of them could not be returned to the country of origin, therefore the safety management of spent and disused radioactive source is need. Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology (TINT) where is as the national waste management center, has the duty to ensure on the safety and the security for long term storage of spent and disused sealed sources before final disposal. The Radioactive Waste Management Center at TINT, is authorized to operate treatment, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste. This paper will describe the proper operational procedures on characterization technique, identification of unknown sources, volume reduction technique, re-packaging, registration and record keeping of spent and disused radioactive source. The successful results exhibit that the record keeping of spent and disused source is developed, and the national inventory of spent and disused source is up to date. This paper would confirm the safety management of radioactive waste in Thailand. (authors)

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Study of two different radioactive sources for prostate brachytherapy treatment

In this study we evaluated two radioactive sources for brachytherapy treatments. Our main goal was to quantify the absorbed doses on organs and tissues of an adult male patient, submitted to a brachytherapy treatment with two radioactive sources. We evaluated a {sup 192}Ir and a {sup 125}I radioactive sources. The {sup 192}Ir radioactive source is a cylinder with 0.09 cm in diameter and 0.415 cm long. The {sup 125}I radioactive source is also a cylinder, with 0.08 cm in diameter and 0.45 cm long. To evaluate the absorbed dose distribution on the prostate, and other organs and tissues of an adult man, a male virtual anthropomorphic phantom MASH, coupled in the radiation transport code MCNPX 2.7.0, was employed.We simulated 75, 90 and 102 radioactive sources of {sup 125}I and one of {sup 192}Ir, inside the prostate, as normally used in these treatments, and each treatment was simulated separately. As this phantom was developed in a supine position, the displacement of the internal organs of the chest, compression of the lungs and reduction of the sagittal diameter were all taken into account. For the {sup 192}Ir, the higher doses values were obtained for the prostate and surrounding organs, as the colon, gonads and bladder. Considering the {sup 125}I sources, with photons with lower energies, the doses to organs that are far from the prostate were lower. All values for the dose rates are in agreement with those recommended for brachytherapy treatments. Besides that, the new seeds evaluated in this work present usefulness as a new tool in prostate brachytherapy treatments, and the methodology employed in this work may be applied for other radiation sources, or treatments. (authors)

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗