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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Infrastructure development for radioactive materials at the NSLS-II

The X-ray Powder Diffraction (XPD) Beamline at the National Synchrotron Light Source-II is a multipurpose instrument designed for high-resolution, high-energy X-ray scattering techniques. In this article, the capabilities, opportunities and recent developments in the characterization of radioactive materials at XPD are described. The overarching goal of this work is to provide researchers access to advanced synchrotron techniques suited to the structural characterization of materials for advanced nuclear energy systems. XPD is a new beamline providing high photon flux for X-ray Diffraction, Pair Distribution Function analysis and Small Angle X-ray Scattering. The infrastructure and software described here extend the existing capabilities at XPD to accommodate radioactive materials. Such techniques will contribute crucial information to the characterization and quantification of advanced materials for nuclear energy applications. We describe the automated radioactive sample collection capabilities and recent X-ray Diffraction and Small Angle X-ray Scattering results from neutron irradiated reactor pressure vessel steels and oxide dispersion strengthened steels.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

NSUF Rad-AFM: Nanoscale Material Property Measurements of Radioactive Materials

Many advances in our understanding of radiation induced damage mechanisms are due to imaging techniques including transmission electron microscopy and scanning electron microscopy. However, the effect of these radiation induced defects characterized on the atomic to micrometer scale are often interpreted by changes in bulk material properties measured in the hundreds of microns to cm scale. In order to bridge this gap, additional tools need to be developed for use with radioactive materials. To this end a new Asylum Infinity multimodal atomic force microscope (AFM) has been added to the library of Nuclear Science User Facility (NSUF) instruments for use on radioactive materials. This instrument is housed in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL) which is a Department of Energy Hazard Category II Non-Reactor Nuclear Facility operated by Battelle at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This allows for the handling, sample preparation, and characterization of highly radioactive materials providing a unique capability to understand fundamental properties of nuclear materials and the effects of radiation induced damage.

Riechers, Shawn L.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development of a Helical Closure for Radioactive Material Shipping Packages

Radioactive Material (RAM) Packagings Used to transport radioactive material • Weapons components • Medical isotopes • Spent nuclear fuel • Etc. • Packages must adhere to 10 CFR 71 which drive to NUREGs, ASME codes, etc. • Transport Index (A2 values) determine if a package is Type A, Type AF, Type B, Type B(U)F

Housley, William M. [Savannah River National Labor↗
DOE OSTI2019

Perspectives on Regulatory Design and Development for Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with the State but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes that a cornerstone in the development of a nuclear security regime is the development of regulations that address security of nuclear material and other radioactive material in transport. While the IAEA provides recommendations and guidance for security of materials in transport through Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents, the challenge of integrating those recommendations into a Member State’s national legal framework is significant. Specifically, the development of transport security regulations requires coordination between both legal and technical experts within the country’s competent authority and multiple governmental agencies, as well as input from transport operators and other stakeholders. In addition to these interactions, the regulations must reflect the legal traditions of the Member State to fit within its overall national legal framework. Recognizing the challenge, the IAEA has requested input from international legal and technical experts to develop a methodology for drafting regulations on transport security of nuclear material and other radioactive material. This paper discusses the progress made so far in developing the methodology and provides a perspective on the need for transport security regulations and the challenges associated with their development. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to introduce the IAEA-proposed methodology and to facilitate the discussion of this methodology with Member States that need support in developing their transport security regulations.

Ladsous, David↗
DOE OSTI2018

Improvement of Discharge Regulation System for Liquid and Gaseous Radioactive Materials in Korea - 18050

In this study, we analyzed radioactive waste management practices and discharge regulations for liquid and gaseous radioactive materials generated from the nuclear power plants. Liquid and gaseous radioactive materials are discharged into the environment in a controlled and monitored state after proper treatment. In order to prevent radiological hazards due to the release of radioactive materials, the standards for effluent control limits and off-site dose constraints at the boundary of exclusion area shall be met. In December 2015, the Nuclear Safety Act was partially amended to add the 'Discharge Plan for Liquid and Gaseous Radioactive Materials' to the application form for the power reactor operating licenses. The Discharge Plan shall include the total amount of liquid and gaseous radioactive materials per site, period (annual, quarterly, etc.), and radionuclide group. Therefore, nuclear power plant operators are required to set in advance the total amount of liquid and gaseous radioactive materials for each radionuclide group per site, and keep them below the control limits during the operation of the facilities. Accordingly, it is expected that public trust regarding regulations on effluent discharge as well as effluent control itself can be further improved. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

RCT Module 2.12: Shipment and Receipt of Radioactive Material [Slides]

The basis of regulations governing the packaging and shipping of radioactive material is to keep radioactive material from affecting the environment during transportation and to keep the environment from affecting the integrity of the radioactive material. The package itself is to be designed and constructed to be the effective barrier between the environment and the radioactive material; thus, most of the regulatory restrictions apply to the package and the method of shipment used to transport the package. To reduce any potential hazard, the regulatory requirements become more restrictive as the quantity, concentration, and potential hazard of the radioactive material increase.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2019

IAEA Guidance on Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material

Regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive material have been developed and maintained at the international and national levels for more than six decades. Following the events of 9/11, a similar effort was initiated for security during the transport of radioactive material; however, safety and security provisions have generally been developed independent of each other. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State but as part of an international effort to address the provisions that complement or conflict with each other in the interface between safety and security during transport, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a series of consultancy meetings beginning in October 2016, to (a) identify the needs and develop a plan to address those needs for the transport of low-activity radioactive material (defined for the purposes of this effort as “Normal Commercial Shipments”) with respect to the interface between transport safety and transport security, (b) develop guidance on the interface between transport safety and transport security, and (c) development of a model workshop that will inform IAEA Member States of the interface between transport safety and security. Specifically, the materials addressed in the IAEA Technical Report Series, TRS No. 1001 (in preparation), are those that are limited to low activity radioactive material (including nuclear materials) with activities below 3000 A2 – as defined in the IAEA transport safety regulations – or activities below 10 D – as defined in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – depending on the radionuclide(s) involved. Emphasis was placed in the Technical Report on these materials since, worldwide, little effort has focused on security for their transport and such guidance could prove beneficial to regulators and operators in many developing countries. An IAEA Technical Report has been drafted and is currently undergoing final steps for publication. The Technical Report will address the issues identified during the consultancy meetings, with a focus on the needs and methods for clarifying safety–security interfaces. This paper will introduce the structure and contents of the Technical Report and provide an update on its progress toward publication. A separate PATRAM 2019 paper will outline the workshop materials developed to date.

Ladsous, David↗
DOE OSTI2020

Geographic Information System Based Emergency Response Training Assessments for DOE Radioactive Materials Transport - 20027

Safety and security are priorities of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) radioactive materials shipping campaigns. In the more than 70-year history of domestic transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), there has never been a transportation-related radiological injury. To support transportation planning, among the tools that DOE uses is the Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). START contains geospatial data and transportation route analyses capabilities designed to support a range of DOE transportation planning initiatives. One of those functions is the capability to support emergency response planning and training for State and Tribal jurisdictions located on routes used for DOE shipments of radioactive materials. As part of the Department's commitment to public safety, DOE provides federally-funded radiological response training to emergency responders along DOE radioactive materials transportation corridors through its Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP). START contains spatial data representing the locations and emergency-response capabilities of fire departments, police, hospitals, State emergency response centers, and where TEPP-trained personnel are based. The START tool supports State and Tribal users' ability to evaluate emergency-response coverage on active and potential DOE radioactive materials transport routes through their jurisdictions, provide expected response times to reach the scene of an incident, identify equipment available to support a response, and identify the number of response personnel and their respective training levels. In addition, START can be used to identify gaps in coverage along a transportation corridor where additional radiological emergency response training may be needed. This paper describes the data, features, and functionality DOE uses to provide a resource for emergency response training needs assessments for States and Tribes along active and potential routes for transporting radioactive materials, and illustrates its use. It also discusses future plans to integrate TEPP and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) radiological training data to provide a more comprehensive source of geospatial information on personnel who have received equivalent radiological response training. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

The Model 9977 Radioactive Material Packaging Primer

The Model 9977 Packaging is a single containment drum style radioactive material (RAM) shipping container designed, tested and analyzed to meet the performance requirements of Title 10 the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71. A radioactive material shipping package, in combination with its contents, must perform three functions (please note that the performance criteria specified in the Code of Federal Regulations have alternate limits for normal operations and after accident conditions): Containment, the package must “contain” the radioactive material within it; Shielding, the packaging must limit its users and the public to radiation doses within specified limits; and Subcriticality, the package must maintain its radioactive material as subcritical

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗
DOE OSTI2015

Analytics of Radioactive Materials Released in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident

The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan resulted in the release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere, the nearby sea, and the surrounding land. Following the accident, several meteorological models were used to predict the transport of the radioactive materials to other continents such as North America and Europe. Also of high importance is the dispersion of radioactive materials locally and within Japan. Based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on Early Notification of a nuclear accident, several radiological data sets were collected on the accident by the Japanese authorities. Among the radioactive materials monitored, are I-131 and Cs-137 which form the major contributions to the contamination of drinking water. The radiation dose in the atmosphere was also measured. It is impractical to measure contamination and radiation dose in every place of interest. Therefore, modeling helps to predict contamination and radiation dose. Some modeling studies that have been reported in the literature include the simulation of transport and deposition of I-131 and Cs-137 from the accident, Cs-137 deposition and contamination of Japanese soils, and preliminary estimates of I-131 and Cs-137 discharged from the plant into the atmosphere. In this paper, we present statistical analytics of I-131 and Cs-137 with the goal of predicting gamma dose from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The data sets used in our study were collected from the IAEA Fukushima Monitoring Database. As part of this study, we investigated several regression models to find the best algorithm for modeling the gamma dose. The modeling techniques used in our study include linear regression, principal component regression (PCR), partial least square (PLS) regression, and ridge regression. Our preliminary results on the first set of data showed that the linear regression model with one variable was the best with a root mean square error of 0.0133 μSv/h, compared to 0.0210 μSv/h for PCR, 0.231 μSv/h for ridge regression L-curve, 0.0856 μSv/h for PLS, and 0.0860 μSv/h for ridge regression cross validation. Complete results using the full datasets for these models will also be presented. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2019

MULTI-MODAL CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (THE ONLY INTERESTING PARTS OF A SYSTEM ARE THE INTERFACES.)

Transportation of nuclear and radioactive material exposes these materials to the most risk for malicious acts. Unlike physical facilities, securing radioactive and nuclear materials during transport requires that many different organizations including operators, regulatory agencies, and security agencies work together to ensure the security of the cargo. A major security challenge for international movement of nuclear and radioactive material is the need to use multiple transport modes. Ensuring security of these cargos as they move through intermodal facilities, some of which may take multiple hours, or days, depending on operational constraints at the yards, ports, or other facilities, is a major operational and regulatory challenge. Especially in the international context, ensuring the security of material in transport through in-transit countries and coordinating transport activities across jurisdictions can lead to challenges as to whose security plan controls, whose transport regulations are to be followed, and how might plans need to be adjusted to adapt to in-transit conditions and ultimately how to ensure cargo security. This paper introduces and highlights selected challenges in the multi-modal movement of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. While the paper will address selected challenges in coordination of stakeholders and resources, activities at intermodal facilities, and other selected issues, this does not address all the challenges, rather it brings issues forward and suggests solutions and strategies for enhancing the security of nuclear and radioactive material transported internationally.

Singley, Paul↗
DOE OSTI2020

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗
DOE OSTI2014

Emergency department management of patients internally contaminated with radioactive material

After a radiation emergency that involves the dispersal of radioactive material, patients can become externally and internally contaminated with one or more radionuclides. Internal contamination can lead to the delivery of harmful ionizing radiation doses to various organs and tissues or the whole body. The clinical consequences can range from acute radiation syndrome (ARS) to the long term development of cancer. Estimating the amount of radioactive material absorbed into the body can guide the management of patients. Treatment includes, in addition to supportive care and long term monitoring, certain medical countermeasures like Prussian blue, Calcium DTPA and Zinc DTPA.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2016

The Approach of the Environmental Consequences and Impacts during Transport of Radioactive Materials (RAM)-A Safety Case - 16420

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works, together with Member States (MS), to provide a strong, sustainable and visible global nuclear safety and security framework, protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. In the announcement of this IAEA Conference it is underlined that 'nuclear safety and security are to a great extent scientific in nature, a regulatory body with responsibilities for nuclear facilities and other licensed activities involving radioactive material needs to have permanent access to supporting expertise'. This can be provided internally to the regulatory body or through an external entity such as a TSO in order to provide a competent and timely response to regulatory needs, and the development and maintenance of an appropriate knowledge base and associated tools and services, including training and tutoring services, are the main areas on which the conference will focus. This paper presents certain results obtained during carrying out the IAEA-Romanian Scientific Research Contract entitled: 'Romanian Contribution to the Development of Methodology for Risk Assessment and State Management of Nuclear Security Regime (Risk and Radiological Consequences)' where the author served as CSI (Chief Scientific Investigator) a part of the IAEA CRP-(Coordinated Research Project) on the: 'Development of Methodology for Risk Assessment and State Management of Nuclear Security Regime'. Also, potential risks and their possible radiological consequences to peoples and environment must not be underestimated. However, the assessment of risk must be realistic and quantified, and the requirements placed on the appropriate. The IAEA regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2012 Edition, Specific Safety Requirements, SSR-6, are applicable to the national and international carriage of radioactive material by all modes of transport- by road, by rail, by air, by sea or by inland waters. The Radioactive Material to be transported must be categorized on the basis of its activity concentration, total activity, fissile characteristics (if any) and other relevant subsidiary characteristics. Packaging and package requirements are then specified on the basis of the hazard of the contents and range from normal commercial packaging (for low hazard contents) to strict design and performance requirements (for higher hazard contents). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Recent Radioactive Material Package Testing Experiences at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was a pioneer in the testing of radioactive material shipping packages and has been performing such tests for over 50 years. Currently, except for Type B thermal tests, testing is performed at the purpose-built Packaging Research Facility that is located at the National Transportation Research Center - a U.S. Department of Energy User Facility. Packages used for the transportation of Type B quantities of radioactive materials must be capable of meeting normal conditions of transportation (NCT) requirements and hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) requirements as defined in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71. Evaluation of package designs to these criteria typically involves a combination of analysis and physical testing. Required physical tests include free drop, crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Packaging Evaluation Facility (PEF) at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC) provides an inclusive testing capability for a wide variety of packages needed for shipment of radioactive materials. Since PATRAM 2019, ORNL has performed several sets of tests including testing of two designs of the Defense Program Package (DPP-3 and DPP-1) and several Special Form Capsules. This paper provides an overview of the testing performed as well as a summary of advancements made to the ORNL package testing program during that time.

Martinez, Oscar↗
DOE OSTI2018

Greater Efficiency in the Management of Low-Level Radioactive Material - 18305

The World Nuclear Association is the international organization representing the global nuclear industry. Its mission is to promote a wider understanding of nuclear energy among key international influencers by producing authoritative information, developing common industry positions, and contributing to the energy debate. Membership encompasses companies from the whole fuel cycle (from uranium mining through to decommissioning) as well as support services. Through discussions and survey of the Association's Waste Management and Decommissioning Working Group, it is clear that there is an issue relating to the management of cleared and/or low level radioactive material, particularly during decommissioning where it represents more than 90% of all wastes generated. The group has found that the status quo on the reuse, recycling and disposal of cleared and/or low-level radioactive material arising from the civil nuclear industry (all successfully tested and implemented options) is untenable, and believes that this message should be conveyed to relevant influencers internationally. This message is key and features prominently in a methodological guide being prepared by the group's experts on managing waste from decommissioning which will work through case studies (relating to both technical and financial management) and showcase good practice to support the development of a successful decommissioning strategy. There are currently nearly 450 operating civil nuclear power reactors in the world with many associated nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear research facilities. During the operation and subsequent decommissioning of nuclear facilities, cleared and low-level radioactive material is routinely generated from normal activities, including clothes, rags, metal equipment, concrete structures, etc. For low-level radioactive material, most of this material can be freed from its added radioactivity through survey and simple cleanup (decontamination if necessary). When properly managed and regulated these activities pose no real health issues for people or the environment. It is understandable that there are increasing public demands and expectations for the reuse and recycling of valuable resources, which nuclear - like many other sectors - can no longer ignore. There are efficiencies to be found through technical solutions (resulting in waste volume reductions, better sorting of waste, etc.), which would enable mitigation of environmental impacts and increased preservation of these natural resources. In addition, it will reduce volumes for storage and disposal which are rare resources. There must be a balance struck between the availability of disposal, and recycling and reuse, depending on the outcomes of assessments. Both the advantages in terms of preserving natural resources and disposal capacity should enable the industry to gain credibility with stakeholders. Taking Europe as an example, excellence in the implementation of the reuse and recycling of metals and of disposal of very-low waste, would, if widely shared between countries, no doubt lead to greater efficiency. International and national leaders from industry, regulators and governments should enable the concurrent availability of these three safe management options in each country, worldwide. Whenever an option considered is supported by a solid industrial business case, operators and regulators can (and must) concurrently deploy and operate safe reuse, recycling and disposal. This flexible approach should be deployed; the Association is of the firm conviction that the exclusive commitment to a single option cannot be sound on any grounds. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

HMPT: Basic Radioactive Material Transportation

Hazardous Materials and Packaging and Transportation (HMPT): Basic Radioactive Material Transportation Live (#30462, suggested one time) and Test (#30463, required initially and every 36 months) address the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) function-specific [required for hazardous material (HAZMAT) handlers, packagers, and shippers] training requirements of the HMPT Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Labwide training. This course meets the requirements of 49 CFR 172, Subpart H, Section 172.704(a)(ii), Function-Specific Training.

42 ENGINEERING↗