DOE OSTI2023
Diversion of nuclear materialsfrom legitimate commercial processes for use by nefarious actors is a frightening and surreptitious problem. Smuggled nuclear material can be used to manufacture a simple radiological dispersion device (RDD) and potentially incorporated into the development of a nuclear weapon. With some frequency, smuggled nuclear material is interdicted in foreign countries as actors cross border checkpoints. Nuclear material interdicted in this way can be analyzed using a variety of tools. Plutonium-239 is commonly used as the fissile material in nuclear weapon production as an alternative to uranium-235. Plutonium in a production, refining, or finishing facility will exist in many forms including oxide precursors (PuF4, PuF3, Pu oxalate, etc.), oxide, and metal. The ability to identify plutonium in each of these forms and determine properties, characteristics, or history of these materials is crucial for determining if the processes occurring in a nuclear facility are legitimate or not. This presentation will focus on the development and application ofspectroscopic tools developed at SRNL using doubled-walled cells (DWC) to characterize Pu-bearing compounds. Advances in the use of vibrational spectroscopy techniques (Raman and IR), UV-VIS-SWIR diffuse reflectance spectroscopy, gamma emission spectroscopy, luminescence spectroscopy, laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in conjunction with XRD and SEM in the characterization of Pu-bearing compounds will be presented with emphasis in material processing history.