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Powered By PRAS features the Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite (PRAS), an open-source, research-oriented collection of tools for analyzing the resource adequacy of bulk power systems. PRAS performs low-fidelity, high-speed simulations of multi-region power system operations, considering hundreds of thousands of years of unplanned resource outages to quantify the risk and potential nature of energy supply shortfalls in probabilistic terms.
PrAs is Halite, Rock Salt structured and crystallizes in the cubic Fm-3m space group. The structure is three-dimensional. Pr3+ is bonded to six equivalent As3- atoms to form a mixture of corner and edge-sharing PrAs6 octahedra. The corner-sharing octahedral tilt angles are 0°. All Pr–As bond lengths are 3.05 Å. As3- is bonded to six equivalent Pr3+ atoms to form a mixture of corner and edge-sharing AsPr6 octahedra. The corner-sharing octahedral tilt angles are 0°.
PrAs is Tetraauricupride structured and crystallizes in the tetragonal P4/mmm space group. The structure is three-dimensional. Pr3+ is bonded in a body-centered cubic geometry to eight equivalent As3- atoms. All Pr–As bond lengths are 3.22 Å. As3- is bonded in a body-centered cubic geometry to eight equivalent Pr3+ atoms.
NREL's Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite (PRAS) was developed for use in renewable integration studies, to assess the resource adequacy of large interconnected power systems with potentially significant interregional transfers of power. This presentation provides an overview of the tool and the methods it uses to solve multi-regional transmission and storage dispatch problems in a computationally-efficient manner.
The Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite, or PRAS, is a software package for studying power system resource adequacy. It allows the user to simulate power system operations under a wide range of operating conditions, in order to study the system’s risk of failing to meet demand due to a resource shortfall, and identify the time periods and regions in which that risk occurs. This reports documents version 0.6 of the tool.
The Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite, or PRAS, is a software package for studying power system resource adequacy. It allows the user to simulate power system operations under a wide range of operating conditions, in order to study the system's risk of failing to meet demand due to a resource shortfall, and identify the time periods and regions in which that risk occurs. This reports documents version 0.8 of the tool.
This study examines the impact of reserve margin-based reliability assessment, as commonly used in capacity expansion models, on planning resource-adequate power systems under high penetrations of solar photovoltaics (PV). As a generation resource, PV is operationally different from the conventional dispatchable resources for which most capacity expansion models were designed. The question this study attempts to answer is whether large amounts of PV on a system (in this case, the Western Interconnection of North America) would bias the results of conventional reserve margin-based capacity expansion modeling towards an over- or under-provisioning of resource adequacy. This analysis used NREL’s Resource Planning Model (RPM) for capacity expansion modeling and NREL’s Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite (PRAS) for resource adequacy assessment. RPM uses a reserve margin requirement to enforce resource adequacy. PRAS, a collection of tools for studying the resource adequacy of power systems and the adequacy contributions of individual resources on a probabilistic basis, was used to compute multiple resource adequacy metrics across a number of simulated scenarios and system representations with differing regional detail. In all cases, including high PV penetrations (up to 33% annual generation from PV, interconnection-wide), RPM was able to produce resource-adequate systems as measured by normalized expected unserved energy and loss-of-load expectation results from PRAS. The accuracy of reserve margin approaches depends heavily on the underlying assumptions informing the capacity credit assigned to variable and energy-limited resources, particularly when such resources are abundant in the modeled system. RPM’s standard methodology for estimating variable and flexible resources’ capacity contributions, which is based on the top 100 hours of net load, did not appear to systematically undervalue or overvalue variable generation relative to a more rigorous equivalent firm capacity assessment using PRAS, although both over- and under-valuations were observed in specific scenarios. In the worst cases, the top 100 hour method underestimated the equivalent firm capacity of PV by two percentage points, and overestimated the equivalent firm capacity of PV by five percentage points. Calculating capacity contributions based on the top 10 hours of net load systematically underestimated equivalent firm capacities at more modest PV penetrations, but was often a better approximation of equivalent firm capacity than the existing 100-hour approach in scenarios with higher PV penetrations.
This report builds upon the body of work sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) Light-Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Flexible Power Operation and Generation (FPOG) program that presented generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to light-water reactors to support the co-location of a high temperature hydrogen electrolysis facility (HTEF). Probabilistic and deterministic hazards assessments and risk analyses are leveraged throughout this report. Several improvements and new analyses are included in this report. First, higher amounts of detail in the specifications of the generic HTEFs are used to produce scaled results for a 100, 500, and 1000 MW nominal hydrogen production facility. An additional hazard assessment of 1000 kg of hydrogen storage is performed. The facility hazards and footprint are assessed to determine the safe distance required for placement near the nuclear power plant (NPP). Second, specific designs for corresponding HESs for the different levels of support required by the HTEFs are analyzed in the PRA model. Third, a hazards analysis of the specified HTEFs leads not only to effects of the quantified risk assessment for the NPP, but also qualitative hazards assessment for the community. Finally, a seismic analysis and a high winds analysis have each been added to the PRA. The results investigate the applicability of the potential licensing approaches which do not require a full United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing review. The PRAs are generic and include listed assumptions. The HTEF design built for this project has further eliminated many conservative assumptions from the prior PRAs in this series. The PRA results indicate that the 10 CFR 50.59 licensing approach is justified due to the minimal increase in initiating event frequencies for all design basis accidents, with none exceeding 7.7%. The PRA results for core damage frequency and large early release frequency support the use of NRC Regulation Guide 1.174 as further risk information that supports a change without a full licensing amendment review. The hazard analyses and PRA confirm the need for engineered blast barriers of storage tanks and the common production header leaving the HTEF. The hazards analyses and PRA also confirm with high confidence that using the assumptions of design in this report that the safety case for licensing an HES addition and an HTEF sited with its unprotected high-pressure stage components 187 meters from the NPP’s transmission towers (the most fragile structure, system, and component) is strong.
This report details an expansion of the original two generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to a light-water reactor, one for a pressurized-water reactor and one for a boiling-water reactor. The new material in this revision includes a new HES design, direct electrical coupling of the nuclear power plant to the High-Temperature Electrolysis Facility (HTEF), and a smaller 100-MWt HTEF analysis. The results investigate the applicability of the potential licensing approaches, which do not require a full United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing review. The PRAs are generic and include some assumptions. We eliminated many conservative assumptions from the preliminary pressurized-water reactor PRA report using design data for both the HES and HTEF. The PRA results indicate that the 10 CFR 50.59 licensing approach is justified due to the minimal increase in initiating event frequencies for all design basis accidents, with none exceeding 5.6%. The PRA results for core damage frequency and large early release frequency support the use of RG 1.174 as further risk information that supports a change without a full licensing amendment review. Further insights provided through hazard analyses and sensitivity studies confirm with high confidence that the safety case for licensing an HES addition and an HTEF sited 1.0 km from the nuclear power plant is strong and that the placement of a HTEF at 0.5 km is also a viable case. Site-specific information can alter these conclusions.
Resource adequacy concerns may be very different in electricity systems that have higher levels of solar and storage, requiring changes to existing planning models. This study explores a novel approach to evaluating resource adequacy under future scenarios with higher solar and storage in the Southeast U.S. It uses NREL’s Probabilistic Resource Adequacy Suite (PRAS), a collection of probabilistic resource adequacy modeling tools, and compares results when interacting PRAS and a portfolio planning tool with a more traditional modeling approach. The results suggest that traditional models perform reasonably well with lower levels of solar PV, but at higher levels of solar probabilistic tools better capture the changes in resource adequacy concerns—such as winter energy availability—associated with higher solar systems. This is the final study in the Preparing Southeast Markets for Reliable and Affordable Integration of Solar into Operations and Planning project. Two prior reports can be found at: Solar and Storage Integration in the Southeastern United States: Economics, Reliability, and Operations. https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/solar-and-storage-integration Solar and Wind Forecast Error Reserve Sharing in a Multi-Utility Region. https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/multiutility_fe_reserve_sharing_final.pdf
Common cause failures (CCFs) have been recognized as significant risk contributors in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) since 1980s. A series of reports including those of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (NUREGs) have been published from late 1980s to early 2000s to provide guidelines for performing CCF event data analysis and modeling CCF in PRA. However, there are still some issues existed in CCF modeling and CCF parameter estimations. One of such issues is the modeling of multiple common-cause component group (CCCG) for the same component in a PRA model. This paper exams the CCCG definition and the requirements from the PRA standard, investigates the CCCG modeling practices and issues existing in PRAs, and presents systematic approaches and guidelines to model CCCG in PRA properly and consistently.
Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) have benefitted the safe operation of the U.S. reactor fleet over many decades. Risk insights from these PRAs have provided information from many different perspectives, from what is most important to maintain at a facility to a better understanding of how to address new information regarding safety issues. The methods and tools that have supported the creation and enhancement of PRA models were established through multiple decades of research, from the 1970s starting with the WASH-1400 Reactor Safety Study through comprehensive plant-specific models in use today. Because PRA models are being used to support such a diverse array of plant decisions, they are now being applied to analyze an increasing number and diverse set of aspects of the plant, which are well beyond the initial efforts envisioned in the 1970s. These demands on PRA methods and tools have led to challenges in terms of further expansion of the use of PRA and raised the potential for future research into how to address these challenges to ensure continued nuclear safety. In addition to the PRA needs, the domain of computer science has led to advances in computational approaches that may serve to help nuclear power plant PRA applications. These newer technologies have great potential to improve the effectiveness and economics of PRA and are being considered for exploration of potential benefits to the PRA and nuclear-power communities.
A digital twin (DT) is a digital model or a collection of models of a physical entity. DTs in the nuclear arena can be used from plant design through decommissioning. Decisions are typically a priori or made offline. Risk-informed decision making is identifying what can go wrong, its frequency, and the consequences of its failure. Ideally risk-informed decision making reflects the current state of the plant and provides a decision in real time. Traditionally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) evaluate the failures of safety systems, the risk of core damage, and the offsite dose as the consequence. However, this DT evaluates the decisions on the control side rather than the protection side. It uses the same risk methods to probabilistically inform the decision-making process but in a different way. Rather than evaluating the risk of core damage, this DT evaluates the likelihood of avoiding a trip set point while maintaining plant safety. Performance-based assessments are identified via its probabilistic evaluation of operational alternatives based on system status. Because the purpose of the control system is to maintain system variables within prescribed operating ranges, upsets or challenges that can exceed a trip set point resulting in a plant transient and a challenge to plant mitigating systems based on actual plant conditions, are evaluated to safely maintain the plant within the operating ranges. The probabilistic portion of the model is autonomously and automatically adjusted, and the metric of interest (i.e. likelihood of avoiding a trip set point) is recalculated. The digital representation of the physical system (i.e. the DT) performs a deterministic performance–based assessment of the probabilistically identified alternatives identified to validate the probabilistic assessment. A decision-making algorithm selects the appropriate option based on the probabilistic and deterministic assessments and transmits a control signal to a component(s) to initiate a corrective action or informs an operator of its decision.
The software uses Bayes' theorem to describe the probability of an event based on prior knowledge of conditions that might be related to the event. The purpose of Bayesian analysis is to determine posterior probabilities based on prior probabilities where new information can be used in the decision-making process as additional data is gathered. The software will be used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) related to the Europa Clipper mission, which is one of NASA’s top priorities. Ultimately, the mission entails sending the Europa Clipper spacecraft to Jupiter’s Europa moon to orbit the planet and collect data for research and development. Europa is the smallest of the four Galilean moons orbiting Jupiter and is believed by researchers to be the most promising place to look for present-day environments suitable for life. Europa is thought to have an iron core, a rocky mantle, and a salt-water ocean covered by an ice-layered surface.
Two generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) addition to a light water reactor (LWR) are performed, one for a pressurized water reactor (PWR) and one for a boiling water reactor (BWR). The results investigate the applicability of the potential licensing approaches which do not require a full U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing review. The PRAs are generic, and some assumptions are made. Many conservative assumptions from a the preliminary PWR PRA report were eliminated using design data for both the HES and the high temperature electrolysis facility (HTEF). The results of the PRA indicate that the 10 CFR 50.59 licensing approach is justified due to the minimal increase in initiating event frequencies for all DBAs, none exceeding 5.6%. The PRA results for CDF and LERF support the use of RG 1.174 as further risk information that supports a change without a full LAR. Further insights provided through hazard analysis and sensitivity studies confirm with high confidence that the safety case for licensing an HES addition and a HTEF sited at 1.0 km from the NPP is strong and that the placement of a HTEF at 0.5 km is a viable case. Site specific information can alter these conclusions.
Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) are integral to nuclear power plant (NPP) operations, having tremendously benefitted the safety of the U.S. reactor fleet for decades. Insights obtained from the models have provided perspectives on a variety of applications, both at the plant and for the regulator. While these models are very useful, they are now being asked to represent and analyze aspects of the plant that were never envisioned by the initial PRA practitioners. Furthermore, heightened demands on the PRA models have led to increased computing power requirements. Additionally, as the complexity of the PRA models increased, the difficulty experienced by non-PRA experts in trying to understand these models, grasp the insights they provide, and effectively use that information has become problematic. The need for research to address key issues regarding PRA tools and methods has never been greater. Although the nuclear power industry has largely been well-served by these tools and methods, the underlying science is dated, remaining mostly unchanged for over two decades. Three areas were identified as most beneficial to address to maintain and improve the usefulness of the current practice legacy PRA tools: improvement in quantification speed, increased ability to efficiently model multi-hazard models, and improvement in modeling human action dependency in PRA. This report provides the outcomes from the FY2021 research into these three areas, identifying potential technical gaps and solutions, and charting the next steps forward to address current PRA challenges.
Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) are integral to nuclear power plant (NPP) operations, having tremendously benefitted the safety of the U.S. reactor fleet for decades. Insights obtained from the models have provided perspectives on a variety of applications, both at the plant and for the regulator. While these models are very useful, they are now being asked to represent and analyze aspects of the plant that were never envisioned by the initial PRA practitioners. Furthermore, heightened demands on the PRA models have led to increased computing power requirements. Additionally, as the complexity of the PRA models increased, the difficulty experienced by non-PRA experts in trying to understand these models, grasp the insights they provide, and effectively use that information has become problematic. The need for research to address key issues regarding PRA tools and methods has never been greater. Although the nuclear power industry has largely been well-served by these tools and methods, the underlying science is dated, remaining mostly unchanged for over two decades. Three areas were identified as most beneficial to address to maintain and improve the usefulness of the current practice legacy PRA tools: improved quantification speed, increased ability to efficiently model multi-hazard models, and improved modeling human action dependency in PRA. This report is focused on the third critical area, improvements in dependency analysis of human actions conducted as part of a typical human reliability assessment.
Act 238 mandated the Hawaii State Energy Office (HSEO) generate a report analyzing the pathways to achieve state and economy-wide 50% emissions reductions from 2005 levels by 2030 and net zero emissions by 2045. NREL supported HSEO in analyzing the electric sector impacts of these decarbonization pathways by performing a capacity expansion modeling analysis for the Oahu, Hawai'i island, Kaua'i, Maui, Moloka'i, and Lana'i island electric grids. NREL used the Engage capacity expansion modeling tool and PRAS resource adequacy tool to perform these analysis.